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 Introduction
‘The sanguine, pulsating, enterprising modern life’: Cinema 
and Vitalism
Taking Life for a Spin
For a moment, the world still seems stable. Two men, a general and a baron, 
are sitting next to each other at a table; the reflection in the mirror behind 
them shows a woman dancing in the mirror’s separate, contained environ-
ment. They speak about her in that familiar male language that suggests 
connoisseurship, aesthetic pleasure, and indulgence, without betraying 
the abyss of emotion, consuming desire, or loss of self that lurks behind the 
woman’s attraction; an abyss that would collapse the stability, the double 
framing, the identif ied places. The nameless ‘Madame de…’ is the one man’s 
wife and the other man’s future mistress. Movement sets in when, after 
a cut, the camera suddenly pursues an older gentleman rushing to the 
right. The camera tracks swiftly to follow him past endless rows of tables, 
along the perimeters of the dance floor. The man approaches the general. 
Despite the general’s attempt to shake off the intruder, who turns out to 
be a journalist, he remains insistent. The baron, with a quick glance at the 
dance floor, avails himself of the opportunity to excuse himself and leaves.
The following minutes constitute the crucial moment in Max Ophuls’ The 
Earrings of Madame de (1953), during which Madame de and Baron Donati 
fall in love; dancing, turning around and around one another while the 
camera dances with them. The image centers on the dancing couple and 
follows them through a whole line of balls connected by cross-dissolves, 
leaving the perimeters of determined time and space. During these minutes, 
spatiotemporal and narrative forward-movement is suspended, or rather 
diverted, into the ornamental f lourish and rotation of the dance and its 
affective impact. Over the course of the dances, the couple’s playful, ironic 
banter slowly falls silent in the face of the increasing seriousness of their 
mutual feelings; the growing intensity is conveyed by the accelerated 
rhythm of their and the camera’s circling movements and the punctuation 
of returning phrases, such as Donati’s ‘Quatre jours sans vous voir (Four days 
without seeing you)’, ‘Deux jours sans vous voir (Two days without seeing 
you)’, and f inally ‘Vingt-quatre heures sans vous voir (Twenty-four hours 
without seeing you)’, as well as an increasingly reticent conversation about 
the absent general’s well-being. The dance resembles the slow turn of a 
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screw. As the camera loosens up and freely circles, pans and tracks across 
the dance floor, the movement of the dancing couple it is pursuing also 
changes from being a fairly stationary rotation into a forward-marching 
twist past the other couples, and then into a somewhat jagged zigzagging 
in which the previous momentum is lost again. Madame’s and Donati’s f inal 
dance in coat and jacket on an empty dance floor, while the musicians pack 
up and the servants extinguish the candles, is almost motionless.
In a melodrama such as Ophuls’, there is a close correspondence between 
motion and emotion. The moment the protagonists fall in love, the f ilm 
enters a different register of movement. The dance sequence is framed 
by scenes with linear movement and clear demarcations: in the previous 
scene, we had the frame-within-a-frame of the mirror behind the general 
and Donati that showed the dance floor, the table separating the two men 
from the foreground, and the straight movement of the journalist joining 
the dance floor and the seating area; the scene following the dances begins 
abruptly with a hunter’s horn and a tracking shot from right to left of the 
general at a military hunt. During the dances, boundaries increasingly 
break down as the camera joins the motion of the dance and cross-dissolves 
create a temporality that is dependent on Donati’s and Madame’s feelings 
alone. This purely cinematic time and space in which motion and emotion 
become entwined, with the spectator caught in this entwinement, is an 
example of cinema’s vital aesthetic.
In the dramatic context of the f ilm, the irregular twirling motion of the 
dance has the form not of a closed circle, but rather a spiral. Two social 
butterflies and ‘incorrigible flirts’ perform the movement that is best suited 
to their temper: a tête-à-tête in public, a play with intimacy in the limelight, 
an attitude that is directed outward even as it tends to the dance partner. 
Over the course of these dances, this attitude changes; the balance of forces 
shifts and the public stage becomes the lovers’ prison. The butterflies flutter 
around one another in circles that represent their enclosure by the same 
moral standards that originally gave them their playful freedom. Madame’s 
and Donati’s desire for more privacy and more time cannot be fulf illed; 
rather than radiating outward, they retreat into one another, dancing 
centripetally rather than centrifugally, forming a spiral inward and down, 
rather than outward and up.
The forces that simultaneously visualize the drama and formulate a 
social critique in The Earrings of Madame de are the same as those that 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe identif ied as the two vital tendencies in 
plants: a vertical force and a spiral force that complement one another 
and, when in balance, produce the most perfect development. While the 
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vertical tendency lends support and stability to the plant and is long-lasting, 
the spiral tendency, according to Goethe, is the nourishing, short-lived 
element that ‘develops, expands, nourishes’; if its effect ‘predominates, it 
soon grows weak and begins to decay’.1 In Ophuls’ f ilm, the melodramatic 
conflict is staged as a conflict between these two tendencies, even though 
the vertical and spiral forces ultimately depend on one another. This conflict 
is emotionally wrenching and tied to social critique, because the balance of 
vertical and spiral tendencies in Ophuls’ rendering of the militarized upper 
classes of late nineteenth-century France is a false one, kept in check by 
means of a social and moral code that stunts and inhibits all of its adherents. 
The balance that upholds social norms and values is one of artif icial stability 
and rigidity versus artif icial spiral nourishment. Both tendencies are merely 
formal, rather than aspects of organic growth. The vertical element is the 
stiff, unemotional military culture, personif ied by Madame’s husband, 
who keeps his rigidity in check by means of his uniform, and whose body 
language is stiff and impersonal, even while a softness in his expression 
or a tenderness in his voice betrays his longing for a different mode in 
which to engage with his wife. The spiral tendency is the social f lirtation in 
which Madame engages and the men’s obligatory affairs —a vital element 
lacking the nourishing satisfaction of deep emotions. The interplay of both 
tendencies also f inds expression in the circulation of commodities, most 
notoriously the circulation of the eponymous earrings that Madame origi-
nally received from her husband as a wedding gift.2 Madame and Donati 
transgress social boundaries both externally—they allow themselves to be 
seen, which ultimately leads to a deadly duel—and internally, by allowing 
their affection to run freely, which puts their emotions at odds with the 
social order. In this spiral into a desire for something that does not have 
a place in this society, the utopian moment—and its immediate thwart-
ing—manifested in the dance marks an instance of cinematic vitalism in 
which the emotional intensity onscreen and the affection of the spectator 
are both heightened by means of formal elements that can be tied to a 
larger aesthetic of vitality.
1 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, ‘Excerpt from “The Spiral Tendency in Vegetation”,’ 105-06.
2 She sells them to pay off a debt, whereupon they are bought back by the general, who gives 
them to a mistress when parting for Constantinople. There, the baron acquires them as a chance 
purchase and gives them to Madame as a token of love. Madame then tells her husband that she 
has found the earrings she claimed to have lost, so that she will be able to wear them in public. 
Her husband confronts her about this lie and forces her to give the earrings to her niece, who 
likewise sells them to the jeweler. After the duel with the general, in which Donati is killed, 
Madame gives all she has to buy back the earrings, which have increased exponentially in value.
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If I speak of a vitalist aesthetic in cinema, this by no means relates to 
nature and organicity alone. Rather, vitalism in f ilm and f ilm perception 
combines an aesthetic of nature with a machinic aesthetic; both elements 
are always present. This is what distinguishes a cinematic vitalism from 
vitalist theories proper. Film’s moving images, temporality, and sensorial 
qualities grip the embodied spectator, who integrates the f ilm’s gestalt into 
her life, into the world she continually re-constitutes every moment she 
lives, simply by perceiving, acting, being. This malleable, organic temporal-
ity and sense-making must reckon with the forceful linearity of the f ilm 
undulating from the spool, pulling the spectator along mercilessly. A flicker 
betrays the stop-motion animation of 24 frames per second that lies behind 
the illusion of movement. The f ilm reel, propped up on the projector and 
turning smoothly at a steady pace, translated by means of a forgiving loop 
into the stutter of the frame-by-frame exposure to the projecting light in 
the aperture gate, gives the forward movement to the f ilm. Its cylindrical 
shape is in keeping with what Helmut Müller-Sievers has identif ied as the 
central kinematic form of the nineteenth century: the cylinder of the steam 
engine, the printing press, the carousel, and the phonograph; a form that 
‘allows the isolation, transmission, conversion, and application of rotational 
and translational (straight-line) motion in machines’.3 Cinematic vitalism, 
we might say, combines the undulation of the organically winding spiral 
with the mechanic rotation of the cylinder and its steady, unchanging pace.
Ophuls’ image of rotational dance motion, which is so central to many 
of his f ilms, including Liebelei (Flirtation, 1933), La Ronde (1950), and Lola 
Montès (1955), may thus serve as an emblematic f igure for the inquiry of 
this study. Many scholars have turned to Ophuls’ dance sequences because 
of the virtuosity of his alignment of camera and on-screen movement, 
the attunement of camera and subject that this dramaturgical alignment 
reveals or puts forth, and the relationship of these sequences and their 
undoing of temporal and spatial coordinates to questions of genre, that is, 
melodrama.4 The formalism of Ophuls’ direction and the seeming excess 
of camera and onscreen choreography have inspired scholars to consider 
questions concerning the function and expressive value of movement in 
his f ilm. For some, this has led to an investigation of the role of desire as a 
3 Helmut Müller-Sievers, The Cylinder, 3. 
4 See, for example, Susan M. White, The Cinema of Max Ophuls; Alan Larson Williams, Max 
Ophuls and the Cinema of Desire; Daniel Morgan, ‘Max Ophuls and the Limits of Virtuosity: On 
the Aesthetics and Ethics of Camera Movement’; George M. Wilson, Narration in Light; and 
Laura Mulvey, ‘Love, History, and Max Ophuls’.
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driving force; others have explored the role of economic circulation. A vital-
ist lens connects these questions of form and content to the properties of 
the medium by asking: what is the nature of the movement depicted? What 
kind of vitality is presented? What kind of life? How is this life lived, what 
are its qualities? These questions tie the ontological and phenomenological 
dimensions of cinema to matters of form and content.
While The Earrings of Madame de stands at the end-point of the period 
under consideration in this book, the rotation of the dances in Ophuls’ 
f ilms takes us back to the visual constellations in early cinema and even 
pre-cinematic devices, and thus also to the early alliance of moving images 
and life. Instead of the spiral created by the entwinement of rotation and 
fatal progression in Ophuls’ f ilms, optical toys such as the phenakisticope 
and the zoetrope were based on rotation and repetition without progression; 
their temporality was experienced as delightful for its pure mechanicity 
and in sharp contrast to narrative development. Their spirit haunts Ophuls’ 
f ilms like a specter. Nicolas Dulac and André Gaudréault write that
[t]he phenakisticope’s format and the way it functioned suggested a 
‘world’ in which everything was governed by circularity and repetition, 
a world which annihilated any hint of temporal progression. The subjects 
are like Sisyphus, condemned ad infinitum to turn about, jump, and 
dance. In another sense, the f igures are machine-like: untiring and un-
alterable, they are ‘acted-upon subjects’ rather than ‘acting-out subjects.’5
The circularity, repetition, and objectif ication associated with images in 
mechanical rotation reappears as a haunting threat to the protagonists in 
Ophuls’ f ilm-worlds, be it the dancing Madame and Donati, or Christine 
and Fritz, whose dance in Liebelei is accompanied by the tinny sound of 
a pianola that requires the repeated insertion of pennies to work, or the 
couples forming in La Ronde, where it is unclear whether it is the allegorical 
carousel that sets the roundelay of desire into motion or vice versa.
Many early f ilm reviewers found in the moving images on the screen a 
combination of unbridled vital movement and the inscription of the ma-
chine haunting the (re-)presentation. As I discuss in more detail below, crit-
ics from Maxim Gorky to Rémy de Gourmont, Max Brod and Georg Lukács 
described the vital pull of the moving image and the strange experience of 
being an onlooker to life. This rift was experienced in one’s own body; the 
5 Nicolas Dulac and André Gaudréault, ‘Circularity and Repetition at the Heart of Attraction’, 
232.
14 CinematiC Vitalism 
pure reproduction of movement sent shivers down early spectators’ spines. 
In the spectacle of a ‘living picture’, the mechanically reproduced movement 
of characters, animals, and the entire background rendered everything in 
the frame animate. As spectators, we react with heightened affect: this 
mediated view is presented to us, for our eyes and ears, and we pay attention 
to it, searching the image and sound for cues. The movement on the screen 
pulls us along, and our senses seek to find a way to align themselves with the 
rhythm of image and sound. This process is different from aligning with our 
natural environment—the moving image is artif icial, limited, and usually 
two-dimensional, and we need to adjust to its spatio-temporality without 
the aid of complete physical immersion. It is precisely in this difference, 
in the ‘almost-as-if’, that we encounter cinematic vitality: in experiencing 
and bridging the gap between our natural being-in-the world and the f ilm 
world, the immersion in a f ilm punctuated by moments of reflection or 
self-awareness, and the conjoining of our fleeting time with the determined 
time-flight of the f ilm, which, despite a continuous 24 frames per second, 
is full of lags, gaps, retardations, and accelerations. It is an attitude of love.
Over the course of the history of f ilm theory, this attitude of love has 
been described in a variety of ways, and despite important differences, it 
has a lot in common with historical attitudes towards other media. Most of 
these descriptions are vitalist in the sense that they start from the way in 
which the spectator’s (reader’s, beholder’s) lively engagement interacts with 
the life force of the artwork. There is, for example, the late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century conception of empathy (Einfühlung) in art history 
and psychology, which maintains that the beholder invests artworks with 
her own vitality. Or one could take theories of animation, which became 
fashionable around the same time, as part of a renewed interest in primitive 
art, and work the other way around: namely, endowing things with a vitality 
of their own that confronts the beholder. Both of these theories, which will 
be addressed in Chapter 1, became signif icant for early f ilm theory, and 
yet needed alterations to account for cinema’s temporal form and force of 
movement. Aesthetic theory from Romanticism onward was also interested 
in the way in which subjects are vitally engaged with their environment, 
in ways that dissolve the boundaries not only of self and other, but also of 
self and world. Terms such as Stimmung (attunement, mood, tonality), aura, 
mood, and atmosphere became crucial tools in def ining the lively interac-
tion with both nature and art (Chapter 3). Dynamic aesthetic concepts such 
as empathy, animation, and Stimmung have a counterpart in biological 
ideas that concern the interstice between inside and outside, internal and 
external milieu, subject and environment, nerve and stimulation, and 
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expand their understanding of life to include a body’s sensorial environ-
ment, such as Jakob von Uexküll’s conception of Umwelt (surrounding world, 
Chapter 2). These expanded notions of life f ind an artistic corollary in the 
moving image, which flattens out f igure-ground distinctions and with its 
vibratory energy imparts vital expression to everything in the frame. When 
Madame and Donati dance in a mobile frame, the entire image is caught 
up in the whirl.
By considering f ilm theory and practice in the light of vitalist theories of 
life, this book performs two crucial inquiries: f irst, it places cinema in close 
contact with philosophy and the sciences, especially the theory of biology 
and psycho-physiology, for in these disciplines, the question of what life was 
and was not, and whether vitalism had a place, was the matter of heated 
debate around the turn of the century and well into the twentieth century. 
And second, this book seeks to reframe the place of f ilm in modernity, 
understood here as the process of social, cultural, political, and technologi-
cal upheaval that stretched from the mid-nineteenth century to WWII. In 
accounts of the cultural history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
cinema has long been understood as an exemplary instance of what we 
might call the mechanistic understanding of modernity: that is, modernity 
understood as a consequence of an ever-expanding application of modern 
sciences and technologies to the human condition.6 From this perspec-
tive, all of the developments that we associate with late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth-century modernity, such as the increasing urbanization of 
Western populations, the emergence of mass culture, and the electrif ication 
of urban and rural spaces, are a consequence of the application of modern 
scientif ic principles of materialism and mechanism to the environments 
in which humans live, as well as those ‘conditions’ that develop alongside, 
arguably as properly human reactions to these institutions (e.g. ‘modern 
man’ as nervous, blasé, anomic, distracted, or hysterical).
According to this account, modernity was a consequence of the triumph 
of the mechanistic worldview over its competitors, which include religion, 
but also scientif ic paradigms that sought to hold on to some essential 
distinction between living beings and the non-living world of matter, such 
as vitalist conceptions of natural science or the humanities. As one of the 
technological innovations produced—or at least enabled—by modern 
science, cinema has been aligned with this triumph of the mechanistic sci-
entif ic and philosophical framework of modernity. Moreover, as a cultural 
product of modernity, cinema was at the same time seen to enable critical 
6 Examples include Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor; Stephen Kern, Time and Space.
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reflection on the forces that engendered it—industrialization, urbanization, 
mass culture, technology, and mechanization. Yet this mutual def inition 
of cinema as a modern medium and modernity as cinematic has led, at 
times, to a narrow rendering of both, thus excluding a more dialectical 
understanding that would allow us to take into account the roles played 
by conservative, alternative, ‘old-fashioned’, and seemingly anti- or pre-
modern movements. And because cinema—as apparatus, public space, 
and dispositif—has been understood as emblematic of the mechanization 
and technologization of modern life, cinema has almost invariably been 
related primarily to mechanist paradigms for understanding both organic 
life and social processes, rather than vitalist approaches, which seem like 
atavistic specters from the past.
Over the past decade, scholars have complicated and complemented 
this account of both modernity and cinema as a modern medium 
by emphasizing the need to comprehend artworks, movements, and 
theories that are conservative, holistic, or pastoral as part and parcel 
of modernity—and not only dialectically so. Important contributions 
that have done so by reevaluating, reinterpreting, and recontextualizing 
classical f ilm theory include Michael Cowan’s work on the cult of the 
will, on the ubiquitous and ambivalent role of rhythm, and on the work of 
abstract f ilmmakers like Walter Ruttmann as not only a cipher of, but also 
formative of, the interaction of aesthetic discourses, artistic movements, 
institutions, and markets; Scott Curtis’ work on the influence of scientif ic, 
medical, educational and aesthetic discourses on the formation of cinema 
spectatorship; Miriam Hansen’s elucidation of Walter Benjamin’s and 
Siegfried Kracauer’s work on the profound historical, cultural, and political 
changes in modernity, their impact on the senses, and their ref lection in 
cinema as an existential playground of experience, as well as Johannes 
von Moltke’s analysis of the changed stakes for Kracauer in the context of 
the intellectual climate in the US after the war; and many edited volumes, 
compilations, and translations that have made crucial f ilm-theoretical 
texts available and provided context.7 The surge of interest in classical f ilm 
7 Michael Cowan, Cult of the Will; Cowan, ‘Advertising, Rhythm, and the Filmic Avant-Garde’; 
Cowan, Walter Ruttmann and the Cinema of Multiplicity; Cowan, ‘The Heart Machine’; Scott 
Curtis, The Shape of Spectatorship; Miriam Hansen, Cinema and Experience; Johannes von Moltke, 
The Curious Humanist (see also Moltke and Gerd Gemünden, eds., Culture in the Anteroom). 
Additional important publications on cinema and modernity, and on classical f ilm theory in 
particular, include Malte Hagener, Moving Forward, Looking Back; Dudley Andrew and Hervé 
Joubert-Laurencin, eds., Opening Bazin; Andrew, What Cinema Is!; Francesco Cassetti, Eye of the 
Century; David Rodowick, Elegy for Theory; Tami M. Williams, Germaine Dulac. New editions, 
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theory is invariably either explicitly or implicitly linked to the dissolution 
of ‘f ilm’ or ‘cinema’ as stable frames of reference in the light of new media 
technologies, new screens, and viewing practices, and the digitization of 
f ilm and f ilm projection.
This book participates in this more general return to classical f ilm theory 
in the wake of our current post-medial and post-modernist challenge, but 
does so in order to locate constellations of moving images, living bodies, 
and technology that also have relevance for the present. All of the f ilm 
theorists and f ilmmakers under consideration in the recent revival of clas-
sical f ilm theory, I argue, have a stake in the conjunction of cinema and life. 
Attending to their engagement with vitalism changes the map of influences, 
intersections, and aff inities not only in the f ilm community, but also of the 
role of f ilm theory and practice within larger cultural (and, in particular, 
scientif ic and philosophical) discourses on life. My inquiry seeks to add the 
movie theater as a modern locale par excellence to the centers of discussion 
about what life is and is not. The movie theater is, I claim, a discursive place 
that incorporated and transformed vitalist ideas. This book is asking: what 
happens when the (intellectual and embodied) insistence on the specif icity 
of life encounters mechanically-produced vitality? What happens when 
different discourses on the specif icity of life—scientif ic, philosophical, 
aesthetic—intersect? I argue that we can only answer these questions by 
attending to three distinct, yet interrelated debates about the role of life in 
and for cinema in turn-of-the-century and early twentieth-century sources 
and accompanying critical literature.
The f irst debate pertains to the French vitalist philosopher Henri Berg-
son and the f ilm-theoretical, critical, and philosophical work inspired by 
his philosophy. Bergson’s works contain a number of direct references 
to photography and cinema, but they were also part of a much larger 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century vitalist movement that 
encompassed the sciences as well as philosophy and cultural theory. 
translations and compilations of notes include Béla Balázs, Early Film Theory; Anton Kaes, 
Nicholas Baer and Cowan, eds., The Promise of Cinema; Sarah Keller and Jason N. Paul, eds., Jean 
Epstein; Tami M. Williams, ed., Pure Cinema. Books that examine the inherent modernity of the 
Nazi regime and its use of mass media, while not central to this book, have also done important 
work in this respect; for example, Lutz Koepnick, The Dark Mirror and Eric Rentschler, The 
Ministry of Illusion. Several other works that include cinema in broader reflections on modernity 
and modernism have likewise been helpful; of particular note here is Laura Marcus, who has 
argued that ‘[w]riting about the cinema thus not only upheld, but also displaced and reworked, 
cultural and conceptual distinctions between mechanism and organism’. See Laura Marcus, 
The Tenth Muse, 4. 
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Vitalism, as well as the closely related ‘philosophy of life’ (Lebensphiloso-
phie) of, for example, Wilhelm Dilthey, operates under the assumption 
that living matter is fundamentally different from inanimate matter, 
and scientists, philosophers, and cultural critics committed to—or even 
just intrigued by—vitalist principles sought to redef ine time, space, and 
organization in the light of the specif icity of life. Cinema emerged as 
a technology and phenomenon at precisely the time when biologists 
and philosophers were debating the nature of life and how life could be 
represented, and cultural critics were seeking to develop methodologies 
for adequately describing the specif icity of life in contrast to inanimate 
matter, especially machines.
Even though Bergson himself referenced f ilm and photography am-
bivalently in his writings, since the 1910s, his philosophy has become an 
important reference point for critics to understand and frame cinema 
and the f ilm experience.8 In Creative Evolution (1911), Bergson famously 
described the workings of the intellect, namely its tendency to abstract, 
rationalize, conceptualize, and to break up time (duration) into compre-
hensible units, by calling it ‘cinematographic perception’. While the f ilm 
camera subtracts time from an event by recording only static shots in 
short succession, the projector reintroduces a general, machinic move-
ment of the second order. The result, Bergson maintained, is a general 
temporality of a quantitative, rather than a qualitative, nature. Thus, for 
him, the cinematographic apparatus illustrates the pitfalls of intellectual 
abstraction and the loss of the embeddedness in the fabric of life and lived 
time that instinctual animals (and, in a different way, humans relying on 
intuition) possess.
What Bergson called cinematographic perception, however, should 
not be taken to mean perception of cinema; rather, it is a modern mode 
of perception akin to the workings of the cinematographic apparatus. 
Cinema as technology, according to him, is paradigmatic of a mechanist 
understanding of the world that determines not only scientif ic and cultural 
practices and beliefs, but even governs the very structure of our perception. 
The perception of a f ilm—that is, f ilm reception—is an entirely different 
matter. Bergson himself admitted as much in an interview in 1914, in which 
he suggested that cinema ‘could be an aid to the synthesis of memory, or 
even of thought itself. If the circumference [of a circle] is composed of a 
series of points, memory is, like cinema, a series of images. Immobile, it is 
8 For an account of Bergson’s positions on the cinema, see Paul Douglass, ‘Bergson and Cinema: 
Friends or Foes?’.
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in a neutral state; in movement, it is life itself’.9 The cinematograph’s re-
constituted movement perceived by a spectator mobilizes memory-images 
which integrate the mechanical, spatialized temporality of a f ilm into the 
durée of life and organic experience.
The second debate with which I am concerned here relates to the many 
pre-WWI accounts of f ilm experience, as well as the f irst attempts to 
formulate an aesthetic of f ilm, in which the term ‘life’ was invoked fre-
quently and with particular emphasis. ‘Life’ appeared as a name for what 
the technical apparatus wrote or inscribed—for example, in company 
names such as Vitagraph or Biograph (‘life-writer’)—but commentators 
also employed the term in their attempts to def ine more closely the 
aesthetic of the cinematic image or the peculiar sensual experience of 
seeing moving images. Even if some writers used terms such as ‘life’ and 
‘vitality’ without much consideration or ref lexive awareness, the occur-
rence of such terms should not be seen simply as off-hand references; 
authors such as Maxim Gorky, O. Winter, Rémy de Gourmont, Max Brod, 
Walter Hasenclever, and Georg Lukács employed these terms when trying 
to f ind a critical language that could grasp the unprecedented properties 
and experience of this new medium. The initial experience of cinema, 
in other words, was not purely that of a mechanical technology that 
conf irmed a mechanistic approach to the world, but rather of a living 
medium that quickened and expanded the writer’s sense of what life 
might be.
Finally—and this is the third debate in which I engage—there is the 
intriguing fact that Bergson and other philosophers of life, such as Georg 
Simmel and Wilhelm Dilthey, played a peculiar and arguably ambiguous 
role in texts by members of the Frankfurt School, especially Walter Ben-
jamin and Siegfried Kracauer. While a number of the terms and ideas that 
Benjamin and Kracauer used seem to be indebted to these life-philosophers, 
Benjamin and Kracauer did not always openly acknowledge this legacy. On 
the contrary, if they discussed life-philosophy or vitalism explicitly, they 
often did so in dismissive fashion (one of the most notorious examples of 
such ambivalent citation is Benjamin’s use/critique of Bergson in his 1938 
essay, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’).10 A similar, though less pervasive 
pattern of reference to vitalist ideas and thinkers can also be detected 
in French f ilm criticism of the 1920s. While a few of these critics (such as 
Émile Vuillermoz) explicitly sought to base their thoughts on the medium 
9 Henri Bergson and Louis-Georges Schwartz, ‘“Henri Bergson Talks to Us About Cinema”‘.
10 Walter Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’.
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of cinema on Bergson, others, including Marcel L’Herbier and Jean Epstein, 
sought to distance themselves from Bergson, describing him (in curiously 
vital terms) as ‘old metaphysical plantstock’.11
The three discussions that I have outlined above suggest that we ought to 
reconsider the relationship between cinema and vitalism. Perhaps neither 
cinema nor modernity should be automatically aligned with mechanistic 
approaches to life and the world, for it may be the case that both emerge as 
much—or perhaps even more—from approaches to living beings and their 
environments developed in vitalist and life-philosophical contexts. This 
book asserts that attending to what I call ‘cinematic vitalism’ will enable us 
to improve our understanding not only of how cinema was understood and 
theorized when it f irst emerged, but also how its formal and stylistic features 
bear upon our understanding of life, human or otherwise, and how it can 
even function as a kind of vital orientation. The relevance of form and style 
is not restricted to f ilms that one might think would privilege questions 
of life, such as nature documentaries or popular scientif ic f ilms. Vibrancy 
and concern for life, including the vitality of the spectator, can be found in 
a variety of f ilms, from avant-garde f ilms to melodramas to realist cinema 
to various new waves; we might even say it becomes an issue whenever 
style matters. In the following two sections, I outline both the concept and 
virtues of cinematic vitalism, f irst by discussing what was at stake in the 
vitalist and life-philosophical debate around the turn of the century in both 
Germany and France, and then by explaining the relationship of this debate 
to early cinema by isolating vitalist themes in a few key early texts on f ilm.
Turn-of-the-century Vitalism and Philosophy of Life
It is no coincidence that the concept of ‘life’ was ready to hand for early 
twentieth-century f ilm theorists. The nature of life—what life is and what 
it is not, how living matter can be differentiated from non-living matter, 
and so forth—had been an issue of heated debate from the second half 
of the nineteenth century through the f irst few decades of the twentieth 
century, and often focused on theories and discoveries in the f ield of 
epigenesist, that is, the development of organisms from egg, seed or spore. 
11 Marcel L’Herbier, ‘Hermes and Silence (1918)’. Interestingly enough, this reference occurs in 
an essay that is itself part of a heated debate about Bergsonism and cinema, between Paul Souday, 
L’Herbier, and Emile Vuillermoz. See Vuillermoz, ‘Before the Screen’, and Souday, ‘Bergsonnisme 
et le cinéma’.
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In the late nineteenth century, scientif ic theories of life fell more or less 
squarely into one of two camps: the mechanist and vitalist understandings 
of organic life. According to mechanist biologists and psycho-physicists—
well-known examples of whom included Hermann Helmholtz, Wilhelm 
Wundt, and Etienne-Jules Marey—living matter is subject to the same 
mechanical, physical, and chemical laws as non-living matter, and these 
laws are suff icient to explain the phenomenon of life. Where seventeenth 
and eighteenth century vitalists had invoked a ‘life force’ or ‘vital principle’ 
(Lebenskraft or Lebensprinzip), Helmholtz and fellow scientists such as 
Emil Du Bois-Reymond turned to terms drawn from mechanics, such as 
force or power, energy, and electricity. Helmholtz’s discovery of the laws 
of thermodynamics, and his and Wundt’s investigations into the workings 
of the nervous system, made the mechanist model of the body extremely 
popular. This mechanistic model informed an understanding of the body 
as electric or automated, and thus of living bodies as ‘animal-machines’: 
according to Helmholtz, ‘[t]he animal body therefore does not differ from 
the steam-engine as regards the manner in which it obtains heat and force, 
but does differ from it in the purpose for, and manner in which the force 
is gained or employed’.12 This mechanist conception of life also underlies 
Marey’s studies of eff icient movement and fatigue, and the importance of 
these studies for Taylorist work practices.
In reaction to the experimental and theoretical advances made by 
mechanists, vitalist biologists by contrast insisted that there was a 
qualitative difference between living and non-living matter. For vitalists, 
the ability of living matter to create more living matter, change its state, 
and self-organize was proof of the fact that in addition to physical and 
chemical laws, there must be a vital force, or at least a set of determinants 
particular to life. By distinguishing life as a def ining factor (and not simply 
as an epiphenomenon of physical or chemical laws), biologists were able to 
isolate orchestrated, qualitative changes over time, which they observed in 
living organisms. Whereas mechanist explanatory models provided tools 
for observing linear and continuous changes over time, vitalist biologists, 
by contrast, focused on qualitative leaps which occurred within time, and 
which led to quite different conceptions of temporality. Eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century vitalists such as Georg Wilhelm Stahl, Johann Christian 
Reil, Marie François Xavier Bichat, Johannes Müller, and Karl Ernst von 
12 Hermann von Helmholtz, ‘Wechselwirkung der Naturkräfte (1876),’ quoted from Rabinbach, 
The Human Motor, 61. See also Driesch’s discussion of Helmholtz’s comments on vitalism in Hans 
Driesch, The History and Theory of Vitalism, 144-47.
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Baer had isolated a life force, or life principle, which they took as distinct 
from matter (in turn, they saw living matter as passive and directed by this 
force). Most turn-of-the-century ‘neo-vitalists’, by contrast, saw life as an 
intrinsic quality of organic matter, and they were particularly interested 
in embryology, regeneration, development, and the reactions of the living 
being to its environment. Neo-vitalism’s most prominent advocate, the Ger-
man biologist Hans Driesch, focused on the relationship between cells and 
organs within a developing living being, while vitalist ‘fellow-travelers’ such 
as Jakob von Uexküll investigated the relationship between the subjective 
perception of animals and their environments.
Driesch, in fact, developed an elaborate theory of vitalism that was 
grounded in the biological experiments that he performed around the 
turn of the century. Driesch manipulated sea urchin embryos by remov-
ing part of the embryo, and discovered that the remaining parts of the 
embryo nevertheless developed into a complete (albeit smaller) sea urchin. 
Ascidians (sea squirts) were another animal of interest for Driesch. These 
organisms retain the capacity for self-initiated self-organization found in sea 
urchin embryos—a capacity that Driesch called harmonious-equipotential, 
since every part of the whole seemed to have the same potential to work 
harmoniously with the other parts—even in the adult stage. If a body part 
is cut off an ascidian, the animal is able to regenerate the body part. ‘How’, 
Driesch asked, ‘could a machine be divided innumerable times and yet remain 
what it was?’13 To him, these organisms revealed the existence of a causality 
that differed from mechanic causality; namely, a unifying causality that 
is specif ic to life. This unifying causality acts in the mode of ‘entelechy’, 
a term Driesch derived from Aristotle. Entelechy suspends the inf inite 
number of potential ways in which a given organism could develop, and 
then, by relaxing this suspension in a certain way, transforms this potential 
of homogenous matter into specif ic realities in heterogeneous matter.14 Yet 
the relatively meager experimental foundation upon which Driesch based 
his theory also illustrated—and Driesch admitted as much—that vital-
ists could only show that there was something that exceeded mechanical 
causality, but they could not directly prove what, precisely, it was that 
distinguished life.
While biologists in Germany developed a theory of vitalism that sought 
to counter the then-prevalent mechanist and naturalist conceptions, phi-
losophers of life waged a related polemic against positivist understandings 
13 Driesch, The History and Theory of Vitalism, 211-12.
14 See Ibid., 203.
introduC tion 23
of both nature and culture. German Lebensphilosophie, or philosophy of life, 
is based on vitalist principles, and the roster of life-philosophers includes 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Simmel, and Ludwig Klages. As 
much as their work varies, it is based on the notion that life is qualitatively 
distinct from non-living matter; a distinction that Arthur Schopenhauer 
sought to capture through the notion of ‘will’; Nietzsche, through the notion 
of the ‘will to power’; Dilthey, by stressing the importance of experience 
and history for the humanities or the ‘sciences of the spirit’; and Klages, 
through his claim that the ‘soul’ grounds life in blood and soil. Dilthey 
coined the term Lebensphilosophie, in fact, in order to distinguish what he 
called the humanities, or Geisteswissenschaften (sciences of the spirit), from 
the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften), arguing that literature, history, 
and the arts are based on a historic and holistic notion of life as experience.
In many ways, Dilthey’s work reads like the humanist counterpoint to 
Driesch’s biological theories. Driesch, for example, used the example of a 
phonograph to describe the difference between life and machine:
[A]ction of any kind whatever […] rests upon an historical basis of reaction. 
That is to say, every action is determined—though not exclusively—by 
everything that has occurred to the acting person until this very mo-
ment of his life. Had we not decided to put aside all psychology in our 
argument, we might say that ‘experience’ based upon ‘memory’ is one of 
the chief features of all acting. But—does not the phonograph ‘act’ upon 
an historical basis of reaction? Certainly it does, and it is especially in 
order to distinguish the acting organism from machines of the type of 
the phonograph that a second criterion must be added to the f irst. The 
phonograph only gives off what it has received, in its very specificity; 
in the organism the occurrences of individual life have only created a 
general stock of possibilities for further acting, but have not determined 
all further reactions quite in detail.15
For Dilthey, the invocation of the concept of Geisteswissenschaften or the 
humanities distinguishes human activity from mechanical reaction, and 
human memory and experience from mechanical inscription. In the realms 
of life and spirit, reasoning, as well as acting, is determined by history, 
experience, and memory, and based on comprehension and decision. The 
humanities consequently need their own methods—their own systems 
of deduction, conclusion and results—that are separate from those of the 
15 Ibid., 212-13.
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natural sciences, and which can translate subjective experience into objec-
tive claims. Dilthey eventually developed a theory of hermeneutics that 
started from subjective experiences, took account of the vital expression 
of, for example, a literary text, and, in a f inal step, aimed at understanding 
(Verstehen) on the basis of expression and experience.16
An implicit concern with experience also lay at the heart of the work of 
the best-known of the philosophical vitalists, Bergson, who turned against a 
mechanical and intellectualist understanding of time, both by contrasting 
mechanical time with the notion of duration as lived time and by reevaluat-
ing the concept of intuition from an evolutionary perspective. In Matter 
and Memory, Bergson developed a theory of perception that broke up the 
perceptual process into pure perception (which is part of, or partakes in, 
matter) and memory (in which we f ind expressed spirit). What we call the 
‘present’ is, according to Bergson, not a point in time dividing past and 
future, but rather has duration itself, because it takes time to perceive and 
process; the past and the future participate in the ‘present’. In this duration 
of the present moment, pure perception and pure memory combine in the 
interval between action and reaction (i.e., this is where matter and memory 
come into contact). Additionally, in lived reality, perception is made ‘impure’ 
by affections—either the invocation of mechanical, automatic memory 
(habit) or of memory-images—which have been unconscious and which 
are called up to consciousness when they become relevant for the present.17
In Creative Evolution, Bergson applied these ideas to the evolution of life 
forms. The two main lines of evolution that are expressed in the animal and 
the human being, respectively, are the development of instinct and intel-
lect. Since evolution entails specif ication and the development of certain 
faculties over others, human intellectual knowledge is necessarily partial 
and incomplete—it is only a part of the Whole of life. Intellect, for Bergson, 
is a bright nucleus, ‘a contraction, by condensation, of a more extensive 
power’ surrounded by a fringe of instinct, or intuition; the latter is ‘that part 
of the evolving principle which has not shrunk to the peculiar form of our 
organization, but has settled around it unasked for, unwanted’.18 Bergson 
contended that by turning our attention to this fringe, we gain access to 
those aspects of life in which we participate, but which are not part of our 
individuation as human beings.
16 See Ferdinand Fellmann, Geschichte der Philosophie im 19. Jahrhundert, 316-35; Herbert 
Schnädelbach, Philosophie in Deutschland 1831-1933.
17 See Bergson, Matter and Memory.
18 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 46, 49.
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For Bergson, one consequence of this evolutionary ‘intellectualization’ 
of the human being is the human focus on action and fabrication, since 
intellect enables humans to f ind solutions to the problems posed by life by 
means of fabricating tools. In order to facilitate the discovery of solutions, 
intellectual perception transforms ‘matter into an instrument of action, that 
is, in the etymological sense of the word, into an organ’.19 Intellectual percep-
tion is thus a utilitarian perception that turns what it sees into distinct 
spatial phenomena upon which it can act; it perceives only in the light of 
anticipated results; that is, end-points. As intellectual beings, humans have 
spatialized time and grasp change—whether it is qualitative, extensive, or 
evolutionary change—as a series of scientif ically determinable states. The 
intellectual approach is thus the method whereby science proceeds, and (as 
a consequence) it also provides the basis for the way in which mechanistic 
scientif ic theories seek to explain phenomena of life and growth. Bergson 
explicitly referred to Marey’s chronophotography—Marey was his col-
league at the Collège de France—and serial photography, as well as to the 
cinematographic apparatus, in order to describe the shortcomings and 
consequences of intellectual perception, claiming that ‘the mechanism of 
our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind’ (in Chapter 1, I will 
discuss in more detail the complicated relationship between mechanism, 
duration, and cinema in Bergson’s work).20
The work of the following generation of life philosophers in Germany—in 
particular, Georg Simmel, Max Scheler, and Helmuth Plessner—illustrates 
the ways in which the vitalist approach ramif ied into sociological and 
anthropological domains. Simmel not only initiated the translation of 
Bergson into German, but also related life-philosophical ideas to sociology 
and applied them to modern urban life. Fundamental to his philosophy of 
life was the idea of a contradiction inherent in life: on the one hand, life is 
f lowing, creative, rhythmic becoming that is characterized by continual 
change (a notion he took from Bergson); on the other hand, life—as soon 
as it is not just animal life, but also has a spiritual dimension, as in the 
case of humans—continually creates expressive forms, such as art. While 
such forms are necessary for life to express itself and become visible, these 
distinct, stable forms simultaneously separate from the dynamic flow of 
life and eventually end up in conflict with life. They are then overthrown 
and substituted by new forms. There is thus ‘a f ight of life against form 
more generally, against the principle of form’ that is constitutive of spiritual 
19 Ibid., 161.
20 Ibid., 306.
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life.21 In philosophical anthropology, both Max Scheler and Helmuth Pless-
ner—the former a student of Dilthey’s, the latter a student of Driesch’s 
and Uexküll’s—sought to redefine human being-in-the-world from a life-
philosophical perspective. A central aspect of Plessner’s anthropology was 
the division of the body into something we are—that we are physically, that 
is, an existential part of our being—and something we have—that we can 
relate to and reflect upon, look at, and separate from ourselves as spiritual 
beings. (This distinction is expressed in German as the distinction between 
body as Leib—a word not coincidentally related to ‘life’, Leben—and body as 
Körper, which is derived from the Latin corpus and denotes a more rational 
approach to the body).22
The approaches I have described above do not fall into a single category, 
and of the authors I have cited, only Driesch and Bergson are invariably 
classif ied by historians as vitalists. Nor am I the f irst to suggest aff inities 
between these different thinkers, although previous accounts have tended 
to employ terms such as ‘holism’ or ‘biocentrism’ as ways of capturing the 
elective aff inities between various related movements at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.23 However, thinking 
of all of the authors I have described above as part of a vitalist stream 
draws attention to the importance that all of them attached to the term 
‘life’, an emphasis that is lost in a term such as ‘holism’. And while the term 
biocentric does maintain this focus on life, it does not in the end help us 
to capture what was at stake in the confrontation between cinema and 
these life-philosophies, for (as I shall describe in further detail below) the 
intersection of cinema and life-philosophies tended to reject precisely 
that notion of a centripetal center around which everything revolved 
which is implicit in the term biocentrism, and instead f igured life as a 
centrifugal force that led viewers in wandering, errant paths outward to 
larger, non-organic forces of life. Vitalism is a term that better captures 
this more expansive sense of life, even if it means wresting the term away 
from its narrow appropriation by Driesch and Bergson. My understanding 
of vitalism is indebted to Georges Canguilhem, who argued that, if it were 
not to be reductionist, a vitalist position was a necessary stance for a 
philosophical inquiry into biological matters. Furthermore, for him, life 
itself conditions philosophical knowledge; as Charles T. Wolfe puts it, for 
21 Georg Simmel, ‘Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur’, 185. See also Chapter 3. 
22 See Helmuth Plessner, Stufen des Organischen; Plessner, Laughing and Crying.
23 For a focus on holism, see Anne Harrington, Reenchanted Science; on the notion of biocen-
trism, see Oliver A. I. Botar, ‘Notes Towards a Study of Jakob von Uexküll’s Reception’.
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Canguilhem, ‘[t]here is something about Life that places the knower in 
a special relation to it’.24 Life, for him, is ‘the form and potential of the 
living’, and thus all philosophical engagement with life is necessarily 
vitalist.
Early Film Theory
It was in the cultural context that I have sketched above that the f irst 
moving images flickered across public screens. Not only did the f irst f ilm 
companies bear names that highlighted cinema’s relationship to life, but 
early advertisements also deployed descriptions such as ‘living pictures’ or 
‘pictures come to life’ for the moving image, expressions that appear in many 
early texts on cinema.25 The reasons behind this linkage seem fairly obvious: 
the spectacular appeal of cinema lay in the combination of photography 
and movement, which animated, or re-animated, the image and seemed 
to make visible life itself. At the same time, many early commentators 
on cinema exclaimed that they were able to see ‘life itself’ on the screen 
(for example, Rémy de Gourmont, Hermann Häfker, and Georg Lukács, to 
mention just a few). In all three invocations of the word ‘life’, life is qualif ied 
at the same time as it is invoked. For example, the term ‘living pictures’ 
imparts life to pictures, which themselves are in a safe, separate realm, 
carefully segregated from real life by a frame. The expression ‘pictures 
come to life’ foregrounds an original separation of picture and life and thus 
invokes the technical working of the cinematic apparatus: a series of still 
images, on the one hand, and the movement generated by the mechanism 
of the apparatus, on the other. In the notion of ‘seeing life itself’, by contrast, 
life as a referent is emphasized by the intensifying pronoun ‘itself’ (which is 
included in most accounts, whether they are French, German, or English). 
This emphasis seems to be necessary to express the feeling of astonishment, 
the extraordinariness, that is produced through this combination of ‘seeing’ 
and ‘life’.
These f irst expressions already hint that there was something about the 
experience of moving images that made it seem that life was at stake; that 
only by opening up the question of life could one come to terms with this 
24 Charles T. Wolfe, ‘The Return of Vitalism’, 5. See also Georges Canguilhem, La connaissance 
de la vie.
25 In the f irst years of cinema, the expression ‘living pictures’ was a common term for the 
moving image. See, for example, Henry V. Hopwood, Living Pictures.
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new medium and this new aesthetic experience. But applying the term ‘life’ 
to cinema meant not only that the concept of life was opened up and made 
vulnerable to the new medium—that is, that cinema could become part 
of the answer to questions about what constituted life, how life could be 
def ined, and how life could be identif ied or perceived—but this move also 
affected the concepts of picture or image and of seeing or perception. The 
turn to the notion of life to explain cinema as an aesthetic and technological 
phenomenon indicates that a struggle took place as to how, conceptually, 
to ‘contain’ pictures if they somehow partake in life (through movement 
and duration). If life and images become connected, how then can one 
establish distinctions between what is in the frame/on the screen and what 
is outside of it? Where does this merging of life and image leave the idea of 
the frame itself? How do we have to redefine ‘the picture’, and how do we 
have to redefine ‘life’?
Vision, for its part, becomes a medium that sensually relays life to us 
in cinema. In cinema, life turns into something one encounters from the 
outside—we are ourselves outside of this framed life that the moving 
image conveys to us. Such a perception of life at a distance, so to speak, 
can end up feeling uncanny, insofar as life is usually something that 
remains opaque to us precisely because we are situated within it and 
cannot be outside of it. Given our embeddedness in life, in fact, it would 
seem that to see life from the outside would also necessarily mean the end 
of perception itself. Cinema, however, conveys life to us via perception, 
in a picture that, as a picture, is separate from our regular environment, 
our regular life. Fleshing out what is implicit in these three common 
usages of the term ‘life’ in early texts on cinema thus illustrates that the 
term not only contributed to a qualif ication (and hence, a better grasp) 
of what cinema itself was, but that cinema also seemed to perform the 
same operation for life. At the same time, these ref lections on life and 
moving images are directly linked to Simmel’s idea that life is engaged in 
an inherent and necessary conflict with form, Plessner’s division between 
being and having a body, and Bergson’s thoughts on lived time. When 
early f ilm critics explained cinema in terms of life, and life in terms of 
cinema, they did not reduce one term to the other, but rather used one 
term as a way of deepening and complicating our understanding of the 
other.
Rémy de Gourmont’s 1907 article ‘Epilogues: Cinematograph’ is a para-
digmatic example of an early text on f ilm that makes recourse to the notion 
of life in order to describe both the aesthetic experience of f ilm and what 
seems to be the medium’s specif ic aesthetic quality. He located the real 
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potential of f ilm in so-called ‘outdoor spectacles’.26 The following passage 
describes the components of such a spectacle:
Yesterday [the cinematograph] showed me the Rocky Mountains and the 
Zambezi Falls: the wind bent the f ir trees on the mountains; the water 
sprang up at the bottom of the falls. I saw life stirring. At the Zambezi, 
a small bush, partially caught in a whirlpool, wavered constantly on 
the brink of the abyss; and its trembling, come from such a distance 
away, inspired in me a previously unknown emotion [ je ne sais quelle 
émotion]. I became entranced by this battle; when they give us a new 
view of this spectacular foaming falls, I will be looking for that bush 
which is courageously resisting the force of water: perhaps it will have 
been vanquished, or perhaps it will have become a tree.27
In this description of a landscape, picturesque scenery, movement and 
emotion combine to create a powerful impression. De Gourmont’s height-
ened sensitivity to the movement of the trees and water foregrounds the 
animation of the landscape. His description also suggests that cinema 
is transforming movement; that cinema allows him to see and relate to 
movement differently. ‘Natural’ movement, by being mediated through 
f ilm, becomes both the object of reflexive observation and something that 
subjectively reverberates in one’s own body. The movement de Gourmont 
describes is not itself organic or self-directed, but the result of a more general 
animation produced by the forces of gravity and wind; it is an animated 
view.
On the one hand, de Gourmont’s description of the trembling of the bush 
is reminiscent of texts on the excessive, nervous movements of actors such 
as Charlie Chaplin or Buster Keaton, movements that f ilm critics of the 
1920s were to hail as cinematic par excellence.28 In this vein, one could read 
26 For de Gourmont, these outdoor spectacles can be natural, such as landscapes, or contrived, 
such as a hippopotamus hunt (which de Gourmont describes as ‘posed certainly, but posed on 
the very banks of the Upper Nile with the local people and animals performing in their own 
environment’). What is important for de Gourmont is only that the spectacle includes the 
setting in order to make full use of cinema’s potential, whether this setting is understood as 
‘landscape’ (paysage) or ‘environment’ (milieu). By ‘landscape’, de Gourmont means panoramic 
scenery without human characters, while ‘environment’ denotes the surroundings of human 
characters involved in a foregrounded action.
27 Rémy de Gourmont, ‘Épilogues: Cinématographe’, 124 . Translated as de Gourmont, ‘Epi-
logues: Cinematograph (1907)’, 47.
28 See, for example, Jean Epstein, ‘Magnif ication’, 238. On the nervous body in French f ilm 
culture more generally, see Rae Beth Gordon, ‘From Charcot to Charlot’. 
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de Gourmont’s account as describing a feeling Walter Benjamin termed 
‘innervation’ with respect to cinema. According to Benjamin, cinematic 
innervation provides a chance not only to incorporate technology play-
fully, but also to encounter somatically a nature that is not antithetical 
to technology (or to humanity).29 On the other hand, the transference of a 
movement ‘from such a distance away’—that is, the physical and emotional 
connection that the f ilm is able to establish between the viewer in Paris and 
the bush in Zambia—is so strong that it forms a tie that persists beyond 
the duration of the f ilm. De Gourmont’s feeling of being entranced is the 
result of a new sense of movement made possible by the mediation of the 
cinematograph, and by the fact that this cinematic movement allows for a 
haptic and kinesthetic empathy with a bush. He sums up the movement on 
the screen with the notion of ‘life stirring’ (vie remuer), since this cinematic 
movement literally animates both organic and inorganic matter; that is, it 
confers on it a different, and differently experienced, life and soul (anima).
In many advertisements for the cinematograph, the term ‘life’ referred 
to the astonishing effect of the cinematographic apparatus’ technology, 
namely the generation of movement by means of discrete images that 
replaced one another at a certain speed. Accounts such as de Gourmont’s, 
however, obviously go beyond the usages of the word ‘life’ we f ind in 
accounts that foreground the technological marvel. In de Gourmont’s 
description, life encompasses both the f ilm’s movement and the embodied, 
moved spectator—a combination at which his choice of the expression ‘vie 
remuer’ also hints, since remuer can refer to external as well as internal 
motion. De Gourmont’s text emphasizes that cinema creates a peculiar 
bond between what has been f ilmed (the really existing bush in Zambia), 
the cinematic ‘view’ itself, and the moved spectator, a bond that revolves 
around movement, temporality, and a strange sense of life.30
If, in de Gourmont’s text, life refers to an external movement that is seen 
differently because of its mediation through the screen, in other texts the 
term is used reflexively, as a way of emphasizing one’s own sense of vitality. 
29 On innervation, see Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art’, esp. 124 n10; as well as Benjamin, ‘One-Way 
Street’. Miriam Hansen discusses the importance of the concept of innervation for Benjamin in 
Hansen, ‘Benjamin and Cinema: Not a One-Way Street’.
30 De Gourmont’s text seems to fall squarely on one side of the binary distinction in classical 
f ilm theory, from André Bazin to Siegfried Kracauer, which Dudley Andrew has long emphasized: 
namely, the distinction (which Kracauer traces back to the Lumières, on the one hand, and 
George Méliès, on the other hand) between a ‘realist’ and a ‘formative’ tendency; that is, an 
aesthetic that is concerned with content and stylistic means such as the long take, versus an 
aesthetic that prioritizes form and montage. I take up this distinction critically in Chapter 1.
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In his short essay ‘Cinematographic Theater’ (1909), for example, Max Brod 
writes that he was overwhelmed by cinema’s life force, and he felt ‘shaken 
out of [his] semi-somnolent state’ by the ‘vitality of such a wealth of events’ 
on the screen.31 While Brod thus felt vitalized by cinema and empowered 
to ‘become an inventor myself and think up a few new pictures for the 
Biograph’ on his way home, other literary commentators on cinema felt 
that cinema’s vitality surpassed their own. Walter Hasenclever—like Brod, 
a modernist author—claimed that in the ‘Kientopp’,
space and temporality serve to hypnotize the spectator; where is there 
any vitality, where is there a single dimension on this earth that it cannot 
reach in its unlimited capacity? It is as though the Kientopp were the most 
extreme consequence of human expansion, and only in it, as in a final form 
of reflection, can the horror of being appear. When we place the chaos at 
a distance by seemingly having reproduced it, we renounce its reality.32
The exuberant vitality of cinema seems to come at the expense of that of the 
audience, which, as Alfred Döblin put it, is ‘spellbound by the f ixed stare’ of 
the film screen’s ‘white eye’.33 For Hasenclever, cinema was the most extreme 
consequence of ‘human expansion’, understood not only as geographical 
reach, but also as including other dimensions and an exponential increase in 
vitality. His comment suggests the excitement about new vistas in actualities, 
travelogues, dramas, and popular scientific films, but also the overwhelming 
sensorial impact of f ilms that seem to surpass human capacities for seeing, 
feeling and experiencing; for living. Hasenclever made explicit what many 
early f ilm commentators addressed only implicitly: in its enlargement of 
life, cinema reflects life—’the horror of being’ (die Ungeheuerlichkeit des 
Daseins)—back to us, enlarged and under altered conditions, such that we 
may comprehend something about it that was not graspable before.34
31 Max Brod, ‘Cinematographic Theater (1909)’, 17. 
32 Walter Hasenclever, ‘The Kintopp as Educator’, 40.
33 Alfred Döblin, ‘Theater of the Little People’, 150.
34 Hasenclever’s comment seems to pref igure Siegfried Kracauer’s image, in his 1960 Theory 
of Film, of the f ilm screen as equivalent to Athena’s polished shield, which allowed Perseus to 
bear the sight of the Gorgon Medusa without turning into stone, such that he could cut off her 
head. ‘[W]e do not, and cannot, see actual horrors because they paralyze us with blinding fear’; 
since ‘of all the existing media cinema alone holds up a mirror to nature’, we depend on it ‘for 
the reflection of happenings which would petrify us were we to encounter them in real life’ 
(Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film, 305). Miriam Hansen and others have pointed out that this 
is only a thinly veiled reference to the atrocities of WWII and the holocaust (made only more 
explicit by Kracauer’s reference to Georges Franju’s holocaust allegory Le sang des bêtes (1949) 
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The painter Gustav Melcher also belonged to the group of critics who 
attributed an excess of life to cinema: ‘one single cinematographic theater 
program leaves world and life in the dust’.35 Prefiguring the idea of cinema 
as a technological prosthetic device that extends human faculties—an idea 
we find in Dziga Vertov’s notion of kino-eye, for example—life, for Melcher, 
was encompassed by technology. The cinematograph, as a ‘new visual or-
gan’, enjoyed a kinship with life that was denied to theory and philosophy, 
privileging it to reveal life’s secrets. ‘Criticism is just as powerless against the 
cinematograph’s shows as the philosopher is with regard to life. They are 
too much.’36 Both the distant (‘stars’) and the microscopic (‘bacteria’) can 
come into view; both the spatially (the ‘streets of New York, London, and 
Paris’) and temporally (‘depths of the past’) far-away can come into reach. 
This new visibility changes our understanding of life, because our access to 
life is no longer limited to human vision and human life: ‘The fly has more 
than ten thousand eyes. The flounder’s eyes can wander across its body. But 
twentieth-century man has the cinematograph. He sees more than the visual 
world: he sees what he desires. . . He sees the timelessness and imperishability 
of life.’37 In this environment, in which life and technology are so thoroughly 
imbricated with one another, production—the work of the actor—is not an 
accumulation of dead labor, but makes visible modern life: ‘The sanguine, 
pulsating, enterprising modern life, which even before birth takes on its cheer-
ful automobile rhythm, is put on display without prejudice in film acting.’38
Another group of critics reacted more ambivalently to the cinematograph; 
for them, cinematic life was signified by lack. For Maxim Gorky, responding 
to an 1896 screening of Lumière f ilms, the f ilms presented a shadowy half-
life, or the shadow of life; even though everything on the screen teemed with 
life and with movements that were full of energy, the smiles were lifeless and 
the life that was presented was bleak and dismal, for it was deprived of color, 
sound and smell.39 That same year, O. Winter likewise described ‘the terrify-
ing effect of life, but of life with a difference’ in cinema: ‘Here, then, is life; life 
it must be because a machine knows not how to invent; but it is life which 
in the same paragraph); see Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 257, as well as Gertrud Koch, ‘“Not 
Yet Accepted Anywhere”‘. But like Kracauer’s f ilm theory, Hasenclever’s comment betrays the 
fascination with the combination of depiction of reality and distortion of (perceptual) reality 
in the cinema.
35 Gustav Melcher, ‘On Living Photography’, 17.
36 Ibid., 18. 
37 Ibid., 19.
38 Ibid., 19-20.
39 Maxim Gorky, ‘Last Night I Was in the Kingdom of Shadows’.
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you may only contemplate through a mechanical medium, life which eludes 
you in your daily pilgrimage.’40 The life cinema gives us, Winter continued, 
is ‘all true’ and ‘all false’, since its faithful recording is accomplished by an 
unintelligent machine that does not know how to privilege certain objects 
and vistas over others and thus order, select, and revise visual impressions 
as a ‘human brain’ would. For Winter, this ‘life moving without purpose, 
without beauty, with no better impulse than a foolish curiosity’ mirrored 
the concurrent ill-fated tendencies in realist and naturalist literature and 
painting, where ‘imagination’ became ‘crippled by sight’, and he denied that 
the cinematograph had an ability for revealing reflection (aside from the 
realm of science): ‘The master quality of the world is human invention, whose 
liberal exercise demonstrates the fatuity of a near approach to “life”.’41 In this 
text, as in many others, the relationship between life, reality, and realism 
is at stake, and the answer depends on the role of human perception in the 
face of a machine’s moving images.
In ‘Thoughts on an Aesthetics of Cinema’ (1913), Georg Lukács also 
described ‘eerily life-like’ f ilm images as lacking, but characterized them 
as primarily fantastic, rather than realistic. The fantastic, however, is ‘not 
the opposite of living life, it is only a new aspect of it: it is a life without 
presence, fate, reason, or motives, one in which everything is possible . . . 
a life without soul, a life of pure surface’.42 Yet it is exactly for this reason 
that the monumental weight of fate ‘f lourishes into rich and abundant life’ 
in cinema, and the animate in nature ‘acquires artistic form for the f irst 
time’.43 In Theory of the Novel, which he wrote around the same time, Lukács 
analyzed various literary forms with respect to their relationship to life, a 
pursuit that reflected Simmel’s and Dilthey’s influence on Lukács before 
the latter’s Hegelian-Marxist turn.44 As Scott Curtis has emphasized, Lukács 
turned against contemplation and inwardness as bourgeois attitudes in both 
his text on f ilm and in Theory of the Novel, qualities on which Winter sought 
to insist. For many other early f ilm commentators, it was the quick, restless, 
modern life to which f ilm corresponded, rather than the contemplative, 
idyllic life associated with earlier styles and epochs. The Austrian author 
Karl Hans Strobl evoked this contrast when he wrote: ‘[The cinematograph’s] 
quick, distracting tempo corresponds to the nervousness of our lives; the 
40 O. Winter, ‘Article in New Review (February 1896)’, 13, 14.
41 Ibid., 16.
42 Georg Lukács, ‘Thoughts on an Aesthetics of Cinema’, 12-13.
43 Ibid., 14.
44 See Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 11: ‘The f irst draft of this study was written in the summer 
of 1914 and the f inal version in the winter of 1914-15.’ 
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restless flickering of the scenes flitting by lies at the opposite end of the 
spectrum from the confident persistence of a regular stride. Before these 
wild images, it becomes apparent that the present has no room for the 
idyllic.’45 Lukács, by contrast, realized that the conflict between form and 
life is not the same as in other media, since cinema, in contrast to the stage, 
is characterized by a ‘temporality and flow’ that ‘is movement in itself, the 
eternal transience, the never-resting change of things’.46 Rather than making 
life visible as a rigid form that separates itself from life’s flow, it is exactly this 
flow, this eternal becoming, that cinema makes visible. As a consequence, 
cinema lacks the depth, the ‘soul’, of other art forms. The medium’s technol-
ogy enables an expression of life that creates a new balance between body 
and soul, since cinema foregrounds the corporeal, moving aspect of life.47
These early texts on cinema revealed three aspects of the relationship 
between moving images and ‘life’. First, the notion of life, when applied to 
cinema, could refer to a quality of the cinematic image itself, as a technologi-
cally produced and reproduced moving image. However, ‘life’ could also 
signify a quality of vitality, or animated-ness, that characterized the objects 
on screen, which seemed to possess either an excessive vitality (Brod) or 
another, uncanny kind of life (Lukács). Third, and f inally, these authors 
used the term ‘life’ to qualify that which transpired between spectator and 
moving image: that magical bond of which de Gourmont spoke.
Cinematic Vitalism
From the early days of the medium onward, as these commentaries on 
cinema indicate, the movie theater became a privileged place to think about 
‘life’. Cinema allowed for theoretical reflection on life, since it seemed to 
present life as such, as a distinct object; yet at the same time, on account 
of its sensual impact on the spectator’s own living body, it forced these 
theoretical considerations back into matter. By the late 1910s and throughout 
the 1920s, we witness a much broader discussion of life-philosophical and 
45 Karl Hans Strobl, ‘The Cinematograph’, 26.
46 Lukács, ‘Thoughts on an Aesthetics of Cinema,’ 13.
47 There have been several excellent readings and contextualizations of Lukács’ essay. A 
foundational reading is Tom Levin, ‘From Dialectical to Normative Specif icity’; more recently, 
Janelle Blankenship and Scott Curtis have analyzed the text in the context of Lukács’ overall 
work and early f ilm theory more generally; see Curtis, The Shape of Spectatorship, 235-41 and 
Janelle Blankenship, ‘Futurist Fantasies’. See also Katharina Loew, ‘The Spirit of Technology: 
Early German Thinking about Film’, 141-43.
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vitalist ideas in the arts more generally, especially in music and dance, but 
also in literature, painting, and photography.48 Vitalist ideas began to thrive 
in various art movements and contexts as a way to formulate and partake in 
a new aesthetic that was by no means simply a regressive reaction to moder-
nity. Rather, these vitalist ideas not only actively shaped modern thought, 
but they also continue to circulate and inform the way that we conceive of 
ourselves, our relationship to others, and our environment. Vitalist ideas, 
moreover, can be found across a number of very different—and in some 
cases even opposed—artistic movements, such as Expressionism, cubism, 
futurism, Dada and surrealism. Though some of these movements, such 
as futurism, embraced a machine aesthetic that might seem antithetical 
to vitalism, there were nevertheless a number of vitalist ideas—even if 
fewer explicit references—that were amalgamated with technology, urban 
velocity, and automatism; as in, for example, Antonio Giulio Bragaglia’s 
photodynamism.49 Yet it was in f ilm as time-based and technological art 
that these ideas found their greatest application and transformation.
In encountering the technologically-produced temporality, and natu-
ralistic, yet ephemeral images, of cinema, however, vitalist ideas about the 
nature of life and its relationship to technology were modif ied to such an 
extent that we can (and should) speak of ‘cinematic vitalism’. Cinematic 
vitalism incorporates certain vitalist ideas drawn from biology and phi-
losophy, while rejecting others, and combines the vitalist ideas that it 
does accept with mechanist ideas. Vitalist ideas, in other words, changed 
as they were incorporated into f ilms and theories of f ilm, just as in any 
experimental setting in which ideas are put to the test. In contrast to the 
often quite rigid conceptions and distinctions that characterized scientif ic 
vitalism, vitalist ideas in cinema were literally put into motion and took 
on a life of their own. This became especially evident in the f ilms and 
writings by the f irst avant-garde in the 1920s, which form the core of my 
inquiry. Vitalist conceptions of temporality, movement, and embodiment 
appeared in texts by f ilm theorists and f ilmmakers such as Hans Richter, 
Jean Epstein, Jean Painlevé, Kracauer, and Benjamin, and these conceptions 
had a major influence on their theories of cinematic perception, montage, 
and the ontology of the cinematic image.
This book aims at more than simply to map the mutual influences be-
tween cinema and vitalism (with the latter understood as either a clearly 
48 See, for example, Hilary Fink, Bergson and Russian Modernism; Mark Antliff, Inventing 
Bergson; and Tom Gunning, ‘Loïe Fuller and the Art of Motion’.
49 See Bragaglia’s manifesto: Anton Giulio Bragaglia, ‘Futurist Photodynamism’.
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def inable movement or theoretical position). By focusing on what I call 
cinematic vitalism, I seek to show that, and how, vitalist ideas in biology and 
philosophy addressed concerns about the value and characteristics of life in 
modernity; that is, in a climate of increasing rationalization, urbanization, 
technologization, and scientif ication. As many f ilm scholars have shown, 
these are, of course, precisely the same concerns that also characterized 
the reactions to and theorizations of cinema. The cinema, as an actual place 
and a discursive f ield, became a place for thinking about the correlation 
of life and technology—or, to put it differently, the relationship between 
the human and technology on the one hand, and with nature, especially 
non-human life (from animals to cells), on the other.
As I noted at the start of the introduction, the signif icance of vitalist 
philosophy for f ilm aesthetics has long been underestimated, primarily as 
a consequence of the association of vitalism and life-philosophy with an 
anti-modernist, conservative, and anti-technological stance. In the German 
context, a number of life-philosophical conceptions of organic unity, holism, 
and life force were incorporated into National Socialist ideology, and while 
some life philosophers, most prominently Nietzsche, were stylized by Nazis 
into ideological godfathers, others, notably Ludwig Klages and Oswald 
Spengler, were in fact directly involved with the fascist regime and were 
among the National Socialists’ main ideologues. Even though Uexküll had a 
much more ambiguous relationship to the Nazi regime and his Institute for 
Umwelt Research came under permanent threat after 1933, Uexküll likewise 
outlined a conservative and elitist biological theory of the state, with the 
family, the Volk, and the state as the natural building blocks.50 And until 
his grand revival in the early 1990s, Bergson’s philosophy, which was so 
popular at the beginning of the century, had been largely forgotten, in part 
because of the antagonistic redirection of French philosophy in the 1920s 
toward Hegel (Alexandre Kojève, Jean-Paul Sartre), and in part because of 
a Catholic, anti-Semitic and/or ‘masculinist’ reaction against Bergsonism 
(Julien Benda, Wyndham Lewis).51 Even though they borrowed heavily 
from Bergson, early f ilm theorists themselves tended to avoid any explicit 
mention of him, since by the early 1920s, Bergsonism—which had turned 
50 See Harrington, Reenchanted Science, esp. 56-71.
51 Bergson, like Simmel, was Jewish, and their work presents the most liberal versions of 
life-philosophy. Bergson’s focus on intuition (versus intellect)—as well as, most likely, the fact 
that his philosophy lectures were indeed attended by many women—led others to decry his 
philosophy as a feminization of philosophy. See Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, 
9-54; and Heike Klippel, Gedächtnis und Kino .
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into a popular mainstream philosophy—seemed already to belong to the 
previous, established generation.
As a consequence of these ideological associations and personal entangle-
ments, many cultural historians have discussed vitalism and life-philosophy 
from an all too narrow teleological-historical perspective, as not only pre-
modern, but also anti-modern.52 Accordingly, the majority of f ilm scholars 
have considered vitalism and life-philosophy to be at odds with a medium 
that is inextricably part of an urban mass culture, because of the way the 
latter integrated various machines and technologies into everyday life. Even 
though scholars such as Stephen Kern and Anson Rabinbach have discussed 
the rise of new cultural conceptions of space and time as fundamental para-
digm shifts that accompanied the process of industrialization, urbanization, 
and changes in social structures, these conceptions are generally restricted 
to mechanist models of explanation that compared living beings and ma-
chines.53 By contrast, I maintain that vitalist conceptions of life not only 
provided a foundation for new approaches to temporality and movement, 
but were also transformed as a consequence of their confrontation with 
cinema as a technical apparatus, and thereby directly came to incorporate 
the cultural and technological reality of modernity.
To date, the bulk of scholarship on Bergson and cinema has followed in 
the footsteps of Gilles Deleuze, though a few more historically-oriented 
texts have also traced Bergson’s influence on f ilm theory and practice.54 
While in his two books on cinema, The Movement-Image and The Time-
Image, Deleuze discusses Bergson’s own comments on cinema, he is not 
primarily interested in pursuing the historical question of the relationship 
between cinema and vitalism. Rather, Bergson’s work provided Deleuze with 
a theoretical framework and vocabulary with which to grasp the relation-
ship between time, movement, body, and action in cinema. Though it is 
of course possible to see cinema as part of the mechanistic vanguard of 
modernity while its contemporary, vitalism, was simply part of a fading 
52 Examples include Harrington, Reenchanted Science; Mitchell G. Ash, Gestalt Psychology; and 
Hans-Joachim Lieber, Kulturkritik und Lebensphilosophie. A good counter-example is Frederick 
Burwick and Paul Douglass, eds., The Crisis in Modernism.
53 Rabinbach, The Human Motor and Kern, Time and Space.
54 See, for example, Malcolm Turvey, ‘Vertov: Between the Organism and the Machine’, and 
Klippel, Gedächtnis und Kino. In art-historical scholarship, however, there are a number of 
publications that delineate the influence of Bergsonism on various art movements, in particular 
national contexts, historically, rather than theoretically; for example, on French avant-garde art, 
on Russian modernism, or on British modernism. See Antliff, Inventing Bergson; Fink, Bergson 
and Russian Modernism; Mary Ann Gillies, Henri Bergson and British Modernism.
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past, Deleuze’s reappropriation of a vitalist philosopher such as Bergson 
to rethink cinema gave scholars pause for thought before prematurely 
accepting this linear account of historical change. Deleuze’s Bergsonian 
f ilm-philosophy, like Bergson, seeks to understand the human mind via 
cinema, but undertakes a systematic analysis of f ilm form to investigate and 
illuminate ways of being and thinking. A number of publications since have 
elucidated, expanded upon, and criticized Deleuze’s approach to cinema.55 
For this project, Deleuze’s work is of interest to me primarily for the ways in 
which it develops further a tradition of primarily French vitalist f ilm theory, 
beginning with Émile Vuillermoz, Elie Faure and others, and continuing 
with André Bazin.
In outlining the importance of vitalism and life-philosophy for cinema, 
my project further engages with recent contributions to f ilm scholarship 
that deal with questions, movements, or theories that are closely related to 
the issue of vitalism, such as cinematic temporality, f ilm phenomenology, 
and affect theory. Mary Ann Doane has sought to explore the historical 
genesis of cinematic temporality. Temporality and its nexus with economics, 
culture and politics has also become a central issue in works on global art 
cinema, particularly with respect to so-called slow cinema.56 In the wake 
of the renewed attention to the body and thus to theories of spectator-
ship that counter the psychoanalytic and structuralist approaches that 
dominated f ilm scholarship up to the early 1990s, a number of scholars have 
turned to phenomenology, which is closely related to life-philosophy, and 
have noted important cross-influences between authors such as Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Simmel, Dilthey, and Bergson. And by 
emphasizing the lived body, affect, perception, and sensation, work by 
Vivian Sobchack, Mark Hansen, and others has redirected f ilm and media 
theory in a direction that is in many ways consonant with that of a vitalist 
account.57
The book as a whole is organized around the four key aesthetic axes of 
cinematic vitalism as it was developed in f ilms, by f ilm theorists, and in 
philosophical-biological theories: 1) rhythm (duration, lived temporality), 
55 Gregory Flaxman, ed., The Brain Is the Screen; Barbara M. Kennedy, Deleuze; Patricia Pisters, 
ed., Micropolitics; David Rodowick, ‘Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine’; Mirjam Schaub, Deleuze. 
56 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time; Lee Carruthers, Doing Time. On slow-
ness, see Koepnick, On Slowness; Tiego de Luca and Nuno Barradas Jorge, eds., Slow Cinema; Ira 
Jaffe, Slow Movies. 
57 Vivian Sobchack has provided the most comprehensive phenomenological account of f ilm 
spectatorship in Sobchack, Address of the Eye; while Mark Hansen’s New Philosophy for a New 
Media has introduced phenomenology into new media theory.
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2) environment (Umwelt, milieu), 3) attunement (Stimmung, mood), and 
4) development (evolution, behavior). Each of these terms depends on and 
expresses those relationships between the human organism, its milieux, 
and technologies such as cinema that can be organized vitally, dynamically, 
and non-teleologically. As I note at several points in the book, however, 
this vision of cinematic vitalism articulated by classical f ilm theorists 
and f ilmmakers is not simply of historical interest, but it also maps out 
connections among human beings, milieux, and technologies that have 
persisted throughout the history of cinema in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, and which have come to the fore especially in recent discus-
sions about the emergence of a fully digital cinema and alternative screen 
practices and installations. By contextualizing early twentieth-century f ilm 
theories within debates about vitalism and life-philosophy, I aim to present 
cinema—both then and now—not simply as an echo of the dynamics of 
mechanization and modernization, but also as a site where f ilm theorists, 
philosophers, f ilmmakers, scientists, and the everyday moviegoer could 
reflect on, negotiate, and even reorient themselves toward questions of life 
in the face of modernity, rationalization, and technologization.
Though the chapters are organized primarily around these four key 
concepts of cinematic vitalism, I argue that we can also locate four historic 
stages of the cinematic engagement with vitalism. For the f irst generation 
of f ilm critics and f ilmmakers, the word ‘life’ signaled the profound way in 
which films called on the spectator as a living, sensing being, even as the use 
of this term also complicated earlier notions of life by providing spectators 
an opportunity to witness a technologically produced liveliness; that is, the 
experience of seeing life outside itself. In the second stage, what we now call 
‘classical’ f ilm theorists of the 1920s pursued these early intuitions about 
the vitality of f ilm by developing a more full-fledged aesthetics of cinema 
that reflected on cinema’s complex relationship with various conceptions 
of life in philosophy, biology, and aesthetic theory. The third stage took 
place in the immediate post-WWII period, characterized both by further 
scientif ic and technological advances and by the experience of systematic 
mass annihilation and destruction, which shifted cinematic engagement 
with life from an emphatic to a restorative or even redemptive (Siegfried 
Kracauer) project.
Finally, and not coincidentally, in the recent past we have witnessed 
resurgent interest in life and vitalism in contemporary theory, cultural 
studies, and the history of science; a resurgence into which this book also 
taps. This interest includes reflections on the imbrication of life, power 
and politics in the wake of Michel Foucault’s elaborations on ‘biopolitics’, 
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work on ‘non-organic life’, work on forms of life that appear in particular 
historical constellations (such as Giorgio Agamben’s ‘bare life’ or Judith 
Butler’s ‘precarious life’), work based on a renewed interest in (media) 
ecology, materiality, and environmentalism, and work on the history of 
vitalism in the light of contemporary biological developments.58 My focus 
on the ongoing engagement of f ilmmakers and f ilm theorists with vitalist 
ideas aims to put this contemporary neo-vitalist thought into historical 
perspective, by linking it to a continuous historical thread of experimental 
vitalist ideas inspired by the moving image.
While this book focuses on the f irst three stages, it is very much in dia-
logue with the contemporary engagement with life and ecology in various 
disciplinary contexts. It seeks to add a historical background to current 
debates while also providing historically-grounded key terms with very 
specif ic, yet historically variable def initions, such as Umwelt or Stimmung. 
The focus on the moving image as a technological medium with a special 
aff inity to life should be understood as case study of the interrelationship, 
or rather mutual conditioning, of natural and cultural geneses. Following 
the description of this book’s chapters, I will briefly outline the current 
debates on which the book’s contents draw and inform.
Chapter 1 grounds cinematic vitalism in a medium specif icity that is 
not simply based on photographic indexicality, but rather on temporality, 
movement, and spectatorial engagement. In the writings of the vitalist 
philosophers Henri Bergson, Georg Simmel, and Ludwig Klages, rhythm is a 
natural, flowing, and embodied temporality that is expressive of the internal 
living body of the performer, listener, or spectator, and is presented by these 
writers as in opposition to modern, urban, and capitalist temporality. The 
f ilm theorists and f ilmmakers Hans Richter and Sergei Eisenstein engaged 
this discourse on rhythm in order to understand the dynamic challenge put 
to the spectator’s lived temporality that is posed by cinema’s mechanical 
temporality—a challenge pref igured in nineteenth century discourses 
in art history about Einfühlung (empathy) as well as vitalist-scientif ic 
discourses on intuition and instinct. Hans Richter’s scroll paintings and 
abstract Rhythm f ilms (1921-25) present an attempt to develop a non-organic 
aesthetic that combines life and machine, merging the temporality and 
58 On biopolitics, see Roberto Esposito, Bios; Melinda Cooper, Life as Surplus; on non-organic 
life, see Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History; on ‘bare life’, see Giorgio 
Agamben, Homo Sacer; on ‘precarious life’, Judith Butler, Precarious Life; on an expanded notion 
of ecology and materiality, see Timothy Morton, Ecology without Nature; Jane Bennett, Vibrant 
Matter; and Matthew Fuller, Media Ecologies; and on the contemporary revisiting of vitalism, 
Sebastian Normandin and Charles T. Wolfe, eds., Vitalism and the Scientific Image.
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formal properties of cinema with the rhythm of the embodied spectator. 
Whereas the abstract f ilms of Walter Ruttmann and Oskar Fischinger were 
based on an aesthetic of organic forms, Richter’s f ilms sought a non-organic 
aesthetic that combined life and machine, merging the temporality and 
formal properties of cinema with the embodied spectator. This non-organic 
formal aesthetic found its equivalent in Richter’s writings, which likewise 
expressed the dynamic challenge put to the spectator’s lived temporality 
by cinema’s mechanical temporality. Richter’s work thus constitutes an 
example of a formalist cinematic vitalism based on movement, composi-
tion, and embodied perception rather than the realism of cinema’s moving 
photographic images. I conclude by noting that Soviet montage f ilmmaker 
Eisenstein’s theory of montage from the 1920s and 1930s transferred this 
formalist vitalism to the f ilm technique of montage, which for Eisenstein 
is cinema’s way of engaging with the inherent vitality of all matter.
Moving away from the organizing capacities of life internal to organisms, 
such as rhythm, Chapter 2 shifts the focus to the external organization of the 
world by a living being. I discuss how, in both biology and the avant-garde 
f ilm of the 1910s and 1920s, there was a new conception of life as radiating 
outward into the environment of living beings. The biologist Jakob von 
Uexküll serves as the protagonist of this chapter, for his interest in the 
way in which the perceptual abilities of different living beings ‘created’ or 
determined that being’s world proved inspirational to many theorists of 
early cinema and, in its use of photographic and cinematic techniques, as 
well as the idea of perceptual worlds, itself constitutes a kind of cinematic 
biology. In contrast to prior understandings of the environment as a ‘milieu’ 
inf luencing and shaping largely passive living beings, Uexküll’s theory 
of Umwelt (the ‘surrounding world’) describes the active creation of the 
environment by a living being. The chapter begins by tracing the central 
role played by chronophotography, cinema, and aesthetic theory (especially 
that of Kant and that developed under the term Einfühlung) in both the 
development of Uexküll’s theory of biology and for his literary and pictorial 
imaginations of various Umwelten. The literary and imaginative qualities of 
Uexküll’s work—the idea that there was not one common world, but rather 
a multitude of worlds—in turn inspired avant-garde artists and filmmakers 
from the Dada and Bauhaus movements, as well as Walter Benjamin, who 
drew upon Umwelt theory in his most seminal writings on f ilm. Unearthing 
the role of Umwelt theory is thus not only a matter of recovering a lost 
context of cinema’s early history, but it is also a means of theorizing how 
cinema provided a blueprint for imagining life, life forms, other bodies, 
and other sensations, both animal and machinic. The chapter concludes 
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with an analysis of the work of the surrealist documentary f ilmmaker 
Jean Painlevé, to discuss how the spectator’s negotiation of f ilm as Umwelt 
and the technological mediation of animals enables an encounter with 
non-human senses and sensibilities.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the aesthetic implications of the modernist con-
cepts of subject-environment interaction outlined in the previous chapter. 
German Expressionist and Kammerspiel (‘chamberplay’) f ilm of the 1920s, 
as well as accompanying f ilm-theoretical texts, located the vitality of 
f ilm in its ability to create a dense, atmospheric surrounding world that 
a spectator might inhabit by attuning herself to its qualities. Lupu Pick’s 
and F.W. Murnau’s f ilms in particular were able to create intense moods 
by means of stylistic choices pertaining to the mise en scène (close shot 
ranges, lighting, etc.) that vivif ied landscapes, locales, and things, and 
dynamize the relationship between protagonists and their environment. In 
discussions of these f ilms, f ilmmakers, scriptwriters, critics, and theorists 
turned to the aesthetic concept of Stimmung (mood, attunement, tonality), 
which captures simultaneously the tonal quality of what surrounds us 
(atmosphere), our own tonality (mood), and the process of attuning to 
a mood or atmosphere. In the long history of Stimmung as an aesthetic 
term, philosophers, writers, and art historians, including Kant, Friedrich 
Schiller, J. G. Fichte, Friedrich Nietzsche, Georg Simmel and Alois Riegl, 
made recourse to Stimmung to think about the relationship between subject 
and environment, objectivity and subjectivity, imagination and reason, and 
sensation and thought. Expressionist and Kammerspiel f ilm of the 1920s 
continued this aesthetic inquiry, but infused it with a vitalist dynamic, 
as evidenced in texts on these f ilms by Béla Balázs, Willy Haas, Lotte 
Eisner, Mayer and Pick. I show how the aesthetics of cinematic Stimmung 
intervenes in broader debates about the role of ‘environment’ in social, 
cultural, and scientif ic debates, and does so by counteracting the notion 
of a rigidly determining milieu developed in realist and naturalist novels 
and plays (and, by extension, in the scientif ic debates upon which those 
literary discourses drew).
The focus of Chapter 4 is the return (and, in some cases, the continua-
tion) of specif ic vitalist motifs in immediate post-WWII f ilm theory, in a 
context in which scientists had abandoned the opposition of vitalism and 
mechanism in favor of more integrative models of how dynamic-organic 
qualities and physico-chemical forces interact. Vitalism was especially 
unpopular after the war, for many vitalist ideas had merged with Nazi 
ideology in the Third Reich, as holism and the idea of the state as organism 
served to justify an aggressive foreign policy and racial ideologies. Yet a 
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progressive strand of vitalist thought persisted throughout this period, 
particularly in France, appearing both in the work of a few individuals 
in disciplines such as philosophy (e.g., Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Helmuth 
Plessner), but also, signif icantly, in f ilm theory. Rather than concentrat-
ing on holistic notions of the body and, by extension, communities, 
authors such as André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer focused on the idea 
of a (vulnerable) open body; instead of the eternal temporality of the 
Third Reich and the ecstasy of its well-orchestrated mass festivals, they 
maintained an open temporality of the everyday (which, for them, was 
exemplif ied by Italian neorealist cinema). This chapter examines Bazin’s 
f ilm essays and Kracauer’s Theory of Film, and in particular the conceptions 
of nature, life, and evolution in these texts, as well as their connection 
to post-catastrophic narrative forms and visual styles in cinema, from 
neorealism to modernist and new wave f ilms from the 1950s and 1960s. 
The questions of vitality, emergence, evolution, and development that are 
central to Bazin’s and Kracauer’s f ilm theories build on the discussions 
of rhythm, mood, and environment in chapters 1-3, but also ref lect the 
post-vitalist debates about behavior, evolution and cybernetics of the 1950s 
and 1960s. In the conclusion, I reflect on the ways in which the contours 
of cinematic vitalism outlined in this book relate to recent ‘neo-vitalist’ 
theories of materiality, media, and affect.
Insofar as the goal of my project is to trace the aff inity between cinema 
and vitalist concepts of life, it also serves as a necessary corrective to many 
current ideas about the relationship between cinema and science, which 
often cast this relationship in terms of transmission: either the transmission 
of scientif ic concepts and methods into cinema, or the transmission of 
cinematic concepts and methods into science. Focusing on aff inities, by 
contrast, means considering the ways in which cinema alters and draws 
out new points of interest from scientif ic ideas even as it incorporates them, 
and it means looking at the ways in which cinematic technologies and 
concepts of cinema facilitate new modes of science. Focusing on the aff ini-
ties between f ilm and vitalism is thus a means for developing a different 
historical, ontological lens for looking at f ilm, and it provides a way both 
to break up narrow ideological conceptions of vitalism and life-philosophy 
and to illuminate the all-too-familiar contours of classical f ilm theoretical 
texts from an unusual angle, which in turn enables us to draw new insights 
and interrelations.
In describing the relationship between f ilm and life in terms of aff inity, I 
am borrowing from Siegfried Kracauer, who claims that cinema harbors an 
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‘aff inity’ for ‘the “flow of life”‘.59 Aff inity is a term that Kracauer never con-
ceptualizes or explains. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, it can 
describe a connection both ‘by inclination or attraction’, be it voluntary and 
social, natural, chemical, or spiritual; and ‘by position’, that is, by marriage, 
by kinship, or by structural resemblance between languages, animals, or 
plants.60 For our present purposes, the term ‘affinity’ thus encompasses both 
the notion that cinema and vitalist conceptions of life may be connected 
by position (because they blossomed historically around the same time; 
because they are indeed structurally related; etc.) and the notion that they 
are connected by inclination (they are drawn to one another since they 
are similar, and thus mutually complement one another, or reaff irm one 
another). Additionally, the term ‘aff inity’ encompasses both a scientif ic-
analytic meaning (as in, for example, the chemical aff inity between atoms) 
and a cultural, emotional meaning. This double sense, both scientif ic and 
cultural, is something that the term aff inity also has in common with 
cinema, which from its inception has been grounded in both science and 
art, analysis and synthesis, fact and fabrication.
It was upon this double meaning of aff inity that Goethe also built his 
novel Elective Affinities (Wahlverwandtschaften). The novel explores mar-
riage, attraction, and free will from the perspective of chemical reaction, by 
describing the experiment whereby a married couple add another man and 
woman to their household.61 Joseph Vogl has embedded Goethe’s novel in the 
context of the then-current scientif ic debates about chemical aff inity. Louis 
Berthollet had discovered that attraction between elements is an unstable 
system, constantly producing new divisions and leaving a remainder that 
ensures the continuation of chemical processes ad inf initum. The scientist 
Johann Wilhelm Ritter, a friend of Goethe’s, subsequently reduced chemical 
aff inity—and along with it, every organic process—to the electric polarity 
59 Kracauer mentions four ‘aff inities’ of photography: an ‘aff inity for unstaged reality’, a 
tendency ‘to stress the fortuitous’, a tendency ‘to suggest endlessness’, and ‘an aff inity for the 
indeterminate’. Film has a f ifth aff inity: ‘Now f ilms tend to capture physical existence in its 
endlessness. Accordingly, one may also say that they have an aff inity, evidently denied to 
photography, for the continuum of life or the “f low of life,” which of course is identical with 
open-ended life. The concept “f low of life,” then, covers the stream of material situations and 
happenings with all that they intimate in terms of emotions, values, thoughts.’ Kracauer, Theory 
of Film, 18-20, 71.
60 ‘Aff inity’, in Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2016). http://www.oed.
com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/Entry/3417?redirectedFrom=Aff inity& (accessed March 15th, 
2016).
61 Goethe, Elective Affinities. On the wider implications of the term ‘aff inity’ in Goethe, see 
Andrew McKinnon, ‘Elective Aff inities of the Protestant Ethics’.
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of hydrogen and oxygen, a process that does not merely combine, join and 
divide separate entities, but also creates a new ‘product’ by consuming the 
joined elements.62 As the four characters in the novel embark on their social 
experiment (‘Description is inadequate’, after all), one of them, a captain 
possessing chemical knowledge, explains:
One has to have these entities before one’s eyes, and see how, although 
they appear to be lifeless, they are in fact perpetually ready to spring into 
activity; one has to watch sympathetically how they seek one another out, 
attract, seize, destroy, devour, consume one another, and then emerge 
again from this most intimate union in renewed, novel and unexpected 
shape: it is only then that one credits them with an eternal life, yes, 
with possessing mind and reason, because our own minds seem scarcely 
adequate to observing them properly and our understanding scarcely 
suff icient to comprehend them.63
Film is reflected in this quote in two ways. The experience and witnessing 
of a chemical reaction bears no relation to its lifeless description. By viewing 
the elements and the unstable forces of attraction themselves, we grant 
them life, mind and reason, a phenomenon ref lected in f ilm theorists’ 
description of the vivif ication of things. But f ilm and life are elements 
like these, too, such that description of the medium becomes theory of the 
medium. Both f ilm and life, I argue in this book, react to one another under 
various conditions and in the context of different additional elements in the 
various f ilms and f ilm-theoretical texts under consideration. The result is 
never an ‘essence’ (of the medium, of life), but an unstable, temporary state 
that seeks to name a fleeting state before it changes shape again.
62 Joseph Vogl, ‘Nomos der Ökonomie’, 519-24.
63 Goethe, Elective Affinities, 47.

1. Vitalism and Abstraction
Rhythm and Non-Organic Life from Hans Richter to Sergei 
Eisenstein
The Reinvention of Cinema in Abstract Film
A number of early f ilm and cultural critics, such as Rémy de Gourmont, 
Alfred Döblin, and Hermann Häfker, discussed cinema’s fascination and 
potential in terms of the lifelikeness of its images. They sought to f ind 
words for the peculiar nature of the relationship in time, via movement, 
between the spectator and the moving image. It might seem that what I 
have called ‘cinematic vitalism’ relies on indexicality and the vitality of 
the photographed world. Cinematic vitalism would then be an aspect of a 
particular trajectory of f ilm theory, namely the one that Siegfried Kracauer 
in his Theory of Film called the ‘realistic tendency’, which he privileged 
over the formalist tendency. This binary distinction was subsequently 
picked up in f ilm theory, most notably by Dudley Andrew in The Major 
Film Theories, and has long shaped our understanding of f ilm history.1 
According to Kracauer, a f ilm’s aesthetic validity, the consequence of a 
‘cinematic approach’ to matter, needs to be led by an engagement with the 
physical world and only secondarily informed by formal interventions of 
framing, montage, narrative, and so forth.2 Like Kracauer, Andrew traced 
the opposition of realism and formalism back to the f ilms of the Lumière 
brothers versus those of George Méliès. However, he organized the history 
of f ilm theory and practice as a whole chronologically around the two poles, 
by claiming that pre-WWII f ilm theory, in reaction to early cinema’s ‘crude’ 
realism, was by and large formalist (Hugo Münsterberg, Rudolf Arnheim, 
and Sergei Eisenstein serve as his prime examples), while Kracauer and 
André Bazin spearheaded post-WWII realist f ilm theory.
Other early f ilm critics, however, who play a central role in my inquiry 
into cinematic vitalism—including Georg Lukács and Béla Balázs—actu-
ally built their thoughts on cinema on the difference between the f ilm 
image and reality; or rather, the difference between the image and unmedi-
ated perception. Both Bazin’s and Kracauer’s work, as well as early Lumière 
f ilms and the ‘Lumière aesthetic’, are indeed central touchstones of this 
1 See Andrew, Major Film Theories.
2 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 37-39.
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book, yet the interaction with vitalism on the part of f ilmmakers and f ilm 
theorists is by no means restricted to realist f ilm and f ilm theory—not 
least because (as both Kracauer and Andrew readily admit) the binary 
division between realism and formalism is itself too rigid and artif icial to 
be useful as a means of orientation.3 The distinction between a tendency 
toward the photographic and a tendency toward the non-photographic, 
formal aspects of f ilm can help us, however, to sketch out a particular aspect 
of cinematic vitalism that, rather than relying on photographic realism, 
emerges from a consideration of the formal and formative properties of 
the cinematographic apparatus and of f ilm itself, including mechanical 
movement, projection, and montage. A cine-vitalist approach is thus not 
restricted to the ‘recording’ and ‘revealing’ of the visible world, but also 
considers the vital exchange between the embodied spectator and the 
f ilm body.
This chapter traces the role of vitalist conceptions of life in and for 
abstract f ilm, on the one hand—that is, f ilms that seem to be diametri-
cally opposed to photographic realism and a depiction of ‘life itself’—and 
montage theory, on the other hand. Early abstract f ilm includes the work 
of f ilmmakers such as Hans Richter, Viking Eggeling, Walter Ruttmann, 
Germaine Dulac, and Fernand Léger. A number of these f ilms were created 
in the context of broader art movements, especially Dada (Eggeling, Richter, 
Léger), and connected to attempts to distill something like cinema’s essence 
by means of a pure or absolute f ilm (Dulac, Richter). The elements of this 
essence were movement, rhythm, and light, and a peculiarly dynamic, 
intuitive connection between spectator and image. These f ilmmakers and 
theorists were concerned with re-building cinema from the ground up, 
starting with its literal body, its matter, and developing cinema’s ‘physical 
expression’, its capacity to express and transmit ideas, on the basis of this 
physiognomy.
In the f irst and longest part of this chapter, I focus on Hans Richter’s 
collaborative work with Viking Eggeling and the eventual production 
of Richter’s f irst abstract f ilm, Rhythm 21 (the exact date of the f ilm 
is unknown, but Richter seems to have begun work on it in 1921 and 
completed it in 1923/24). I argue that we ought to see Rhythm 21 as a 
3 A case in point of the limitations of this distinction is Andrew’s classif ication of Béla Balázs 
as a formalist. Sergei Eisenstein, a ‘formalist’ f ilmmaker par excellence, formulated the sharpest 
critique of Balázs in this respect (avant la lettre): see Eisenstein, ‘Béla Forgets the Scissors’. Dan 
Morgan has made a powerful argument for a reconsideration of classical ‘realist’ f ilm theory 
and the role of style; see Morgan, ‘Rethinking Bazin.’
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‘reinvention’ of cinema. Cinema had become a well-established medium 
by this point, with abundant nickelodeons dotting city streets and an 
increasing number of picture palaces—grand cinemas in the style of 
theaters—accompanying efforts to reach bourgeois audiences and raise 
the medium’s artistic prof ile. Yet Richter and Eggeling turned to cinema 
in order to solve a set of vitalist-aesthetic issues and problems that they 
had initially addressed in scroll painting, but that—at least, so Richter be-
lieved—could only be fully pursued by exploiting the capacity of cinema 
to merge the living temporality of the spectator with the mechanical tem-
porality of the f ilm apparatus. They tried to f ind an abstract expressive 
f ilm language that could capture the potential of the new, mechanical 
vitality they felt the cinematograph possessed. In the second, shorter part 
of this chapter, I turn to montage theory, in particular Sergei Eisenstein’s 
writings. I argue that Russian montage theory, especially Eisenstein’s 
later conception of montage, presents a translation of the sensual-formal 
principles employed by Richter in Rhythm 21 into photographic, narrative 
f ilm, and can be seen as a continuation of a certain approach to f ilm as 
vitalized matter.
None of the artists and f ilmmakers that I consider in this chapter were 
vitalists in the sense that biologist Hans Driesch was; that is, none of 
these artists and f ilmmakers felt the need to commit him- or herself to a 
specif ic set of ontological claims about the relationship between life and 
physical-chemical explanations of the natural world. However, all of the 
artists and f ilmmakers that I consider addressed a topic that was central 
to vitalist accounts of life, namely, the importance of vital rhythm; and 
for most of them, this seems to have been a function of reading vitalist 
philosophers such as Henri Bergson, Ludwig Klages, or Georg Simmel. The 
importance of vitalist conceptions of life to these authors and f ilmmak-
ers is thus related to their belief in the ability of the medium of f ilm to 
structure, that is, rhythmicize, time, and create a temporal organization. 
Rhythm paired with Einfühlung (‘empathy’), abstraction, and animation, 
I am suggesting, provided a formula for a ‘vitalist formalism’. A projected 
f ilm, according to this line of thought, has an aff inity for life not because 
it presents the living duration of the natural world, but rather because it is 
itself a temporal, organized body, an organism changing over time, whose 
rhythmic temporality—a result of f licker, the mechanical motion of the 
f ilmstrip, the movement in the image, mise en scène, and montage—is 
expressive of the f ilm’s life. The distinction between this vitalist formalism 
and a vitalist materialism in f ilm theory and practice is just one of several 
tendencies, however, since both directions converge in a consideration of 
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the spectator’s perception and sensations. This chapter thus also turns 
to painting and music, because it was by rethinking cinema with the help 
of other arts—and in particular music’s temporal gestalt and painting’s 
planar expressivity—that Richter and others sought to conceive of a vital 
expressivity specif ic to f ilm.
A Universal Language
The 1910s and early 1920s saw the creation of a number of abstract f ilms, 
especially in the context of futurist, constructivist, or Dadaist art move-
ments. The non-representative, non-photographic images of these early 
abstract f ilms challenged dominant ideas about the nature of cinema: while 
these f ilms emphasized movement and rhythm, they also rendered the 
cinematic image independent from photographic realism. Some of these 
abstract f ilms—for example, those of Oskar Fischinger (who later went to 
Hollywood and worked briefly for Disney on Fantasia, 1940) and Walter 
Ruttmann (who created the abstract Opus 1-4 f ilms before his famous f ilm 
Berlin: Symphony of a Great City from 1927)—emphasized forms and move-
ments that were organic, pulsating, reminiscent of natural movement, and 
intended to facilitate a mimetic response in the spectator. The early abstract 
f ilms of Hans Richter and his friend Viking Eggeling, by contrast, lacked 
forms that would encourage a mimetic response, for their f ilms featured 
geometrical, inorganic forms, such as lines, squares, and rectangles.
Yet I argue that it is precisely the inorganic quality of these f ilms’ formal 
language that demonstrates the amalgamation of vitalist ideas and techno-
logical medium. This amalgamation was the result of a work process over 
the course of several years on the part of Richter and Eggeling, and I thus 
develop my argument by retracing their steps in four stages. I f irst describe 
Richter’s collaborative work with Viking Eggeling, which began with an 
attempt to create a universal sign language. Then, in part two, I discuss 
Richter’s and Eggeling’s move to the medium of painting on long scrolls, and, 
in part three, their move to the medium of f ilm. In following this trajectory, 
I am especially interested in the different conceptions of the temporality of 
the aesthetic object and its relationship to the temporality of the beholder 
or spectator that accompanied their shift from one medium to another.4 
4 One could argue that alongside this theoretical and aesthetic adjustment, there is a third 
one, namely the adjustment from the paradigm of artistic exclusive production and the artist-
as-creator to the cinematic paradigm of a popular, democratic, mass-cultural medium and the 
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As I will try to make clear in the fourth and f inal part, what emerges from 
Richter’s and Eggeling’s engagement with cinema is an approach to the 
medium strongly influenced by Bergsonian vitalist ideas, which challenges 
not only our usual understanding of cinematic temporality, but also early 
twentieth-century discourses on abstraction and empathy. I argue that 
Rhythm 21 provides us with an example of a cinema created on the basis of 
vitalist ideas of life, whereby the latter were transformed and mutated to 
accommodate the mechanical apparatus of cinema.
How should we approach a f ilm like Rhythm 21? It is a f ilm that consists 
only of white, black and grey squares and rectangles changing shape and 
shifting position; a f ilm that is not only devoid of narrative, but also ap-
parently of any other means that would allow us to project emotions or 
values. Moreover, the f ilm’s form, length, title and year of creation are also 
unclear: Richter and others provide contradictory information, and, as 
Holger Wilmesmeier concludes, the ‘existence of four different designa-
tions—Film ist Rhythmus, Rhythmus 21, Filmspiel, Ohne Haupttitel—for 
one single f ilm […] indicates the rather provisional character of this work.’5 
And how might we relate a f ilm that is so obviously lodged in an artistic, 
painterly context to f ilm aesthetics, theory, and history? In 1921 (the year 
of Rhythm 21’s partial creation; it was only screened publicly in 1924), f ilms 
on international screens included Charlie Chaplin’s The Kid, Fritz Lang’s 
Destiny or Der müde Tod, and D. W. Griff ith’s Orphans of the Storm, while 
The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari had been produced the year before. All of these 
narrative f ilms are representative of a moment in f ilm history when f ilm 
became more widely accepted as an art form in public discourse, and 
narrative cinema had developed a wide array of stylistic devices, from 
parallel editing to the close-up, from intricate special effects to increasingly 
experimental camerawork. By the time that Richter began to establish 
himself in the world of artists and bohemians, in other words, cinema had 
already been around for almost twenty years and had established itself as 
an art form in its own right with a distinct aesthetic.
At the same time, both f ilm and its precursor, chronophotography, had 
had a huge impact on artists working in other media, such as painting, 
photography, architecture or theater. These new technological media shook 
spectator-as-creator. After his experiments in abstract f ilm, Richter made short essay f ilms 
(Inflation) and became much more interested in socially-engaged documentary f ilm that reached 
out to the audience. And in montage theory (see the f inal section of this chapter), the active 
role of the spectator is even more pronounced.
5 Wilmesmeier, ‘Entstehungsgeschichte’, 40.
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artists’ understanding of temporality, movement, and the relationship 
between human body and machine.6 Richter’s work in painting, which 
eventually led him to f ilm, was thus itself already influenced by f ilm; yet, 
because he was approaching f ilm as a painter, through the back door, he 
was able to see f ilm differently and, in this sense, reinvent it. Rather than 
as a model of influence, we might want to think about this intertwined 
path as a process of cross-pollination, with ideas of movement, form, time, 
abstraction, and nature generated by both media (and others, certainly) in 
the air, which were then taken up by artists such as Richter. (André Bazin 
develops a similar model of the mutual evolution of painting and cinema, 
as well as theater and cinema, according to which each only comes into its 
own by opening up to other art forms. I will return to this in Chapter 4.)
Richter’s orientation towards f ilm was forged during the time he spent 
in Zürich as part of the f irst Dada group that had formed there. While WWI 
was claiming the lives of friends, colleagues, and countless others around 
them, a group of artists had gathered around Hugo Ball and Tristan Tzara 
in Zürich in neutral Switzerland, and they soon called themselves ‘Dada’. 
In the context of this group, in 1918, Hans Richter, a young painter from 
Berlin, began to collaborate with the Swedish painter Viking Eggeling. 
Eggeling was already undertaking systematic studies of the possibility of 
creating a universal visual language, something in which Richter had also 
just become interested. Initially, Hans Richter played the role of a student, 
studying the laws Eggeling had worked out for the relationship of lines to 
each other, and gradually incorporating them into his style.7
The term ‘universal language’ was a buzzword in the 1910s, especially 
with respect to the debate about the possibilities and achievements of f ilm. 
Film pioneer D.W. Griff ith claimed that f ilm was universally understand-
able and fundamentally democratic, and he sought to put these principles 
into practice with films such as Birth of a Nation (1915) and Intolerance (1916).8 
This ‘language of f ilm’, however, was by no means the semiotic, structuralist 
understanding of a parallel between f ilm and language that dominated 
f ilm theory in the 1970s and 1980s. The idea of f ilm as universal language 
was rather based upon the idea that photographic f ilm’s representation of 
6 Ideas of simultaneity, dynamism, time and movement, which occupied futurists, cubists, 
and Dadaists alike, are rooted in the confrontation with chronophotography and f ilm—an 
important example would be Marcel Duchamp’s Nude Descending a Staircase, which almost 
seems like a response to Muybridge’s serial motifs. See also Marta Braun, Picturing Time.
7 Compare the descriptions of Eggeling’s and Richter’s collaboration in Louise O’Konor, Viking 
Eggeling; Hans Richter, Dada: Art and Anti-Art; and Richter, Begegnungen von Dada bis heute. 
8 On Griff ith’s ideas of f ilm as a universal language, see Hansen, Babel and Babylon. 
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a waving hand or a smile can be understood by all humans immediately, 
mimetically, and as such resembles a hieroglyphic language, which is based 
on mimetic signs. It thus bore a closer relation to Walter Benjamin’s no-
tion of language as a mimetic faculty. According to Benjamin, runes and 
hieroglyphs indicate the passing of a certain type of mimesis, namely 
‘non-sensuous similarity’, from occult practices to (written) language.9 
This is also how Vachel Lindsay, an early American f ilm theorist, def ined 
the ‘Egyptian’ quality of cinema (and somewhat later, Sergei Eisenstein 
likewise compared cinema to hieroglyphics).10
Yet even as Eggeling and Richter used this same term, ‘universal lan-
guage’, they seem not to have been aware at this point of a parallel between 
their project and the description by f ilm directors and critics of cinema as 
a new, ‘universal’ medium. Rather, Eggeling’s and Richter’s studies of the 
possibility of a universal language took music and its time-based perception 
as their point of departure. Music, as a non-representational art form, has 
a long history of being conceived of as universally understandable; one 
need only think of the discussions of music in Lessing’s Laocöon, Schopen-
hauer’s World as Will and Representation, or Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, 
all of which grant music a privileged position among the arts due to its 
temporal, non-representational nature.11 Eggeling and Richter were trying 
to develop a basic system of lines, forms, and interrelations between them 
that would constitute the underlying basis for more complex expressions; 
something Eggeling called a ‘general bass (or basso continuo) of painting’.12 
As a consequence, they modeled the visual forms that they produced on the 
musical principles of harmony and counterpoint, that is, on the interplay 
of several musical lines. In music, the term ‘harmony’ describes the sound 
of notes that are heard simultaneously. Even though harmony is depend-
ent upon the context within which it is heard, one could still say that it 
privileges the vertical aspect of sound. ‘Counterpoint’, by contrast, refers to 
the principle of simultaneous melodies that are interacting (harmonically) 
with one another. In counterpoint, both the linear or horizontal dimension 
of individual melody-lines and the vertical dimension of their harmonious 
interaction are important elements of composition. As a consequence, 
9 See Benjamin, ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’, 722.
10 See Vachel Lindsay, The Art of the Moving Picture, esp. 199-216.
11 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocöon; Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Repre-
sentation; Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy.
12 An idea already formulated by Goethe; similarly, Leibniz had attempted a universal language 
based on musical and mathematical principles to express ‘thoughts’.
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contrapuntal music can become fairly complex, and often has an almost 
spatial, multi-dimensional structure.
The direct musical influence on Richter and Eggeling came, in large part, 
from the composer Ferruccio Busoni, who befriended Richter in Zürich in 
early 1918, shortly before Eggeling arrived (Richter himself was a skilled 
piano player).13 Busoni’s most important work, which occupied him for 
most of his professional life as composer, was the transcription of Johann 
Sebastian Bach’s works for organ and clavichord to piano, the so-called 
Bach-Busoni Editions. Richter’s and Eggeling’s interest in counterpoint was 
thus not coincidental, but derived from a study of Bach’s eighteenth-century 
fugues and preludes, rather than the music of Beethoven or Wagner, for 
example.14 Richter himself later noted that Busoni had advised him to study 
the laws of counterpoint when ‘form, as such, became a handicap’ in his 
attempt to organize ‘the relationship of one part of a painting to the other’.15
Richter’s and Eggeling’s translation of the principles of counterpoint 
into painting was itself part of a small movement within painting in the 
1910s. Other painters within their sphere of influence had already done so, 
including Frantisek Kupka with Amorpha: Fugue à deux couleurs (1912), 
Wassily Kandinsky with Fuga (Beherrschte Improvisation) (1914), and Adolf 
Hölzel with Fuge (Über ein Auferstehungsthema) (1916). While these were 
stylistically all very different, they had in common the application of the 
structural principles of counterpoint by variations and inversions of shape 
and color throughout the image, resulting in dynamic compositions.16 
For Richter and Eggeling, counterpoint was the basic principle of their 
sketches toward a universal language, because they sought to dynamize 
expression. For them, expression was not located in a stable form, but in 
the relationship between forms. They thus systematically tested out the 
effects of various vertical and horizontal relationships; that is, the tension 
and relaxation between parts created by particular formal constellations. 
According to Eggeling, the guiding formal principles in their studies were 
‘polarity’, ‘contrast’ and ‘analogy’.17 The concept of ‘polarity ‘ as elemental 
natural dynamic has a long history in nineteenth-century philosophy and 
13 See Marion Hofacker, ‘Chronology’, 288.
14 William Moritz adds to the musical influences on Eggeling Stravinsky, Arnold Schönberg 
and the Vienna School. See William Moritz, ‘Der abstrakte Film seit 1930’, 133. 
15 Richter, Hans Richter, 112.
16 See Maria Teresa Arf ini, ‘Abstract Film as Viewable Music’.
17 Eggeling quoted in Richter, Hans Richter, 112. In ‘Die schecht trainierte Seele’ (‘The Badly 
Trained Sensibility’), Richter describes the fundamental principle of Rhythmus 21 with the same 
simple paradigm. See Richter, ‘Die schlecht trainierte Seele’.
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life science, from Schelling to Goethe to Schopenhauer, and Richter’s and 
Eggeling’s formal choice highlights the degree to which their universal 
language was meant to be modeled on principles of movement and growth 
applicable throughout the natural world.18
Eggeling’s sketches show that he was primarily interested in working 
out these formal issues by means of lines (Fig. 1.1). This sketch reveals that 
he derived the basic forms for the elements of a universal language from 
abstractions of natural forms, such as the relationship between the outlines 
and structures of hills, trees, and other visual phenomena (this is especially 
evident in the drawings on the bottom right). In the upper half of the sketch, 
he systematically explores the effect of drawn-out, dotted, or non-existent 
outlines (f irst row) and lines (center of the page), as well as radial lines 
(second row). The latter, in turn, pose the question of the ‘directionality’ and 
‘spatiality’ of lines: when radial outlines are added to a line or form (circle, 
square, triangle), this addition not only adds dynamism and direction to 
the form, but also upsets the perception of space, since the rays def ine 
further the relationship between the form and its environment. The sketch 
also illustrates Eggeling’s experiments with contrast and analogy, that is, 
experiments on the ways in which forms influence one another, creating 
an expression based on their relationship. A quick glance at the variations 
of two pointed and two round shapes on the right side of the bottom half of 
the page reveals Eggeling’s exploration of the relationships between outline 
(Silhouette, pointed/inorganic and round/organic), size, ‘f illing’ (Füllung, 
striped and dotted), and position, and the consequences of subtle variations 
for the expression of the whole ensemble.
Richter, by contrast, was more interested in the relationship between 
planes, rather than lines, an interest that had already occupied him in the 
series of ink drawings entitled Dada Head (Dada Kopf), which constitutes 
his f irst experimentation with counterpoint (see Fig. 1.2). An exemplary 
sketch of his universal form language (Fig. 1.3) illustrates Richter’s sys-
tematic exploration on the level of planes and volumes of ‘contrast’ and 
‘analogy’ and the expression ensuing from the various tensions that are 
established between forms. Yet it is worth stressing that this was not just 
a mathematical sketch of possible positions, but rather an exploration of 
basic elements of design, of Gestaltung, and, as such, of artistic creation 
itself. Richter takes as his starting point two rectangles—one black and 
one white—that align on a horizontal plane, but that stand at right angles 
18 On the relevance of the concept of ‘polarity’ for Richter, see also Cowan, ‘Bewegungskunst,’ 
66-69.
 
Fig. 1.1: Viking eggeling’s sketches for a universal language.
 Fig. 1.2: Hans richter’s Dada Kopf.
Fig. 1.3: Hans richter’s sketches for a universal language, entitled ‘following V. e.’ (undated).
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to one another (top left). In the vertical column, he progressively changes 
number and color—he f irst doubles the rectangles, then switches their 
color, and then doubles them again—while the corresponding horizontal 
rows switch the positions of these variations in number and color. These 
early studies thus express a very specif ic and unique conception of form 
as dynamic interplay, rather than as static outline. Richter formulated his 
insight thus: ‘Form could only be configured by its opposite and became 
alive only through the production of an intimate relationship between the 
opposites.’19 For both Eggeling and Richter, a form was not expressive in and 
of itself. Rather, a form became expressive only in relation to something 
else. This relationality between forms produced an expressive tension, and 
it is from the perception of this tension that meaning emerged. It was in 
this tension, this relationship of one form to an Other, that Richter located 
vitality, the ‘living’ quality of form.
Bergson, Intuition, and Art
According to Richter and Eggeling, the meaning of this universal formal 
language had to be grasped intuitively, rather than intellectually. They 
founded this premise upon Henri Bergson’s notion of intuition, introduced 
by Bergson in Creative Evolution, which appeared in France in 1907 (though 
the book was not translated into German until 1921) and which soon became 
an important reference work for artists throughout Europe.20 The Zürich 
Dada group’s connections to Paris, particularly via Hans Arp, Tristan Tzara, 
and Francis Picabia most likely initially introduced Eggeling and Richter 
to Bergsonism. Extensive notes on Creative Evolution by Eggeling, made 
at the time of Eggeling’s and Richter’s collaboration at the Richter family 
estate near Berlin in 1919/20, establish Eggeling’s deep familiarity with 
Bergson’s ideas—indeed, all of the notes that Eggeling subsumed under 
the heading ‘Film’ are quotations, summaries, and comments related to 
Creative Evolution.21
As discussed in the introduction, Bergson famously discussed the cin-
ematograph as an example of the workings of the intellect, yet Eggeling and 
Richter, like many other painters in the early twentieth century, seized upon 
Bergson’s notion of intuition as inspiration for their work in painting and 
19 Richter, Dada: Art and Anti-Art, 65.
20 See, for example, Antliff, Inventing Bergson; Fink, Bergson and Russian Modernism. 
21 See O’Konor, Viking Eggeling, 92-96.
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f ilm. In Creative Evolution, Bergson distinguished between two different 
approaches to the world, which he argued had resulted in two separate 
lines of biological evolution. He called the f irst an ‘intellectual’ approach. 
Intelligence, he argued, grasps objects as facts, and thus it grasps what it 
already knows; it is therefore always oriented toward inert matter and 
its spatial, factual extension. The intellectual approach to the world—of 
which humans are the most extreme instance—proceeds by constantly 
inventing new instruments that mediate among the self, the natural body, 
and the world. Intelligence, Bergson claimed, is unable to grasp time as the 
essence of life, as experiential, lived, qualitative time, or what he called 
durée (‘duration’). By contrast, the instinctual approach to the world on the 
part of animals, and especially of lower animals, such as insects, is f irmly 
lodged in life and cannot be strictly separated from the overall organization 
of a living being. Consequently, the instruments that instinctive beings 
use are an organic part of their body, and they have instinctive, immedi-
ate knowledge of how to use these instruments. Instinctual beings thus 
comprehend the surrounding world through a gesture of sympathy, in the 
original cosmological meaning of the term.22
To illustrate his understanding of sympathy as intersubjective instinct, 
Bergson turned to an animal that the famous French entomologist Jean-
Henri Fabre had discussed repeatedly with great fascination, namely the 
sand wasp Ammophila.23 Bergson recounted Fabre’s observation that Am-
mophila paralyzes, rather than kills, its victim, the caterpillar, as a simple 
means of preserving it for longer as a food source for its larvae. Ammophila 
22 Prior to the restriction of the term ‘sympathy’ to moral sentiment in the seventeenth century 
by moral philosophers such as David Hume and Adam Smith, sympathy and antipathy were 
understood to be the decisive cosmological forces that made possible, in their interplay, both 
change and identity, difference and sameness. In that sense, one could draw a connection 
between Richter’s and Eggeling’s formal language based on contrast and analogy, i.e., basic 
relationships between forms, and the ur-forces of sympathy and antipathy. Michel Foucault 
notes that in the sixteenth century, sympathy was understood to be a principle of mobility that 
draws distant things together while also exerting a power of assimilation by which each thing 
takes on the quality of other things, such that without the counterforce of antipathy, everything 
would be reduced to the same: ‘The identity of things, the fact that they can resemble others and 
be drawn to them, though without being swallowed up or losing their singularity—this is what 
is assured by the constant counterbalancing of sympathy and antipathy. It explains how things 
grow, develop, intermingle, disappear, die, yet endlessly f ind themselves again; in short, how 
there can be space (which is nevertheless not without landmarks or repetitions, not without 
havens of similitude) and time (which nevertheless allows the same forms, the same species, 
the same elements to reappear indef initely).’ Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, 24-25.
23 Fabre provides a detailed and passionate account of the Hairy Ammophila’s ‘operation’ of 
her victim. See Jean-Henri Fabre, More Hunting Wasps, 295-302. 
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does so by stinging the caterpillar in nine nervous centers and subsequently 
squeezing the caterpillar’s head in its mandibles to manipulate the central 
nerves even further. The wasp somehow ‘knows’ where to sting its victim 
to paralyze it and render it unconscious without killing it. Fabre recounts 
how toward the end of his career, Charles Darwin admitted that he had not 
solved ‘the problem of the instincts’ and recommended in a letter that the 
case of the sand wasp would be the true test of any theory of instincts.24 
This is the puzzle that Bergson picked up. For him, Ammophila’s treatment 
of her victims was illustrative of a sympathetic relationship between the 
bodies of wasp and victim; the wasp feels itself instinctively into the nervous 
system of the other animal.
Such sympathetic, intersubjective access to the world and to other 
beings seems to be denied to humans, who approach the world through 
intelligence and analyze, identify, and individuate that which is given. But 
Bergson argued that though humans encounter the world almost entirely 
through intelligence, they nevertheless also have recourse to intuition, 
which is a form of disinterested, self-conscious instinct. Intuition, Bergson 
claimed, gives us access to life, duration, and sympathetic union; though 
in order to gain this access, one must train this capacity. Signif icantly, for 
24 Fabre, More Hunting Wasps, 286-87.
Fig. 1.4: sand wasp (ammophila) with caterpillar in Carl Gottfried Hartman’s observations on the 
Habits of some solitary Wasps of texas (1905).
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Bergson, art could serve as a means for activating and accessing intuition. 
Aesthetic intuition, according to Bergson, is a form of sympathy between 
artist and world that allows the artist to feel into an object; to connect to 
the artwork on the basis of a vital temporality that unites both artist and 
object:
Our eye perceives the features of the living being, merely as assembled, 
not as mutually organized. The intention of life, the simple movement 
that runs through the lines, that binds them together and gives them 
signif icance, escapes it. This intention is just what the artist tries to 
regain, in placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy, 
in breaking down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier that space puts 
up between him and his model.25
Intuition, understood as divining sympathy, was for Bergson ‘an aesthetic 
faculty along with normal perception’, a kind of inner feeling that allowed 
the artist to grasp not just external appearances (that is, matter), but life 
itself, ‘the key to vital operation’, ‘the intention of life’. Bergson described 
this ‘intention of life’ in painterly terms, as a movement that ‘runs through 
the lines, that binds them together and gives them signif icance’.26
For painters such as Richter and Eggeling, this notion of intuition as 
sympathy provided a model not only of the artistic process, but also of 
abstract painting and its reception. They wanted their universal language 
to be based on intuitively understandable forms—that is, forms to which 
one would relate by means of an embodied, sympathetic intuition, rather 
than by means of intelligence. These forms themselves represented the 
vital substratum, the ‘intention of life’ as movement in lines and planes. 
‘Art’, Richter wrote in 1921, ‘is not the subjective explosion of an individual, 
but rather organic language of human beings and of extremely serious 
importance.’ Art should always aim at this general, overarching goal, 
and put those aspects of one’s work that are subservient to one’s will 
in the service of a much deeper, underlying organic language. ‘Such a 
scientif ic presentation of a problem, as it were, is less an inhibition of the 
intuitive (upon which artistic creation is ultimately based) rather than its 
elementary means.’27 The formal language that he and Eggeling sought to 
develop, in other words, presented a belief in giving expression to general 
25 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 177. 
26 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 176, 177.
27 Richter, ‘Prinzipielles zur Bewegungskunst’, 109-112 (translation mine).
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intuitive relations. The forms are developed by means of artistic intuition, 
but aim at expression of generally valid relations and attitudes that can 
then become constructive stepping stones to create new intuitive (and, 
building upon the intuitive, new emotional, spiritual and intellectual) 
attitudes.
In addition to the influence of Bergson through (at least) Eggeling’s stud-
ies of Creative Evolution, vitalist inspiration also came in other, less direct 
guises, through the work of groups and movements with whom Richter 
and Eggeling had contact and which also sought to dynamize ‘form’ in 
painting and other arts. The Dada group in Zürich began its infamous 
soirées in 1917, of which music and especially dance formed an important 
part. This emphasis on music and dance occurred not least because of the 
proximity of Rudolf von Laban’s dance school, which provided the Dada 
group with a theoretical model of body, movement, and rhythm, dancers 
for the soirées, and, as Richter salaciously noted, a number of girlfriends.28 
In a project that bore many similarities to Richter’s and Eggeling’s formal 
efforts, Laban’s school of Ausdruckstanz (‘expressive dance’) sought to break 
with the eighteenth-century model of dramatic gesture as providing direct 
access to the soul. Instead, gesture became abstracted in order to institute 
‘a split between emotion and expression.’29 Laban was also interested in 
gesture as a universal language that allows us to reflect on and produce 
universal ‘laws of movement’ and modes of ‘experiencing, being, and 
communicating.’30 Gesture was able to do so, Laban maintained, because 
it made visible and performed the flow of life, and the resonance between 
body and environment in particular.31
Through their combination of painting, poetry, sculpture, music, dance, 
and performance, the Dada soirées were thus directly expressive of the 
inter-artistic influences at play within a given artist’s work. Richter’s and 
Eggeling’s work shared with most of their Dada colleagues’ work at the 
time an experimentation in expression. Ball’s sound poems were another 
example, since they likewise sought to break out of the mold of meaning 
and signif ication of language by incorporating elements of other art forms. 
Moreover, the work of Wassily Kandinsky—whom Richter describes, along 
with Paul Klee, as one of the ‘fathers’ of Dada—and his 1911 book Concerning 
28 See Richter, Begegnungen von Dada bis heute. 
29 Mark Franko, Dancing Modernism/Performing Politics, x.
30 Rudolf von Laban, Die Welt des Tänzers, 58. Quoted in Lucia Ruprecht, ‘Gesture, Interruption, 
Vibration’, 23-24.
31 See Ruprecht, ‘Gesture, Interruption, Vibration’, 29-30.
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the Spiritual in Art were likely an important influence on and inspiration 
for Richter and Eggeling. Kandinsky’s paintings formed the centerpiece of 
two important exhibitions by Dada Zürich, and his texts were often read 
at gatherings and soirées.32 Kandinsky’s book spelled out—much more 
eloquently and clearly than comparable texts by other artists at the time, 
such as Piet Mondrian’s writings on Neo-Plasticism—that music provides 
the best guideline for thinking about the spiritual meaning, effect, and 
value of painting.33
Even though Kandinsky’s thought was heavily influenced by theosophy 
and oriented toward a purely ‘spiritual’ realm, there are also important 
correspondences between his and Bergson’s work. Paralleling the relation 
that Bergson established between music and intuition, Kandinsky’s chapter 
on ‘The Language of Form and Colour’ began with a discussion of music as 
an art form that produces a direct resonance in the mind. For Kandinsky, 
color and form could only be harmonic if they rested on ‘a corresponding 
vibration of the human soul’.34 This harmony could be achieved by means 
of organic, material, and purely abstract forms. And with respect to the 
overall composition and orchestration of forms, Kandinsky maintained 
that the harmony of the composition is altered by the relation of forms to 
one another: ‘Nothing is absolute. Form-composition rests on a relative 
basis, depending on (1) the alterations in the mutual relations of forms 
one to another, (2) alterations in each individual form, down to the very 
smallest.’ He concluded:
The adaptability of forms, their organic but inward variations, their 
motion in the picture, their inclination to material or abstract, their 
mutual relations, either individually or as parts of a whole; further, the 
concord or discord of the various elements of a picture, the handling of 
groups, the combinations of veiled and openly expressed appeals, the 
use of rhythmical or unrhythmical, of geometrical or non-geometrical 
forms, their contiguity or separation—all these things are the material 
for counterpoint in painting.35
32 See Richter, Dada: Art and Anti-Art, 17, 35, 39, 78.
33 Mondrian’s texts on Neo-Plasticism were f irst published in Theo Doesburg’s journal De Stijl 
and in 1920 in book form. See Piet Mondrian, Le néo-plasticisme.
34 Wassily Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, 29.
35 Ibid., 32-33.
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Kandinsky thus also posited the primacy of relationality and the principle 
of counterpoint—as well as other musical expressions, such as ‘melodic’, 
‘symphonic’, ‘rhythmic’, ‘fermata’, and ‘tonality’, which he used to describe 
principles of painterly composition—in order to define how painting could 
express spiritual reality, or the ‘inner need’ of the soul, and create spiritual 
freedom in the relationship between beholder and painterly compositions 
that were free from external constraints.
Setting Form into Motion: Scroll Paintings and Empathy
Though Kandinsky’s influence on both Richter and Eggeling is undeniable, 
their subsequent work on scrolls emphasized the difference between Kand-
insky’s and their own conceptions of form, composition, and movement, not 
least by moving on to a more constructivist, objective formal language. On 
the basis of their studies of form relations as a universal language, Richter 
and Eggeling created increasingly complicated successive f igures on scrolls 
in order to spell out and develop the dynamism and movement that each 
single relation expressed.36 These scrolls were long, mostly horizontal paper 
rolls hung on a wall, and the beholder would move her eyes—and possibly 
the whole body—from left to right to follow the progression of f igures. 
As a consequence of the adoption of this new format, the temporality of 
the paintings, and the beholder’s engagement with the painting in time, 
became increasingly complex. Even more than in their earlier sketches, the 
forms that Richter and Eggeling used in their scroll paintings were oriented 
toward musical analogies and strove to create a harmonic spiritual balance 
in the beholder, although the emphasis had now shifted toward a dynamic, 
constructivist conception of form and formal relation. While the forms 
were still composed with an understanding of abstraction as a spiritual 
liberation—a distillation of expression out of naturalistic forms—the role 
of movement had shifted. Rather than emphasizing static relations that 
36 One inspiration for drawing scrolls came from the tradition of Chinese scroll painting, 
as Werner Gräff, who became Richter’s technical assistant and developed his own abstract 
f ilms, noted: ‘Inspiration for the abstract scroll paintings came from great old Chinese scroll 
paintings that represented nature, such as the (artfully shortened) representation of the “Course 
of the River Yangtse Kiang from its Source to its Estuary”.’ Werner Gräff, ‘Über den Ursprung 
der abstrakten Filme’, 58 (translation mine). Before Eggeling and Richter turned to Chinese 
scrolls, however, they had studied Chinese language symbols for their means of expression 
using relationships of lines. See Richter’s sketch on Chinese symbols in Richter, Hans Richter, 
112.
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express tensions and relaxations, the scrolls contain an implied dynamic, 
elliptical movement from one f igure to the next. As such, they present not 
only an important step toward f ilm, as I discuss in more detail below, but 
they also help us to understand how form, expression, sensual percep-
tion, and intellectual engagement are affected when the temporality of 
an artwork changes. Tracing this change will thus help us to understand 
the correlation of movement, temporality and perception with respect to 
f ilm, and the location of a non-organic vital principle in the moving image.
Richter’s f irst scroll from 1919 is entitled ‘Präludium’ (‘Prelude,’ see 
Fig. 1.5)—a term for a musical piece that often serves as an introduction 
to the musical motifs of the work as whole—and it illustrates not only the 
evolution of the contrapuntal principles he had studied, but also presents 
a step toward f ilm. The scroll depicts a number of so-called ‘chords’. Like a 
musical chord of several notes struck at the same time, these forms consisted 
of a number of shapes and lines interacting with one another. Richter and 
Eggeling called these shapes and lines ‘instruments’ or ‘voices’. The chords 
develop from relatively simple forms to increasingly complex forms. On the 
scroll, then, the temporality of the forms is no longer one of tension and 
relaxation, of a cosmic balance of sympathy and antipathy that expresses 
movement more as potential (as inner tension) than as an actuality, but 
rather it suggests real, progressive movement from one chord to the next.
The scrolls’ organization of distinct forms that succeed one another 
bears a more than formal resemblance to the new temporality introduced 
to photography by Eadweard Muybridge’s and Etienne-Jules Marey’s 
chronophotography in the late nineteenth century. Chronophotography 
influenced an entire generation of artists, most notably Giacomo Balla, 
Umberto Boccioni, Frantisek Kupka and Marcel Duchamp.37 Like Richter 
and Eggeling’s scrolls, chronophotography featured the successive depiction 
37 For an overview of Marey’s influence on the art world, see Braun, Picturing Time, 264 ff.
 
Fig. 1.5: Hans richter, Präludium (1919).
Vitalism and abstraC tion 67
of a moment in time. Finally, just like chronophotography 35 years earlier, 
the scrolls also inspired Richter and Eggeling to try and set the shapes and 
their relationships into motion in f ilm. Richter’s and Eggeling’s trajectory 
from scrolls to f ilm could, in other words, be read as a belated repetition of 
the genesis of f ilm out of chronophotography. Yet a more careful comparison 
of Richter’s and Eggeling’s work and chronophotography reveals a diver-
gence between these two endeavors that will in turn force us to understand 
Richter’s and Eggeling’s ‘reinvention of cinema’ in quite different terms: 
not as belated repetition of something that had already occurred, but as a 
coming-to-cinema by a quite different route.
Chronophotography, a technique invented and made popular by 
Eadweard Muybridge in the US and Etienne-Jules Marey in France, is the 
production of a series of photographs shot at short intervals that allows the 
presentation of various stages of a continuous movement. An action that 
takes place over a given time is broken down into a series of photographs 
which are shot at regular intervals, and thus each resulting still photograph 
presents an instant, a singular moment, within that larger block of time. 
This procedure allowed scientists as well as artists to isolate and visualize 
instants of complicated, rapid movement—most famously, the positions 
of the legs of a galloping horse—that had previously been imperceptible. 
There are two different methods: either the photographic plate changes 
with every exposure, such that the result is a strip of singular photographs 
taken at short intervals (see Fig. 1.6), or—and this is the method we now 
most associate with Marey—multiple exposures are taken on the same 
plate, resulting in one photograph combining different positions in time 
of a moving subject (see Fig. 1.7).
As scholars from Friedrich Kittler and Gilles Deleuze to Anson Rabinbach 
and Mary Ann Doane have argued, cinema’s roots in chronophotography 
are not only technical—that is, the cinematographic apparatus is not just 
historically and technically derived from chronophotography—but the link 
between chronophotography and f ilm is also conceptual and ontological.38 
From an aesthetic standpoint, chronophotographs did not restrict them-
selves to a synthesized ‘pregnant moment’, in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s 
sense of the term—that is, a moment that is chosen because it best captures 
a narrative trajectory and implies prior and future movement.39 Instead, the 
motion studies provided the observer with a series of scientif ically correct, 
38 See Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter; Deleuze, Cinema 1; Doane, The Emer-
gence of Cinematic Time.
39 Lessing develops the notion of the pregnant moment in Lessing , Laocöon.
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Fig. 1.6: eadweard muybridge, athlete running, straight High Jump, from the Human Figure in 
motion, series 16 (1887).
Fig. 1.7: etienne-Jules marey, High Jump. Chronophotography on a fixed plate (archives at the 
Collège de France, no date).
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arbitrary (coincidental, contingent) poses that presented mere instants 
of an executed movement. Underlying Marey’s scientif ic chronophotog-
raphy in particular was a mechanist conception of the body as a vessel of 
physical and chemical forces and a conception of time as objective and 
divisible—conceptions, in other words, that put him at the forefront of the 
group of French mechanist physicists who aspired to implement Hermann 
Helmholtz’s positivist principles in French science. Marey’s approach to 
time was thus diametrically opposed to that of Bergson, who was his col-
league at the Collège de France. In order to be legible, Marey’s motion studies 
could only present a limited number of instants—or, to put it differently, 
scientific value was only achieved by the selection of information and by the 
extraction of data. The result of this negotiation of readability and data was 
a double abstraction: a temporal abstraction, since only a limited number of 
instants could be selected; and increasingly a visual abstraction, in order to 
manage the overflow of information provided by the photographic image 
(see Fig. 1.8).
While both chronophotography and Richter’s and Eggeling’s scrolls 
present a series in time, there are thus nevertheless important differences. 
Marey’s chronophotography is a visualization of chronological, scientifically 
 
Fig. 1.8: etienne-Jules marey, Walk of Human being: Filtered. Graphic obtained by means of 
partially geometric chronophotography (archives at the Collège de France, 1883/84).
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measurable time; the images were to provide a stable relationship between 
time and space, that is, the spatial configuration of a body at a given mo-
ment.40 Each image presented an instant in time and, as such, contained 
no duration in itself. Richter’s scrolls, by contrast, feature a much more 
varied temporality that combines the conception of intuited, dynamically 
interrelated forms with an evolution from one chord to the next. Richter’s 
scrolls do not depict an objective, progressive temporality, but rather a 
temporality that interacts with the perceptual activity of the beholder.
The f irst three images of Richter’s scroll Präludium illustrate this 
point. The f irst chord consists of a black rectangle, a grey shape with six 
sides at right angles, two long, straight lines or a white pole (not clearly 
distinguishable), and a swinging line of varying thickness on the right 
that progressively varies throughout the scroll and most clearly suggests 
movement. Several ‘harmonic’ relations can be traced between the instru-
ments within the single chord: there is an increasing lightness from left 
to right; the two planes react to each other, revolving around the point in 
which they touch; and the swinging line reacts to this point as well, which 
consequently appears to be a center of gravity. But as we explore these 
relations within the f irst chord, our eye already wanders on to the next 
40 In fact, though, the simultaneity of instants in the display of chronophotography—as well 
as in Marey’s later chronophotography, in which he recorded the movements onto the same 
photographic plate—actually inspired artists to think about non-scientif ic, non-chronological 
models of temporality. One only need think, for example, of Anton Giulio Bragaglia’s photo-
dynamism; that is, his series of long-exposure photographs that make visible the continuous 
trace of every movement executed during the exposure time. 
 
Fig. 1.9: the first three ‘chords’ of richter’s scroll Präludium.
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chord and places the former in a durational context as well. This second 
chord features the same basic structure, only the planes have switched 
color, a small rectangle has formed within the bottom rectangle, the pole 
has turned grey and the line seems to swing upward now, indicated by a 
stronger stroke at its upper end. As our eye returns to the f irst chord, we 
can retrospectively add relations that we are now able to see because of our 
knowledge of the chord’s progression (for example, the correspondence in 
emphasis of the swinging line with the black shape). The scroll thus contains 
two temporal expressions that interact contrapuntally: the relationship of 
instruments within a chord, and the relationship between chords. The f irst 
temporality is vertical, and corresponds to the simultaneous sounding of 
notes in a musical score. The beholder comprehends the expression of a 
chord—that is, a complex of shapes and lines—as a synthetic whole. The 
second temporality is horizontal, and corresponds to the melody developing 
by notes struck one after the other. The beholder sees the chords as stages, 
and the expression—the melody—develops between the chords, in the 
interval synthesized by the beholder.
In describing how people perceive the scrolls, Richter emphasized the ac-
tive participation of the beholder, who compares, meditates and memorizes. 
He described the perceptual activity when looking at the scrolls thus:
We experienced the sensation of arresting time, of enjoying the develop-
ment of forwards and backwards. The eye was stimulated to a special 
kind of participation by the necessity of comparing and meditating […] 
This sensation lies in the stimulus which the remembering eye receives 
by carrying its attention from one detail, phase or sequence to another 
that can be continued indefinitely […] In so following the creative process, 
the beholder experiences it as a process, not as a single fact. In this way, 
the eye is stimulated to an especially active participation, through the 
necessity of memorizing; and this activity carries with it the kind of 
satisfaction which one might feel if one were to suddenly discover new 
or unusual forms of one’s imagination.41
The key elements of the perception of the scrolls are thus the active partici-
pation of the beholder on the basis of eye and body movement and memory 
and an ‘intensive’ time that is both harmonic and contrapuntal, that is, both 
horizontal and vertical; a kind of voluminous, deep time. This active mode 
of perception and the resulting mode of temporality are a consequence 
41 Richter, Hans Richter, 113-14.
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of the fact that the scroll painting, as a medium, reveals and displays the 
procedural, developmental character of painting. All movement in the scroll 
is based on relations, and it is in the ultimate relation between the scroll 
as a ‘living machine’, as Richter described it, and the spectator’s animating 
perception in time that the formal expression is realized—a process that 
is quite like hearing music as opposed to simply reading a score.
The comparison of the scrolls to music highlights the fact that there are 
two intertwined dimensions to the scrolls: they are both a notation system 
(like sheet music) and, when perceived durationally, actual temporal art, 
or visual music. In his notes, Richter described the scrolls as merging these 
two dimensions: ‘The scrolls are “machines”, complicated constructions 
like life with organic + alive and ever changing expression [...] not like a 
hammer that bangs on your head—more like an active living power—like 
a radioactive element for example, that without your knowing it transforms 
you—’.42 The scrolls, in other words, are machines that contain life in the 
tension between their parts, but do not impose an automated, external 
movement, since they rely on the animating power of perception in time. 
Because the expression is founded on tension and relation between a form 
and its environment (i.e., the spatial organization of the other forms), it is 
always dynamic and indivisible; that is, ‘living’ expression. Even though 
Richter used mechanical terms for the scrolls, the temporality of the scrolls 
depends on the activity of the beholder, who is supposed to feel herself into 
the forms depicted on the scroll and correlate the temporal expressivity of 
those forms with her own lived temporality, just as the sand wasp entered 
into sympathetic union with the caterpillar.
It is important to note, however, that intuition, sympathy, and memory 
are not tied to individual perception, emotion, and history. Richter was 
after an elemental, material connection between beholder and art that is 
built upon, and activates, vital strata in the beholder that exist below or 
beyond personal histories and capacities. Therefore it is important that 
the artistic forms are abstract and do not invoke natural forms that would 
activate memories and concrete associations: ‘Like [in music] the action (in 
an entirely spiritual sense) occurs together with the pure material, and finds 
in this pure material tension and resolution in a sense that is—because 
all material comparisons and memories cease to apply—elementary-
magical.’43 Richter’s scrolls and his subsequent Rhythm f ilms strove to be 
42 Richter in his sketches on a universal language. Reprinted in: Stephen C. Foster, ed., Hans 
Richter, Appendix, 191. 
43 Richter, ‘Prinzipielles zur Bewegungskunst’ (translation mine), 109. 
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elemental in order to forge an intuitive union between beholder and art that 
could bypass the influence of memory, history, convention, and tradition on 
perception. This, for him, was the way in which art could create new ideas. 
Theo van Doesburg, one of the most important members of the Dutch art 
movement De Stijl, reprinted Richter’s ‘Prelude’ in an essay in his journal, 
De Stijl, in which he formulated this turn away from the individual in more 
programmatic fashion:
We only know one thing, namely that the solution of the economic 
problem as well as of the problem of art lies outside of individual at-
titudes—and that is a gain. For this means that the supremacy of the 
individual (the attitude toward life of the Renaissance) has been broken 
[…] In order to rightly understand the task of our time, it is necessary 
that we grasp the structure of life not only with our eyes, but rather our 
inner sense organs.44
Richter’s and Eggeling’s application of Bergson’s concept of intuition also 
evokes another important art-theoretical context that can help def ine 
Richter’s work more closely; namely, the concept of Einfühlung (‘empathy’; 
literally, ‘feeling-into’). Einfühlung was developed as an art-historical 
concept in the late nineteenth century by German art theorists, including 
Robert Vischer and Adolf Hildebrand, and it became the centerpiece of 
Theodor Lipps’ psychology of aesthetics in the early twentieth century. Art 
theorists claimed that in perceiving artworks—from paintings to sculpture 
and architecture—as well as nature, the beholder animated the lines and 
forms she saw with her own vitality. Lipps expanded this idea and gave it 
a broader and more psychologically nuanced foundation. ‘[W]riters taking 
up the idea of Einfühlung’, Scott Curtis summarizes, ‘explained aesthetic 
pleasure as a resonance between the structures of the body and the struc-
ture of the artwork, thereby explicitly acknowledging the embodied nature 
of perception.’45
Like Bergson’s intuition, Einfühlung is a projection of vital forces into 
another object. The colloquial and academic uses of the word ‘empathy’ 
over the past decades obscure, however, the extent to which the historical 
concept of Einfühlung encompasses not only the alignment with living 
beings, but also includes inanimate objects as well as qualities such as 
44 Van Doesburg, ‘“Der Wille zum Stil”‘, 23.
45 Curtis, The Shape of Spectatorship, 216.
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atmosphere or acoustic or visual rhythms.46 ‘[I]n the form of things we 
perceive an analogy to the expressive quality of the vitality of the human 
body’, as Robin Curtis paraphrases Karsten Stueber.47 Our living body in-
voluntarily and instinctively engages in mimicry with things in the world. ‘I 
give expression to this kind of Einfühlung in everyday life when I say that the 
line stretches or bends, surges up and away again, confines itself; and when 
I say that a rhythm strives or refrains, is full of tension or resolution etc.’, 
Lipps wrote. ‘This is all my own activity, my own vital, internal movement, 
but one that has been objectif ied.’48
Lipps’ understanding of Einfühlung as a projection of the self into 
the surrounding world thus also views discrete objects as secondary to 
formal or qualitative properties with which our living body engages. Our 
primary attitude toward the world is not in fact a concern with the objec-
tive, given world, but rather, in Robin Curtis’ words, ‘one is occupied with 
characteristics of one’s own embodied engagement with that world and 
its things, in short: with the sensations, activities, and atmospheric moods 
that come about through this engagement.’49 We may understand Richter’s 
and Eggeling’s universal language similarly as an attempt to express an 
engagement with the world, rather than (qualities of) the world itself. Part 
of aesthetic enjoyment, according to Lipps’ theory of Einfühlung, is thus 
a kind of Selbstentäußerung (variously translated as ‘self-estrangement’, 
‘self-distanciation’ or ‘self-alienation’)—in aesthetic contemplation, we 
move into a form provided by an aesthetic object and are thus set free from 
the confines of the self.50
A closer look at Lipps’ theory of Einfühlung also changes the division 
between empathy and abstraction that was postulated by Wilhelm Wor-
ringer in his popular 1908 study, Abstraction and Empathy—the text that 
allowed Richer and Eggeling to imagine an empathic animation of abstract, 
inorganic forms. In this study, Worringer roughly distinguishes between 
two types of art (a distinction that still bears upon art history today). For 
Worringer, there is, on the one hand, organic, natural representation with 
which we can empathize; that is, a representation we feel ourselves into and 
that we animate with our own life force. On the other hand, there is what 
46 Lipps’ Einfühlung has much in common with the uses of Stimmung as an aesthetic concept 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Chapter 3. For a brief overview of the 
history of the understanding of Einfühlung, see Curtis, The Shape of Spectatorship, 216.
47 Robin Curtis, ‘Einfühlung and Abstraction in the Moving Image’, 429.
48 Theodor Lipps, Ästhetik, quoted in Curtis, ‘‘Einfühlung and Abstraction’, 429.
49 Ibid., 430.
50 See Lipps quoted in Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraktion und Einfühlung, 60. 
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Worringer calls ‘inorganic abstraction’, of which he believes Egyptian art 
to be exemplary. This inorganic abstraction voids representation of space, 
emphasizes tactility, isolates the various elements of the artwork and thus 
allows the beholder to experience instinctively an eternal harmony by 
bringing her into contact with a more primal form of being.51 Worringer 
draws on evolutionary theory to make an aesthetic argument:
A convinced evolutionist might [assert] that every differentiation of 
organized matter, every development of its most primitive form, is ac-
companied by a tension, by a longing to revert to this most primitive 
form so to speak […] [I]n the contemplation of abstract regularity man 
would be, as it were, delivered from this tension and at rest from his 
differentiation in the enjoyment of his simplest formula, of his ultimate 
morphological law. The spirit would then be merely the instrumental 
provider of these higher relationships.52
For Worringer, the most primitive form is not the protozoon and its plastic 
quality.53 Rather, Worringer sees the delivery from the tension of life in the 
return to preorganic or anorganic, that is, crystalline matter. Worringer 
was formulating a principle here that Sigmund Freud would pick up on in 
his 1920 essay, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle.’ Freud introduced the idea 
of a ‘death drive’ as the instinctual corollary of the ‘soma,’ the organic body 
that is destined to die (in contrast to the germ-plasm, which is, in essence, 
immortal). For Freud, the instinct to return to an original inorganic state is 
an essential part of life itself, and his formulations bear striking similarities 
to Worringer’s:
The attributes of life were at some time evoked in inanimate matter by 
the action of a force of whose nature we can form no conception. It may 
perhaps have been a process similar in type to that which later caused 
the development of consciousness in a particular stratum of living matter. 
51 It is along these lines that Eggeling developed landscape paintings into abstract lines. 
However, Eggeling’s and Richter’s decision to make scroll paintings already points to an excess 
of energy that arose from combining different forms; and then the scrolls became an energy 
machine that demanded a movement of its own.
52 Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy, 35-36. 
53 In Sergei Eisenstein’s discussion of animation, cartoons, and the case of Disney f ilms, 
he develops the argument that the malleability of matter in drawing can be explained by a 
quasi-biological theory of the protozoon and its plastic quality as the ur-form of animated 
matter. See Eisenstein, Eisenstein on Disney.
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The tension which then arose in what had hitherto been an inanimate 
substance endeavored to cancel itself out. In this way the f irst instinct 
came into being: the instinct to return to the inanimate state.54
Freud’s discussion of the two opposing instincts—life instincts and death 
instincts—at work in living beings highlights what seems to be internal 
contradiction in organic life.
Worringer conceived of the two tendencies of abstraction and empathy 
in art in a similar way. Yet recent studies on the concept of Einfühlung 
have demonstrated that Worringer made use of very selective references 
to Lipps in order to be able to set up abstraction as Einfühlung’s opposite. 
Jutta Müller-Tamm has argued that both Einfühlung and abstraction are 
forms of projection.55 Similarly Juliet Koss suggests that,
[w]hile refusing to acknowledge that Einfühlung was abstract—in-
sofar as it described a viewer’s basic physiological response to pure 
form—he transposed its universalizing claims to the concept of 
abstraction (…) Beyond this, he reconf igured Einfühlung in his text 
as a general emotional identif ication, ignoring its spatial orientation, 
thus further separating the visual and applied arts from the discipline 
of architecture.56
A reading of Lipps and the critical reassessment of Worringer’s opposition 
also affects our understanding of the role of abstraction and Einfühlung 
for Richter and Eggeling.57 Worringer’s description of the connection of 
abstraction to tactility and intuition coincides with the expressivity of 
the scrolls, which consist of abstract, inorganic forms, yet ‘act like a living 
power’ that can ‘transform’ the beholder. However, according to Worringer’s 
interpretation of ancient art—he was, after all, writing prior to Expression-
ism and cubism—abstraction induces stability and rest, while the scrolls’ 
main element is animation, vital movement.
There is one instance in Worringer’s discussion where the opposition of 
abstraction and Einfühlung melts to create something like a living mechan-
ics: namely, Nordic Pre-Renaissance art in general, and the Gothic cathedral 
54 Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, 46.
55 Jutta Müller-Tamm, Abstraktion als Einfühlung.
56 Juliet Koss, ‘On the Limits of Empathy’, 148.
57 Paul Dobryden has also explored the crucial role of the discourse on Einfühlung for Rhythm 
21; see Dobryden, ‘Einfühlung.’
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in particular. This is the place where, arguably, Worringer stays closest to 
Lipps’ comprehensive understanding of Einfühlung; it also constitutes the 
passage that, if not directly inspirational for Richter and Eggeling, certainly 
helps us to understand better the relationship between life and mechanics, 
empathy and abstraction in Richter’s work.
The f irst thing we feel with the Gothic cathedral is a strong appeal to 
our capacity for empathy, and yet we shall hesitate to describe its inner 
constitution as organic (…) In the Gothic cathedral (…), matter lives solely 
on its own mechanical laws; but these laws, despite their fundamentally 
abstract character, have become living, i.e. they have acquired expression. 
Man has transferred his capacity for empathy onto mechanical values. 
Now they are no longer a dead abstraction to him, but a living movement 
of forces.58
The heightened movement of forces Worringer found in the Gothic ca-
thedral ‘in their intensity of expression surpassed all organic motion’. In 
contrast to inorganic abstraction, which strives to provide rest and relief 
from the tension of life and is the result from a most fundamental instinct 
or intuition toward such a relief, the Northern line that dominates Gothic 
cathedrals and Nordic pre-Renaissance ornamental art is searching, striv-
ing, and vital. Its dynamism is expressive of the fact that Northern man 
is not experiencing an equilibrium of man and environment, but rather 
a struggle. The Gothic cathedral’s ‘living movement of forces’ has a vital 
expressivity that is not based on organic laws, but rather combines organic 
Einfühlung with mechanic abstraction.
It is diff icult not to read Worringer’s description of the Gothic aesthetic 
in the context of modernity, that is, the time of Worringer’s own writing. A 
perceived struggle between man and environment ensures that the abstract 
line remains alive and searching, even as it has abandoned organic expres-
sion. By mediating between Einfühlung and abstraction, it also mediates 
between life and mechanics, organic body and inorganic matter—a defini-
tion of artistic expression that subsequently comes to def ine modern art 
and also evokes Richter’s description of the scrolls as ‘living machines,’ as 
well as the interface of spectator and f ilm—which was what Richter and 
Eggeling turned to next.
58 Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy, 112-13.
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The Transition to Film
Richter and Eggeling identif ied the aff inity between their scrolls and f ilm 
quite quickly, and were fascinated by the possibility of actually setting their 
‘chords’ into motion.59 Yet the attempt to shift from one medium (scroll 
painting) to another (f ilm) fundamentally changed the way in which their 
project dealt with time and movement—and this, as it turned out, created 
signif icant problems for Richter and Eggeling. What made the switch from 
scroll painting to f ilm so diff icult on a theoretical level was—to return to 
Worringer’s categories for a moment—the fact that rather than depend-
ing solely on an animating empathic beholder, the medium of f ilm itself 
(that is, the mechanical, inorganic apparatus) took over the animation of 
forms. The apparatus, in other words, determined the temporality. In f ilm, 
movement—the ‘life force’ of form—became independent from that of an 
empathic beholder.
There were not only theoretical problems, however, but also very practi-
cal ones. Neither Richter nor Eggeling had anticipated the conflict between 
the scrolls’ temporality, which was primarily based on the f lexible time 
of perception, memory, and empathy, and the uniform time units of the 
f ilmstrip. Much later, Richter recalled the words of a technician at UFA, 
Germany’s largest and state-run f ilm company, when he and Eggeling 
presented their scrolls to him and demanded that he transfer the scrolls 
onto film. The man reacted with disdain: ‘If you want me to set your drawing 
in motion, you f irst have to show me which of these f igures will begin the 
movement, when and where that f igure will move, when and where to and 
how fast or slow the others will move, and then, when, how, and where they 
are supposed to disappear!’60 Subsequently—and with the help of two 
friends, Bauhaus student Werner Graeff and Erna Niemeyer, who later went 
by the name of Ré Soupault (she married Philippe Soupault and became 
an accomplished photographer)—Richter and Eggeling began to develop 
different notation systems for the f ilms, which took the unif ied time units 
of the f ilmstrip as their basis.
59 At the same time, another trajectory can be distinguished in Richter’s work that leads to 
further scroll paintings, such as Orchestration of Color (1923), Victory in the East (Stalingrad) 
(1943-4), or the series of Motorythms and Lyrrythms in the early 1960s. These scrolls, while 
maintaining a directionality of reading (i.e., a time element), differ from the early scrolls in 
that they are non-serial and instead show a gradual process of dissolving the different stages 
into a single painting, sculpture, or mosaic, much like the Chinese scrolls that had originally 
fascinated Richter and Eggeling. 
60 Richter, Begegnungen von Dada bis heute, 190 (translation mine). 
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Graeff’s Bauhaus scroll ‘Film Composition II/22’ (Fig. 1.10) is one of these 
notation systems that has itself become graphic art. This scroll clearly 
demonstrates the separation of notation system and actual ‘music’ or ‘ex-
pression’. Visually it already resembles a f ilmstrip, and like a f ilmstrip, 
every image has a predetermined duration, namely a third of a second. 
When the images are supposed to be shorter in duration, they are stacked 
on top of one another to share the time slot of one third of a second (on 
the bottom scroll, there are two instances of a sequence of three images, 
each one ninth of a second long).61 Lines indicate the movement that will 
take place within this predetermined duration. On the top scroll, we see 
diagonal lines in white squares, indicating that the white square will shrink 
toward the center. This scroll is solely a script, while the actual expression 
is dependent upon the animation in f ilm. The composition submits itself 
to chronological time, similar to the actual f ilmstrip, only in condensed 
temporal form and in stylized fashion. This notation system therefore 
bears a much closer relationship to chronophotography than to Richter’s 
61 See Gräff, ‘Anmerkungen zur Filmpartitur Komp. II/22’.
Fig. 1.10: Werner Graeff’s Film Composition ii/22.
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and Eggeling’s earlier musical scrolls, insofar as it ties the relationship of 
movement to chronological time rather than the activating, individually 
varying perception of the spectator.
With the transition to f ilm, time thus did not have to be created by 
means of the dynamic interaction between complex forms on a scroll, for 
the apparatus already provided time. The role of the f ilm was to provide 
a nexus between apparatus and spectator, between cinematic time and 
lived time or duration. However, Richter was convinced that by creating a 
sensational rapport between the temporal expression of his f ilm and the 
spectator, he could unearth new sensations. While Eggeling thus continued 
to work on the forms he had developed in his scrolls—the result of which 
was his Vertical Symphony, completed in 1924, shortly before his untimely 
death—Richter felt the need to translate the formal experiments of the 
scroll into the f ilm material. In f ilm, he realized, the question of design, 
Gestaltung, was not a question of form, but of time. The new task that he 
set himself was to visualize time and abolish formal expression as much 
as possible, and rhythm was the means to accomplish this. The formal 
language of Rhythm 21 is thus basically a Gestaltung—a design or shap-
ing—intended to rhythmicize time by creating a rhythmic f igure or form. 
This rhythmic form is created by means of the reduction of f ilm to its basic 
elements: light, movement, and the square of the screen. As such, Richter’s 
f ilm, much more so than Eggeling’s Symphonie Diagonale, employs the 
constructivist principles of faktura and tektonika and might in fact better 
described as constructivist rather than Dada f ilm experiment .62 In Rhythm 
21, the screen is neither a frame nor a window, but a form in its own right, 
the basic square, and fully part of the f ilm’s Gestalt.63
The f irst images of Rhythm 21 seem to introduce precisely this activation 
of the screen, for white planes move inwards from the side and meet in 
the middle, creating a white screen that immediately breaks up again; the 
white planes then recede to the sides until the screen is black again. This 
62 Richter was well aware of the aff inity between his work and that of the Russian constructiv-
ists; in May 1922, he formed the International Fraction of Constructivism with van Doesburg 
and El Lissitzky, and Richter’s journal G is in many ways a direct outcome of the international 
contacts he made in the spirit of constructivism. For more on Richter’s ties to constructivism, 
see Hoffmann, “Hans Richter: Constructivist Filmmaker”; Finkeldey, “Hans Richter and the 
Constructivist International.” 
63 Richter’s formal language is certainly inf luenced by the squares and rectangles of Piet 
Mondrian, Theo van Doesburg, and Kazimir Malevich. The latter also destroyed the function of 
a painting’s frame with his iconoclastic black square on white ground, a square that itself hovers 
between being a frame-within-a-frame, an object, and the denial of an object. See Tupitsyn, 
Malevich and Film, 9-15. 
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Figs. 1.11.a-j: Hans richter’s Rhythm 21: white planes move in from the side and recede; squares 
increase and decrease in size, changing position and tone.
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movement is reminiscent of theater curtains, but it pulls screen, curtain, 
and f ilm onto one level. Squares that decrease and increase in size provide 
an illusion of depth: our perception goes back and forth between seeing 
a receding square that burns a third dimension into the flat surface, and 
seeing merely a two-dimensional change in size. The f ilm presents in-
creasingly complex ‘contrapuntal’ movements of squares and rectangles, 
with at least one shape constantly changing position and size. There is 
no f irm ground for us to establish space such that we could distinguish 
it from time. This effect is not least due to the fact that for spatial effects, 
Richter relies only on overlapping planes and differing sizes, but eschews 
perspectival order. Pictorial perspective—including the use of vanishing 
points and horizon lines—’secures’ space on a two-dimensional surface and 
separates it from time, while overlap and size can retain dynamism and 
simply propose variable relations between space and time.64 Space is simply 
an effect of movement in Richter’s f ilm. Since the screen itself is a relational, 
rectangular temporal gestalt, there is no outside to the relationality of the 
contrapuntal principle in f ilm; everything is subjugated to the rhythmic, 
f lowing temporality of contrast and analogy. The squares and rectangles 
are not forms-in-space, but rather forms-in-time for the project of sculpting 
with movement; as Richter put it, the squares are ‘limitations (borderlines, 
endings) of actions in different dimensions . . . [t]he film should be felt (when 
projected) as tensions and contrast-light-movements’.65
In contrast to the formal language of the scrolls, which was based on 
perception in time—that is, on ‘matter and memory’—film subjects the 
spectator’s perception to the fleeting forward-movement produced by the 
apparatus. The rhythm f ilm thus forces the spectator to feel and perceive 
on the f ilm’s own rhythmic terms: ‘This f ilm does not provide us with 
“resting points,” which allow us to return in recollection, instead, one is at 
the mercy of the f ilm—forced to “feel”—to follow the rhythm—breath-
ing—heartbeat;—By the up and down of the process, the f ilm expresses 
what feeling and sensation really are…. a process…. movement.’66 Though 
this temporality is restless, linear, technological and ‘oblivious’ to the 
temporality of the spectator, Richter understands that in the process of 
perception, in the encounter between f ilm and spectator, this technologi-
cal temporality is nevertheless animated by the spectator’s temporal and 
64 On space and time in Rhtyhm 21, see also Klaus Müller-Richter, ‘Architektur’, 45-47.
65 Even though Richter turned against Moholy-Nagy, there is a connection to the latter’s ideas 
about the lightplay that would be worthy of further investigation.
66 Richter, ‘Die schlecht trainierte Seele’, 51.
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spatial sensations. The f ilm ‘forces’ and the spectator ‘feels’, and it is in this 
nexus of forcing and feeling that Richter locates the potential of the medium 
to create new sensations. The sweeping temporality of the f ilm, which 
is dislodged from Euclidean space and instead itself creating a dynamic 
space, is fundamentally non-human, yet the spectator can perceive and 
incorporate these rhythmic forms in light.67
Rhythm 21 does something quite extraordinary. As a consequence of 
the fact that f ilm’s essence is a mechanical temporality, Richter sought to 
create a f ilm that expresses temporality, rather than creating expression 
on the basis of temporality. Rhythm 21 should be understood as a temporal 
sculpture, one that does not create a space in time, but that creates space 
and time; space, in Richter’s f ilm, is only a consequence of the temporal 
gestalt. This is what Richter is trying to express in a text from G in 1926:
The real sphere of f ilm is that of mobile space, mobile surface, mobile 
line. This space is not essentially architectonic nor essentially plastic, 
but rather temporal; i.e. the light creates by means of a change of qual-
ity (light-dark, large-small) light-spaces which are not voluminous, but 
rather only turn by way of their succession that into space which, if one 
interrupted the temporal progression, would only be surface, line, point.68
The ‘light-spaces’—the shapes that structure spatiotemporality in the 
f ilm—thus effectively abolish not only representation, but also presen-
tation. They are synonymous with the f ilm itself. As a consequence, as 
Philippe-Alain Michaud put it, the spectator’s space becomes an integral 
part of the space of the f ilm, while the separation between the projec-
tion surface and movie theater is abolished. ‘The limit, or frame, of the 
representation disappears, and the spectator f inds himself in the presence 
of a system that unfolds in the same space that he occupies: he no longer 
watches the f ilm as a theatrical representation; he optically experiences 
it.’69 Detlef Mertins describes the viewing experience of Rhythm 21 in similar 
terms as a ‘comprehensive, f lowing and abstract spatiality, within which 
67 Klaus Müller-Richter connects the spatial relationship betweenspectator and Rhythm 21 
to contemporary architectural discourses such as Ludwig Hilberseimer’s, according to which a 
building’s construction can only be understood in the context of the complex dynamic interac-
tion of a building with its environment (Umwelt, see also Chapter 2). Müller-Richter, ‘Architektur,’ 
48.
68 Hans Richter, ‘Film’, 65 (translation mine).
69 Philippe-Alain Michaud, ‘Toward the Fourth Dimension’, 56.
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the spectator floats weightlessly in the endless, timeless play of expansion 
and contraction, light contrasts and rhythmical movement.’70
The importance of Rhythm 21 for f ilm theory lies not just in the fact 
that it, like other f ilms belonging to abstract, absolute, or pure cinema 
movements, sought the essence of f ilm beyond its representational ca-
pacities and in a movement-based expression of sensuality or spirituality. 
Rather, what makes this f ilm and its precursors important documents 
is their exploration of the meeting point between, on the one hand, hu-
man perception, affect, and sensation, which are activities performed in 
time and which have a certain duration, and on the other hand, cinema, 
which seemed to be based on a mechanical time diametrically opposed 
to duration. This exploration of the creative potential inherent in the 
encounter between human and technological, organic and non-organic 
time, upsets the often too rigid distinction between mechanism and 
vitalism. It is in this sense that I describe the trajectory from Richter’s 
scrolls to Rhythm 21 as a retracing of the invention of cinema, or even as 
a reinvention of cinema.
Richter’s ‘reinvention’ also allows us to reconsider how the shaping 
of cinema spectatorship as a thoroughly modern, embodied, sensu-
ally stimulating experience redef ines the valence of central aesthetic 
terms. Scott Curtis discusses the clash of Einfühlung, interiority, and 
contemplation as traditional aesthetic cornerstones with modernity and 
cinema in particular. He argues that especially in Germany, modernity 
was understood to be ‘too pushy; it shoved its spectators along, giving 
them no pause for ref lection’; a formulation that highlights how Richter’s 
denial of ‘resting points’ and opportunities for ‘recollection’ sought to 
break with bourgeois, nineteenth-century attitudes.71 In contrast to 
the physical engagement and stimulation that is central to many early 
texts about cinema—for example Walter Serner’s ‘Cinema and Visual 
Pleasure’—in Einfühlung aesthetics, Curtis maintains, projection and 
movement are interior acts dependent upon the imagination, and thus 
ensure that real movement and physical sensation remain outside of the 
realm of aesthetic experience.72 For Richter and other Dadaists, as well as 
many cinema enthusiasts, then, the emphatic embrace of movement and 
sensation went hand in hand with a renunciation of contemplation, which 
for them had become equated with passivity and complacency. Rhythm 
70 Mertins, Architektur des Werdens, 128. See also Müller-Richter, ‘Architektur,’ 52.
71 Curtis, The Shape of Spectatorship, 208. For Richter, see footnote 61.
72 Walter Serner, ‘Cinema and Visual Pleasure’.
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21 is thus engaged in a direct dialogue with earlier texts on cinema and 
not only mirrors their perspectives, but also contributes formally to the 
redef inition of spectatorship and the dynamic interface of spectator and 
artwork that early f ilm theory had set into motion. This new spectatorship 
seeks an interconnection that is profound, but nevertheless renders the 
spectator an active participant.
Understanding Rhythm 21 as a reinvention of cinema also sheds new 
light on Bergson’s ref lections on the relationship between cinema and 
duration. In Creative Evolution, Bergson had famously referenced Marey’s 
chronophotographs as well as the cinematograph to illustrate the workings 
of the intellect and its more or less complete rejection of duration. Like a 
f ilm strip consisting of a series of static images stripped of duration, the 
intellect can only perceive spatially, by isolating moments in time. The 
f ilmic apparatus, Bergson claimed, restores a false movement to things, 
since it sets things in motion with one general movement that ends up mak-
ing all things equivalent to one other, and in this sense, it is a movement 
that is indifferent to the qualitative differences between those things that 
it represents. Bergson argued that, like this f ilmic apparatus, we ourselves 
in everyday perception also abstract a general movement from the various 
qualitative, developmental, and extensive movements around us. This 
cinematic mode of perception and knowledge is a consequence of our 
adaptation to the demands of modern life, and thus our daily activities 
are also marked by a similar disjunction between our perception and the 
qualitative distinctions in duration between things. Bergson describes our 
everyday mode of action as kaleidoscopic: we position ourselves kaleido-
scopically vis-à-vis surrounding bodies, reducing our being-in-the-world 
to disjointed conf igurations.
On the one hand, Richter’s f ilm experiments embraced this quality 
of cinema to create a non-human temporality. But he also understood 
that Bergson’s description of intellectual perception as cinematographic 
perception did not describe the experience of f ilm as intellectual. Rather, 
Bergson had used the cinematographic apparatus, that is, the technical 
functioning of the machine, as a metaphor. Bergson was not talking about 
the visual experience of continuous f ilmic motion that rendered its origins 
in discrete images invisible. Thus, Richter’s understanding of f ilm, and 
the development of his Rhythm f ilm, was able to combine two elements 
of Bergson’s philosophy that are generally understood to be diametrically 
opposed, namely, his description of f ilm—which Bergson claimed was 
based on intellectual arrest and spatialization—and on the other hand, 
intuition, which grants access to duration, or life.
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The restoration of non-prejudiced, non-intellectual, or non-conceptual 
sensation based on pure movement—which Bergson saw as threatened by 
cinematographic perception—is thus accomplished precisely by means of 
the cinematic apparatus as a kind of living machine. Drawing not only on 
Bergson’s philosophy, but also on theories of empathy and vitalist concep-
tions of rhythm as organic temporality, Richter’s Rhythm 21 turned the 
cinema into a place in which technology enabled a ref lection on, or an 
encounter with, life in the experience of visual, embodied sensation. As 
such, the f ilm not only constitutes an important addition to the work of f ilm 
theorists such as Jean Epstein, who describes cinema’s animistic quality of 
bestowing life on objects (in photographic f ilm), but it also constitutes an 
early experiment that performed an operation that Walter Benjamin would 
formulate more poignantly f ifteen years later; namely, that the reflection 
of humanity in a technicized world, of life in the face of technology, is only 
possible in f ilm.
Back into Matter: from Abstraction to Montage
Certainly, this focus on Richter is to some extent artif icial; not only is 
Eggeling credited by many as being the driving force behind the duo, 
but Eggeling’s and Richter’s f ilm experiments also lagged behind Walter 
Ruttmann’s experiments, both chronologically and, more importantly, 
with respect to their technical accomplishment. My emphasis on Richter 
might also seem like a rather loaded contribution to what has been a 
surprisingly contentious debate among f ilm scholars about the origins of 
early abstract f ilm in Germany, and Richter’s role in this movement. The 
animosity of this dispute can largely be attributed to the fact that Richter 
was the most outspoken of all the participants in this movement, and some 
of his accounts were either distorting or have been distorted. Richter’s role 
in the Dada movements in Zürich and Berlin has been disproportionately 
emphasized in the form of performances, speeches, and publications in 
Theo van Doesburg’s De Stijl, László Moholy-Nagy’s MA, and Richter’s own 
journal that he published together with Mies van der Rohe, G. Zeitschrift 
für visuelle Kommunikation—and later in books on the history of Dada, as 
well as on his own life and work. In contrast to Eggeling, who died in 1925 
shortly after the f irst screening of Symphonie Diagonale, and Ruttmann, 
who stayed in Germany making war and propaganda f ilms until he died 
in 1941, Richter remained an important public f igure in the art world in 
the US until his death in 1976, and many f ilm scholars have felt the need to 
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‘correct’ what is often seen as Richter’s magnif ication of his own centrality 
to the development of abstract f ilm.73
However, I have singled out Richter’s f ilm in my argument about a 
non-representational cinematic vitalism not in order to award Richter 
some special place in the pantheon of early abstract f ilm, but rather to 
emphasize the trajectory that led him to the idea of a rhythmic-organic 
connection between f ilm and spectator, a kind of non-organic life cre-
ated by f ilm. Richter sought to create an abstract language that used the 
cinematographic apparatus to transmit sensation directly to the spectator, 
thereby creating a direct relay between f ilm and spectator. The result 
should be, he thought, a pure cinematic sensation that activates the 
spectator’s thoughts and feelings by means of a direct communication 
with his corporeal vitality, bypassing engrained concepts and judgments. 
Ruttmann’s abstractions, by contrast, did not seek such a pure form of 
sensation, but instead used f ilm’s potential for free movement of forms to 
present a formal play that enabled associations, memories, and analogies. 
This method and goal becomes especially evident in Ruttmann’s own 
description of his f ilm Opus 1 in a 1919/20 manuscript entitled ‘Painting 
with Time’:
[I]n a particular point of the canvas a star-like center of brightness 
develops—the wave-like movement from the beginning of the f ilm 
reappears, but this time increasingly lightened in lively movement, 
always in conjunction with the crescendo of the light center—round, 
soft, bright ones are blooming—and glide into the black pointiness of the 
73 In her biography of Viking Eggeling, Louise O’Konor tries to restore Eggeling’s leading 
role in the collaboration of the two artists. Jeanpaul Goergen’s work on Walter Ruttmann has 
uncovered the f ilmmaker’s pioneering work on abstract f ilm, foregrounding his technical 
expertise, especially evident in the 1921 Lichtspiel Opus 1. More recently, William Moritz denied 
Richter a legitimate part in the history of early abstract f ilms, arguing that Rhythm 21 and Rhythm 
23 were only completed in 1927/8 by Erna Niemeyer, and that Richter’s f ilms ‘needed the special 
pleading of “f irst, early, primitive” to make them worth considering, since they lacked the quality 
of Ruttmann’s f ilm.’ See Moritz, ‘Restoring the aesthetics of early abstract f ilms’, 222. The most 
important and most recent account of the importance of Ruttmann’s work is Cowan, Walter 
Ruttmann and the Cinema of Multiplicity. Since Moritz does not provide proof for his claims, 
it is unclear how accurate his information is regarding the production of the Rhythmus f ilms. 
Accounts of other, previously disregarded f igures, such as Richter’s assistant Werner Graeff, or 
Eggeling’s assistant Erna Niemeyer (f irst his girlfriend, then Richter’s wife for three years; she 
later married Soupault) complement the picture; and most recently, a DVD entitled ‘Medien-
Kunst’ (Absolut Medien, 2009), produced by the Bauhaus Foundation, juxtaposed Richter’s and 
Eggeling’s f ilms with a series of abstract experiments by Graeff, Heinrich Brockspieper, Kurt 
Kranz and Kurt Schwerdtfeger.
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beginning and f inally reach a radiating, happy brightness and dance-like 
motion of the entire image, which slowly transforms into a bright, joyful 
rest. Next, a threateningly dark, snake-like sneaking movement might 
set in, which increases, pushes back the brightness and f inally calls up 
an extremely lively f ight between light and dark—white forms in the 
movement of galloping horses throw themselves against the advancing 
dark masses—there is a shattering, a clamoring confusion of light and 
dark elements, until somehow, by means of the victorious intensif ication 
of the light, equilibrium and conclusion are brought about.74
Ruttmann’s description, with its representational analogies (star, wave, 
bloom, snake, horse) and acoustic analogies (crescendo, shattering), mirrors 
the viewing experience of his Opus f ilms quite accurately: we witness a 
play of organic and inorganic forms that pulsate, breathe, grow, shrink, 
and metamorphose, all the while evoking associations in a spectator.75 As 
a consequence, the viewing experience encouraged by his f ilm is intense 
and engrossing, and can be understood as a kinetic version of Einfühlung 
aesthetics. Richter, by contrast, strove—whether successfully or not—to 
create a f ilm that would free perception from subjective recollection. Such 
a freeing of perception was to evoke, by means of new cinematic sensations, 
a new sense of being that, through technology, would break the shell of 
subjective human being. By relying on empathy, Ruttmann’s f ilms fell 
behind (or to the side of) such aspirations, since they left the empathizing 
subject intact.
My emphasis on the trajectory that led Richter to ‘reinvent’ f ilm also 
suggests that we should see Richter’s f ilm experiments not just in con-
nection with later abstract experimental f ilm, but also in relation to a 
certain ‘vital’ conception of constructivist f ilm aesthetics—montage in 
particular—and politics based on a material (sensorial, physical) con-
nection between f ilm and spectator. This is not to deny the historical 
74 Walter Ruttmann, ‘Malerei mit Zeit’, 74.
75 This is somewhat surprising, since in ‘Malerei mit Zeit’, Ruttmann actually devalorizes 
an approach to the new temporality of ‘speed’ (Tempo) by means of the ‘gloves of analogy’. The 
forms and movements in Opus III are recognizably derived from factory machinery and bear 
a strong formal resemblance to photographic f ilms that focus on the movement of machines, 
such as Eugene Deslaw’s March of the Machines (1927) or Germaine Dulac’s Disque 957 (1928) 
and Arabesque (1929). Yet because of the increased abstraction of forms, Ruttmann is able to 
play with the translation of three- into two-dimensionality much more effectively (when, for 
example, a spinning spiral is reduced to a two-dimensional line with growing and shrinking 
bulges).
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trajectory that indeed leads from Ruttmann’s and Richter’s f ilms to later 
abstract experimental f ilm production in a variety of experimental f ilm 
styles, ranging from psychedelic, mystic experiments in form and color, 
to perceptual experimentation to structural f ilm, both in Europe (Peter 
Kubelka, Kurt Krens) and in the US; I am thinking especially of Jordan 
Belson, Harry Smith, Richard Breer, and Jonas Mekas.76 However, what 
interests me here is the transition from abstract to photographic f ilm, a 
step taken by both Richter and Ruttmann (Oskar Fischinger was the only 
one who continued to work on abstract f ilms in the US). While a focus on 
formal composition continued to inform Richter’s shots, there is a direct 
trajectory, based in their interest in a form derived from the materiality of 
f ilm as medium, from Eggeling’s and Richter’s conception of the interaction 
of forms to montage theory.
In the abstract experiments of Richter, Eggeling and Ruttmann, montage 
could be said to be either non-existent or all-pervasive, since every shot 
is f ilmed by itself, separated from the previous and subsequent shots by 
an interruption and by a manipulation of the tinfoil (in Richter’s case) or 
the glass plate (in Ruttmann’s case). The transition from form language to 
scroll painting to f ilm illustrated, however, that Eggeling and Richter were 
from the outset interested in relations and in an expression not intrinsic to 
one form, but based on the relationship between forms. This relationship 
could be spatial (in the universal language scripts) as well as temporal (in 
the scrolls and, differently, in f ilm). In Richter’s subsequent f ilms such as 
Filmstudie (1926), Vormittagsspuk (Ghosts Before Breakfast, 1926) or Inflation 
(1928), photographic objects are investigated as symbols and as forms, and 
montage—the juxtaposition, comparison, and evolution of images on the 
basis of editing—becomes a new mode of expression.
From this perspective, montage—and especially the advanced montage 
f ilms and theories of montage of Sergei Eisenstein and Dziga Vertov—
emerges as a continuation of the line of a ‘sensual-formal’ (and, to some 
extent, formalist) cine-vitalism that so clearly comes to the fore in Richter’s 
abstract f ilm. Richter himself was aware of the resonance between his own 
work and that of Eisenstein, often describing seeing Eisenstein’s Battleship 
Potemkin in 1926 as a watershed moment in his (Richter’s) idea of cinema. 
He later became close friends with both Eisenstein and Vertov, and even 
embarked on a collaborative f ilm project with Eisenstein for Meshrabprom 
Film in Russia (Metal, which was never completed and of which only f ilm 
76 On this trajectory, see P. Adams Sitney, Visionary Film: The American Avant-Garde; Moritz, 
‘Der abstrakte Film seit 1930’; Hein, ‘Der strukturelle Film’.
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stills and a script remain).77 And though Richter’s theoretical foundation for 
his early f ilm experiments often sounds more metaphysical than political, 
it nevertheless bears a close resemblance to Eisenstein’s montage theory.
Eisenstein’s theory of montage, like Richter and Eggeling’s work, is 
based on counterpoint.78 Essential for Eisenstein’s understanding of the 
cinema is the dynamic, antithetical relationship between two shots or 
other audiovisual elements and a resulting conceptual (psychological) 
synthesis. Eisenstein’s understanding of the cinematic image (obraz) is 
thus profoundly dynamic and dialectical and eventually leads him to 
simultaneously describe the cinema as a synthesis of all arts and seek the 
cinematic in the long history of artistic expression across all arts. Montage 
in this tradition, to put it simply, is the organic, dynamic creation of a new 
whole by means of two shots. This conception of montage, and a conception 
of cinema that views montage as the medium’s essence, follows logically out 
of the trajectory I have laid out in Richter’s work—in fact, they mutually 
illuminate one another. Richter’s early experiments with Eggeling on a 
universal language recall Eisenstein’s foundation of montage principles 
in hieroglyphs and the ideogram, a parallel that emphasizes the inherent 
cinematic-ness of Richter’s and Eggeling’s studies. At the same time, if we 
return for a moment to Fig. 1.4 (Richter’s sketch for a universal language), 
we can note the similarity of these formal experiments to Eisenstein’s 
systematic exploration of the importance of the relationship of volumes, 
shapes, color, and so forth, to one another from one shot to the next. Rich-
ter’s sketch appears to be a montage experiment itself, except that the 
‘parts’ are not subsequent parts in time (as shots would be in montage), 
77 On Richter’s relationship to Eisenstein and Vertov in the context of the 1929 Congress for 
Independent Film at La Sarraz, where Richter and Eisenstein directed a f ilm with participating 
f ilmmakers and critics, see the special issue of Archives on Le 1er Congrès international du cinéma 
indépendant, Roland Causandey and Thomas Tode, ‘Le 1er Congrès international du cinéma 
indépendant’. Tode also published a letter from Richter to Vertov about the political dynamics 
at the congress, in which Richter conf irms his alliance with Eisenstein and Vertov (whom he 
originally wanted to be the Russian delegate) against Bálazs. See Tode, ‘“Das Gegenteil von 
revolutionär”‘. Günter Agde describes Friedrich Wolf’s script of Metal in Agde, ‘Filmutopien vor 
der Katastrophe’.
78 Counterpoint is a central term in Eisenstein’s f ilm theory. In ‘The Heir,’ part of his Notes 
for a General History of Cinema, Eisenstein describes ‘The Method of Cinema’ as ‘[m]ontage and 
counterpoint. The ultimate exposure of the fundamental patterns of being,’ and both in his 
famous ‘Statement on Sound’ and elsewhere did he conceive of the relationship of sound and 
image as counterpuntal. See Eisenstein, Notes for a General History, 112, 207, 215-18; ‘Vertical 
Montage’; Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Alexandrov, ‘Statement on Sound.’ James Tobias discusses 
Eisenstein’s role in a f ilm history of the role of music for structuring f ilm images in Tobias, 
‘Cinema, Scored’. 
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but interacting parts in space. This similarity in turn highlights the fact 
that Eisenstein never understood montage to be purely linear—that is, as 
expressing the relation between two successive parts, as the images are 
located on a f ilmstrip—but rather as a dynamic interaction of ‘montage 
cells’ that creates a ‘third image’, a new whole. Moreover, Eisenstein, like 
Richter and Eggeling, developed a complex notion of counterpoint in f ilm 
language that, in his later work and writing, focused more and more on 
‘vertical montage’, that is, less on collision and more on integration.
Juxtaposing Richter and Eisenstein emphasizes that Eisenstein’s work, 
even as it reveals an incredible breadth of artistic, literary, philosophical, 
historical, scientif ic, and political knowledge, also contains an interesting 
general tension between a materialist, dialectical, constructivist under-
standing of form (which is mechanistic in its basic orientation) and an 
organicist understanding of form (which is vitalist in its basic orientation). 
This tension is most obvious in Eisenstein’s discussion of the basic elements 
of montage. Eisenstein criticizes the conventional conception of montage, 
exemplif ied by Lev Kuleshov’s and, by extension, Vsevolod Pudovkin’s work 
as static, linear, and inorganic. Eisenstein maintained that, according to the 
Kuleshov school, montage is the assembly of one ‘brick’ on top of another.79 
A good montage then yields a solid, stable wall, and improvement can be 
measured as an evolution toward ever more stable, skillfully constructed 
walls. The problem with this view of montage, according to Eisenstein, 
lies not only in a false conception of montage, but also a false conception 
of matter. Matter for Eisenstein is inherently dialectical and proceeds by 
dynamic tensions and conflicts between material elements, which resolve 
into new syntheses. Eisenstein’s dialectical materialism is thus not to be 
understood as mechanistic, but rather is a materialism that nevertheless is 
oriented toward forms that are found only in the register of life.
Linking Richter’s Bergsonian-inspired vitalism with Eisenstein’s ‘or-
ganicist’ dialectical materialism may seem like a flawed enterprise, even 
if we acknowledge that Eisenstein’s intellectual sources were not limited 
to Bolshevik, party-line views, but also included conservative, reactionary 
vitalists such as Ludwig Klages. Conceiving of Eisenstein as a ‘vitalist’ is 
undoubtedly problematic, for it threatens to confuse theoretical positions 
that seem fundamentally opposed, even if there are some points of minimal 
contact between the two (e.g., a mutual interest in organic form). However, 
it is important to stress that the link that I am establishing between Richter 
and Eisenstein is ultimately less concerned with the ‘sources’ of theoretical 
79 Eisenstein, ‘The Cinematographic Principle,’ 36-37.
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inspiration—that is, is less focused on the vitalist provenance of ideas that 
f ilmmakers, f ilm critics and f ilm theorists brought to cinema—and rather 
emphasizes the creative potential of cinema as dispositif. From this perspec-
tive, the question of what is ‘put in’ or ‘brought to’ cinema—in Eisenstein’s 
case, a dialectical, materialist view of nature that is not originally focused 
on f ilm—matters, but only with regard to the emergent product, be it a 
f ilm or a theory of f ilm. In Eisenstein’s f ilm theory, the cinema essentially 
becomes a constructed cosmos: starting from a material base of f ilmstrips 
with recorded footage, Eisenstein literally sought to animate the material 
by a method of editing and image composition that aimed at a construction 
that would follow the progression from inorganic matter to living bodies 
to living thought that is described in both Hegel’s idealist philosophy and 
Marx’s dialectical materialism.
Eisenstein’s view of nature is very close, in fact, to Friedrich Engels’ mate-
rialist updating, in Dialectics of Nature, of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. En-
gels grounds dialectics in matter and makes extensive reference to modern 
scientif ic advances, from Helmholtz to Darwin, to substantiate this view. 
For Engels, the fact of life, the workings of complex organisms, and thought 
itself can be explained on the basis of a fundamental conception of matter 
as ceaseless motion and on the basis of a dialectical interaction between 
parts.80 Eisenstein was thus following Engels—and not more mechanistic 
biologists—when he (Eisenstein) wrote that the action of thinking is ‘the 
highest form of movement’.81 If matter is characterized by ceaseless motion, 
then the shots as elementary montage pieces are not bricks, but themselves 
dynamic entities—they are ‘montage cells’, as Eisenstein laid out in his 
early writings, that are characterized by collision and conflict.82 There are 
a number of implications that follow from the term ‘cells’. What Eisenstein 
was aiming at with this organicist vocabulary was an animation of the 
cinema. Every f ilm frame contains a number of conflicts—of space, line, 
volume, color, etc.—which, like ‘molecules’, form a creative new whole; 
namely, a cell (a shot) which, in contrast to a brick, links to and interacts 
with other cells in multiple directions and on various levels.83
80 See Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature, especially Chapter 2, ‘Dialectics.’ Yet it is possible 
that Engels’ philosophy of nature reached Eisenstein mostly indirectly, through Lenin’s writings; 
at least, Lenin is most frequently quoted in Eisenstein’s writings on dialectic materialism.
81 Eisenstein, notes. Quoted from Anne Nesbet, Savage Junctures, 248 n2.
82 Eisenstein, ‘The Cinematographic Principle and the Ideogram’, 37; see also Eisenstein, ‘A 
Dialectical Approach to Film Form’, 53.
83 Based on Eisenstein’s discussion of rhythm as a struggle between the organic and the 
technological in ‘The Dramaturgy of Film Form’, Michael Cowan also makes the point that 
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Over the course of his career, Eisenstein increasingly shifted the focus 
from a confrontational model of montage—a montage of shocks and ‘simple’ 
dialectical oppositions—to a more complex, integrated, organic model. By 
the time that he wrote the main texts in what now comprise the volume 
Nonindifferent Nature in the late 1930s and 1940s, his efforts had shifted to 
a conception of f ilm structure as mimicking organic structure. If a f ilm 
not only constitutes an organic whole, but is also created on the basis of 
a unif ied set of organic laws—just like a real organism—then it is able to 
become part of nature, and both show a greater aff inity to the nature it 
represents and to the spectator who herself is part of organic nature:
It is obvious that a work of this type has a very particular effect on 
the perceiver, not only because it is raised to the same level as natural 
phenomena but also because the law of its structuring is also the law 
governing those who perceive the work, for they too are a part of organic 
nature. The perceiver feels organically tied, merged, and united with a 
work of this type, just as he feels himself one with and merged with the 
organic environment and nature surrounding him.84
To return to Engels’ materialist nature-philosophy for a moment, Eisenstein 
thus sought to locate the principles of the Gestaltung of a f ilm within the 
kind of natural creation that leads to self-determining organic entities. If 
this is accomplished, a f ilm can organically communicate with the spectator 
(and all of nature), since its matter, its orders of motion, are based on the 
same principles as the rest of animate nature. Antonio Somaini, using 
Eisenstein’s words, call this ‘an ecstatic “flow” that circulates between the 
artist, the work, and the spectator: a flow which becomes possible if all three 
of them “participate” in the stream of dialectic, ecstatic enegery which runs 
across all natural phenomena, across a ”matter” which Eisenstein conceived 
“as a continuous process of becoming.”‘85
For Eisenstein, these organic principles were most perfectly expressed in 
the formula of the ‘golden section’, which expresses the relationship of parts to 
whole. The golden section describes a ratio between two parts that is equiva-
lent on two levels: part a is to part b as a + b is to a. The relationship between 
‘Eisenstein’s notion of f ilmic “conflict,” while derived from Marxian dialectics, also resonates 
with the vitalist models of rhythm so important for the early 20th century’s understanding of 
the body.’ Cowan, ‘The Heart Machine’, 234. 
84 Eisenstein, Nonindifferent Nature, 12.
85 Somaini, ‘Cinema as “Dynamic Mummif ication,”‘ 70.
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a and b is thus not only that of two parts to one another, but immanent to it 
is also the relationship of the whole to the parts. In the nineteenth century in 
particular, physiologists such as Adolf Zeising and Gustav Fechner had been 
interested in grounding the golden section in nature, in the arrangement of 
branches on a tree, the veins on a leaf, or in the spiral of a Nautilus shell. What 
distinguished the golden section for Eisenstein is the fact that it simultane-
ously expresses a principle of natural organic structure, a mathematical 
principle, and a principle of organic development and evolution, a principle of 
growth; it is thus structural, calculable, and dynamic.86 In this combination, 
the golden section can create relationships that literally spiral something 
given out of its framework into a new, higher order, into a different state.
The emotional-affective expression of the organic model of development 
in which Eisenstein sought to ground cinematography and in particular his 
own films, especially Battleship Potemkin, is an understanding of pathos as a 
state of ecstasy, of being-beside-oneself. This state of ecstasy is exemplif ied 
as much by that water which, in the encounter with heat, is about to turn 
into steam, as by the man who, in Battleship Potemkin, is at the point of 
transforming his sadness into anger and who thereby rises up in resistance 
and revolution. Pathos comes into being at all points at which the collision 
of two oppositional forces creates a new whole and catapults that whole 
into a new stage. From the perspective of this image of an energized, vital-
ized cosmos—a nonindifferent nature indeed—the responsibility of the 
f ilmmaker consists not just in orchestrating pathos in the leading actors, 
but likewise making that pathos resonate in objects and landscapes.87
Eisenstein’s later conception of montage cinema—as well as of literature, 
painting, and other arts—as a mutual interpenetration and orchestration 
of various dialectical dynamics (rather than simple collision on one plane), 
provides us with an example of how the vital conception of form and of form 
reception in Richter’s Rhythm 21 is not restricted to abstract form. Rather, 
Richter’s f ilm experiment simply distilled a model of the interrelation of a 
spectator or beholder and moving matter. Both Richter’s and Eisenstein’s 
conceptions of the material interface of f ilm and spectator can be described 
86 Ibid., 15-26.
87 Although outside the scope of this book, it should be noted that in his Notes for a General 
History of Cinema written largely contemporaneously with Nonindifferent Nature, Eisenstein 
applies these thoughts on the dynamic history to not only the history of cinema and the arts at 
large, but history in general. He detects a ‘dialectic polarity’ between ‘regression’ and ‘progress’ in 
every work of art, linking artworks not only to both ‘the deepest layer of emotional thinking’ and 
‘the highest peaks of consciousness,’ but also to both ancient or primitive art and contemporary 
or even future art. See Eisenstein, ‘Closing Speech,’ 38, 41-46.
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with reference to Henri Bergson’s famous example of sugar water. Bergson 
described the combination of sugar and water, two distinct substances 
which, after a little while, transform into a new whole, namely sugar water.88 
Eisenstein would describe the state of the sugar as it lay in the water and 
was about to dissolve, and the state of the water which surrounded the sugar 
crystals, as a state of ecstasy—if they ‘could psychologically register their 
own feelings at these critical moments—moments of achieving the leap, 
they would say they are speaking with pathos, that they are in ecstasy’.89
While both Bergson and Eisenstein were interested in the creation of 
a new whole, Bergson emphasized duration as a lived temporality that is 
open to the future, to creation. The mode of experiencing duration is aptly 
captured in the image of the philosopher waiting passively until the sugar 
is dissolved, f inding pleasure in the adaptation of his duration to that of the 
creation of sugar water. Eisenstein, by contrast, was interested in the active 
transformation of matter. His focus lay not on duration as the experience 
of open time, but on the property of matter to clash and collide and thus 
create new wholes. Eisenstein took a spoon and began to stir the water to 
accelerate the process of dissolution. Gilles Deleuze, who also picked up on 
Bergson’s example of the sugar water, described the consequence of this 
action: ‘If I stir with the spoon, I speed up the movement, but I also change 
the whole, which now encompasses the spoon, and the accelerated move-
ment continues to express the change of the whole.’90 One might say that 
Eisenstein envisioned montage to be a tool just like this spoon, by means of 
which the f ilmmaker creates a ‘sped-up’ movement with an increased ratio 
of conflict and pathos of which the spectator becomes a part. The ‘change 
of the whole’ system works itself up organically:
[B]orn out of the pathos of the theme, the compositional structure repeats 
that single basic principle by which organic, social, and all other processes 
of the formation of the universe are achieved, and cooperation with 
this principle (whose ref lection is our consciousness, and the area of 
application—our whole being) cannot but f ill us with the highest feeling 
experienced by man—pathos.91
88 See Bergson, Creative Evolution, 9-10. It is likely that Eisenstein would also have found this 
example intriguing on the level of writing, since the newness of the new whole that is sugar 
water is indicated simply by eliminating the ‘and’ (or, for the German word Zuckerwasser, the 
space) between sugar and water.
89 Eisenstein, Nonindifferent Nature, 36.
90 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 9.
91 Eisenstein, Nonindifferent Nature, 36.
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Just as in Bergson’s example of waiting, the f ilm spectator as organic, 
intellectual, and social being becomes part of Eisenstein’s stirred-up f ilm 
cosmos of revolution. However, the spectator—at least, this was Eisenstein’s 
hope—participated in this stirred-up film cosmos by experiencing the same 
state of ecstasy, of transformation into a new whole, as sugar, water, and all 
the elements needed to bring a social revolution into motion.
The trajectory from simple formal experiments to abstract f ilm to 
montage theory that I have pursued here thus outlines not only Richter’s 
and Eisenstein’s conception of vital form in cinema, but also seeks to locate 
a cine-vitalist element in the construction of f ilms, in their formal aspects. 
Both Richter and Eisenstein were interested in creating a rhythmic dynamic 
of forms and formal relations on the screen that are innervated sensorially 
by the spectator. The vitality of f ilm is a consequence of the fact that f ilm as 
a temporal medium can merge with the organic, rhythmic temporality of 
the spectator. This experiential fusion, which takes place on the basic level 
of organic functions, and which affects mood and thought ‘from the bottom 
up’ (in Eisenstein’s model), is the basis for what I have called, with respect 
to Richter’s f ilm, not just a non-organic aesthetic, but also a non-organic 
vitalism that extends to technology and inorganic matter. The principle of 
a dynamic dialectic evolution that underlies Eisenstein’s idea of the ‘leap’ 
into a new quality, a new state of being, and Richter’s experience of new 
sensations, namely the confrontation, or contrast-analogy tension, between 
two entities, ultimately also applies to the encounter between spectator 
and f ilm: the living, sensing being and the technological medium, in their 
confrontation, leap into a new qualitative state.
2. New Worlds
Uexküll’s Umwelt Theory at the Movies
The deadening of the affects, and the ebbing away of the waves 
of life which are the source of these affects in the body, can 
increase the distance between the self and the surrounding 
world [Umwelt] to the point of alienation from the body.1
Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama
Like a chameleon, the human mind disguises itself by 
camouflaging the globe . . . The cinema has given man an eye 
more marvelous than the multifaceted eye of the f ly.2
Blaise Cendrars, ‘The Modern: A New Art, the Cinema’
Forays
In 1934, the German biologist Jakob von Uexküll published his second book, 
intended for a general audience. Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren 
und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten (A Foray into the Worlds of 
Animals and Humans: Picture Book of Invisible Worlds) promised its readers 
‘worlds (that) are not only unknown; they are also invisible’. At the same 
time, it invited its readers to transform their very way of seeing and step 
into a new world:
We begin such a stroll on a sunny day before a f lowering meadow in 
which insects buzz and butterflies flutter, and we make a bubble around 
each of the animals living in the meadow. The bubble represents each 
animal’s environment [Umwelt] and contains all the features accessible 
to the subject. As soon as we enter into one such bubble, the previous 
surroundings of the subject are completely reconfigured. Many qualities 
of the colorful meadow vanish completely, others lose their coherence 
with one another, and new connections are created. A new world arises 
in each bubble.3
1 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 319. 
2 Blaise Cendrars, ‘The Modern: A New Art, the Cinema’, 182. 
3 Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, 43. See also the transla-
tion in Uexküll, ‘A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men’, 319.
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Uexküll’s Romantic, pastoral image of a leisurely stroll through a summer 
meadow might initially suggest a familiar scene to the casual reader—an 
outdoor enthusiast or occasional birdwatcher, perhaps, convinced of the 
benefits of fresh air, constitutionals, physical exercise, and a general sense 
of the beautiful and at times sublime nature surrounding him. The next 
sentence, though, transforms this image and its corresponding mood into 
a fantastic scenario by means of the fanciful soap bubbles we ‘blow’ around 
each creature. Yet even this step—from the pastoral to the fantastic—is 
only a precondition for an even more radical transformation of perception, 
one that promises the reader the possibility of stepping into a completely 
alien and unfamiliar world, much in the way that Lewis Carroll’s Alice 
entered Wonderland; or, for that matter, the way that the city stroller enters 
the movie theater.
Imagining stepping into the soap bubbles surrounding other creatures 
not only enabled a radically different vision, but it also depended on a 
paradigm of vision other than that of objective perception; a different 
dispositif. Uexküll playfully introduces the basic assumption of his theory 
of biology: there is no common ground and there is no common world, for 
every living being perceives the world differently and as a result lives in a 
world different from that of other beings, each surrounded by a subjective 
world that Uexküll terms Umwelt (‘environment’, but more literally ‘sur-
rounding world’). These individual Umwelt bubbles envelop plants, animals 
and humans like an outer shell or extended body, while simultaneously 
isolating and separating each entity existentially into quasi-monadic units. 
The cheerful stroller has himself evoked and painted this picture, and 
following a familiar trope of the fantastic, is able to step inside; but once 
there, he becomes captivated and loses control.
This scenario bears more than just a superf icial resemblance to the 
experience in a movie theater. The surface of the bubble that Uexküll 
invokes surrounds us and shows us a world we hardly recognize. We know 
that this is ‘our’ world, yet everything looks different; if we were to imagine 
this scenario as a f ilm scene, the genre would be science f iction rather than 
Heimatfilm (homeland f ilm). Uexküll’s reference to new and unfamiliar 
worlds brings to mind Charles Urban’s f ilm series ‘The Unseen World’, which 
in 1903 marked the beginnings of the popular science f ilm with a program 
consisting of comical or dramatic animal scenes and microcinematographic 
f ilms. Microcinematographic f ilms presented everyday objects and crea-
tures that had never been seen before, or at least not seen at such close 
quarters, and they evoked strong responses of amazement, awe, and disgust 
in the contemporary press. One of the most popular f ilms, for example, used 
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microcinematography to transform an image of a man eating cheese into 
the horrifying scenario of countless giant spider-like cheese mites crawl-
ing over his seemingly lifeless piece of food.4 By employing the technical 
capacity of f ilm to change the scale of vision, microcinematographic f ilms 
established a technical analogue of the soap bubble that Uexküll asked his 
readers to create in their imaginations.
In its focus on the centrifugal organization of the environment by a 
living being, Uexküll’s Umwelt theory constituted not only an interesting 
example of a vitalist conception of life, but also a cinematic theory of 
biology. On the one hand, of course, Uexküll’s Umwelt theory was simply 
one of many early twentieth-century transdisciplinary attempts to rethink 
the relationship between the subject and that which conditioned the 
subject; that is, the relationship between subject and world. On the other 
hand, though, Umwelt theory was a particularly signif icant instance of 
this rethinking, for in linking biological concerns with the question of 
perception, Uexküll brought to the fore questions of methodology (by 
means of which concepts and techniques can this rethinking be accom-
plished?) and technicity (what technical instruments are necessary for 
this rethinking?). For these reasons, Uexküll—and, as I shall note in this 
chapter, a number of social critics and f ilm theorists—saw Umwelt theory 
as a signif icant advance over the Darwinian concept of ‘adaptation’. The 
concept of adaptation also focused attention on the ways in which the 
surrounding world conditioned the organism, but this concept renders 
the surrounding world as a ‘milieu’, rather than an Umwelt—that is, as a 
deterministic, conditioning set of forces, rather than as an environment 
that was actively constituted by the perceptual capacities of living beings. 
Many of the key terms that we associate with early twentieth-century 
philosophy, social theory, and psychology—for example, attention, inten-
tion, and consciousness—were worked out on the terrain between milieu 
and Umwelt, in attempts to understand how human subjects were able 
to react to an environment that was itself rapidly changing; that is, they 
were attempts to understand how subjects were able to evaluate, make 
decisions, and successfully interact with what is ‘given’. We might say that 
the concept of the ‘environment’ formed the backdrop to the most pressing 
issues and concerns in this period: the environment was that which was 
4 On Urban’s f ilms and for a discussion of Cheese Mites, see Oliver Gaycken, Devices of Curiosity, 
16-37.
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‘there’, whether one paid attention to it or not; it def ined the horizon for 
one’s actions and perceptions; and it was shaped by people as they were 
shaped by it.5
For many early twentieth-century theorists, cinema turned out to be 
an especially important part of the modern environment, for—as Walter 
Benjamin noted—cinema not only epitomized the conditions found in the 
modern world at large, but it also brought these conditions into what he 
called the optical consciousness. Uexküll’s theory suggested an explana-
tion of why this could be the case, for his account of Umwelt suggested 
that what cinema presents is simultaneously of this world and a world. 
Since cinematic images are not the direct result of human perception, 
they do not show us the world as our Umwelt. This difference is not only 
a consequence of the fact that we are watching recorded images on a 
screen. It is, in addition, a consequence of the fact that viewing f ilm 
images requires a doubling of perception: we perceive f ilm images as 
embodied spectators, yet these images themselves present a perception 
of the world that is not dependent upon our body (which perceives the 
world within physiological limits determined by our intentions and 
radius of action). We see, instead, the perception of a ‘f ilm body’, to use 
Vivian Sobchack’s expression, that the screen relays to us.6 We thus 
perceive another perception, the perception of an apparatus. In doing 
so, we can integrate, and ‘innervate’, the way the world appears to us in 
these images.7 These properties of cinema allocate it a central role in 
ref lecting, changing, and reformulating the ‘natural’ environment and 
our relationship to it—and with that relationship, our sense of our bodies 
(and, indeed, our bodies’ senses themselves). In contrast to the much 
more pervasive notion of ‘milieu’, then, Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt is of 
particular interest for media studies, since it goes beyond the condition-
ing aspects of the relationship between organism and environment and 
5 Theories of environment are thus closely related to the concepts of ‘atmosphere’ or ‘mood’ 
(Stimmung), which are likewise held to influence and determine foreground actions and percep-
tions without themselves being the subject of focus or attention (both of which they tend to 
dissolve when one attempts to focus upon them); see Chapter 3 on Stimmung. On the relevance 
of the notions of atmosphere and Stimmung, see David Wellbery, ‘Stimmung’, and Leo Spitzer, 
‘Milieu and Ambiance’.
6 On the phenomenological notion of the f ilm’s body, see Sobchack, Address of the Eye. 
Christiane Voss has recently developed further the relationship between body and cinematic 
illusion for a phenomenology of f ilm in Voss, ‘Film Experience and the Formation of Illusion’.
7 Innervation is a concept important to both Uexküll’s and Benjamin’s understanding of the 
relationship between mind and body. See Uexküll, Die Lebenslehre, 109-11. For an account of the 
role of innervation in Benjamin, see Hansen, ‘Benjamin and Cinema’, especially 315-20.
neW Worlds 101
encompasses the effects on perception of specif ic bodily comportments, 
as well as the translation of stimuli into signs.
Umwelt theory’s extension of life into what surrounds the f inite body 
(that is, into the Umwelt of the living being) brings to the fore two issues, 
both of which were central to f ilm theory in the 1910s and 1920s: the role of 
perception as the sensible link between body and environment, and world-
creation as the active shaping of and engagement with our environment. 
While Chapter 1 considered the implications of theories of the internal 
organization of a living body for f ilm theory and practice (i.e., duration and 
rhythm as vitalist conceptions of time), in this chapter I am interested in 
the implications for f ilm theory when the focus moves to a living being’s 
perceptual organization of its surroundings. The f irst half of this chapter 
introduces the question of Umwelt and the intersection of animals and 
media by means of a meditation on three differently mediated dogs. It 
then traces the genesis of the concept of Umwelt in Uexküll’s own writings, 
documenting how this theory emerged at the intersection of Uexküll’s 
physiological studies, his reading of Kant, his interest in aesthetic theories 
of empathy, and his work in chronophotography. The second half of the 
chapter outlines the reception of Uexküll’s theory by philosophers, social 
theorists, and theorists of f ilm. I emphasize that this reception was not 
unif ied, but instead theorists blazed two quite different trails leading from 
Umwelt theory to broader cultural, including f ilm-theoretical, concerns. 
The f irst trail—what we might call the path of man—was traced out in 
German philosophical texts of the 1910s and 1920s. The authors who took 
this path focused on the implications of Umwelt theory for the reconception 
of the mutual constitution of ‘world’ and ‘subject’, and developed concepts 
such as Edmund Husserl’s Lebenswelt (‘life-world’), as well as Max Scheler’s, 
Helmuth Plessner’s, and Martin Heidegger’s distinctions between man and 
animal, Umwelt and world.
Travelers on the second trail, which we might call the path of alienation 
(or the path of the animal), were willing to abandon—to varying degrees—
the terrain of the human. These travelers were mostly f ilm theorists and 
artists, rather than philosophers. Some, such as art critic Adolf Behne and 
artist Franz Marc, were inspired by Uexküll’s colorful theories, images, and 
imaginings, which provided them with a model for breaking up the habitual 
perception and conception of both things and living beings, thus opening up 
the senses to enable a new unity with the cosmos.8 Film theorists including 
8 In 1918, Adolf Behne wrote the most comprehensive text on the ways in which Uexküll’s work 
underpinned the interests of contemporary art, including the work of Paul Scheerbart, Bruno 
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Blaise Cendrars and Jean Epstein went a step further, for they gave in to the 
temptation—and aesthetic and political potential—to cross-breed human, 
animal, and technological perceptions. Their texts express the idea of a 
queered, or cross-species perception that Uexküll’s own references to f ilm 
inspire, describing the alien, and alienating, worlds and worldviews that 
f ilm offers, as well as f ilm’s (re)integration of the human being into a leveled 
playing f ield (or, in Uexküll’s words, a grand symphony of interweaving 
melodies) of animals, plants, and inanimate objects. In mapping out this 
second path, I take Walter Benjamin as my guide, for his work provides a 
comprehensive framework for understanding Umwelt theory in the context 
of the playful experimentation with a new physis. He is central to this 
chapter not only because he was familiar with Uexküll and integrated the 
concept of Umwelt into his writings on film and modernity, but also because 
in doing so, he developed the concept of Umwelt in a way that gave it a much 
more urgent and critical valence.
This second path also allows us to reevaluate the question of Uexküll’s 
modernity. Uexküll might initially seem an unlikely protagonist for a project 
concerned with cinema. A biologist from the old, German-speaking Esto-
nian nobility, his sociopolitical texts betray a staunch conservatism, and he 
was later to apply his notion of Umwelt to questions of the German family 
and state.9 In addition, Uexküll’s scientif ic theories were themselves per-
ceived as untimely for most of his career: he was seen as old-fashioned and 
conservative by leading Darwinist, mechanist, and behaviorist biologists, 
but at the same time he was seen as too subjectivist—and as suspiciously 
close to ‘socialist’ milieu theory—by National Socialist ideologues. And, 
f inally, his close friendships with Nazi ideologue Houston Stewart Cham-
berlain and the conservative philosopher Ludwig Klages emphasize that 
while Uexküll might not have agreed with Third Reich political practices 
such as genocide, the ideological gap between his positions and those of 
National Socialism was marginal when it came to other elements of blood 
Taut, Wassily Kandinsky and Franz Marc. See Adolf Behne, Die Wiederkehr der Kunst, esp. 57, 
109-11. In his animal paintings, Marc tried to depict a harmonic unity of animal and its Umwelt: 
‘What does a deer have to do with the worldview we have? . . . Who says that a deer senses the 
world cubistically; it senses it as “deer”, the landscape therefore has to be “deer”‘ (Franz Marc, 
‘Aufzeichnungen auf Blättern in Quart (Winter 1911/12)’). For more information on Uexküll’s 
influence on artists and painters, including Theo van Doesburg, Raoul Haussmann, Gottfried 
Benn, and Thomas Mann, see Malte Herwig, ‘The Unwitting Muse’, and Botar, ‘Notes Towards 
a Study of Jakob von Uexküll’s Reception’. Behne and Marc are further discussed in Chapter 3.
9 See Florian Mildenberger, Umwelt als Vision, 156-67.
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and soil ideology.10 Yet at the same time, Uexküll’s scientif ic work betrays 
an astonishing modernity and aesthetic sensibility that was recognized 
by both artists and f ilm theorists alike. While Uexküll’s own cultural and 
political views might have been conservative, his biological work produced 
theories, concepts, and images that could be dislodged from conservative 
ideology in order to serve other, more progressive purposes.
A Meditation on Mediated Dogs
Uexküll’s Dog: A Dog’s World
In 1937, The American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) in New York 
finalized its plan for a Hall of Animal Behavior, to be curated by Dr Gladwyn 
Kingsley Noble and sponsored, promoted, and supported amongst others 
by William Douglas Burden, the writer and creative force behind the 1930 
documentary drama The Silent Enemy (Burden also had ties to the Hol-
lywood f ilm industry, especially Merian C. Cooper and Ernest Schoedsack, 
the directors of f ilms such as Chang: A Drama of Wilderness (1927) and King 
Kong (1933)). The Hall, as well as an entire lab devoted to behavioral studies, 
was a tribute to the fact that ethology had become an important zoological 
discipline that needed representation—and a place for research—at the 
AMNH. Noble himself had published important ethological papers and 
had sought to translate them into f ilm with his scientif ic documentary, 
The Social Behavior of the Laughing Gull (1940). The creation of a depart-
ment of animal behavior thus spurred forays on the part of the museum in 
two seemingly opposed directions: on the one hand, toward experimental 
research on live animals, a direction that also involved including live 
animals in exhibitions; and on the other hand, toward the use of f ilm and 
other media for educational and entertainment purposes, a direction that 
included interest in documentaries that presented animals in their natural 
habitat, displays of animals with interactive elements such as lights, sound 
recordings, and images, and even amusement park-like rides.11
Though these two approaches might seem to push in opposite direc-
tions—one real, one virtual; one grounded in scientif ic research, the other 
10 See Anne Harrington’s comprehensive, though reductive, description of Uexküll’s social 
and political views in Harrington, Reenchanted Science, 34-71. By focusing primarily on his 
later sociopolitical texts, Harrington does not always do justice to the complexity of Uexküll’s 
biological work, which she sees as simply one of several ‘holistic’ approaches that emerged in 
early twentieth-century Germany.
11 See Gregg Mitman, Reel Nature, 62-63.
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one in popular entertainment—they are nevertheless closely related. Both 
moved away from (literally) dead, static, and uncontextualized displays 
and instead sought to engage animals in vivo, which meant observing the 
behavior of animals as actions and reactions in time and within a certain 
environment. ‘If the interpretation of life is not the proper main objective 
or goal of our Museum, then what is it?’, Burden asked in various letters 
that he sent in the hopes of gaining support for the new directions of the 
museum.12 Film, for Burden and Noble, was not only an important scientif ic 
research tool for the scientif ic study of animal life, but it was also an excel-
lent means of popularizing such study. This belief that f ilm was both a 
means of conducting research on, and popularizing research about, animals 
was thus a vision Burden and Noble shared with ethologists such as Konrad 
Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, Julian Huxley, and Karl von Frisch, all of whom 
produced animal behavior f ilms beginning in the late 1920s, continuing the 
legacy of early popular science f ilmmakers such as Jean Comandon, J. C. de 
Mol, and Charles Urban.13 For all these f igures, the mediation by f ilm was 
able to provide something that displays of live animals lacked: namely, the 
behavior of animals in their natural environment, rather than in captivity. 
Noble, in fact, had begun to combine diorama displays of Komodo dragons 
with a f ilm of the same species: while the diorama allowed visitors to study 
closely the body and physiognomy of the animal, the f ilm provided a sense 
of the natural movement of the Komodo dragon and the engagement of 
these animals with their environment. Inspired by Noble’s displays, Julian 
Huxley tried to implement f ilm displays in the London Zoological Garden 
that were intended to supplement the fact that the live animal’s presence 
occurred solely within a restricted, artif icial environment, by providing 
f ilmed representations of the natural behavior of the animal.14
It is against this background of the relationship between taxidermied, 
mediated, and live animals, between different modes of display and spec-
tatorship, that I want to consider a particular diorama that was part of the 
small 1937 exhibition entitled ‘Some Suggestions for a Future Hall of Animal 
Behavior’. This exhibition sought to give visitors a sense of what to expect, 
and what they might learn, from the new behavioral department at the 
AMNH. The centerpiece of this exhibition was inspired by Uexküll’s work 
12 See Ibid., 62, 233.
13 On early popular science f ilms, see Gaycken, Devices of Curiosity; on the f ilms of Lorenz, 
Tinbergen, and von Frisch, see Tania Munz, The Dancing Bees. On the work of these early 
ethologists more generally, see the comprehensive book by Richard W. Burkhardt (Burkhardt, 
Patterns of Behavior).
14 Mitman, Reel Nature, 74-75.
neW Worlds 105
and consisted of several interactive dioramas, all of which depicted animals 
and their respective Umwelt.15 A stuffed animal—in one diorama, a f ish; 
in another, a dog; and in a third, a hen—occupied the foreground of the 
diorama. The animals were positioned with their backs to the spectator, and 
each animal focused its attention on a painted background that represented 
its familiar environment: a riverbed, a living room, and a chicken pen. The 
exhibit received some attention in the press, since its interactive features 
and incorporation of visual trickery were novelties against a background of 
traditionally ‘serious’ educational museum displays. A review of the exhibit 
in The New York Times exclaimed:
MUSEUM VISITORS CAN SEE AS FISH DO—New Gadgets Also Let 
Them View a Colorless World as It Appears to Dog—HENPECKING IS 
EXPLAINED—Psychic Factors Distort Fowl’s Vision So That Objects 
Seem to Be Thrice Their Size
15 On the importance of Uexküll for the exhibition, see Mitman, ‘Cinematic Nature’.
 
Fig. 2.1: diorama ‘a dog’s World’, american museum of natural History, new York (1937).
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. . . [the exhibit] presented an array of living and dead snakes, f ish, rats, 
lizards and other specimens and a series of gadgets by means of which 
all sorts of miracles can be performed. By the turning of a switch every 
day scenes are presented to the human eye in the way that animals are 
supposed to see them.16
The dog diorama featured a stuffed black bulldog, complete with studded 
collar, that was directing its attention at a bourgeois living room painted 
on a canvas (see Fig. 2.2.a). If the visitor pressed a button, however, the 
backdrop magically changed. The activation of different light sources 
allowed the screen to fade and make visible a three-dimensional room 
that corresponded to the animal’s vision: in the case of the dog, a lower 
point of view, an absence of colors and details, decreased depth percep-
tion, a loss of distinction of certain lines, and a foregrounding of elements 
that held a functional character in the dog’s life, such as a chair on which 
the dog could jump and sit or a table under which it could hide (see 
Fig. 2.2.b). The dog’s view has an almost threatening, uncanny quality, 
since it strips the living room of all its distinguishing markers of class, 
value, and identity.
The museum display connected spectator and animal in a peculiar 
way. Fig. 2.1 illustrates that the setup of the diorama resembles that of 
an over-the-shoulder-shot. The ‘safely stuffed’ dog in the foreground 
confronted the visitor with its materiality and authenticity, while the 
interactive spectacle of the trompe l’oeil scenery change emphasized the 
immateriality and instability of the latter.17 At the same time, it is the 
dog that, by withholding from us its face and gaze, remains out of reach, 
even as we are able to control the view that we project onto the dog with 
the push of a button. The wistfulness and melancholia we sense when 
we focus on the dog, with its inherent temporality of pastness (‘I once 
lived’) and the sense of elusiveness and ultimate unattainability that 
is the consequence of the dog’s denial of the possibility of face-to-face 
encounter, f inds an equivalent in that melancholia that, according to 
Alice Kuzniar in Melancholia’s Dog, generally marks encounters between 
human and dog. As a companion species, dogs are attuned to humans 
and generally exist as dependent upon humans. As ‘man’s best friend’, 
dogs can not only have their own food, bed, and hairdresser, but their 
death can also be mourned like that of a human companion. Yet at the 
16 Anon., ‘Museum Visitors Can See as Fish Do’, 27.
17 See Ibid.; Anon., ‘Science: Museum Wants’ .
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same time, the dog’s being—its feelings, its language, its drives—remain 
unattainable.18
Formally, then, the diorama introduces us to a number of interrelated 
questions about subjectivity, environment, and mediality that will reoccur 
throughout this chapter. First, the diorama emphasizes the problem of 
access to the animal, both physical and metaphysical. It also brings up 
the question of materiality and the role of media in the contrast between 
taxidermy and light show trompe l’œil (and the question of whose œil we 
are thinking of). Second, the diorama highlights the relationship between 
animal and spectator, and between animal and its environment, natural 
or contrived, fact or f iction. And third, it brings up the role of the medium’s 
‘framing’ of the animal, which can direct and limit our approach. The dio-
rama also illustrates that there are always (at least) two aspects to a (re-)
presentation of an animal: there is, on the one hand, the animal’s view and, 
on the other, the view of the animal—or, to put this less anthropomorphi-
cally, we have the animal’s world (Umwelt) and we have our world, which 
includes the animal as an element. The diorama confronts us with two 
modes of relating to an animal: a playful or scientif ic desire to feel like a 
dog, and an existential or philosophical desire to feel for, and with, a dog. 
The dog diorama thus allows us to ask how the desire for communication, 
mutual understanding, and sympathy, on the one hand, and the sense of 
absolute, existential difference, incongruity, and isolation, on the other 
hand—in other words, the simultaneity of difference and sameness we can 
18 Alice A. Kuzniar, Melancholia’s Dog. See also Donna Haraway, When Species Meet. On the 
history and aesthetics of animal dioramas, especially Carl Akeley’s dioramas at the AMNH, see 
Stephen Christopher Quinn, Windows on Nature, 8-24.
Figs. 2.2.a-b:  the two visual modes of the dog diorama: left, human view; right, dog’s view.
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feel in a ‘live’ encounter with a dog—changes with technological mediation. 
Mediation intervenes in the physical presence of two living beings, which 
might also mean relief from being-human or being locked into being-human 
(in the face of a dog).
Nipper—The Dog as Medium
The iconic image of Nipper the dog attending to the voice of his master as 
it emerges from the gramophone has become emblematic, and not just for 
Victor RCA, for the painting visualizes perfectly the complex relationship 
between animals and technological media. The painting of the dog listening 
attentively to what the viewer presumes is coming out of the gramophone 
horn was registered as trademark, along with the inscription ‘His Master’s 
Voice’. As such, the painting and trademark link sound recording, death, 
and animality in an iconic image. The story of this painting is well known: 
Francis Barraud painted a picture of his dead brother’s dog Nipper (whom 
he had taken in) listening to an Edison gramophone. The painting itself was 
painted three years after the dog’s own death. While the Edison Company 
showed no interest in the image, the Gramophone Company (later Victor 
RCA) did, and Barraud repainted his representation of the gramophone to 
match the company’s model. The new layer of paint allowed for corporate 
appropriation, while the new logo for the image—’His Master’s Voice’—
provided a new interpretation of the dog’s attention. The most important 
transfer enabled by the painting, however, was that of acoustic marvel to 
visual spell. It is the dog’s attentive gaze directed at the gramophone horn 
that actually visualizes the sound by standing in for it, transforming the 
acoustic medium into a visual cipher. As Tom Gunning notes, Nipper’s 
confusion about the mismatch between a familiar voice and an unfamiliar 
machine depicts how the dog ‘experiences the sense of disproportion that 
early audiences did in experiencing sound reproduction without an attempt 
at visual simulation’.19
However, it is worth exploring the complex relationship between the tem-
porality of the beholder’s reception and the temporality of the two media 
involved, namely painting and phonograph. While the painted Nipper will 
forever identify the apparatus with his late owner, the beholder of this image 
begins by identifying with the ‘Dog looking at and listening to a Phonograph’ 
(the original title of the painting), but then distinguishes herself from this 
animal, which must remain a dog listening to ‘His Master’s Voice’ (the 
corporate inscription of the image). What makes the image amusing is 
19 Gunning, ‘Doing for the Eye’, 20.
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precisely the beholder’s transition from one attitude to the other, as well as 
the fact that, once we have performed the transition, we are able to move 
freely back and forth between these two attitudes. This movement from 
immediate, empathic identif ication to reflective analysis and distinction is 
a temporal transition that the dog cannot perform, since, in this painting, it 
is forever frozen in the position of immediate reaction; the position of false 
belief, of being duped. In other words, the beholder’s own sensory confusion 
when she f irst encountered a gramophone playing a recording—which, for 
a moment, creates a bond between the beholder and the listening dog as a 
visualization of the beholder’s confusion—is sublated by a double mastery: 
both the mastery of Mark Barraud/Francis Barraud/the gramophone over 
the animal (i.e., the dog as an owned pet, a commodity, a painted object), 
and the mastery of the beholder of the image/early gramophone listener over 
 
Fig. 2.3: ‘His master’s Voice’: nipper in barraud’s ‘dog looking at and listening to a Phonograph’ 
(1899, second version).
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the animal (‘stupid dog!’). Like the gramophone itself, the listener, in behold-
ing a painting, plays out her mastery over temporality. The momentary bond 
between spectator/listener and dog thus gives way to a breach between a 
superior and an inferior being, which in turn reestablishes the mastery of 
the future record buyer.
This establishment of a hierarchy between animal and human simul-
taneously allowed the apparatus of the gramophone to appropriate the 
dog. Upon the incorporation of the painting into the RCA Victor logo, the 
painted, copyrighted, and endlessly reproduced dog served to reunite the 
sound apparatus and the human beholder/customer. The dog lent its body 
to the gramophone, visualizing, and thus signifying, the capacity of the 
apparatus for faithful sound reproduction—a corporeal transfer so com-
plete that commentators have often referred to this image as the ‘Talking 
Dog’.20 This transfer is eased by the symmetry of the painting and the 
correspondence in ‘posture’ and ‘attitude’ of gramophone and dog. With the 
boundaries between dog and human, and between dog and human senses 
and sensibilities, safely redrawn, the dog can lend a body, a face, and an 
attitude of docile servitude to the technological apparatus, whose unsettling 
alterity now becomes the safe otherness of a mastered pet. Nipper thus 
sets into motion what Michael Taussig describes as the ‘imperial balance 
of mimesis and alterity’.21
Yet it is precisely this ‘imperial balance of mimesis and alterity’ that, I will 
suggest below, is often upset by moving—rather than painted—reproduc-
tions of animals. Taussig’s discussion of Nipper and the gramophone does 
not seem particularly interested in the specificity of the media involved, nor 
in the particular role animals play in capitalism and modernity. Yet such 
considerations cannot simply be bracketed here, for in the case of the image 
of Nipper, the pleasurable, albeit momentary, destabilization produced by 
an initial identif ication with Nipper is kept in check by the ability of the 
spectator to redistribute and separate out the (visually stable) positions of 
machine, dog, and her human self. The freeze-frame of the painting, in other 
words, makes it possible for the beholder to surpass the deceived dog by 
‘moving on’ to a superior position of knowledge. In this temporal movement, 
the beholder aligns herself with the temporal f low of the gramophone’s 
sound. In other words, it is the temporal friction between the two media 
20 Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity, 212.
21 Taussig seems even less interested in the question of the extent to which mimesis and 
alterity—as well as empathy, identif ication, projection, readability, and interpretation–might 
function differently for animals as opposed to humans.
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involved (gramophone and painting) that allows for an exciting destabiliza-
tion, since one can always safely return to f ixed positions. The painting of 
Nipper shows us, in short, that in the encounter between human, animal, 
and technological media, the ontological dividing line between human 
and animal can become blurry, perhaps even breached; but it also shows 
us that this line can be reinforced, at the expense of a blurring of lines 
between animal and technology. The painting, or rather, the reception of 
the painting rehearses the effacement of the capacity to recognize both the 
dog’s animality and its sameness, as a living, sensing creature, and locates 
it in the grey zone of human pet. The body and spirit Nipper transfers on to 
the gramophone have a similarly toned-down grey hue and protect us from 
recognizing the technological medium’s affinity with both the wildness and 
otherness of animals as well as with a life, expressivity, and sensuousness 
that does not differentiate between animals and humans.
Dickson’s and Heise’s Dog—Spectacle and Spectator
A quite different dynamic between medium, animal, and spectator was 
established by one of the f irst dogs to ever star in a moving picture. This 
was a dog that appeared almost incidentally in one of W. K. L. (‘Laurie’) 
 
Fig. 2.4: Athlete with Wand (dickson/Heise, 1894).
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Dickson and William Heise’s early f ilm experiments at Edison’s Black Maria 
Studio in 1894. Like their other short f ilms for Edison’s Kinetoscope—a 
viewing device that allowed one spectator at a time, paying one nickel at a 
time, to peep through a hole into a box—Athlete with Wand shows a human 
subject on a stage against a f lat black background engaging in extreme 
movements that make the mechanical reproduction of motion especially 
spectacular and visible. The athlete takes on different poses with his ‘wand’ 
(a long pole roughly 4 feet in length), each pose separated by a bend of his 
knees or a repositioning of his legs; he lifts the wand horizontally above 
his head, holds it in front of his stomach, or twists it vertically to align it 
with his body. According to Charles Musser, the man was an athlete from 
the Newark Turnverein, and the entire f ilm was probably a test run for the 
f ilming of Eugene Sandow, which took place shortly thereafter.22 What is 
unusual about the framing of this short, however, is that it includes a dog 
lying on the ground next to the athlete, in the bottom right of the frame. 
The dog is obviously at home in the studio environment and presumably 
belonged to Dickson, Heise, or the man they were f ilming. The camera is 
surprisingly oblivious of the dog (as are, it is worth noting, most descriptions 
of the f ilm, all of which completely neglect to mention the dog’s presence), 
and the dog is oblivious of the camera. The dog, resting its head on its 
front paws, is turned away from the athlete swinging his pole and seems 
to be disinterested in the spectacle; only when the end of the pole swings 
particularly close to the dog does it get up on its front legs and lift its head 
to watch the athlete cautiously.
The dog’s presence in this f ilm is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the 
fact that the dog appears in the f ilm emphasizes, or reveals, the experimen-
tal studio character of Dickson and Heise’s f ilms, in which someone’s dog is 
able simply to lie on the stage while the f ilmmakers and technicians take 
turns before and behind the camera to film and act out short scenes. Second, 
the fact that we cannot decide whether the dog’s presence in the f ilm was 
an ‘accident’ or a deliberate aesthetic or experimental decision emphasizes 
the question of the dog’s relationship to the spectacle.23 The dog functions 
as a stand-in for the f ilm spectator, such that its presence and witnessing 
of the stage act mirrors the mediated presence of the f ilm spectator, while 
the dog’s body becomes a medium that transfers the spectator onto the f ilm 
22 Charles Musser, Before the Nickelodeon, 29-56.
23 My guess is that the dog happened to lie on the stage and Dickson and Heise decided on a 
whim to include it in the f ilm—after all, the athlete is f ilmed slightly off-center to allow the 
entire body of the dog to occupy the bottom right.
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itself. Yet this dog-spectator is, for the most part, apparently oblivious of 
the performer who constitutes an attraction for us, as he (the performer) 
is so spectacularly animated and mediated. In contrast to Nipper, though, 
this dog is part of the technological mediation. It thus sets in motion a shift 
back and forth between presence and mediation, subject (in its presence 
to the spectacle) and object (in its presence as attraction itself). Moreover, 
the fact that the dog is peripheral to the scene and the framing, and the 
fact that the dog is decidedly not ‘performing’, add to its spectral quality. In 
contrast to the many other f ilm dogs that would follow it, this dog presents 
an anomaly, since it does not constitute an attraction in itself.
The dog’s ability to elicit this subtle, complex response from the spectator 
is exemplary of the way in which animals on screen are able to punctuate 
the f ilm experience and enable meditation not only on animals themselves, 
but on film—and life—as media. Though both Nipper and the dog in Athlete 
with Wand react (at least briefly) to a spectacle, their reactions do not invite 
identif ication in the same way. Nipper’s facial expression and posture were 
painted by Barraud in a careful balance of dogness as both other (non-
human) and the same (the facial expressivity of a complex mammal) in 
order to invite identif ication and association. The joke consisted in the 
momentary conflation of one’s own human attitude with the animal’s, fol-
lowed by a subsequent dissociation from the animal. In Athlete with Wand, 
one cannot appropriate the dog’s expressivity through identif ication and a 
projection of emotions, since the dog’s existence in time provides resistance 
to such appropriation—it exists; it ‘behaves like a dog’. As a consequence, 
though, we also do not need to dissociate ourselves from the dog in the way 
that we dissociated ourselves from Nipper, and we are thus ‘relieved’ from 
the reestablishment of rigid boundaries.
We are, however, able to establish a connection to the dog based on its 
movement and expression of intention, its behavior. When the dog lifts 
its head to gaze cautiously at the pole that has swung close by its body, 
we too can become aware of this ‘spectacle’ of the athlete as an event that 
has a relationship—possibly threatening—to living bodies in its environ-
ment. This is not connection via appropriative identif ication, but rather a 
connection by means of a corporeal and sensual link. While the painting 
of Nipper sets up an absolute dynamic of being the same/being different, 
Dickson’s and Heise’s dog presents us with a life that is both different and 
the same, that we recognize and are bound to as temporal, living creatures, 
but that we nevertheless do not conflate with our own being. These three 
dogs—in a diorama, in a painting, and on f ilm—illustrate that in the me-
diation of animals, there is always a double transfer that takes place. The 
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spatiotemporality of the medium, as well as its addressing and configuration 
of a beholder or listener, intersects with the negotiation of attitude, empathy, 
and perspective between spectator and dog. Both dog and media do not just 
present themselves to us; they present a world, or worldview, to us, and thus 
an invitation to step outside of our spatiotemporal, perceptual coordinates 
into uncertain territory.
The Agony of the Starfish: Uexküll’s Chronophotography
For Uexküll, the role of media for comprehending the intersection of 
organism and environment began in the f inal decade of the nineteenth 
century, when he connected his studies in biology with philosophical and 
art-historical theories of perception and comprehension. In Dorpat, Estonia, 
Uexküll studied with the anti-Darwinian biologist Karl Ernst von Baer. 
However, it was while working at Anton Dohrn’s Zoological Station in Naples 
in the late 1890s and early 1900s—at the same time, as it turned out, that 
neo-vitalist biologist Hans Driesch was also working there—that Uexküll 
began to turn away from Darwinism and pure physiology and sought to 
integrate his earlier studies of Kant with the organicist-vitalist approaches of 
von Baer.24 This was not, however, a turn that had purely intellectual origins, 
and the crucial role of photography, especially chronophotography, in help-
ing Uexküll to redefine the task of biology and his notion of organicity is 
evident in his early work.
Uexküll began to reconceive the relationship between organism and 
environment by developing a new theory of ‘organic form’ around a Kantian 
conception of biology. In a 1902 article entitled ‘In the Battle over the Soul 
of the Animal [Im Kampf um die Tierseele]’, Uexküll elaborated on Kant’s 
theory of apperception in order to criticize the premise that psychology was 
able to make any claims about the ‘psyches’ of non-humans. He reminded 
his readers of Kant’s claim that apperception is the process by means of 
which sensations are transformed into intuition (Anschauung), and he 
stressed that, in addition to this ability to synthesize and recollect sense 
perception, apperception also included a process of Gestaltung (creation, 
design, construction, formation). This so-called Gestaltungsprozess for 
Uexküll emphasized the role of the brain in perception, for the brain is not 
24 On Uexküll’s time in Naples and his indebtedness to von Baer, see Mildenberger, Umwelt 
als Vision, 16-41. Tim Lenoir provides the most thorough discussion of von Baer’s embryology 
as a form of ‘vital materialism’; see Timothy Lenoir, Strategy of Life, esp. 72-95.
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only the organ in which sensory data is collected, but is also the location 
in which these data are informed by previous perceptions, and in which 
concepts are formed (and it is only by means of these latter that we can 
grasp percepts). Uexküll thus claimed that, in this sense, apperception is 
completely subjective, for it is the individual as subject that provides unity 
to all percepts. Taking his lead from Helmholtz, Uexküll described the 
relationship between thought and extensive matter—the fact that move-
ment in the brain seems to stand in a lawful relationship to the external 
world, even though mediated by manifold sensations that give incoherent 
input—as one of ‘signs’: the sensuous qualities of consciousness are signs of 
the movements in the brain and, as mediated by the latter, of the external 
world.25 The relationship between objects in the world and consciousness of 
them (qua sensations) can therefore be traced physiologically and is indeed 
indexical, but nevertheless non-deducible—the objects in the world cannot 
be determined by looking at the brain.
Uexküll would not develop the concept of Umwelt until a few years 
later, but we can already discern the f irst elements of this concept in the 
implications of the essay. First, since we have no access to the signs that 
other living beings employ and we are, moreover, unable even to imagine 
sensations different from our own, we cannot make any claims about the 
psyche of non-human subjects (i.e., animals). Second, by understanding 
biological processes as signs—that is, in terms of a biosemiotics—we can 
substitute for a psychological approach to animals a model that captures 
the subjectivity and arbitrariness of human and animal perception. And 
f inally, the diversity in the arrangements and functions of animal tissues 
and organs (and thus, perceptions) is due to the diversity of milieux to 
which organisms had to adapt. A study of the milieu, the essay concludes, 
is therefore an integral, yet to date neglected, part of biology.
Though these three elements might initially appear to limit themselves 
to biological and philosophical issues, Uexküll’s attempt to reformulate the 
concerns of biology as a science of life were closely related to questions with 
which contemporary aesthetic theory was also grappling. The importance 
of aesthetic theory for Uexküll is underscored by his reference to Adolf 
Hildebrand’s 1893 book The Problem of Form in the Fine Arts (Das Problem 
der Form in der bildenden Kunst).26 Hildebrand’s Problem of Form was among 
the most popular theories of art at the time, and Uexküll’s reference to this 
book in his discussion of Gestaltung emphasized the extent to which he 
25 Uexküll, Im Kampf um die Tierseele, 17.
26 Adolf Hildebrand, ‘Problem of Form’, 227-79.
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was creating a new biological theory by bridging the concerns of multiple 
disciplines.27 In part, this convergence of German aesthetic theory and 
German theoretical biology can be explained by the common Kantian 
heritage of both disciplines. Like those turn-of-the century aesthetic 
theories that have been grouped under the rubric of ‘empathy’ (Einfühlung, 
literally ‘feeling-into’), Uexküll was working from Kant’s understanding of 
the relativity of perception. And like these same art theories, Uexküll was 
interested in the organization of matter, in ‘form’. Kant had defined the form 
of an appearance as ‘that which so determines the manifold of appearance 
that it allows of being ordered in certain relations’, and he distinguished 
between ‘pure forms of intuition’ (space and time) and ‘forms of thought’ 
(concepts and categorizations that mediate intuition).28 Rather than being 
an inherent property of objects, form is a subjective, and necessary, element 
of apperception—a ‘mode’, as Mallgrave and Ikonomou put it, ‘under which 
we arrange the objects of perception, a transcendental reality’.29 According 
to Kant, the form of an object and the body of the perceiver are correlated, 
such that pleasure in certain forms, whether natural or artistic, is based on 
a harmonious relation of the external form with our cognitive faculties. Art 
theorists such as Robert Vischer (who coined the term Einfühlung), Conrad 
Fiedler, and Adolf Hildebrand (and, a few years later, philosopher Theodor 
Lipps) developed further Kant’s suggestions concerning the active, and 
constitutive, participation of the body in perception. For these theorists 
of art, the ground for the apperception of form and for aesthetic apprecia-
tion was provided by the organic structure of the human body, including 
its spatial arrangements (e.g., symmetry of body parts or horizontal and 
vertical axes), its temporalities (e.g., the rhythm of heartbeat, circulation, 
muscle tension, etc.), and also by kinesthetic perception (such as eye move-
ment) in particular and bodily movement more generally. Additionally, the 
organic connection of body parts meant that the senses were interrelated 
and supplemented each other’s input, resulting in synesthetic perception.
In striving to incorporate this interdependence of the perception of form 
and perceiving body into the new discipline of biology, Uexküll focused on 
the question of how a subject constitutes an object, and what this allows us 
27 In their comprehensive introduction to Empathy, Form & Space, the editors describe how 
the publication of The Problem of Form coincided with Hildebrand’s artistic success as a sculptor, 
and the book quickly went into seven editions. See Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios 
Ikonomou, ‘Introduction’, 36.
28 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 66.
29 Mallgrave and Ikonomou, ‘Introduction’, 5.
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to say about the subject.30 First, he notes that in the process of Gestaltung, 
an object is formed on the basis of ‘lawful relations’ to an ‘I’ (that is, an 
apperceiving beholder).31 More specif ically, the arbitrary and momentary 
sensations this I receives only gain coherence because the I itself is coherent; 
because the I gathers the sensations in apperception in order to form a 
definite object on the grounds of the object’s relationship to the I itself. The 
structure of the object corresponds to the structure of the I, the subject. 
Yet what can we know about the perception of form in beings completely 
different from ourselves, such as animals? Since Uexküll insists that we 
cannot make any claims about their psyches and processes of apperception, 
the application of psychological methods to animals is ill-conceived, which 
means that we have no idea of how animals constitute objects. And this 
in turn brings up the question of how to proceed when investigating other 
species.
It was by turning to chronophotography that Uexküll found a way to avoid 
making recourse to an inaccessible ‘inner life’ of animals. Photography not 
only restricted its information to the surface, the externally visible, without 
any interpretive work (from which even drawings were not completely free), 
but it also depicted its object independently of human perception. In his 
early work, Uexküll focused on the relationship between nerve stimulation 
and muscle tension in lower animals such as starf ish and sea urchins, and 
he needed a medium able to record changes over time. Chronophotography 
had just become more widely known through the publications and traveling 
lectures of Eadweard Muybridge and Etienne-Jules Marey, with Muybridge 
focusing on chronophotography’s aesthetic potential and Marey using it as 
a scientif ic-analytic tool. Having become frustrated with the limited pos-
sibilities for analyzing and representing the movement ‘of the whole animal’, 
Uexküll traveled to Paris to study chronophotography with Marey for two 
months.32 For his second paper on muscle tone, Uexküll prepared a number 
of chronophotographs that functioned as the backbone for his conclusions 
about the starf ish Ophioglypha’s ability to walk, turn, feed, and perform 
defensive movements. By focusing closely on his chronophotographs, we 
can see how Uexküll was able to make the shift from a criticism of animal 
30 Evolutionary biologist Ernst Haeckel was another scientist whose work on form influenced 
aesthetic theories. His book Art Forms in Nature, with its fantastic illustrations, became an 
especially important source for Jugendstil artists. Uexküll, however, was the f irst to bring the 
perception of form as a concern to biology. See Robert J. Richards, The Tragic Sense of Life, and 
Stacy Hand, ‘Embodied Abstraction’.
31 Uexküll, Im Kampf um die Tierseele, 9.
32 See Gudrun von Uexküll, Jakob von Uexküll, 39, and Uexküll, ‘Studien über den Tonus’, 5.
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psychology and a denial of its methodology to the development of a new 
approach to animals, one that focused on the relationship of animals to 
their environment.
At the beginning of his paper, Uexküll distinguished between two 
different kinds of ‘photographic time-writing’: chronophotography with 
a static plate and chronophotography with a running f ilm. If an animal 
moved swiftly past the camera, the result was a recording of separate 
phases of movement, or what Uexküll calls a ‘record of coordinates’ 
(Koordinatenschreibung), no matter which method of chronophotography 
was employed. Such a record of coordinates consisted of segments in time 
and allowed for an analysis of the progression of the coordinated move-
ment. However, if an animal was f ixed to a specif ic position in front of 
the camera, chronophotography with a static plate allowed for a ‘record of 
amplitudes’ (Amplitudenschreibung) of the animal’s movement. The record 
of amplitudes is a form of ‘stacked time’ and gives us segments in space. 
Such a record tells the researcher nothing about the order and temporal 
dimension of movement, but rather visualizes the intensity and extension of 
the movement (of, for example, a starf ish pinned on a black surface).33 This 
recording method allowed Uexküll to represent graphically the distinction 
between two different kinds of starf ish ‘strolls’: on the one hand, a form 
of walking with the inactive, unpaired f ifth leg being dragged behind the 
four paired, active legs (Fig. 2.5, picture left); on the other hand, a form of 
walking in which the f ifth leg was positioned in front of the other four 
(Fig. 2.5, picture right).
Though Uexküll had learned chronophotography from Marey, his use of 
this technique pointed to an entirely different conception of the living body 
than Marey’s. As I noted in the f irst chapter, Marey’s chronophotography 
was based upon a Helmholtzian notion of the body as an energetic machine, 
and the measurements that his recordings yielded allowed him to analyze 
the distinct components of different processes of movements, such as walk-
ing, running, jumping, f lying, crawling, or f ighting, whether the subjects 
of these movements were human or animal. Marey’s chronophotography 
has for this reason become synonymous with the modern spatialization 
of time, the analysis and decomposition of perception, and the scientif ic 
33 There is a sad irony in the fact that such chronophotographs are unable to record the passage 
of time, for in order to obtain the image, the starf ish was pierced and held fast to a piece of cork. 
Uexküll assures us that ‘the arms’ movements are the same as under normal circumstances, 
only faster’. While these images may thus give us a correct sense of the movement, they erase 
the agony of the animal.
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rationalization and mechanization of the body and its performance—in 
a trajectory that leads, both historically and ideologically, to cinema.34 
Uexküll’s chronophotography provides not only a different use and analysis 
of the medium, but also points toward an alternative legacy of chrono-
photography for cinema. He was not simply interested in analyzing the 
movements of the starf ish with respect to their function and eff iciency, but 
rather explored the animal’s ability to organize and reorganize its use of 
its legs depending upon the circumstances in which it found itself; that is, 
in the face of the stimulations that the animal received from the environ-
ment. Uexküll’s quite different focus is especially evident in his ‘record 
of coordinates’ (Fig. 2.6) of the starf ish. This photographic series consists 
of f ilmstrips 2-4 meters in length, which Uexküll claimed to have shot by 
means of a ‘new apparatus’. What is evident in these strips is that the legs 
not only change their pairings and mutual coordination in response to 
stimuli, but, in addition, the starf ish, which is prone to ‘shed’ its legs at the 
slightest resistance, instantly adapts its walk to the new constellation of 
limbs, proving that there is an intricate collaboration between the different 
body parts. Any given local change, whether internal or external, thus 
prompts the entire organism to adapt and change systemically. The graphic 
serial images of the starf ish’s stark silhouette illustrate this quality almost 
symbolically: the distinct, coordinated, and regular arm movements are 
34 See, for example, Braun, Picturing Time, Rabinbach, The Human Motor’, and Doane, The 
Emergence of Cinematic Time.
 Fig. 2.5: record of amplitudes of ophioglypha prepared by uexküll.
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the result of impulses travelling from the periphery of the starf ish body to 
its center, where they are organized and travel back into the limbs.
In interpreting the results of his photographs and experiments, Uexküll 
stressed that there must be a center, a ‘differentiated mechanical apparatus’ 
of a quality different from that of the regular nerve pathways.35 In contrast 
to Marey’s motion studies, which simply analyzed bodily movements, 
Uexküll’s photographs positioned movement as an organized reaction to 
stimuli, with the consequence that the bodily surface or external Gestalt of 
the animal became an integral part of the observation. These differences 
between Uexküll’s and Marey’s approaches to chronophotography were in 
large part disciplinary: where physiology (Marey) sought to trace biological 
processes back to physical or chemical processes, and in this sense ground 
life in the anorganic world, biology—at least according to Uexküll’s def ini-
tion—began with living tissues and sought to deduce from the properties 
of those tissues the functions of the organs and the life of the organism as a 
whole.36 What was at stake in Uexküll’s photographs, in short, was a concept 
of organic form, rather than simply bodily movement.
35 Uexküll, ‘Studien über den Tonus’, 37.
36 See Uexküll, Im Kampf um die Tierseele, 20.
 
Fig. 2.6: record of coordinates of ophioglypha (excerpt). First row: side view (‘unpaired arm 
behind’); second row: walk with 5 arms; third row: walk with 2 arms (‘unpaired arm behind’); fourth 
row: walk with 1 arm; fifth row: intelligence experiment.
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Uexküll’s work with chronophotography and aesthetic theory was thus 
on the cusp of a new understanding of biology—or, more precisely, a new 
conception of the relationship between an organism and its environment, 
between life and world—without yet being fully able to draw its own conclu-
sions. Uexküll’s initial solution to the problem of animal perception was to 
investigate an organism’s physical reactions to the environment, as that sole 
aspect of the interaction of an animal with its world that is available to us. 
Chronophotography was the medium of this investigation, for it allowed 
Uexküll to focus solely on the visible body—that is, the response of nervous 
tissue to outside stimuli and resulting muscular movement—and make 
observations about the organism’s ‘f ight’ against its milieu. But there is a con-
flict inherent in this answer, a stumbling block, and that is the conventional 
understanding of environment as milieu from which Uexküll was working. If 
we focus solely on the way in which the milieu influences the organism, and 
we understand milieu as ‘that part of the external world [Außenwelt] that is 
impacting [a particular] animal’, then all we have on the part of the living be-
ing is passive reaction.37 The only formation (Gestaltung) that occurs is that of 
the organism by the milieu. Yet this view is incommensurable with Uexküll’s 
aesthetic—empathic—understanding of Formgestaltung in perception as the 
active, creative, and willing capacity of the body to relate to its surroundings.
This traditional notion of milieu with which Uexküll was working, but 
against which he was also struggling, had a long lineage in both biological 
and sociological thought. While Jean-Baptiste Lamarck introduced the 
term ‘milieu’ into biology, it was Auguste Comte who redef ined it more 
specif ically in 1838 as the ‘sum total of outside circumstances necessary 
to the existence of each organism’.38 Milieu became a strictly mechanistic 
term: for example, Jacques Loeb, a mechanist biologist greatly admired by 
Uexküll, proclaimed that all movement of the organism was forced upon 
it by the milieu. Hyppolite Taine extended the forces of the milieu to the 
social sphere; according to Taine, humans are conditioned by race (collective 
cultural conditions), milieu (specif ic circumstances of living), and moment 
or time (accumulated experiences). Milieu was thus f irmly established over 
the course of the nineteenth century as an all-powerful force, ‘mindless of 
man, who is its f inished product, its creature’.39
37 Ibid., 21, footnote 1.
38 The Positivist Philosophy of Auguste Comte Vol. 2 (New York: D. Appleton, 1853), 364, quoted 
in Canguilhem, ‘The Living and Its Milieu’, 10.
39 Spitzer, ‘Milieu and Ambiance’, 177. While my focus here is on f ilm, it is worth stressing that 
debates about the virtues of using the term ‘milieu’ also emerged in discussions about literature, 
in part because Émile Zola—drawing on Claude Bernard’s use of the term—proposed that the 
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Recognizing this tension between the determinism inherent in milieu 
theory, on the one hand, and his account of the activity essential to an 
organism’s perceptual abilities, on the other, Uexküll introduced the term 
Umwelt into biology and philosophy. Where milieu is an objective set of 
determining conditions, Umwelt is a subjective environment that envelops 
every living being like a soap bubble. Uexküll’s theory thus opposed the 
‘centripetal’ architecture of inorganic things, which are formed by outside 
forces, to the ‘centrifugal’ plan of organic life that develops from the inside 
out in a self-regulating fashion (a model that André Bazin would ascribe 
to the cinematic image itself some f ifty years later; see Chapter 4). Since 
we are ourselves creatures of the world, we are confined to our individual 
human soap bubble. Even in our attempts at objective scientif ic knowledge, 
we will inevitably project the elements of our Umwelt—its phenomenal 
objects and its temporal and spatial paradigms—onto other creatures. 
Uexküll’s biology is therefore an attempt to create a methodology that 
aims not at getting behind appearances (the goal, for example, of Uexküll’s 
contemporary Helmholtz), but rather accepts that there is only appearance, 
yet this appearance in turn reveals something about the living body to 
which things appear. Since ‘all reality [Wirklichkeit] is subjective appear-
ance’, investigating different organic interactions with the environment 
will mark the manifold of subjective worlds which ultimately give us a 
richer sense of the world itself. Such marking often depends upon technolo-
gies, such as chronophotography and f ilm, that mediate between these 
other Umwelten and our human Umwelt by enabling our senses to grasp 
phenomena that they could not have registered in the absence of such 
technologies. These technologies thus alter and expand our all-too-human 
gaze, enabling relationships to the world that, even if still necessarily human 
relationships, were nevertheless not possible prior to a sustained encounter 
with non-human Umwelten.40
naturalist novel should focus its ‘experimental’ technique on the milieux that determine social 
action. Georg Lukács’ 1936 attack on Zola and his conception of milieu (in the essay ‘Narrate or 
Describe?’) should thus be seen as part of the same dynamic that I outline for the case of f ilm. 
See Émile Zola, ‘The Experimental Novel’ and Georg Lukács, ‘Narrate or Describe?’
40 Jakob von Uexküll, Theoretische Biologie, 9. 
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Of Ticks and Humans
One of the most famous and dramatic examples that Uexküll used to 
illustrate Umwelt theory is his evocation of the world of a tick. This lit-
tle parasite—which Uexküll describes as like a ‘blind and deaf highway 
woman’—with its limited Umwelt had become an infamous example by 
this point, since it had been taken up lovingly by a now-long lineage of 
philosophers and historians of biology, including Georges Canguilhem, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and Giorgio 
Agamben.41 According to Uexküll, the tick’s capability for perception and 
reaction is limited to three stimuli, which he called ‘effector cues’: the sun 
on its skin, the smell of butyric acid that issues from the skin of mammals, 
and the temperature of blood in a mammalian body. The photosensitivity 
of the tick’s skin compels it to climb up trees or bushes; when it smells 
butyric acid, it lets itself fall; if it senses warmth, it will move to f ind a 
hairless spot on the skin and begin to burrow into the skin and start sucking. 
(Uexküll focused on the female tick for his example, which after having 
f illed her stomach, drops to the ground, lays her eggs and dies.) Nothing 
aside from these three elements can be perceived by the tick; nothing else, 
consequently, exists in its Umwelt.
Though Uexküll’s restriction of the female tick’s Umwelt to three factors 
might seem analogous to contemporary biological concepts, such as ‘tro-
pism’, that pointed to the role of specif ic external influences in triggering 
automatic biological responses, the concept of Umwelt was, by contrast, 
intended to underscore the autonomy of the living being’s subjective 
world. Jacques Loeb’s concept of ‘tropism’—for example, the heliotropism 
of sunf lowers or moths—placed its emphasis on external factors that 
determine plant and animal movement and positioned these movements 
as simply physico-chemical reactions. Uexküll, by contrast—and much 
more in line with teleological and vitalist colleagues such as von Baer 
and Driesch—understood these external factors as an extension of the 
animal’s Bauplan, its blueprint or body plan.42 The difference between 
Umwelt theory and Loeb’s tropism (as well as similar concepts conceiving 
of the organism as physico-chemical and the environment as milieu) was 
41 See Uexküll, ‘A Stroll’, 321. References include: Canguilhem,’The Living and Its Milieu’, 20-21; 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 173-75; Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 51, 
257; and Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, 45-47.
42 See, for example, Jacques Loeb, Forced Movements, Tropisms, and Animal Conduct, and 
Arnold E. S. Gussin, ‘Jacques Loeb’. On Uexküll’s rejection of Loeb, see Uexküll, ‘Biologie in der 
Mausefalle’; Uexküll, Die Lebenslehre, 132-33; and Uexküll, Theoretische Biologie, 326-29.
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thus the directionality of the relationship between external and internal 
factors: it is the organism determining how its Umwelt is constituted, 
rather than the milieu determining the organism. By means of what he 
called a ‘functional circle’, Uexküll explained how ‘subject and object are 
interconnected with one another and form an orderly whole’ (see Fig. 2.7).43
The double link of receptor and effector signs, of perceptual and motor 
activity, by means of which the subject grasps—and thus also consti-
tutes—the object, illustrates how those aspects of external objects that 
function as bearers of perceptual and functional cues (the striped part 
of the object in Fig. 2.7) become interwoven with the subject’s capacities. 
Consequently, in a f ly’s world, everything, including the spider’s net, is 
‘f ly-like’.
This image of subject and object ‘interconnecting’ with one another 
has an ambivalent emotional valence. On the one hand, the perfect cor-
respondences between subjects and objects seem to point to a miraculous, 
overarching ‘plan’ of nature (how else to explain the fact, Uexküll asked, 
43 Uexküll, A Foray, 49.
Fig. 2.7: Functional circle showing how inner world of the subject (‘innenwelt’) and object 
(‘objekt’) interact by means of a perception organ (‘merk-organ’) that constitutes a perception 
world (‘merkwelt’) and an effect organ (‘Wirk-organ’) constituting an effect world. the perception 
organ grasps the object by its perception-mark carrier (‘merkmal-träger’) and the effect organ by 
its effect-mark carrier (‘Wirkmal-träger’).
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that a spider’s web is woven with threads just beyond the threshold of a 
f ly’s vision, in a pattern ideal for capturing f lies?).44 On the other hand, 
though, the reduction of subjective worlds to perceptual and functional 
cue bearers produces a feeling of claustrophobia; each animal is enclosed 
in its own circle. Contemporary philosophers who engaged Uexküll’s 
texts grappled especially with this latter aspect, and either sought to 
create more room for agency in the notion of Umwelt or sought to restrict 
the functional circle to animals, thereby excluding humans from its 
enclosure.
Phenomenologists and philosophical anthropologists were especially 
interested in probing the consequences of the relationship between animal 
and Umwelt, so clearly illustrated by the functional circle, for the relation-
ship of the human being to the world.45 In Ideas, for example, Edmund 
Husserl introduced consciousness and intentionality into the notion of 
Umwelt, thereby adding historical variability and freedom to the subject-
object relationship. ‘Umwelt ’, for Husserl, is
the world that is perceived by the person in his acts, is remembered, 
grasped in thought, surmised or revealed as such and such; it is the world 
of which this personal Ego is conscious, the world which is there for it, to 
which it relates in this or that way, e.g. by way of thematically experienc-
ing and theorizing as regards the appearing things or by way of feeling, 
evaluating, acting, shaping technically, etc.46
Umwelt, he continues, is the physical reality a person ‘knows’ about; it is that 
of which the person has consciousness. ‘Speaking quite universally’, Husserl 
summarizes, ‘the surrounding world [Umwelt] is not a world ‘in itself’ but is 
rather a world ‘for me,’ precisely the surrounding world of its Ego-subject, 
a world experienced by the subject or grasped consciously in some other 
way and posited by the subject in his intentional lived experiences with 
the sense-content of the moment.’47 As a consequence, Husserl asserts, the 
Umwelt is ‘always in the process of becoming’, constantly producing itself by 
44 Darwin, of course, had a different answer, namely natural selection.
45 In most of the cases mentioned here, the authors directly, and often extensively, reference 
Uexküll. However, it is likely that Uexküll was often present virtually even in texts in which he 
was not mentioned by name, for though the term Umwelt was rarely used before the publication 
of Umwelt and Innenwelt der Tiere, it became a central category in German philosophy after 
1909, suggesting the extent and importance of Uexküll’s work. See G. H. Müller, ‘Umwelt’.
46 Edmund Husserl, Ideas II, 195.
47 Ibid.
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means of transformations of sense. Husserl distinguished between a ‘natu-
ral’ relationship between body and environment—the physico-chemical 
reaction of the body to stimuli that can be explained by causal (scientif ic) 
laws—and an intentional relationship that constitutes our Umwelt. This 
intentional relationship is governed by ‘motivation’, and things exist not 
‘in themselves’, but rather as experienced (or thought) things. Husserl thus 
adopts from Uexküll the notion of Umwelt as an individual or personal 
world, but by introducing intention and experience, our relationship to 
things, and thus to our Umwelt as a whole, becomes subject to constant 
change and becomes historical.
For the philosophical anthropologists Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, and 
Arnold Gehlen, as well as for Martin Heidegger, Umwelt theory functioned 
as a starting point for making an ontological differentiation between hu-
man and animal, and the functional circle came to illustrate the closed 
nature of the animal’s interaction with the world, its boundedness.48 On the 
basis of the claim that every animal is bound to, and unable to transcend, 
its particular Umwelt, each of these authors developed ontologies that 
fundamentally distinguished between humans and animals. Scheler, for 
example, introduced the notion of ‘openness to the world’ (Weltoffenheit) 
as the definition of the human being’s active capacity to engage and shape 
its world, and contrasted this capacity with the animal’s closedness: as a 
‘being having spirit’, the human being is existentially released from the laws 
governing organic matter and is ‘not tied anymore to its drives and Umwelt, 
but is ‘free-from-Umwelt’ [umweltfrei] or, as I wish to put it, “world-open” 
[weltoffen]. Such a being has “world.”‘49 In similar fashion, Heidegger turned 
to Uexküll’s biology in order to make a distinction between beings that 
simply ‘live’ and those that have what he called ‘existence’ (Dasein). He 
ascribed to humans the capacity for ‘world-forming’, while animals are ‘poor-
in-world’ (weltarm) and non-organic things, such as stones, are ‘worldless’ 
(weltlos). Heidegger contended that animals are ‘captivated’ by what they can 
perceive—they cannot relate to objects ‘as such’, but rather relate only in the 
sense that perceptual cues selectively ‘disinhibit’ the animals’ relationship 
to the world—and as a consequence they have no access to Dasein.50
48 See Max Scheler, The Human Place in the Cosmos; Plessner, Stufen des Organischen; Arnold 
Gehlen, Man, His Nature and Place in the World; Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts 
of Metaphysics.
49 Scheler, The Human Place in the Cosmos, 27 (translation modif ied).
50 See Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 238-70. The somewhat reductive 
treatment Uexküll received from Heidegger—and, by extension, Agamben—is, of course, 
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Yet Uexküll’s work was not solely the starting point for a lineage of 
thought that sought to establish a division between humans and animals—
a lineage of which Giorgio Agamben’s The Open: Man and Animal, is one of 
the latest and most prominent examples—and thus arrive at a def inition 
of human being, essence, or existence. This line of reception of Uexküll’s 
work has received signif icant attention in the last decade, in large part as 
a consequence of Agamben’s use of Uexküll’s example of the tick in The 
Open: Man and Animal. What has received far less attention, however—and 
perhaps even fallen by the wayside—is another path of reception, one 
that takes up the creative potential of Uexküll’s work, its thrust against 
anthropocentrism, and its interest in the visual mediation of difference.51 If 
we take another look at Uexküll’s image of the functional circle, for example, 
we see that there is a blank center of the object, indicating those aspects 
of the object that escape the subject (what Uexküll calls counterstructure, 
‘Gegengefüge’).52 This elusive part of the object differs from subject to sub-
ject. In Uexküll’s attempt to reconstruct and depict other Umwelten, new 
views of the object can emerge, since with the change of perception and 
possible action, the blank center—the invisible, imperceptible, untouchable 
part of the object—is also transformed, opening up non-human vistas. And 
opening up these non-human vistas was, as we shall see in the next section, 
an interest that Uexküll shared with many early f ilm theorists.
Against Anthropocentrism: Umwelt and Cinema
As I noted above, Uexküll’s descriptions of Umwelten evoke feelings of 
estrangement and encourage an uncanny fascination with creatures we 
thought we knew; despite occasional lapses into comparisons with our 
mostly due to the interest of these latter in linking a human/animal difference to a (differently 
perceived and def ined) crisis of humanity.
51 Amongst the recent publications on Uexküll, I found the following useful when thinking 
about this lineage: Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, ‘Afterword: Bubbles and Webs’; Jussi Parikka, 
Insect Media; and Brett Buchanan, Onto-Ethologies.
52 This is a trope we can already f ind in Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory. The ‘images’—
matter’s halfway stage between thing and representation—’act and react upon one another in 
all their elementary parts’, yet subjective perception displays images only with respect to ‘the 
eventual or possible actions of my body’. Uexküll follows Bergson in conceiving of objects as 
entwined with the perceiving body: since the body’s possible actions are reflected by the external 
images as in mirror, this realm of possibility is located exactly between body and image, such 
that it seems to be dependent upon the body’s recognition of itself in the image-as-mirror. See 
Bergson, Matter and Memory, 17-21.
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familiar human world (e.g., the tick as a ‘highway woman’), Uexküll’s 
descriptions and the scientific implications that he drew from these descrip-
tions derive their strength from the attempt to tear off the veil of human 
perception—not in idealist fashion, as an attempt to show us objects in the 
world as they really are, but rather as an attempt to reveal the plurality of 
perceptual worlds (the world as it is to a tick, or a dog, or a fly). By opening up 
every object to a manifold of creaturely perceptions, we have the impression 
of a multitude of veils, all of which provide different glimpses of objects, 
without there ever being an object-in-itself, or one veil that would reveal 
everything as it is, if only it could be lifted.
In the technical mediation of f ilm, Uexküll found not only a surface-
ness that, like chronophotography, revealed the organized interaction of 
living being and environment, but also a technical method for producing 
an estranging veil. Uexküll introduced the cinema in his writings as a 
privileged apparatus that was able to mediate between species perceptions 
because it was able to alter time and space. Uexküll’s biological inflection 
of Kantianism encouraged him to treat time and space as dependent upon 
the body of the respective living being: ‘without a living subject, there can 
be neither space nor time’.53 He defined the space of a given living subject 
as a composite of operational, tactile, and visual space. Operational space 
is produced by the kinesthetic sensations of our own bodily movement, 
as well as of the three-dimensional bodily coordinate system that issues 
from the semi-circular ear canals in higher animals and humans. Tactile 
space is produced by the ability of living beings to localize touch on their 
bodies, while visual space can be thought of as a ‘place-mosaic’ that the 
visual elements on the retina spread over the environment.54 The spatial 
53 Uexküll, A Foray, 52. 
54 This sense of kinesthetic orientation in space as enabled by a moving body, as well as 
similarities in the conception of tactile and visual space, between ‘roving eye’ and ‘feeling 
hand’, echo Uexküll’s indebtedness to theories of empathy and recall Adolf Hildebrand’s and 
August Schmarsow’s theories of perception (see Hildebrand, ‘Problem of Form’; and August 
Schmarsow, ‘The Essence of Architectural Creation’). In particular, Schmarsow’s interest in 
bodily comportment in space in the perception of architecture has strong resonances with 
Uexküll’s notion of bodily space and makes it especially interesting for thinking about f ilm 
perception. At the same time, Uexküll’s conception of space as produced by, and dependent 
upon, the body points forward toward theories of orientation in cinematic space, such as the 
work of perceptual psychologist James Gibson, who coined the term ‘ecological psychology’, as 
well as to recent applications of theories of empathy and embodied perception by Robin Curtis, 
Laura Marks, and others. Despite many parallels with Uexküll’s work, though, Gibson’s influence 
seems to be restricted to the American context (e.g., William James’ pragmatism). See James 
Jerome Gibson, The Perception of the Visual World; Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual 
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paradigms of a given Umwelt are thus completely dependent upon the body 
of the subject and its capabilities for sensing.
While Uexküll sometimes employed references to the cinematograph as a 
metaphor for his understanding of the biological nature of time, this did not 
exhaust the role that f ilm played in his work. Much more fundamentally, his 
conception of the relationship between biological time and perception was 
based on the way in which f ilm functions as a technology for manipulating 
time. The paradigmatic status of f ilm for Uexküll is especially clear in his 
description of an experiment on the time perception of a snail:
A snail [Helix pomatia] is placed on a rubber ball which, because it is 
f loating on water, can slide freely past beneath the snail. The snail’s shell 
is held in place by a clamp. The snail is thereby free to crawl and also stays 
in the same place. If one places a small stick at the foot of the snail, it will 
crawl up on it. But if one strikes the snail from one to three times a second 
with it, the snail will turn away. However, if the blows are repeated four 
or more times a second, the snail begins to crawl onto the stick. In the 
snail’s environment, a stick that moves back and forth four or more times a 
second must be at rest. We can conclude from this that the perception time 
of the snail takes place at a speed of between three and four movements a 
second. This has as a result that all processes of motion take place much 
more quickly in the snail’s environment than they do in our own. Even 
the snail’s own movements do not seem slower to it than ours do to us.55
The experiment is conceived so as to create the illusion of movement for the 
snail. Instead of the snail moving itself across space, however, a rubber ball 
moves underneath the snail (see Fig. 2.8). If a stick is positioned underneath 
its foot, the snail takes it for a continuation of its path. As the experimenter 
begins to wiggle the stick, the snail will refuse to climb onto it, presumably 
because the stick seems unstable and unsafe to the snail. However, as soon 
as the stick oscillates faster than one third of a second, the snail will continue 
to climb as though the stick was stable. The conclusion that Uexküll drew 
from the experiment is based on von Baer’s notion of the ‘moment’ as the 
basic time-unit of apperception: that is, a moment is the shortest time-span 
during which a living being can distinctly perceive different qualities. For the 
duration of its moment-unit, everything in a living being’s perceptual world 
Perception; Curtis, ‘Einführung in die Einfühlung’; Curtis, ‘Expanded Empathy’; Antonia Lant, 
‘Haptical Cinema’; and Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film.
55 Uexküll, A Foray, 72.
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is immobile, since change has become imperceptible. (In contrast to Henri 
Bergson’s concept of durée, which is an organic-vitalist temporality, von Baer’s 
moment-time is therefore a psychophysical temporality.) Just as space for 
Uexküll was a subjective variable dependent upon the body, time was similarly 
subjectivized by the ‘moment’, and he derided the idea, encouraged by the 
prevalence of objective time-measuring, that time itself is in any way objective. 
Apparently, the snail cannot perceive anything shorter than a quarter of a 
second; a ‘snail moment’, he concluded, is thus somewhere between one-third 
and one-quarter of a second long, such that ‘all processes of motion take place 
much more quickly in the snail’s Umwelt than they do in our own’.56
56 Clearly, there are f laws in this interpretation of the experiment. First, this interpretation 
assumes that the snail behaves in the lab setting just as it would in nature; in other words, that 
the snail is duped by the set-up. And second, this interpretation assumes that the snail’s decision 
to get onto the stick is necessitated by its perception of movement; in making perception and 
action equivalent, the experimenter does not leave any room for a decision on the part of the 
snail (‘This is wobbly, but I might still dare to climb onto it!’). Finally, for the sake of his argument, 
Uexküll does not distinguish between different sensory receptor times. This experiment is based 
 Fig. 2.8: experiment on the time perception of a snail.
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The snail in the experiment cited above is in many ways reminiscent 
of an immersed f ilm spectator. The snail is held in place while various 
objects (rubber ball, rod) move around it. The ‘f licker’ of the rod marks its 
threshold of perception, just as the discrete images on the f ilmstrip replace 
one another at a speed that marks the human receptor-time (which Uexküll 
determined to be one-eighteenth of a second). And indeed, in all of his 
references to time perception, Uexküll mentions the cinema: ‘The cinema 
alternatingly presents an image and darkness to our eyes. If both occur 
during the same [human time] moment, the darkness is not perceived. Only 
when the time-units last longer than one [human] moment does flicker set 
in, which for so long has been part of imperfect cinemas.’57 One could even 
imagine devising a cinematographic apparatus for snails, hoping their visual 
capacities would be up for the task: f ilms would only need to be f ilmed and 
projected at four frames per second in order for a gastropodian audience to 
enjoy a spectacle of smooth life-like movement.
Of course, a ‘species cinema’ sounds like a crazy idea, since in the 
case of cinematic representations of living beings, time manipulation is 
normally used not to mimic the time perception of the creature being 
represented, but rather simply to visualize an animal movement for the 
curious or scientif ic human eye. In such uses, cinema actually functions 
as an anthropomorphizing machine, one that translates non-human 
registers of movement into a human scale, taking into account the hu-
man perceptual apparatus and its attention span. Uexküll emphasizes 
this anthropomorphizing capacity of cinema, noting that in slow-motion 
photography, ‘more than eighteen pictures are taken per second, and then 
projected at a normal tempo. Motor processes are thus extended over a 
longer span of time, and processes too swift for our human time-tempo 
(of 18 per second), such as the wing-beat of birds and insects, can be made 
visible.’ Similarly, time-lapse photography speeds up motor processes, so 
that ‘processes that are too slow for our speed, such as the blossoming of a 
flower’, can be brought within the range of our perception.58 As a translation 
machine from plant and animal temporality to human temporality, cinema 
serves both a scientif ic interest (making visible temporal processes that 
were previously invisible or obscure) and a popular interest in seeing that 
which is curious and spectacular.
on skin contact, yet other senses such as vision or hearing might work according to differing 
intervals. 
57 Uexküll, Die Lebenslehre, 141.
58 Uexküll, A Foray, 71.
132 CinematiC Vitalism 
Yet the implications of Uexküll’s snail experiment are in fact more radical 
than this anthropomorphizing interpretation suggests. Even in cases in 
which cinema anthropomorphizes time or space (in the sense of translating 
into human standards spatiotemporal events that would otherwise be too 
fast, slow, big, or small for human perception), cinema nevertheless bends the 
spatiotemporality of the world as we know it and breaks with the conditions 
of our Umwelt: if we change either the time of recording or of projecting, 
we are manipulating the duration of the ‘moment’ as the basic time-unit 
of perception. By watching something in slow motion or fast motion, we 
either stretch or shorten the ‘moment’ and are thus able to form an image, 
within our perceptive frame, of the temporality of a living being of a different 
kind. A time-lapse shot of a snail shows us its movement not as it naturally 
appears to us in our Umwelt, but as it is mediated by an apparatus with 
different perceptual-actual capacities than our own, namely those of camera, 
f ilm and projection. Thus, following Uexküll’s conclusions and calculations 
above, if we f ilmed a snail’s movement using a f ilm camera that recorded 
at a speed of four images a second and the f ilm was then projected at the 
regular speed of 1/18 second, we would see a snail that no longer appeared to 
be ‘crawling’—that is, no longer appeared to move at a slow pace relative to 
our own bodily sense of ‘normal’ speed—but would instead appear to move 
at close to our normal walking speed. Such an image is uncanny, because it 
stretches and deforms our habitual sense of the relationships between slow, 
normal, and fast movement, in part by reminding us that the snail likely has 
its own sense of ‘normal’ speed which differs signif icantly from our own, 
and in part by making the snail move ‘too fast’—4.5 times too fast, to be 
precise—in comparison with our habitual understanding of snail speed. 
This f ilm of speedy snails thus provides us with a template for reorganizing, 
in the wake of the snail, our sense of what constitutes ‘normal’ temporality.
Researchers such as Henri Fabre, Charles Otis Whitman, and Julian Hux-
ley had already conducted similar experiments to obtain data concerning 
‘natural’ animal behavior. Yet for Uexküll, the result of an experiment such 
as the one described above, despite its use of ‘objective’ instruments and 
calculations, does not provide us with an objective result, if by ‘objective’ we 
understand that ‘view from nowhere’ later made famous by Thomas Nagel.59 
Rather, the experiment provides us with an indication—an image—of the 
subjective perception of a snail by destabilizing our pre-given conceptions 
of what constitutes ‘normal’ (or ‘fast’ or ‘slow’) movement. The theoretical 
paradigm of Umwelt research thus puts Uexküll somewhat at odds with 
59 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere; see also Nagel, ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ 
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the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century research agenda Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison describe as ‘mechanical objectivity’, according 
to which images that are mechanically produced—such as photographs 
or drawings made by an uninformed, non-judgmental individual—reveal 
the truth, even though they might be more diff icult to decipher.60 While 
Uexküll employed photography and similar technical instruments to obtain 
data, he rejected the idea of objectivity per se, including the idea of objec-
tive time and space, as a construction or illusion. Precisely for this reason, 
however, illustrations and colorful descriptions in his work are liberated 
to take on a new valence, to provide alternate paths for creating images of 
animal Umwelten—illustrations become ‘intuitions’ (Anschauungen) of 
Umwelten.61 Even though Uexküll seldom says so explicitly, he is aware of 
the fact that the (human) image of the Umwelt of a sea urchin will always 
project human Umwelt values and percepts into the image, and can for this 
reason never be more than an image or an intuition. The technological 
production and alteration of images thus makes possible a view that is 
not objective, but rather other or alien. Film can alter temporality, as I have 
discussed with respect to the snail; similarly, photographs shot with specific 
lenses or otherwise enlarged and reproduced can alter space and make 
anschaulich animals’ spatial perception.62 Rather than remaining immanent 
and transparent, technological media become tools that allow Uexküll to 
create images of species soap bubbles more effectively than experiments 
and conceptual tools such as the notion of the moment could.
Cinema presents a particularly valuable technological medium, since it 
is able, as the earliest f ilm theorists noted, to evoke a world of its own that 
has the capacity to question or tear at the seams of our ‘natural’ world. By 
60 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity. 
61 Uexküll says of images produced by taking a photograph of a village street and altering 
it by means of a rougher and rougher grid that they ‘offer a chance to gain an intuition of an 
animal’s environment if one knows the number of visual elements in its eye’ (Uexküll, A Foray, 
63). Similarly, already in ‘In the Fight about the Soul of the Animal’, Uexküll grants literary 
imagination—he mentions Maurice Maeterlinck’s book on bees—its own epistemological value. 
Since we are not able to criticize or exclude the colorful possibilities of what life is like from 
the perspective of various animals, real or not, creative fantasy can provide us with ‘graceful 
problems’ with respect to animals’ perception. See Uexküll, ‘Im Kampf um die Tierseele’, 18.
62 Another way of putting this would be to say that in Uexküll’s use of images, objectivity is 
revealed to be an illusion. Mechanically-produced images such as photographs thus do not reveal 
nature as it really is, unf iltered by an informed, opinionated, and selective human observer, 
as those committed to what Daston and Galison describe as the paradigm of ‘Truth-to-Nature’ 
would have it, but rather reveal a space-time alien to our human bodies’ being-in-the-world 
that might be closer to the space-time of other beings, real or not.
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bringing previously imperceptible details and movements into our f ield of 
vision, close-up, slow motion, and time-lapse ‘queer’ our anthropocentric 
perspective by providing us with images that do not coincide with our 
regular embodied vision of the world.63 In queering our perceptual relation-
ship to things—in breaking with the functionality of the functional circle, 
in other words—cinema creates new relationships between bodies and 
things. This operation, however, requires technology on all levels. It occurs 
in the f ilmic construction of time and space, which means: the decision 
to f ilm at a certain speed (i.e., by employing specif ic Baerian moments) 
and with specif ic lenses positioned at a specif ic distance. This queering 
also occurs in the visualization of the cinematic recording, which means: 
the decision to project at a certain speed, through a particular system of 
lenses and mirrors, onto a screen of a certain size. Consider, for example, a 
representation of a f lower that grows and blossoms in extreme time-lapse, 
so that we can translate its striving toward the light, its search for space, 
its stretching, wriggling and unfolding, into our bodies and connect these 
movements to those sensations produced by the movements of our own 
muscular and nervous tissues—such a f lower, as Benjamin taught us, is 
Romantic-blue (whatever its actual color) and has its roots in the ‘land of 
technology’.64
Uexküll’s theory of Umwelt thus pointed to the ways in which cinema 
provided an apparatus that offered a new vision, and many writers, crit-
ics, and artists embraced this potential, indeed f inding in the cinema a 
mechanical eye that confronted them with Umwelten—and with an image 
of themselves—to which their bodies and minds were unaccustomed. The 
world in the cinema often seemed threatening, since its vision was not 
grounded in a coherent subject, in an interiority that provided depth and 
cohesion. During the ‘Kinoreform’ debates in Germany in the 1910s about 
the moral and aesthetic value of cinema, a number of progressive voices 
(among them Hermann Häfker, Georg Lukács, and Herbert Tannenbaum) 
63 My notion of ‘queering’ here bears similarities to Sara Ahmed’s use of the term in Queer 
Phenomenology, where she pays attention to the issue of orientation. A queer phenomenology, 
Ahmed suggests, is one that redirects attention toward ‘different objects, those that are “less 
proximate” or even those that deviate or are deviant’. I suggest here that f ilm queers our percep-
tion of everyday objects. See Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology.
64 See Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art’, 115: ‘In the f ilm studio the apparatus has penetrated so 
deeply into reality that a pure view of that reality, free of the foreign body of equipment, is the 
result of a special procedure—namely, the shooting by the specially adjusted photographic 
device and the assembly of that shot with others of the same kind. The equipment-free aspect 
of reality has here become the height of artif ice, and the vision of immediate reality the Blue 
Flower in the land of technology.’
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discussed the cinema as purveyor of not just a new aesthetic, but a new 
experience of body and world that was expressive of modernity.65 In the late 
1910s in France, the members of a progressive f ilm movement spearheaded 
by Louis Delluc and Jean Epstein began to formulate their thoughts on the 
specif ic aesthetic of cinema—what they called photogénie (Epstein) or the 
Seventh Art (Ricciotto Canudo)—and developed further the ideas that were 
only implicit in Uexküll’s use of cinema.66 Authors such as Blaise Cendrars, 
Epstein, Émile Vuillermoz, and Colette euphorically described the f ilm 
experience as a new ‘symphony’ that might initially sound strange and 
unusual, but would ultimately result in a new techno-organic harmony.67 
In responding to this cinematic challenge, these authors found that they 
had to adapt or train their perception and innervate the new environment 
in order to adjust their bodies to this new experience. Authors in this camp 
took up literally the idea of species-queering, of experiencing a temporary 
shift of their perception—and along with their perception, their body—into 
that of another techno-organic creature.
French poet and novelist Cendrars, who assimilated cinematographic 
elements into his writing style at an early stage, freely assembled human, 
animal, plant, and machine elements into phantasmatic configurations in 
his texts on cinema. They present a theory of modernity as techno-organic 
cosmogony, of which cinema becomes a privileged expression. In The ABCs 
of Cinema (written between 1917 and 1921), Cendrars exclaimed:
Like a chameleon, the human mind camouflages itself, camouflaging 
the universe. [...] A hundred worlds, a thousand movements, a million 
dramas simultaneously enter the range of the eye with which cinema 
has endowed man. And, though arbitrary, this eye is more marvelous 
than the multi-faceted eye of a f ly. [...] Everything is rhythm, word, life. 
No longer any need to demonstrate. We are in communion. [...] At high 
speed the life of f lowers is Shakespearean; all of classicism is present 
65 See, for example, Hermann Häfker, Kino und Kunst; Häfker, ‘Kinematographie und echte 
Kunst’; Herbert Tannenbaum, ‘Probleme des Kinodramas’; and Lukács, ‘Thoughts on an Aesthet-
ics of Cinema’. On the Kinoreform debates, see also Anton Kaes, ‘Literary Intellectuals and the 
Cinema’ and Heide Schlüpmann, The Uncanny Gaze. For a detailed discussion on the role of 
‘life’ as an aesthetic category in early comments on cinema, see the Introduction.
66 See the essays by these authors in Abel, ed., French Film Theory and Criticism.
67 The parallel between Vuillermoz’s theory of f ilm, which describes the medium in musical 
terms as new symphonic harmony, and Uexküll’s symphony of Umwelten that are linked harmoni-
cally, is striking. Both authors attempt to dissolve fragmentation (montage and the static image 
on the f ilmstrip, in Vuillermoz’s case, and the individual, closed soap bubble, in Uexküll’s case) 
into a harmonic unity. See Vuillermoz, ‘Before the Screen: Hermes and Silence (1918)’.
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in the slow-motion f lexing of a biceps. On screen the slightest effort 
becomes painful, musical, and insects and microbes look like our most 
illustrious contemporaries [...] The least pulsation germinates and bears 
fruit. Crystallizations come to life. Ecstasy. Animals, plants, and minerals 
are ideas, emotions, digits. [...] We see our brother the wind, and the 
ocean is an abyss of men. And this is not some abstract, obscure, and 
complicated symbolism, it is part of a living organism that we startle, 
f lush out, pursue, and which had never before been seen.68
This text contains a number of tropes that echo throughout the writings of 
French f ilm theorists like Epstein, Germaine Dulac, or Vuillermoz, such as 
the idea that cinema has provided the human being with a new prosthetic 
eye, and that details presented in ‘high speed’, ‘slow-motion’ or close-up lay 
the groundwork for the new aesthetic of photogénie. Cendrars’ emphasis 
on camouflage, mimicry, and mimesis also expresses a sense of new bodily 
potentials of assimilating the environment. Anorganic (crystals, minerals) 
and organic matter (non-anthropomorphic animals, plants) is combined 
with the abstract and machinic (ideas, digits, etc.) to create a new organism. 
Cendrar’s style—the short sentences, enumerations, comparisons, and 
equations—mimics that of a f ilm with fast-paced editing that joins together 
disparate shots. This literary strategy translates the power Cendrars ascribes 
to cinema into his text about cinema: a taking-apart, or blasting apart, of 
the world, and a defamiliarization of the familiar and habitual that extends 
into one’s own body.
A Necessary Field of Action: Benjamin, Umwelt, and Play
Partaking in the broader European discourse on f ilm (which, aside from 
Germany and France, also included Russia), authors such as Walter 
Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer, Léon Moussinac, Dziga Vertov, and Sergei 
Eisenstein emphasized the political importance of the aesthetic of f ilm. 
However, Benjamin’s media theory is especially important in the context of 
my inquiry, since he not only made recourse to the notion of Umwelt, but he 
also converted it into a central aspect of what he deemed to be a necessary 
revolutionary practice of aesthetic engagement with cinema. Benjamin saw 
the techniques of cinema that the French critics had highlighted—that 
is, the techniques of ‘a taking apart, or blasting apart, of the world, and a 
68 Cendrars, ‘The ABCs of Cinema’, 25-26. 
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defamiliarization of the familiar and habitual that extends into one’s own 
body’—as the brutal but necessary process of an image space that tears 
apart ‘the inner man, the psyche, the individual, or whatever else we wish 
to throw to them’ for the sake of the creation of a body space.69 Even though 
Benjamin used the term Umwelt not in a strict Uexküllian sense, Uexküll’s 
theory of Umwelt, as well as his more playful writings, illustrations, and 
experiments, provide a powerful instrument that highlights what is at 
stake in Benjamin’s writings on cinema and surrealism: nothing less than 
the attempt to bridge the gap between body and Umwelt that technology 
and commodif ication had introduced.
As was common in sociological and philosophical texts at the time (for 
example, in Scheler’s writings), Benjamin used both ‘Umwelt’ and ‘Milieu’ 
(as well as ‘Außenwelt’, external world, and ‘Lebensraum’, living space or 
home territory) in talking about human surroundings.70 For Benjamin, the 
German term ‘Milieu’ connoted those environmental forces that influence 
and shape the human beings (and, presumably, all other living beings) that 
reside within such surroundings. So, for example, Benjamin used the word 
‘Milieu’ when he discussed the visibility of the environment in Russian 
f ilm.71 Furthermore, as Antonio Somani has detailed, Benjamin—just as 
some of his contemporaries, such as Ludwig Klages, Béla Balázs, or László 
Moholy-Nagy—used the term ‘Medium’ not for technical media such as 
photography or f ilm, but rather to describe the ‘“medium of perception”: 
the environment, the milieu, the atmosphere, the Umwelt in which percep-
tion is configured and organized by a series of steadily evolving technical 
Apparate [apparatuses, I.P.].’72 Benjamin’s use of ‘Medium’ can thus be said 
to encompass both ‘Umwelt’ and ‘Milieu’; it is a realm of a historically and 
materially specif ic and variable quality, in which specif ic relationships 
between humans and objects can be established. The slipping, or slippage, 
from ‘Milieu’ to ‘Umwelt’ in Benjamin’s writings, especially in his essay on 
‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility’, as well as in his texts on 
surrealism and photography, indicates a crucial qualitative change of the 
‘medium of perception.’
69 Benjamin, ‘Surrealism’, 217.
70 Benjamin’s use of the Uexküllian neologism ‘Merkwelt’ (perceptual world) in his text ‘On 
the Mimetic Faculty’ also emphasizes his familiarity with Uexküll’s work. See Benjamin, ‘Über 
das mimetische Vermögen’, 211.
71 See Benjamin, ‘Kleine Geschichte der Photographie’/’Little History of Photography; ‘Er-
widerung an Oscar A. H. Schmitz’/’Reply to Oscar A. H. Schmitz’.
72 Antonio Somaini, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Media Theory’, 27.
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Benjamin employed this distinction between Umwelt and milieu in 
order to address what he understood to be a profound and dangerous 
historical alienation between body and environment. In his dissertation 
on the Origins of German Tragic Drama, he had described the state of 
melancholy as one in which ‘[t]he deadening of the affects, and the ebbing 
away of the waves of life which are the source of these affects in the body, 
can increase the distance between the self and the surrounding world 
[Umwelt] to the point of alienation from the body’.73 In melancholy, the 
subject’s loss of affect caused in turn a loss of links to his Umwelt—that 
is, this loss of affect produced detachment, since feelings ‘respond like a 
motorial reaction to a concretely structured world’.74 Because the feedback 
loop between body and environment has been disrupted, the ‘distance’ of 
the subject from its Umwelt can go so far as to alienate the subject even 
from her own body.
Benjamin’s use of the term Umwelt thus signif icantly modif ied Uexküll’s 
original concept. Though Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt was intended to 
counter the external determinism implicit in concepts such as milieu, he 
nevertheless tended to describe the elements of subjective Umwelten—for 
example, the ‘effector cues’—in terms that seem quasi-automatic, and 
thus make it diff icult to understand whether any ‘distance’ could open 
up between a self and its Umwelt. Would Uexküll, for example, have al-
lowed for the possibility of a melancholy tick—a tick, that is, that smells 
butyric acid, but cannot quite bring itself to drop from the tree onto the 
body of the animal whence the smell originates? For authors such as 
Scheler and Heidegger, animals lacked such capacities of non-response, 
or varied responses, to effector cues, and hence these two philosophers 
appropriated the term Welt solely for humans. (For Heidegger, for example, 
the purported automaticity of animal response is precisely what denies 
animals the openness of the world, and instead makes them simply ‘poor-
in-world’.) Benjamin, by contrast, was less interested in parsing out the 
limitations of animal being than in thinking about what had in essence 
remained an unexplored dimension of Uexküll’s account: namely, how 
is it that a living being’s Umwelt can change, and how does this change 
relate to possible changes of the living being? Uexküll’s descriptions of 
73 Benjamin, Origin of German Tragic Drama, 140. There is a remarkable similarity between 
Benjamin’s description of melancholy and Heidegger’s description of boredom as a method 
of detaching us from our Umwelt in order to gain more ‘authentic’ access to our Dasein. See 
Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.
74 Benjamin, Origin of German Tragic Drama, 139.
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the variety of human Umwelten—for example, the Umwelt of the child vs. 
that of the adult, or the Umwelt of the hunter vs. that of the non-hunter—
made it clear that there was not one, but many, human Umwelten, and 
that through changes in their physical capacities and their knowledge, 
Umwelten also changed.
Rather than understanding moods like melancholy solely as experiences 
that aff licted isolated individuals, however, Benjamin was interested in 
the ways in which such moods were widespread consequences of social, 
political, and economic changes. In his later texts, Benjamin warned that 
if we are not able in some way to re-insert ourselves into the Umwelt, we 
will become playthings of the forces of nature and technology. The goal that 
Benjamin suggested ought to guide our attempt to reconnect ourselves with 
the modern capitalist Umwelt is not that of mastery, but rather a functioning 
interaction between body and environment, an ‘equilibrium’—a functional 
circle, as it were, in which the body has become as naturally unnatural as 
the technologized environment.
Film, Benjamin proposed, can take on a mediating role in our efforts to 
produce this equilibrium, for when we watch a f ilm, it is not simply part of 
our Umwelt—that is, it is not like the theater seat on which we sit. Instead, 
the f ilm screen relays the Umwelt of the camera and of f ilm as an industry 
to us, a technologized and capitalized Umwelt. This Umwelt can take on 
human or animal qualities, but it remains fundamentally alien. Benjamin’s 
notion of Umwelt, like his notion of perception, thus took on a political and 
historical dimension, and photography and cinema for him were means ‘for 
a salutary estrangement between man and his Umwelt ’.75 This capacity of 
cinema is summarized in his notion of the ‘optical unconscious’. Everyday 
objects (as well as humans themselves) become unfamiliar and escape 
those efforts to ‘grasp’ them that are grounded in the circuit of perception-
actualization; the habitual links between subject and object break down. 
By stepping into the soap bubble that is the cinema, we can see our own 
Umwelt in a different light; and by allowing us to become estranged from 
our surroundings, f ilm also allows us to become aware of the force that 
these surroundings, as milieux, are exerting upon us.
Cinema is able to perform this function because it does not simply ‘reveal’, 
but can function as a tool, or toy—both Werkzeug and Spielzeug—by means 
of which humans can claim this estranged Umwelt back as their Umwelt.76 By 
75 Benjamin, ‘Little History of Photography’, 519.
76 This is why Benjamin calls the cinema a ‘second technology’ in the artwork essay. See 
Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art’, 106-08, 117-18.
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training their perception collectively through f ilm reception, by adapting 
their bodies through an innervation of cinematic shocks and by putting 
their bodies in front of the camera lens, f ilm spectators can realize new 
potentials for action. With these connotations of Umwelt in mind, a familiar 
quote from Benjamin’s artwork essay takes on new meaning, since the terms 
‘Milieu’ and ‘Umwelt’ he used now signal the dialectical operation of the 
cinematic apparatus:
The most important social function of f ilm is to establish equilibrium 
between human beings and the apparatus. Film achieves this goal not 
only in terms of man’s presentation of himself to the camera but also in 
terms of his representation of his environment [Umwelt] by means of this 
apparatus. On the one hand, f ilm furthers insight into the necessities 
governing our lives by its use of close-ups, by its accentuation of hidden 
details in familiar objects, and by its exploration of commonplace milieux 
[Milieus] through the ingenious guidance of the camera; on the other 
hand, it manages to assure us of a vast and unsuspected f ield of action 
[Spielraum, literally ‘room-for-play’].77
For Benjamin, there can be a lag, or a gap, between creature, Umwelt, and 
milieu. If the milieu changes, due to economic, social, and technological 
forces, we are not able immediately to adapt our bodies, senses, and actions 
to the new conditions, which also means that our Umwelt does not adapt 
immediately. There is a temporal lag between milieu, on the one hand, and 
body and Umwelt, on the other. A medium such as cinema can help us bridge 
this lag, not only, but particularly, because it itself is one of modernity’s 
capitalist, technological, mass-oriented enterprises. It literally reflects back 
to us the ‘new’ environment with which our bodies, and Umwelt, are out of 
sync. Since this reflection includes us, as actors, and our Umwelt, we gain 
creative space in the gap between our immediate sensorial Umwelt and 
our Umwelt reflected and refracted through the cinematic apparatus. The 
reclaiming of the Umwelt as f ield of action in the cinema, the coincidence of 
body-space and image-space (as Benjamin put it in his essay on ‘Surrealism’), 
opens up room-for-play, a space within which a new body, penetrated by 
technology, can be playfully tested out. This creative space not only allows 
us to adjust our outdated sensorium to the present, but it also makes possible 
new provisional constellations geared toward possible futures.
77 Ibid., 117.
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In his writings on play—which are influenced by contemporary child 
psychology and Uexküll’s Umwelt research, as I will outline below—Benja-
min provided an implicit methodology that clarif ies how we could actually 
make use of this room-for-play which becomes visible in the alienated 
image cinema provides of human being and of human Umwelten. The child’s 
engagement with its Umwelt in the mode of play is for Benjamin exemplary 
of f ilm’s creative and restorative potential for enabling new engagement 
with our surroundings, and thus allowing us to appropriate the modern 
Umwelt.78 As a number of his essays testify, throughout his life, Benjamin 
maintained a keen interest in children’s play and in toys. Berlin Childhood 
around 1900, for example, documents Benjamin’s serious engagement with 
the phenomenal world of the child. In short vignettes, Benjamin recounts 
and retrospectively analyzes in this text the sensations, experiences, games, 
and fantasies that occupied him as a bourgeois child in Berlin: his relation-
ship to the disembodied voice that issued forth from the telephone in the 
hallway; butterf ly hunting, in which the relationship of hunter to prey 
was characterized by a magical metamorphosis and a becoming-prey; the 
intense and intimate relationship of a sickly child to his bed as a sort of 
territory that contained a comforting landscape of valley-folds, wrinkle-
mountains, and pillow-buildings that could be rearranged at will; his secret 
bond to the numerous statues in the Tiergarten park. All of these short 
vignettes emphasize the instability of the child as a subject and of the 
objects in its environment, as well as the magical power of these objects to 
change, to become-other, and sweep up the child in their transformation. 
Though the child might initially have summoned up the transformation, 
stable identities were soon lost in the vortex of a mutual metamorphosis 
of subject and object.
In establishing the connection between Umwelt and play, Benjamin is 
likely to have drawn on the work of child psychologists who had explic-
itly connected Uexküll’s work to children’s engagement with the world.79 
78 My work on Benjamin and play is indebted to Miriam Hansen’s essays on Benjamin, 
especially Miriam Hansen, ‘Room-For-Play’.
79 Benjamin may also have known Uexküll personally, for Agamben has claimed that Benjamin 
stayed in Uexküll’s villa on Capri during his f irst visit to the island in 1924. See Agamben, The 
Open: Man and Animal, 39. While I have not been able to verify this claim, it seems likely that 
Benjamin and Uexküll at least met in the tightly-knit German community on Capri. In 1924, 
Benjamin rented a room in a separate little cottage at ‘Villa Dana’, but never mentioned any 
details about the location. See Benjamin, ‘Letter to Gershom Sholem, Capri 7.7.1924’. Since Dana 
is the name of Uexküll’s and Baroness Gudrun of Schwerin’s daughter, this might have been their 
villa, though they seem to have moved several times, from the villa of Gudrun von Schwerin’s 
aunt, to one of Axel Munthe’s villas, and ultimately to an old villa in Anacapri (which is now 
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Martha Muchow’s 1935 Der Lebensraum des Großstadtkindes (The Living 
Space of the Metropolitan Child), a wonderful, albeit now largely forgot-
ten text, may have pointed out to Benjamin the productive potential of 
Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt, especially when it came to describing (and 
seeing) the world differently on the basis of children’s playful action and 
perception. Muchow had applied Uexküll’s Umwelt theory to modern urban 
life and contrasted ‘adult perceptions’ of city spaces with the perceptions 
of children. She analyzed how children in Hamburg-Barmbeck interacted 
with typical urban spaces, such as an unused industrial area, a playground, 
streets with just a little traff ic in comparison with streets with signif icant 
traff ic, and a Karstadt department store.80 Her work originated in William 
Stern’s Psychological Institute at the University of Hamburg, which was 
working closely together with Uexküll’s Umwelt Institute and Ernst Cas-
sirer’s Philosophical Institute.81 Stern, Eduard Spranger, and Heinz Werner 
focused on child psychology and language, and Muchow combined Uexküll’s 
and Stern’s work in order to explore the premise that the Umwelt of children 
is entirely different from that of adults. Benjamin was well acquainted with 
the research at Stern’s institute; moreover, William Stern was the husband 
of Benjamin’s cousin Clara, and in their book on children’s language, the 
Sterns included a number of examples from a four-year-old ‘Walter B. from 
available as a vacation rental). See Uexküll, Jakob von Uexküll. Uexküll’s and Benjamin’s paths 
also might have crossed at the café Zum Kater Hiddigeigei, which both frequented.
80 While Muchow’s study testif ies to the climate of lively interdisciplinary exchange in Ham-
burg in the late 1920s and early 1930s, it simultaneously and tragically exemplif ies the brutal 
end of this atmosphere with the rise to power of the National Socialists. In April 1933, Stern 
and Cassirer, who, like most of the other employees of the Psychological Institute, were Jewish, 
were prevented from entering university property and subsequently f led to the Netherlands and 
England, respectively. Muchow was denounced as a collaborator with Jews and on the basis of 
that claim, it was further claimed that she was an ‘active member of the Marxist Weltbund für 
Erneuerung der Erziehung (World Association for the Reformation of Education)’. In September, 
shortly after she was f ired and the Psychological Institute was closed, Martha Muchow attempted 
suicide and died two days later. Her brother published Muchow’s Lebensraum posthumously. 
See Jürgen Zinnecker, ‘Recherchen zum Lebensraum des Großstadtkindes’. 
81 Uexküll’s Umwelt Institute was founded in 1926. Until its closure in 1946, one of its most 
important employees was Emilie Altenloh, who had published one of the f irst sociological studies 
of cinema in 1914: Altenloh, Zur Soziologie des Kino. On the collaboration between the institutes, 
see Mildenberger, Umwelt als Vision, 145-65. The integration of Uexküll’s Umwelt theory into 
Stern’s personalist psychology and Cassirer’s philosophy also illustrates the far-reaching 
interdisciplinary proliferation of Uexküll’s thinking. Cassirer based what he proposed as the 
distinction between man and animal—namely, man’s symbolic capacity—in an Uexküllian 
foundation. See, for example, Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man, 27.
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Berlin’.82 Benjamin in turn made references to Stern’s work in his letters 
and described Heinz Werner’s work as ‘the most advanced treatment’ of 
a ‘physiognomics of language’ that locates ‘linguistic and choreographic 
expression in one and the same mimetic faculty’.83
Muchow’s analysis of the role that a former cargo-unloading area at Ham-
burg’s Osterbek Canal played for children, in contrast to its role for adults, 
provides a striking example of children’s appropriation of a functional, 
purposive space and their playful, tactile, and mimetic transformation of 
it. Muchow begins by describing the site objectively, as a ‘thing in itself’, 
and goes on to describe how the unloading area relates to different subjec-
tive worlds: the ‘purpose-space’ (Zweckraum) as it was intended by the 
construction agency; the ‘space of action’ (Handlungsraum) in the worlds 
of workers or of anglers, who used the space to f ish in the canal; and f inally, 
the ‘room-for-play’ (Spielraum) in the world of the child. In the children’s 
Umwelt, there is no ‘functional tone’ to the site; that is, they do not regard 
its features with respect to their intended purpose. Instead, their activities 
are centered around a gate and the banks of the canal. To adults, the gate is 
only in the periphery of their perception as something that marks the border 
between street and workspace and that protects passers-by from falling 
down onto the lower ground of the unloading area. It is primarily an optical 
perceptual cue (Merkzeichen) that ‘structures space, blocks movement and 
provides protection’. The kids, by contrast, whether they are passing by 
or looking for a place to play, try to ‘establish a direct relation’ to the gate:
The gate literally has a calling-character. Hardly any child between three 
and thirteen years of age on the sidewalk along Osterbeckstraße passes 
by the gate without touching it. They may choose to let their hand glide 
over the upper or middle bar of the gate, or touch it with a stick, a ball or 
even a schoolbag or shopping bag; or they may mark their path past the 
gate rhythmically by just beating, touching or tapping the gate’s posts: 
in any case, and in fact invariably, a touch, a tactile sensation is sought. 
Other children—and not only those who want to enter the unloading 
area—seem to feel like a passionate mountain climber (or does the latter 
feel like them?): they cannot leave the towering height unconquered. 
Even though two broad, convenient sets of stairs and a slowly inclining 
runway offer comfortable possibilities for getting up and down, the 
82 William Stern and Clara Stern, Die Kindersprache. On the references to Benjamin in their 
work, see Heinz Brüggemann, Walter Benjamin über Spiel, Farbe und Phantasie, esp. 86-88.
83 See Benjamin, ‘Problems in the Sociology of Language’.
144 CinematiC Vitalism 
children almost exclusively use the gate and the slope behind it. They 
either climb across the gate or go through the bars, if they are among 
the smaller children—sometimes for no other reason than to return the 
same way, sometimes in order to enter the unloading area via the slope, 
and sometimes to clamber about the gate. . . . In the world of the child, 
[the gate] presents a tactile perception- and action-image [Merk- und 
Wirkbild]. By means of the strongest, irresistible power, it seems to exert 
a force that compels the children to touch it [Berührungszwang].84
Muchow’s careful observations highlight that whatever we (grown-ups) 
think of the gate, however we perceive it (even when we see kids playing 
on it), the gate has completely different qualities in the Umwelt of a child. 
For children, is a ‘grasp-, jump-, climb-, sit- and squat-thing’ that almost 
magically summons the child and demands to be touched.
In Muchow’s evocation of the world through a child’s eyes and senses, 
the urban landscape is transformed and restructured as we enter the child’s 
‘soap bubble’. As in watching a f ilm, where we shift back and forth between 
awareness of, and attention to, the world the f ilm presents (thus making 
it our immediate Umwelt) and the Umwelt of the movie theater, in read-
ing Muchow’s descriptions we drift between immersion in the children’s 
Umwelt’s new order, sensations, and attractions (which resonate in us by 
triggering memories), and a comparison with our preconceived understand-
ings of the importance, meaning, and function of these same urban sites. 
The quiet residential street becomes a playground and protected ‘home 
zone’, while the busier streets have little importance and are often only 
a space for passing through, whose features hardly enter the children’s 
Umwelt—with the exception of shop windows, which compel only one-sixth 
of the children. The youngest ones make contact by touching the glass or 
tracing the outlines of exhibited goods; the attention of somewhat older 
kids is caught by attractions such as moving puppets, colorful pictures, toys, 
candy, and so forth. Only older kids are interested in shop windows as the 
presentation of purchasable commodities. The department store, f inally, 
f igures as a fantastical ‘adventure world’ for children. Their energy focuses 
on bypassing the doormen (who keep out unaccompanied minors) by sneak-
ing past them, showing forged notes from their mothers, or pretending to 
be ‘with someone’, that is, a customer whom they either asked beforehand 
or who unknowingly takes on the role of parent or older sibling in the 
children’s acting scheme. Once inside, they try to become invisible in the 
84 Muchow and Muchow, Der Lebensraum des Großstadtkindes, 47-48.
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shopping crowd, make use of the store’s labyrinthine structure to play, 
compare, touch, or slip into their pockets objects of their desire, or mimic 
adult consumers by discussing expertly the qualities of clothes, tools, pens, 
and so forth, and inventing reasons for their use.
I have stressed the importance of Uexküll and his theory of Umwelt for 
an understanding of early f ilm theory not simply for the sake of historical 
completeness, but also in order to establish the concept of Umwelt as an 
important intervention in theories of cinema and, by extension, an addition 
to the conceptual tools by means of which we think about the conditions of 
modernity. From this latter perspective, we might summarize the impor-
tance of Uexküll and Umwelt theory for our understanding of early cinema, 
as well as cinema more generally, under three headings. First, in contrast 
to more simplistic concepts of milieu which focus only on the influences of 
the environment on the individual, Umwelt research stressed that mental 
and physical engagement with the environment opens up new leeway, or 
room-for-play, in the relationship between the individual and what sur-
rounds it. Second, the concept of Umwelt emphasizes that cinema—like 
Muchow’s study and like Uexküll’s imaginings in a text such as Forays into 
the Worlds of Animals and Humans—makes use of our capacity to imagine 
other worlds. Third, and f inally, cinema’s world, at least as perceived by a 
number of critics in the 1910s and 1920s, bears signif icant similarities to 
the child’s world.
The central elements of children’s play in both Muchow’s study and 
Benjamin’s childhood memories—mimicry and mimesis, the testing of 
spatial boundaries, a blurring of subject-object distinctions, the anima-
tion of objects or their investment with magical powers, a dominance of 
the sense of touch over other senses—outlined, in a sense, a blueprint for 
those aesthetic operations that f ilm critics performed in their perception 
of cinema itself. Jean Epstein, for example, described the animistic quality 
of cinema. For Epstein, cinema not only bestowed life on objects such as ‘a 
revolver in a drawer, a broken bottle on the ground, an eye isolated by an iris’, 
but these objects were also ‘elevated to the status of characters’; they gained 
a mysterious personality.85 And in his essay on the close-up, he emphasized 
the intimacy and pressing proximity of touch of the image.86 Blaise Cendrars’ 
account of f ilm perception is also modeled on a playful engagement with 
the world: ‘the human mind disguises itself by camouflaging the globe’.87 
85 Epstein, ‘Photogénie’, 317.
86 Epstein, ‘Magnif ication (1921)’, 237.
87 Cendrars, ‘The Modern: A New Art, the Cinema’, 182.
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When the children in Colette’s description of an educational f ilm screening 
watch ‘the intentional and intelligent movement’ of flowers in the cinematic 
land of slow-motion technology, they ‘get up, imitate the extraordinary 
ascent of a plant climbing in a spiral, avoiding an obstacle, groping over 
its trellis: “It’s looking for something! It’s looking!”‘88 The magic bond that 
the children formed with the plant in this experience of cinema reflects 
that of little ‘Walter B. from Berlin’ as he is hunting butterflies: ‘the more 
butterfly-like I became in my heart and soul—the more this butterfly itself, 
in everything it did, took on the color of human volition.’89 The spell cast by 
both the ‘old law of the hunt’ and cinema (both encompassing the activities 
of shooting and capturing), reveals how the latter, as technology, activates 
the same perceptual-actual—even ontological—mobility in the child as 
the magical and ritual aspects of the hunt.
However, it was only in Benjamin’s appropriation of Umwelt and play for 
his texts on art, technology and politics that play became a politically viable, 
even necessary methodology of engaging one’s environment, at least if we 
are to avoid false subjugation and to effect real, mutual transformation of 
subject and environment. Benjamin’s approach emphasizes that f ilm has 
the capacity to create its own world, even as the f ilm world’s ‘stuff’ is taken 
from the world, in the sense that f ilm is ‘of’ this world. When we watch a 
f ilm, it becomes part of our Umwelt, our subjective world. However, it does 
not just show us things—a stone, a tree, a smile—as they appear to us in 
our normal Umwelt. Rather, everything is transformed by the apparatus. In 
cinematographic mediation, things—whether a dog, a smile, or a magni-
f ied cheese mite—become visible and audible to us. They are no longer 
immediate objects of our Umwelt, yet they remain recognizably objects in 
the world. The cinema, to use Benjamin’s terms, is a technical apparatus 
that reorganizes ‘the medium of perception’, that is, our perceptual world, 
yet it also produces a medium of reflection between spectator and screen. 
This experience is exhilarating and unsettling—and, as Benjamin warned, 
necessary in order to take on a world full of apparatuses. What is given to 
us in the f ilm experience is thus simultaneously familiar and unfamiliar, 
old and new, heimlich (in the sense of familiar, intimate) and unheimlich 
(unfamiliar, uncanny)—uncanniness is a fundamental part of the f ilm 
experience. We might say, in fact, that Epstein’s concept of photogénie 
seeks to describe precisely this surplus value that is produced by means 
of cinematic reproduction, a surplus value that, as Epstein wrote, ‘acts on 
88 Colette, ‘Cinema (from Aventures Quotidienne)’, 61.
89 Benjamin, ‘Berlin Childhood around 1900’, 351.
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one’s feelings more to transform than to confirm them, and personally, it 
makes me uneasy’.90
Uexküll’s Umwelt theory thus not only introduced a concept with 
which to understand one’s environment as a subjective creation, but it 
also provided f ilm critics of the early 1920s—and can continue to provide 
us—with the example of a playful engagement that breached the Umwelt 
boundaries of ‘proper’ perception. Engaging this latter potential, of course, 
requires that we move beyond Uexküll’s own interpretation of Umwelt 
theory as describing an ahistorical system of functional circles, and toward 
the approach outlined in Benjamin’s texts on f ilm, which emphasize the 
critical issue of historical environments and conditions of perception. As 
Benjamin stressed, things that change as a consequence of the processes 
of commodif ication and technologization—and these include goods, but 
also patterns of work and daily life—can slip out of our radius of perception 
and action because our body does not automatically adapt to these changes. 
That is why, as Benjamin stressed, we need f ilm as a second technology, a 
technology that in the name of play and experiment distances the human 
being from nature—which means, as well, from natural perception.
Painlevé’s Cinema of Bewilderment
I began this chapter by discussing animals in non-cinematic media, 
considering f irst, a taxidermied dog that appeared in a diorama inspired 
by Uexküll’s work, then the painted dog Nipper in RCA Victor’s iconic 
‘His Master’s Voice’, and f inally the appearance of a dog in one of W. K. 
L. Dickson’s early f ilm experiments for Edison. These three examples of 
mediated ‘companion animals’ allowed me to identify three quite dif-
ferent relationships between technological medium and animal life. The 
relationship between medium and animal can emphasize the gap that 
separates animal life and technological mediation, pointing toward a loss 
in modernity of animal life as radical otherness; it can also, conversely, 
conflate technological medium and animal in an operation that drains 
both of their potential to upset traditional understandings of what con-
stitutes a human being. Yet media, and especially cinema, can also allow 
animal vitality to play a more destabilizing role by eschewing strategies 
of identif ication and narrative control, instead enabling a more corporeal 
mode of relation that sets into motion a feedback loop between animal and 
90 Epstein, ‘Magnif ication (1921)’, 239.
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technology as two media that allow a renegotiation of, and reflection on, life 
in general and human life in particular. This feedback loop destabilizes rigid 
boundaries between animals and humans and thus enables an exhilarating 
state of bewilderment.
In his f ilms between 1927 and 1954, Painlevé combined scientif ic docu-
mentary with avant-garde techniques as a way of f inding the strange and 
unfamiliar in the seemingly familiar waters of France. Painlevé’s f ilms, 
whether they take sea urchins, water spiders, octopuses, or seahorses as 
their subject, are interested in life forms that do not correspond to our mam-
malian sense of the body and anthropocentric perspective on behavior and 
interaction, and his f ilms thus destabilize our understanding of movement, 
physicality, bodily comportment, and sexuality, as well as our relationship 
to our environment. Stylistically, these f ilms combine the scientif ic with 
the fantastic and even the political (as, for example, in a f ilm on the ‘fascist’ 
vampire bat), using techniques such as microcinematography, coloration, 
slow-motion, and the f irst underwater cameras.
The engagement with animals in early cinema is due to the aff inities of 
animals with technical reproduction, an aff inity based on both physical 
and metaphysical correspondences. These aff inities include the visual 
appeal of animal bodies, movements, and behavior, their strong pres-
ence on the screen due to their un-self-conscious being, and their kinship 
with the cinematic apparatus due to the way that both seem to transmit 
life (a transmission that, in the case of animals, is often positioned as 
a function of unquestioning situatedness in life). In various ways, early 
f ilms and animals each harnessed the resonant power of the other, or 
gave themselves over to the other, serving the other, often in the form of 
play. This was a play that already implied, like the playful f ights of young 
animals, a struggle over life and death—but at the same time we need to 
distinguish this from that Hegelian death-struggle that has so marked 
twentieth-century philosophical engagement with the relationships 
between animals and humans.91
The popular science f ilm combines many of the strands of f ilm-animal 
interaction I have discussed above. These f ilms have their origin in the 
attraction and spectacularity of animals, which is often heightened by 
means of special effects ranging from manipulations of the animal or its en-
vironment—for example, a terrarium the size of the f ilm frame containing 
91 See Hegel’s account of the struggle between master and slave in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, 11-19. For the importance of this for a variety of f igures, 
including Kojève, Bataille, and Sartre, see Descombes, Modern French Philosophy .
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two antagonistic species—to suggestive montage to microcinematography 
and timelapse photography. These f ilms then combine such images with 
explanations and with scientif ic facts and educational information about 
the animals.92 In the case of Flies: A Scientific Film (Charles Urban, 1913), for 
example, intertitles explain; ‘The fly larvae dig into the soil to undergo a 
metamorphosis’; ‘The pupa’; or ‘After one hour.’ The visualization of ‘How a 
fly transmits tuberculosis’, invisible to the naked eye, is achieved by means 
of a Kuleshovian montage effect, namely the image of flies crawling around 
in a spittoon, followed by a close-up of flies on a pacif ier, followed by a child 
sucking on a pacif ier.
Jean Painlevé not only continued the legacy of the early popular science 
f ilm, but also thematized in his f ilms questions of animal presentation, 
Umwelt, and technology. Painlevé’s work on scientif ic cinema follows in the 
footsteps of Marey, in a genealogy that Painlevé himself laid out, and which 
includes Dr Eugène Doyen and Jean Comandon as important intermediaries. 
I will focus on Painlevé’s early popular f ilms, most of which were spin-offs 
of research projects and research f ilms. Especially in their employment of 
microcinematography, the f ilms combine scientif ic interest and facts with 
an aesthetic impulse to reveal bizarre, unusual life forms, reproductive 
cycles, organs, and behaviors. On the most basic level, Painlevé’s f ilms 
make visible life as movement where the naked eye was not able to see 
anything, or at most a tiny, undifferentiated creature. Consistently, the films 
take up a creature and provide closer and closer views of parts of its body, 
creating the impression of a vortex that draws one deeper and deeper into 
life, where everything is revealed to be organic movement (one could call 
this f irst level the level of interest in the ubiquity of life as movement, or 
movement as life). On a second level, the f ilms are interested in the moving 
animal or animal part depicted (an interest in the spectacular visuality of 
animals). The pumping air hole of an octopus, the grasp of the unhinged jaw 
of a stenorhynchus, the labor contractions of a male seahorse: all of these 
scenes pivot on the border between factual representation and scientif ic 
interest, on the one hand, and the presentation of a fantastic world—some 
sort of alternate universe—that leaves the spectator astounded, confused, 
disgusted, and amused, on the other hand.
Painlevé’s real skill, however, lies in a combination of images, music, 
playful comments, and scientif ic fact (via intertitles and voice-over) that 
probes the spectator’s relationship to the image and the animal depicted; 
this constitutes the third level of the f ilms’ engagement with animal life. 
92 See Hamery, Jean Painlevé, 27-33; James Leo Cahill, Cinema’s Copernican Vocation.
150 CinematiC Vitalism 
Intertitles and image track—or, in the later films, soundtrack, voiceover, title 
cards and image—pull the spectator in various directions at once. Animals, 
often mundane, but of such a small size or so familiar that they had never 
been given a second look before, are elevated into beautiful and horrifying 
creatures. The spectator is constantly called upon to compare physical or 
behavioral traits of animals to human physiognomy and demeanor. As 
soon as the spectator is lured into appreciating the animal scientif ically 
or ‘objectively’, an image or a verbal comment highlights the relationship 
of the animal to the human being and destabilizes any objective, simply 
factual stance.
Painlevé’s f ilms thus mobilize cinematic means to break open notions 
of human self and animal other. Not only does life become a cinematic 
matter in his f ilms, but cinematic life no longer remains bound by man-
animal distinctions. Painlevé’s f ilms do not simply focus on the aesthetic 
dimension of science f ilms, but rather jolt the spectator out of a distanced 
mode of aesthetic reception, bringing her body and her sense of human self 
into the game. The reception is thus not only involved and physical, but 
takes apart the spectator’s self-movement, behavior, feelings, and cultural 
customs and sets these, as elements, alongside or against the movement, 
behavior, and feelings of the animals onscreen. This cinema works by 
continually confronting scientif ic fact with unfounded, interpretive f iction, 
rationality with fantasy, documentary style with manipulation pre- and 
post-production, and neutral observation with anthropomorphization. 
The screen itself becomes the space where the animality—of animals and 
of the spectator—is negotiated as something physical, instinctual, and 
intellectual.
Painlevé’s indebtedness to Marey as both a scientist and father of 
chronophotography highlights again that the commitment of a scientist 
to non-vitalist positions by no means implies that his work in or on f ilm 
could not be important for the formulation of a cinematic vitalism. What 
makes Painlevé such an important f ilmmaker for this project is the way in 
which his f ilm style allows f ilm and animal to engage in an open exchange 
of vital expression, each profiting from the other and engaging, or rather 
incorporating, the spectator. The camera makes visible life and movement 
on microscopic levels, where the naked eye, or previous, less magnifying 
shots, had only seen stillness. His popular science f ilms emphasize that 
our senses have only an incomplete grasp of the life that surrounds us and 
the f ilms inevitably turn into a journey into the abundance and ubiquity 
of everyday life, since they always remain with everyday environments 
and everyday creatures in and around freshwater and seaside in France.
neW Worlds 151
Painlevé’s cinematic operations depend on the mobilization of different 
genres and styles, of different regimes of knowledge, such that they mutually 
question one another. Most importantly, these are the genre of scientific film 
and the reliance on facts derived from external observation and analysis, on 
the one hand, and the genre of the avant-garde and experimental f ilm and 
artistic operations of making-strange, making-familiar, and of highlighting 
irrationality and the unconscious. The origins of this unique combination 
lie in Painlevé’s association with various camps. He studied zoology and 
biology at the Sorbonne, where he became the research assistant of Paul 
Wintrebert, an important embryologist associated with the Marine Biology 
Station at Roscoff, who employed Jean Comandon in the 1910s to collaborate 
on a film together (Wintrebert had relied on films as research tools and for 
presentation early on). Yet simultaneously, Painlevé became part of artistic 
circles, especially the surrealists, in his early twenties, mostly mediated by 
his cousin Pierre Naville, in whose apartment André Bréton’s ‘Bureau of 
Surrealist Research’ found a home in 1924. Around the same time, Painlevé 
befriended Yvan Goll and contributed to the f irst and only issue of Goll’s 
journal Surréalisme. In 1926 and 1927, he participated in films with Antonin 
Artaud, contributed footage of a starfish to Man Ray’s L’Étoile de Mer in 1928 
and, the following year, one of his photographs (of a lobster claw) to George 
Bataille’s Documents. Film critics including Elie Faure, Germaine Dulac, and 
Fernand Léger praised Painlevé’s first films in 1928-29, and some of Painlevé’s 
closest friends were filmmakers, including Jean Vigo and Sergei Eisenstein.93
In an essay entitled ‘Neo-Zoological Drama’, his f irst artistic publication 
in Goll’s Surréalisme, Painlevé provides an early literary example of his 
cinematic strategy of interlacing science and art, as Roxane Hamery, in her 
comprehensive monograph on Painlevé, and more recently, James Cahill, 
have argued. In this text, Painlevé amasses scientif ic names and references, 
combining and embellishing them with word plays, poetic turns of phrase, 
and anthropomorphizing, eroticizing descriptions:
The plasmodium of the Myxomycetes is so sweet; the eyeless Prorhynchus 
has the dull color of the born-blind, and its proboscis stuffed with zo-
ochlorellae solicits the oxygen of the Frontiniella antypyretica; he carries 
93 See Brigitte Berg, ‘Contradictory Forces’, 19. Léger, along with Marc Chagall, was quoted in 
a review of Painlevé’s f ilm in L’Intransigéant (23 December 1930). Elie Faure mentions Painlevé 
in De la Cinéplastique; and Germaine Dulac and Jean Renoir were invited to the premiere of 
Painlevé’s f irst f ilm, La Pieuvre. See Roxane Hamery, Jean Painlevé: le cinéma au cœur de la vie, 65. 
Dulac frequently rented a copy of La Pieuvre for the f ilm screenings and lectures she organized.
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his pharynx in a rosette, a locomotive requirement, horned, stupid, and 
not at all calcareous. But Dendrocoelum lacteum and Planaria torva, 
gonocephalous and olive-greenish, sharpen the pleasure of the hoops; 
the little turbellarian knows the embrace of their mouth; good for Chi-
ronomus plumosus to outline their intestinal arborizations in red lace; 
what spherical astonishment: he flees and ruptures the phlegmy threads 
reserved for the Bythotrephes longimanus, that sacred little crustacean 
with close-cropped hair; he would rather be born by parthenogenesis 
than touch these threads of the ovoviviparous Mesostoma . . .94
To be sure, all scientif ic names and facts that Painlevé mentions are correct; 
a biologist could decipher the references and would f ind the text to be a 
poeticization of the life cycle, diet, enemies, and companion species of 
a f latworm (turbellarian) called Prorhynchus. However, to the lay reader 
with a sensitivity to literary aspects—that is, the majority of the intended 
readership—the Latin genus and species names only reference the treas-
ure chest of unknown life forms without classifying particular identities. 
Rather than ascribing identities within the Linnaean taxonomic system, the 
scientif ic names have here the opposite effect. The result is not dissimilar 
from the effect produced by Dada sound poems, for which the evocative 
power lies in the sound and rhythm of non-sensical words; yet in the case 
of Painlevé’s text, these words do have a real denotation. Painlevé’s employs 
the device of defamiliarization in two directions: the language of science 
is defamiliarized by an injection of non-scientif ic language and semantic 
procedures at the same time as poetic language is defamiliarized by the 
injection of scientif ic classif ication and description of facts. Hamery notes 
that this text coincided with ‘the Gollian conception of surrealism, in which 
brute, living matter provides the basic support for poetic images, subversive 
misappropriations and incongruous association’.95 In contrast to André 
Bréton’s def inition of surrealism, which soon—a few months after Goll’s 
publication—became the predominant and canonical def inition of the 
movement, Goll insisted on deriving surrealist elements from brute reality, 
rather than the unconscious: ‘Every artistic creation has its point of origin in 
nature . . . the most beautiful images connect elements of reality far removed 
from one another as directly and as rapidly as possible.’96
94 Jean Painlevé, ‘Neo-Zoological Drama’, 117.
95 Hamery, Jean Painlevé, 32.
96 Yvan Goll, ‘Manifest des Surrealismus’, 186 (translation mine). On Goll’s def inition of sur-
realism in contrast to Bréton’s, see Jeremy Stubbs, ‘Goll versus Bréton’. See also Andreas Kramer, 
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For Yvan Goll, f ilm was the surrealist medium par excellence, since it 
could connect disparate bits of reality directly, as images, without any 
detour through language or other symbols. Film was based on ‘movement’, 
which he identifies as the single most important element of modern art. Film 
relayed reality as brute matter on the basis of its technical reproduction, yet 
transformed it into surreality due to the newly-won visibility provided by 
the camera-eye, and it was able to connect disparate parts of reality through 
‘synthesis and the play of opposites’ on the basis of montage.97 Painlevé’s 
interest in f ilmmaking thus had a double foundation that is reflected in 
the double defamiliarization of his ‘Neo-Zoological Drama’. There were 
scientif ic f ilmmakers such as Jean Comandon, who made educational 
f ilms for the broader public and were very aware of the aesthetic quality 
of the f ilms they were producing. And then there were avant-garde artists 
such as Yvan Goll, who regarded f ilm as the most powerful medium of 
expression of the current time, since it could take bits of (also scientif ic, 
factual) reality and translate them ‘onto a higher artistic plane’.98 In his best 
popular science f ilms, Painlevé mobilized both our understanding of the 
natural scientif ic world to yield an aesthetic value and our understanding 
of aesthetics to yield an epistemological value. As a consequence—and this 
is often overlooked—Painlevé’s f ilms develop not only a kind of scientif ic 
aesthetic, but also a methodology for a different understanding of science 
that includes a sense of wonder, or, as Hamery describes Comandon’s work, 
‘a poetic approach to life where the exploration of physical phenomena 
retains a profound mystery’.99
Painlevé’s f irst popular science f ilms, or ‘zoological dramas’, from 
1928-29, while lacking the modern musical accompaniment and ironic 
voiceover that characterizes his later f ilms, already contain the aspects I 
have highlighted in the beginning of this section. First, they are interested in 
life as a movement that determines pace and structure of the f ilm. Second, 
they are focused on animal bodies, developments and behaviors that we can 
‘Yvan Goll und das Medium Film’.
97 Yvan Goll, ‘The Cinedram’, 53.
98 Goll, ‘Manifest des Surrealismus’, 186. Indeed, Goll’s conception of f ilm art and Comandon’s 
notion of cinematic mediation are not that far apart. Comandon writes, for example: ‘Soul 
speaks to soul without conventional intermediary: these here are the universal languages, the 
spiritual diapasons the vibrations of which are passed on with intensity to the minds [esprits].’ 
Jean Comandon, ‘Le cinéma et les sciences de la nature’, quoted in Hamery, Jean Painlevé, 50-51.
99 ‘For [Comandon]’, she continues, ‘the discovery of a strange microcosm, populated with 
unknown elements, exceeds the limits of pure science and elevates the mind [pensée].’ Hamery, 
Jean Painlevé, 50 (translation mine).
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grasp and comprehend with our mammalian understanding of life, but that 
nevertheless stretch and bend this understanding. And f inally, they open 
up a space for reflection on our limited perspective on life, which focuses on 
intelligent behavior, the mammalian body, and easily perceivable body size, 
and our relationship to the bizarre animal world we are witnessing in the 
f ilms, a world to which the f ilm brings us too close to remain comfortable 
in our seat.
The Octopus (La pieuvre, 1928), The Daphnia (La Daphnie, 1928), and Sea 
Urchins (L’Oursin, 1928) were shown as short features preceding a main 
feature (and, in some cases, accompanied by another short f ilm) at the 
most important avant-garde theaters in Paris between December 1928 and 
October 1930; these theaters included the Studio Diamant, the Studio des 
Ursulines, and the Parisiana.100 Painlevé conceived of these f ilms following 
his f irst scientif ic f ilms in 1927, most notably The Stickleback’s Egg: From 
Fertilization to Hatching (L’Œuf de l’épinoche, de la fécondation à l’éclosion) 
and his participation in a couple of avant-garde ventures, f irst as an actor 
alongside Michel Simon in René Sti’s never completed The Unknown Woman 
of the Six-Day Race (L’Inconnue des Six-Jours, 1926), and subsequently as 
director of Yvan Goll’s play Methuselah (Mathusalem ou l’éternel bourgeois, 
1927), with Antonin Artaud as protagonist.101
The Octopus stands out among the early f ilms, since it seems to have the 
least consolidated form. The f ilm is still very much suspended between a 
100 A few months after these three f ilms, Painlevé completed his f irst sound f ilms that had a 
similar circulation and include The Hermit Crab (Le Bernard-l’ermite, 1929), Hyas and Stenorhyn-
chus (Hyas et Sténorinques, 1929) and Crabs and Shrimp (Crabes et Crevettes, 1929). The premiere 
of The Octopus took place at the Studio Diamant. It was shown together with Georg Wilhelm 
Pabst’s Abwege or Begierde (The Devious Path / Desire / Crisis, 1928—the f ilm was released under 
various titles)—a brilliant pairing, I think. Not only do the images of the octopus and Brigitte 
Helm’s characteristic body movement (stretched-out head, angular, exaggerated movement of 
the limbs, pliable, almost boneless torso) complement (and compliment) one another, but the 
latter f ilm’s f irst half, which shows Helm trapped in her haute-bourgeois life in a modern glass 
villa, more than resembles an animal trapped in an aquarium, while the second half, which 
shows her ecstatic experience at a nightclub, mirrors the drama of octopuses f ighting a crab, a 
lobster, and one another in the second half of The Octopus.
101 See Berg, ‘Contradictory Forces’, 12-19; and Hamery, Jean Painlevé, 276. Berg, who directs 
Painlevé’s archive ‘Les Documents Cinématographiques’ in Paris, also recounts that it was 
Painlevé who introduced actor Michel Simon to Painlevé’s best friend Jean Vigo for the role of the 
old sailor in L’Atalante (Jean Vigo, 1931). However, there are also further personal entwinements 
between Painlevé’s artistic and scientif ic endeavors in f ilm: the cameraman for The Unknown 
Woman, André Raymond, employed time manipulation techniques that inspired Painlevé to 
pursue a scientif ic f ilm on the basis of the same techniques. Raymond became his cameraman 
for many subsequent popular science f ilms.
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surrealist f ilm experiment and an aestheticized documentary, and it lacks 
the more complex engagement with scientif ic discourse that characterizes 
Painlevé’s later f ilms. The f ilm nevertheless has a discernible structure. It 
begins with a kind of surrealist overture of various shots of an octopus in 
absurd settings: following two introductory shots that acquaint us with 
the body and movement of the octopus, we see a living octopus slithering 
from a window sill (Fig. 2.9), an octopus crawling over a doll lying on its 
back, an octopus sliding down from a tree and a few shots of an octopus in 
water, moving around a human skull. The overture thus functions like the 
introductory scene in Luis Buñuel’s Un chien andalou, in which an eye is 
cut open in close-up: an opening scene that provides not only a symbolic 
image of the destruction of conventional (artistic) vision, but also a violent 
physical reminder that the spectator ought to remain on the edge of her 
seat, distrustful, suspicious, and alert, paying heightened attention to every 
image and subsequent cut.
In The Octopus, the opening shots deliver this lesson more gently: Pain-
levé uses the capacities of f ilm to present photographed movement and to 
combine seemingly disparate things in order to confront us with images of 
a real, living, moving octopus, in and of itself already an uncanny creature 
 
Fig. 2.9: an octopus sliding down a window sill in Painlevé’s The Octopus (1928).
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of monstrous appearance, such that we open up our vision and imagina-
tion to the many unscientific associations the animal’s body, features, and 
movements evoke. The introductory images, in other words, fulf ill a sort 
of educational task, namely that of ensuring that over the course of more 
sober images, we remain open to the mythical, monstrous, and irrational 
dimensions of the creature, in order to leave space for the mystery that sci-
ence cannot explain away and to ensure that our perceptual frame remains 
open to ideas, stories, facts, and associations of all kinds. While it might 
seem as though these images are just a joke that does not do justice to the 
real animal, I argue instead that it is not only a joke, but also a trick to ensure 
that the f ilm, spectator, and animal represented are not limited to scientif ic 
logic and reasoning, but maintain a right to make illogical, unreasonable 
connections. In this interplay of discourses and visual strategies, not only 
is the spectator enabled to combine reactions such as amazement, disgust, 
arousal, and insecurity with a scientif ic interest in knowing and seeing, 
but the f ilm itself also insists on a freedom to rip at the seams of genre 
ascription, and the f ilmed animal regains a freedom of expression in the 
spaces thus opened that it did not have in f ilms that tried to stitch narrative 
trajectories predetermining the animal’s attraction. The f ilm then transi-
tions into a more educational style by means of a dissolve to a landscape 
shot of the Atlantic, with long waves slowly rolling in against a rocky shore 
(long-distance shots of the ocean occur twice more, segmenting the main 
body of the f ilm into three parts). Subsequently, two long shots allow the 
spectator to ‘discover’ octopuses in shallow tidal pools. An intertitle helps 
us to see and understand further indices of the presence of octopuses, such 
as ripples in the water around a rock that betray the otherwise hidden 
creature. Rather than lecturing at us in a top-down fashion, these shots 
turn the spectators into independent students and accomplices.
Though the subsequent, more ‘scientif ic’ shots lack the obviously 
transgressive qualities of the opening sequence, they nevertheless instanti-
ate a similar aesthetic by subordinating the f ilm’s pace to the animal’s 
vital movement. This remains one of the most important aspects of all of 
Painlevé’s subsequent f ilms, in fact: the exploration of animal movement, 
from the plainly visible (as in the octopus) to the microscopically small, 
and the willing subjugation, or loving yielding, of the f ilm’s temporality to 
the vital rhythm of animal movement. The f irst segment of the f ilm’s main 
part contains a series of shots that focus f irst on the octopus’ eye, which 
with its eyelids and iris resembles a human eye, and then on the octopus’ 
breathing mechanism. The otherwise motionless animal inhales through 
two breathing holes on its sides, and uses one of its two breathing tubes 
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to exhale. As it takes water in, the breathing tube closes like a mouth, 
and the entire animal body extends; as it exhales, the body compresses 
and water f lutters out of the tube. Painlevé slows down considerably the 
cutting rate for this scene and f ills the images with the rhythmic movement 
of the octopus’ breath. At the same time as one takes note of the strange 
breathing apparatus and makes uncomfortable or exciting physiologi-
cal connections (both pulsating hole and tube resemble other malleable 
orif ices and boneless extremities), one cannot help but be affected by the 
rhythmic breathing and a need to willfully disengage oneself from an 
alignment with the pace of the octopus’ breath (which has a faster rate 
than the average human’s breath).
 
Figs. 2.10.a-f: Zooming into the rock urchin in Painlevé’s Sea Urchins (1928).
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Painlevé achieves the most effective integration of f ilm and animal move-
ment when he employs microcinematography to make visible otherwise 
unseen life forms, organs, body parts, and movements. Both Sea Urchins 
and The Daphnia, as well as the majority of Painlevé’s later popular science 
f ilms, contain moments of increased excitement built around increasing 
magnif ication. A sea urchin, for example, is a less immediately spectacular 
subject for a f ilm than an octopus. In Painlevé’s Sea Urchins, it is thus the 
magnif ication (and, to a lesser degree, timelapse) that slowly undoes our 
conception of the sea urchin as a distant, boring, fairly motionless animal 
and allows us to discover in the urchin an entire republic of fantastic 
creatures in wild animation. After briefly presenting the sand urchin, the 
f ilm turns to the rock urchin. We see Painlevé himself standing in the 
ocean water in a bathing suit, fetching an urchin from underneath the 
water (Fig. 2.10.a). A series of shots show us the urchin in extreme close-up, 
revealing far more detail than an unmediated look at a sea urchin would 
have provided, and functioning as an incentive to take a closer look. After 
the f ilm explains, with intertitles, microcinematographic shots, and an 
animation, how the sea urchin moves by means of sinuous spines ending in 
suckers, underwater shots present to us ‘The sea urchin’s walk’ (Fig. 2.10.b). 
The attraction of this shot is not only the close-up of the animal, but the 
witnessing, and understanding, of how a rock urchin moves up a rock, one 
contracting sucker after another—the attraction of seeing the animal’s 
natural behavior in its environment. This shot constitutes the transition 
from perceiving the sea urchin as an object to realizing that even an animal 
as bizarre and non-human as the sea urchin engages in activities and move-
ments to which we can relate. The following shots magnify more and more 
details of the sea urchin’s body. We move into ‘the forest of spines’ that 
now appear as enormous Doric columns stretching to the sky (Fig. 2.10.c). 
Between the spines, numerous pedicellariae (swiftly moving snake-like 
extensions ending in three jaws) become visible. The jaws open and close, 
turning in every direction, in a wild search for food (Fig. 2.10.d). Moving 
ever closer, we discern various teeth in these threatening jaws, teeth that 
range in appearance from a shark’s serrated teeth to a snake’s fangs, ready 
to inject poisonous venom into their victim (Fig. 2.10.e). The maximum 
magnif ication—200,000x—reveals that the surface of these pedicellariae 
is actually covered by swiftly moving cilia, slender protuberances 0.001 
mm long, the rotation of which generates whirlpools that bring food into 
the reach of the jaws. Having undone our conception of the sea urchin as a 
unif ied, somewhat boring animal/object, Painlevé ends with a panoramic 
sunset over the water (Fig. 2.10.f), returning us to our familiar vision with 
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a canonical image that, as we now know, belies the incredible life forms 
contained in it.
By the time we are watching the cilia, and thus movement on a cellular 
level, the f ilm has several times revealed an excess of life forms where we 
had previously been unable to see movement, nor had we been expecting 
it. The sea urchin has been transformed before our eyes into a foreign 
planet with a plurality of different life forms and movements. Uexküll had 
described the sea urchin as an animal with a large number of independent 
functional cycles or reflex arcs that are not centralized—’when a dog runs, 
the animal moves its legs. When a sea urchin runs, its legs move the animal.’ 
In Uexküll’s vocabulary, the sea urchin constitutes a ‘reflex republic’ in 
which spines, pedicellariae, and so forth, each constitute ‘reflex persons’ 
that react separately to different receptor cues that are not centralized into 
a concerted response or the perception of a distinct form or motion.102 While 
Uexküll’s description highlights the difference between the sea urchin’s 
organism and Umwelt and ours in order to make clear that we cannot project 
our conception of the body and perception onto this and other animals, 
Painlevé’s f ilm instead seeks to create a confusion of boundaries, or what 
I would like to call a strategy of bewildering.
Etymologically, the term ‘to bewilder’ f irst came into use in the late 
seventeenth century and is a compound of be- ‘thoroughly’ + archaic wilder 
‘lead astray, lure into the wilds’, which latter is derived from the Old English 
word wildern (adj.) ‘wild, savage’ (from wilde ‘wild’ + deor ‘animal’). Ac-
cording to the Oxford English Dictionary, bewilderment, that is, the state 
or condition of bewildering or being bewildered, can mean a), confusion 
arising from losing one’s way; mental confusion from an inability to grasp 
or see one’s way through a maze or tangle of impressions or ideas; or b), a 
tangled or labyrinthine condition of objects, an inextricable confusion or 
medley.103 Painlevé’s f ilms take the word literally: they confuse us, they 
create an entanglement of the ideas of man and animal, by leading us astray, 
into the wilderness, that is, to where the wild animals live. According to the 
change in meaning from wilderness to bewilder, modern wilderness consists 
precisely in mental and physical confusion and disorientation. Painlevé’s 
f ilms provide an example of a f ilm form that uses the confrontation of 
styles, genres, and the audience’s expectations such that in the resulting 
confusion and disorientation, a sense of wilderness, a wild sense of life, 
102 Uexküll, A Foray, 76. 
103 See Oxford English Dictionary, ‘bewilderment, n.’ Oxford University Press, May 2017. http://
www.oed.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/Entry/18465? (accessed May 5, 2017).
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is set free. This sense of life comes close to what Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
termed ‘wild being’, namely a mode of being in which self, perception, and 
world are all part of a dense weave of f lesh.104 ‘Wilderness’ understood in 
this sense does not refer to a separate realm that is opposed to civilization, 
but rather constitutes a mode of existence in which human and animal 
are connected on the basis of a ‘lateral kinship’.105 This kinship expresses 
itself in an act of perception that is based on a corporeal continuum and 
connects human spectator, f ilm, and screen animal.
Painlevé brings this wild kinship into our awareness by creating a cin-
ematic texture of life that envelops animal body, f ilm form, and embodied 
spectator, but combines it with maneuvers that jolt us out of wild being 
and into a state of objective reflection by means of scientif ic or educational 
discourse and an objectif ication of the animal. An example of this shift 
from affective, corporeal engagement to detachment would be when, in 
Sea Urchins, he evokes the image of the sand urchin getting sand into its 
mouth as it is digging, creating a corporeal bond between the spectator 
and the urchin. In the following shot, however, he simply cuts open a 
sand urchin with a knife, allowing its bodily f luids to run over his hand, 
in order to reveal the urchin’s sand-f illed intestines. It is the contrast 
between modes, the jolt that marks our switch from corporeal, sensual 
bond to reflective, intellectual engagement, that creates an awareness of 
f ilm and animal as vital participants in our own being, both corporeal 
and spiritual or intellectual.
Painlevé’s f ilms, even though they did not strive to present the Umwelten 
of animals, thus illustrate the aesthetic implications of Uexküll’s attempts 
at imagining other worlds. While Umwelt at f irst glance might seem to be 
a concept that reduces world and world-perception to a limited subjective 
sphere, it in fact opened up biological research, philosophy, imagination, 
and images to a multiplicity of worlds imaginable by, but inaccessible to, 
humans—a conception of world and perception that was ref lected in 
early f ilm theory. At the basis of the concept of Umwelt, however, is the 
impression (and scientif ic validation) of the fact that each kind of animal 
does not simply have an organic structure that differs from ours, but in 
addition its world, and its access to the world, is also a different from ours. 
Our engagement with animals—and, by extension, with other human 
beings, as well as with plants—thus not only opens up our eyes and minds 
to new visions, but it also sensitizes us to a different mode of being, of 
104 On wild being, see Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible.
105 Louise Westling, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Human-Animality Intertwining’, 173.
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being-in-the-world, and of life. Early twentieth-century f ilms that depicted 
animals were, deliberately or not, doing two things. They were, f irst, making 
use of the medium’s ‘aff inity with life’ to gain an understanding of animals 
that is impossible, or diff icult, to achieve otherwise. Second, these f ilms 
were using the cinematic mediation of animals to transmit a different sense 
of being, corporeality, and life to the audience.
Uexküll’s theories thus opened up the question of the extent to which 
media, and especially technological media, can mediate between different 
forms of life, including different Umwelten. The aspects of a man-animal 
encounter—seeing, being seen, and (man) seeing (animal) seeing (man)—
when brought into cinema, extend into an existential, all-encompassing 
confrontation with one’s participation in animality. Cinema makes this 
possible, because the cinematic image is continuous with our world, is 
part of our world, while, at the same time, cinema brings into our world a 
new visibility. Cinema can thus make visible animality, as that which we 
share with animals, where before we only saw categorical distinctions. This 
capacity of cinema is not least based on the spectator’s attitude toward the 
cinematic image, namely the fact that the spectator is half situated in her 
own body, and half situated in the screen image as she is making sense of 
the image. This position of both being a body and lending one’s body to the 
image is one of heightened passivity (the capability of being affected) and 
vulnerability. Cinematic images of animals thus reveal a mode of being of 
passivity and vulnerability that links being animal, relating to the animal, 
and being in cinema.

3. The Interweaving of World and Self
Transformations of Mood in Expressionist and Kammerspiel 
Film
The Mediation of a Dog’s World
Franz Marc’s ‘The White Dog (Dog before the World)’ from 1912 looks like 
the aesthetic complement to the Uexküll-inspired diorama that would be 
shown at New York’s Museum of Natural History some thirty years later. The 
painting shows a dog at an angle that allows us to see part of the dog’s face, 
despite the fact that this is an almost complete back view. We see the dog 
seeing, but perceive this act from the outside—we ourselves are not part of 
the connection between the dog and its environment. ‘Is there for an artist 
an idea more mysterious than [imagining] how nature might be reflected 
in the eye of an animal? How does a horse see the world or an eagle, a deer 
or a dog?’ Marc asks in notes preceding the painting.1 ‘From now on, we 
have to unlearn to relate animals and plants to us, and to present in art our 
relationship to them […] Every thing in the world has its forms, its formula, 
which we cannot grope with our plump hands, but which we can rather 
grasp to the degree to which we are artistically gifted.’2 The task of an artist 
in getting to know, and trying to represent, animal being, perception, and 
Umwelten is, in contrast to the task of the scientist, not one of experimentally 
inferring perceptual abilities, but rather one of intuiting, empathizing, in a 
process that seeks to transcend human perception. ‘(I seek to increase my) 
sensitivity for the organic rhythm of all things, [a pantheistic feeling-into] 
(I seek to pantheistically feel myself into) the trembling and running of 
the blood in nature, in the trees, in the animals in the air.’3 The resulting 
painting is supposed to present the forest or the horse ‘as they really are,’ as 
they ‘themselves feel’ by avoiding looking at the world with our human eye.4
While the painting of Nipper set into motion a feedback loop of gazes—a 
reading of the image is only successful once the observer has dislodged herself 
from the dog duped by the gramophone (Chapter 2)—Einfühlung (‘empathy, 
feeling-into’) into the dog in Marc’s painting is key to understanding and 
1 Marc, ‘Aufzeichnungen auf Blättern in Quart (Winter 1911/12)’, 99 (translation mine). 
2 Marc, ‘Aufzeichnungen auf Bogen in Folio (1912-13)’, 113 (translation mine).
3 Marc, ‘Über das Tier in der Kunst (April 1910)’ (translation mine).
4 Marc, ‘Aufzeichnungen auf Bogen in Folio (1912-13)’, 112.
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unlocking the painting for us. We are insufficiently equipped if we do not grasp 
the object of the dog’s attention. There is a double projection from beholder of 
the painting to beholding dog to dog’s world. That is why we see this dog not as 
a complete Rückenfigur (‘f igure seen from behind’) turned away from us, but 
rather still see the dog’s gaze. The real object in Marc’s painting, then, is the 
dog’s being as it is expressed in the interplay of its body, its gaze, its attitude, 
and its Umwelt. Yet we can still place the painting in the long lineage of images 
that combine a view of nature with the self-reflexivity of a Rückenfigur from 
the paintings showing painters by Jan Vermeer or Jan van Eyck to Velasquez, 
Caspar David Friedrich, and Gustav Carus. A Rückenfigur such as Caspar 
David Friedrich’s Wanderer above the Sea of Fog combines perception and 
reflection in its mediation of our own gaze; nature, in turn, becomes visible as 
a construction, since it is the exterior world as seen by someone, as connected 
to an interior world, as something that is always already an image. The painting 
allows us to participate in the loneliness and intimate attitude of an opaque 
figure, while we are simultaneously kept at a distance. For Hartmut Böhme, 
this reflexivity of perception accounts for ‘the melancholia of the image’ in 
general: the reflexivity of seeing is connected to ‘the longing for unmediated 
coincidence of I and World, which we might see, but cannot have, no less be’.5 
5 Hartmut Böhme, ‘Rückenf iguren bei Caspar David Friedrich’, 56.
 
Fig. 3.1: Franz marc, ‘the White dog (dog before the World)’ (1912, oil on canvas, 111 x 83 cm).
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Yet instead of depicting man’s eccentric positionality (Helmuth Plessner), 
Marc’s painting forces us to engage with the dog because it holds the key to the 
simultaneously interior and exterior world surrounding it.6 We see it seeing, 
but only understand its vision by relating the exterior world back to it.
For art historian Adolf Behne, one of Marc’s earliest and most vocal sup-
porters, Uexküll’s work in biology is a direct complement to Expressionist 
art—indeed, Behne calls Uexküll himself ‘Expressionist,’ even though Uexküll 
himself responded to Behne’s ascription with harsh words concerning Expres-
sionist art. At least until Uexküll’s more nationalist and conservative essays 
appeared in the late 1910s, Behne maintained that surely, Uexküll had not 
seen good Expressionist art yet; he might just be rejecting it on the basis of 
the ‘half-new, decorative’ art of Brücke painters such as Ludwig Kirchner or 
Erich Heckl, rather than the painters associated with the Blaue Reiter or others 
similar to them in style, including Franz Marc, Chagall, Paul Klee, and Oskar 
Kokoschka.7 These latter artists, Behne maintains, create according to the 
same organic laws Uexküll describes for the creative force of organisms; their 
works—’”spiritual organisms”‘—are not ‘made,’ they rather ‘become’ and 
‘grow’. ‘Uexküll’s insights,’ Behne proclaims, ‘allow us to tear down the wall 
between art and life, to connect art to life, yes, to identify it with life’.8 As living 
beings imbue everything in their Umwelt with life in the act of perception, so 
do the new artists turn away from artistic renderings of the ‘concrete’ (das 
Gegenständliche), since they understand the concrete as itself already the 
result of perception. Instead, they seek to approximate life by transcending 
the limited position of their own subjective Merkwelt—the world according 
to their individual senses. Life, for Uexküll, encompasses two unequal worlds, 
the perception world (Merkwelt) and the effect world (Wirkwelt). While we are 
limited to our subjective view, life simultaneously stands outside of it: it encom-
passes the genetically-driven coloration of the wings of the eyed hawk moth, 
which protects the animal from predators, but it also encompasses the way the 
wing-image appears to various birds who flee from any eye-like appearance. 
Artistic creation, for Behne, can approximate the dovetailing of perceptual 
and effect worlds into one another. ‘Franz Marc’s animals! Shouldn’t Uexküll 
be able to comprehend them first of all when he writes these sentences: “The 
essence of an animal is not the form, but rather the transformation, not the 
structure, but rather the process of life. The animal is a mere event!”‘9
6 See Plessner, Stufen des Organischen.
7 Adolf Behne, ‘Biologie und Kubismus’, 696-97 (translation mine).
8 Ibid., 700.
9 Ibid., 704.
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In this chapter, I seek to explore the emergence of a new aesthetic—what 
I call Stimmung aesthetics—in cinema and related art discourses; one 
that, like Marc’s painting, seeks to present the interweaving of world and 
self, including other selves that would be inaccessible without a mediating 
Stimmung or mood. More specif ically, I argue that the vitalist biological 
conceptualization of the relationship between organism and environment 
explored in the last chapter f inds an aesthetic expression in Stimmung, a 
word encompassing mood, attunement, and tonality that entered aesthetic 
discourse in the late eighteenth century. The Rückenfigur itself is an aes-
thetic motif tied to the entrance of Stimmung into aesthetic discourse via 
Caspar David Friedrich’s friend Carl Gustav Carus. Yet where the Romantics 
understood Stimmung to be the attunement to an objective, shared situ-
ation, for later vitalist writers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal, the term denominated primarily subjective moods that 
are unstable, decentered, and dependent upon external circumstances, 
including the perception and voluntary and involuntary recollection of 
these circumstances.
This latter, vitalist understanding of Stimmung encompasses several 
experiential registers that became central to f ilm theory and practice. 
First, Stimmung allows us to grasp the entwinement of the spectators’ own 
temporality and situatedness with the temporality and (world) view that 
unfold in a f ilm. Second, it can also illuminate the relationship between 
individual spectator and collective audience, that mysterious co-presence 
in the theater and the co-experience of the f ilm. Most important for my 
project, however, is the capacity of Stimmung to describe and illuminate 
stylistic and formal aspects of f ilms themselves—a grasp of mise en scène 
that already includes experience and effect (or affect) in its articulation.10
To contextualize my discussion of f ilm and Stimmung, I begin by outlin-
ing the Romantic invocation of Stimmung, from Kant to Friedrich and Carus, 
before then contrasting this early use of the term with Nietzsche’s and 
Hofmannsthal’s ‘affective’ use of the term, on the one hand, and Alois Riegl’s 
and Georg Simmel’s reflections on the relationship of Stimmung and the 
observer, on the other hand. I argue that the Stimmung aesthetics developed 
by these writers, and in the cinema and painting of the early twentieth 
century, can only be understood when it is brought into connection with 
life-scientif ic models of subject-environment interaction. In the nineteenth 
century, the rise of milieu theory was concomitant not only with, say, Émile 
10 Robert Sinnerbrink has written an illuminating essay on the importance of mood for f ilm 
analysis. See Sinnerbrink, ‘Stimmung’.
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Zola’s ‘naturalism,’ which held that individuals are ‘determined’ by their 
milieu, but it also enabled a much more indeterminate understanding of 
external Stimmungen that take hold of individuals, and which is expressed 
in the literature of Adalbert Stifter, Gottfried Keller, and Theodor Fontane.
The rise of Expressionism in art and subsequently in f ilm, however, 
presented a turning point in the history of Stimmung aesthetics, enabling 
a new way of thinking about Stimmung and environment, one in which 
the individual is not determined by her external surroundings, but rather 
struggles with ‘problems’ proposed by that environment. To explore how 
Expressionism reorients Stimmung aesthetics, this chapter focuses on vari-
ous films from the Expressionist period in German cinema, in particular The 
Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari, Robert Wiene, 1920) and 
Shattered (Scherben, Lupu Pick, 1921). Not coincidentally, Stimmung became 
important for the f ilm-critical and aesthetic discourse of the time as well, 
and Béla Balázs makes extensive use of the term in his discussion of Expres-
sionist, Impressionist, and Kammerspiel (‘chamber play’) f ilm, for example, 
as do Rudolf Kurtz and Lotte Eisner in their books on Expressionist cinema. 
Focusing especially on Balázs’ arguments, I argue that Balázs helps us to see 
how Caligari’s mise en scène effectively creates a determinist aesthetic, but 
the Kammerspiel f ilms—despite the return to ‘naturalist’ motifs in these 
f ilms—in fact reframe and mobilize the subject-environment interaction 
by means of their use of closer shot lengths and an increasing mobilization 
of the camera, and hence develop a Stimmung aesthetic that proposes an 
open relationship between an individual and her surroundings.
This chapter thus has three primary goals. First, it demonstrates an 
important link between the vitalism discussed in earlier chapters and the 
concept of Stimmung. Second, the chapter explains why the concept of 
Stimmung was of interest to early f ilm commentators: namely, it enabled 
early f ilm critics to describe moods as well as processes of resonance, at-
tunement, and animation in cinema and on the f ilm screen, and to do 
so by discussing cinematic style in a way that did not subordinate form 
to plot elements or questions of photographic representation. Stimmung, 
to return to the discussion of Walter Benjamin in Chapter 2, describes 
the aesthetic quality of the ‘medium of perception’ and the contacts and 
correspondences it enables. Third, and f inally, focusing on Balázs’ use of 
the term gives us greater insight into why recent critics have found the 
historical genre category of German Expressionism problematic, and also 
helps us to understand better the dialectic between Expressionist f ilms and 
later chamber play f ilms that relied on differing understandings of how an 
environment ‘determines’ characters.
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A Brief Aesthetic History of Stimmung
As David Wellbery has shown in his enlightening history of the term, the 
use of the word Stimmung combines nuances that set it somewhat apart 
from related English terms, such as mood, atmosphere, or attunement.11 
Stimmung is both subjective and objective (it can be ascribed to a person 
or a landscape, for example), internal and external, communicating and 
communicable, and it carries a strong musical sense that connects it to 
tune, voice, and harmony. Stimmung as an aesthetic concept captures the 
sense of mood as well as processes of resonance, attunement, and animation 
between living beings and their environment, and there is thus no precise 
translation of the term into English. Wellbery also argues that Stimmung be-
came a concept or term at a particular historical point—the late eighteenth 
century—when the subject had lost its secure and predetermined place in 
the world, and the world and its order became subject to change; that is, the 
relationship between subject and world needs to be negotiated again and 
again. The concept of Stimmung thus supplants the idea of a pre-stabilized 
world harmony (as in, for example, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s philosophy). 
There is the possibility of harmony (in the sense of an attunement) between 
subject and world, but this harmony only means attunement of subject 
and world to a random (beliebige) and temporary, not an absolute, value. In 
that sense, Stimmung is often connected to longing (Sehnsucht), because it 
allows for a connection with a larger whole—environment, nature, com-
munity—while still lacking absolute determination.
Immanuel Kant made an explicit connection between the concept of Stim-
mung and aesthetic theory. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant addresses the 
attunement between self and world when considering the fact that judgments 
of beauty, while based on subjective grounds, still contain a reference to uni-
versally validity. How do subjective judgment and universal validity cohere? 
If reason is what connects us as individuals to a community and the world at 
large, how can this connection be achieved when we are dealing with beauty, 
that is, a judgment made beyond reason? The ‘pleasure’ that is bound up with 
aesthetic judgment grows out of the subject’s reflexive understanding that its 
own ‘subjective condition’ at the moment of aesthetic experience amounts 
to something ‘universally communicable’ (allgemein mitteilungsfähig). This 
communicability is pre-conceptual, pre-conscious; it must be located in our 
‘mental state’ (Gemütszustand). This mental state is characterized by a free 
play of the faculties of cognition (Erkenntniskräfte), namely imagination and 
11 Wellbery, ‘Stimmung’.
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understanding (Einbildungskraft und Verstand), which somehow ‘zusammen-
stimmen’ (‘harmonize’, fit/tune together). A specific presentation (Vorstellung) 
brings the faculties of cognition into a Stimmung that is proportionate to this 
representation: because of this link between our cognition and presentation, 
our judgments of beauty can be subjective yet general, even though they are 
not based on concepts.12 Thomas Pfau summarizes this process as follows:
The ‘proportionate accord’ (proportionierte Stimmung) of the faculties of 
cognition, Kant argues, constitutes both the cause and the substance of 
the aesthetic-reflective judgment (§ 9, 54). At its most general, all cogni-
tion (Erkenntnis) can thus be characterized as a way of being ‘attuned’ to 
discrete phenomena, such that their contemplation will gradually ‘deter-
mine’ (bestimmen) the subject via its affective experience of a ‘concord’ 
(Übereinstimmung) or ‘conformity’ (Zusammenstimmung) that connects 
an (empirical) appearance to the (transcendental) form in which the 
subject’s sensory and discursive faculties relate to one another.13
Pfau’s analysis of this passage highlights the fact that for Kant, feeling, or 
affect, holds a privileged position both for cognition and for an ethical 
being-in-the-world. The attunement to phenomena is already the attempt 
to comprehend and judge the world; it is not simply pre-cognitive, but a 
substantive and necessary part of the process of cognition. At the same 
time, Kant’s use of the term Stimmung signals how these feelings are 
always already connected to an awareness of their communicability and 
sharedness; aesthetic experience thus appears as the nexus of self and 
imagination with community and livable reality (as projection). Much later, 
Martin Heidegger would deepen this logic, asserting that wherever we are, 
a Stimmung is already there and encompasses us; hence, Stimmung cannot 
be an event in the soul, but rather determines the conditions of our being-
together: ‘It is clear that attunements are not something merely at hand. 
They themselves are precisely a fundamental manner and fundamental way 
of being, indeed of being-there [Da-sein], and this always directly includes 
being with one another [Miteinandersein].’14 In both Kant’s and Heidegger’s 
(otherwise quite different) uses of the concept of Stimmung, an inquiry into 
the conditions and tonalities of Stimmungen implies an ethical dimension.
12 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 62. See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 67.
13 Thomas Pfau, Romantic Moods, 34.
14 Heidegger, Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik/Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphys-
ics: World, Finitude, Solitude, 67; 100/101.
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As both Kant and Heidegger suggest, though in different ways, Stim-
mung always concerns mediation, whether this is the mediation between 
imagination and reason, between self and representations, or between self 
and others. This mediating role remains central in others’ use of the term: in 
Schiller’s Aesthetic Education, it is the mediating moment between sensation 
and thought that suspends the determining force of either domain; in Hegel’s 
Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik it is the lyrical mediation between subjectivity 
and the outside world. In most eighteenth- and nineteenth-century accounts 
of Stimmung, no matter whether the focus is on the interior/subjective or 
exterior/objective, this mediating moment arises reactively, passively; it comes 
forth without a will or clearly identifiable agent. Particularly in its nineteenth-
century use in literary texts (for example, in the writings of Goethe, Adalbert 
Stifter, and Gottfried Keller), Stimmung designates a whole that encompasses 
people and their environment.15 Yet this is not an organic, predetermined, or 
teleological whole; rather, this whole is the result of a precarious network of 
indeterminable, unwilled relations. Stimmung, in other words, is a vitality of 
relations, of the in-between, possessing people and things, possessed by none, 
and requiring sensitivity to both internal and external voices.
Perhaps because the history and aesthetic valence of the term Stimmung 
has been a topic of interest primarily to literary scholars in German studies, 
the fact that this concept has an inherent temporal dimension and is almost 
always connected to movement has often been ignored or deemphasized.16 
15 See, for example, Eric Downing, ‘Binding Magic in Gottfried Keller’s Der Grüne Heinrich’; 
Timothy Attanucci, ‘Atmosphärische Stimmungen’; Thomas Pfau, ‘“Epochenwandel . . . mit 
metaphysischen Anklängen’.
16 For example, Anna-Katharina Gisbertz, ed., Stimmung; Hans-Georg von Arburg and Sergej 
Rickenbacher, eds., Concordia discors; Pfau, Romantic Moods. Recently, several cognitive theo-
rists—most notably Noël Carroll, Greg M. Smith, and Carl Plantinga—have sought to integrate 
‘mood’ into cognitive f ilm theory and theory of art at large. But because they understand 
mood functionally and as something that is neuro-scientif ically verif iable (and in this sense 
dislodged from aesthetic-historical uses and transformations, and beyond etymological and 
semantic considerations), their account only aims to describe the important role mood—in 
contradistinction from emotions or affects—plays in f ilm reception. The use of the English term 
‘mood’ further means that, in contrast to Stimmung, they do not think about subjective (human) 
mood and environmental atmosphere together. To them, the question of transference of mood 
from one entity (say, a f ilm) to another (a spectator) is a ‘mystery’ onto which they aim to shed 
light. Smith, for example, maintains that mood is f ilm’s primary way of communicating. Films, 
for him, extend an ‘invitation to feel’ rather than make people feel. In contrast to more short-lived 
emotions, sustaining ‘mood cues’ serves to ‘orient’ us and pave the way for emotions proper. 
To this end, Plantinga invented the term ‘art moods’ to distinguish the mood of a f ilm—as the 
affective character of a f ilm—from the human mood that a f ilm may evoke. Such an invocation 
of mood as a critical category fails to grasp the complex interaction between cinematic mood 
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Given that this aspect of Stimmung is one that made it especially suitable for 
early-twentieth-century discussions of moving images, it is worth stressing 
this aspect here. Just as tuning an instrument is connected to the vibration 
of strings, for example, Stimmung for the poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
is a vibration in nature that connects things. The Romanticist philosopher 
Gottlieb Fichte, in particular, emphasizes the role of movement in the 
communication of a Stimmung in art:
The enthusiastic artist expresses the Stimmung of his soul in a mobile 
body, and the movement, the gait, the f low of his characters are the 
expression of the inner vibrations of his soul. This movement is supposed 
to produce the same Stimmung in us that was in him; he lent his soul to 
the dead matter, so that it may transfer this soul to us […] those characters 
are the mediators between him and us, like the air is a mediator between 
our ear and an instrument’s string. This inner Stimmung of the artist is 
the spirit of his product; and the arbitrary characters, by means of which 
he expresses them, are the body or the letter of this spirit.17
For Fichte, in contrast to Kant, Stimmung ‘is not the condition of possibility 
of communication, but rather that which is supposed to be communicated 
in art’, as Wellbery succinctly puts it.18 Yet Fichte still distinguishes between 
Stimmung and its mediation: Stimmung is internal only and refers to the 
movement of the artist’s soul, which can be transferred to others’ souls by 
means of a different medium (in the case of the vibration of string instru-
ments, for example, this would be air). Attunement is thus the product of 
the mediation of Stimmung as a mood or tonality.
Stimmung itself became a medium in nineteenth-century art theory and 
practice, whereby it was increasingly understood to encompass inner life 
and life outside oneself. In contrast to the letter (Buchstab), which Fichte 
conceived as the independent mediator of an inner Stimmung, a medium such 
and the spectator, namely the capacity of a f ilm to envelop the spectator with a mood that is 
as complex and intense as moods found in directly experienced environments. It also fails to 
answer a question that scholars of melodrama have been asking for decades, namely: why would 
we willingly subject ourselves to a f ilm that affects our mood negatively? Because cognitivist 
f ilm theory maintains that our reception of f ilms is always goal-oriented, it ultimately does 
not allow for Kant’s ‘free play’ of the faculties of cognition or for disinterested pleasure, both 
of which are central elements of f ilm spectatorship. See Noël Carroll, ‘Art and Mood’; Greg 
M. Smith, Film Structure and the Emotion System; and Carl Plantinga, ‘Art Moods and Human 
Moods in Narrative Cinema’.
17 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ‘Ueber Geist und Buchstab in der Philosophie’, 294 (translation mine).
18 Wellbery, ‘Stimmung’, 715 (translation mine).
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as landscape painting can express a Stimmung contained in that landscape, 
which then can influence the beholder’s soul. For Carl Gustav Carus, a painter, 
doctor, and philosopher who was close to Caspar David Friedrich, the main 
task of landscape painting was the ‘(re)presentation of a certain Stimmung of 
inner life (Gemüthlebens) (sense) by means of the imitation (Nachbildung) of 
a corresponding Stimmung of natural life (truth)’.19 This correspondence has 
its origin in the fact that for Carus, sensations (Empfindungen) emerge from 
a sense of the self as part of a larger whole, in contrast to the individualizing 
tendency of ideas (Vorstellungen). As sensing beings, we are part of nature, 
because the same life pulses through us; a life that expresses itself through 
the states of growth, chaos, organization, equilibrium, decline, decay, and 
death; the manifold Stimmungen can be attributed to various combinations 
of these states. Only the free, unbiased mind will be able to be tuned by, to 
attune to the Stimmung of landscapes, while the biased (befangen) mind, 
which is already tuned by an inner mood or agitation, might transfer this 
inner agitation to what it perceives. A sick mind might be affected wrongly 
by things—be depressed by a spring morning, for example. Attunement for 
Carus might go both ways, but should only go from environment to observer; 
ideally, the observer should be empty, unprejudiced, calm, and even-keeled.
Two decisive late nineteenth-century shifts in the sense of Stimmung 
helped set the stage for its subsequent adoption by early critics and theorists 
of f ilm. The first shift was the introduction of historicity into an understand-
ing of the relationship between Stimmungen and art: that is, the idea that 
art-Stimmungen play different roles in different periods. This shift is evident 
in Alois Riegl’s early twentieth-century considerations of Stimmung and 
modern art. For him, quietude and a distanced view (‘Ruhe und Fernsicht’) 
enable Stimmung to come forth, while anything close that stimulates the 
senses of touch, including the perception of fast or close movement, throws 
us into the pressure of existence as fight.20 What distinguishes Riegl’s invoca-
tion of Stimmung from that of Carus, however, is his introduction of the term 
as a historically determined approach to art. The end goal of all art, Riegl 
surmises, is harmony, a relief from the f ight for existence; rather than a 
metaphysical harmony that would allow for insight based on an attunement 
to the larger forces, Riegl’s harmony is functional and simply allows for a 
reprieve. The kind of art that would grant a relief from existential pressure, 
however, is dependent upon the historical context of that which constitutes 
the most pressuring f ight: for the primitives, man against man, each for 
19 Carl Gustav Carus, Neun Briefe über Landschaftsmalerei, 41.
20 Alois Riegl, ‘Die Stimmung als Inhalt der modernen Kunst’, 28-29.
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themselves, resulted in the fetish as protection; in antiquity, the strongest 
against the weaker resulted in admiration of the strong and beautiful body 
that is equally god and human; in medieval times, moral and spiritual purity 
against sin resulted in art focusing on the face and gesture as expressions 
of such purity; and in modernity, the conflict between the dissecting 
knowledge of the natural sciences and belief resulted in ‘Stimmungskunst’ 
(Stimmung art) that represents nature as a chain of causalities.
The second key shift, which we see in the work of life-philosopher Frie-
drich Nietzsche, is the position that Stimmungen completely determine 
the individual: that is, rather than Stimmungen serving as a means for the 
faculty of reason, as in Kant, the subject is instead the outcome of competing 
Stimmungen. With Riegl’s sober analysis of why Stimmungs kunst pleases 
and appeases us, Stimmung became dislodged from any immediate and 
absolute epistemic value. Such a disconnection between Stimmung and 
knowledge also informed nineteenth-century vitalist and life-philosophical 
discourses, where it was further tied to the qualities of life that determine 
the perceiving individual. With surprising wit and insight, in 1864, the 
young Friedrich Nietzsche analyzed, in an essay entitled ‘On Moods,’ how 
the mental state is determined by conflicts between old thoughts and new 
impressions, and ‘Stimmung’ simply names the current state of the conflict.
Let us admit it: I am writing about moods, insofar as I am right now in a 
certain mood; and it is fortunate that I am just in the mood for describing 
moods. Today I played Liszt’s Consolations many times over, and now I 
feel how its tones have penetrated my being and continue, spiritualized, 
to resonate within me. I recently underwent a painful experience that had 
to do with a parting or a not parting, and now I notice how this feeling and 
those tones have fused together, and I see that the music would not have 
appealed to me had I not just had this experience. So the soul strives to 
attract what is like it, and the current mass of feelings squeezes like a lemon 
the new events that impinge upon the heart, but always in such a way that 
only a part of what is new fuses with what is old, and a residue is left over 
which is not yet able to f ind anything related to it in the household of the 
soul, and thus lodges here alone, quite often to the displeasure of the older 
residents with whom it often comes into conflict. But look! Here comes a 
friend, there a book is opening, a girl passes by. Listen! Music! Already new 
guests are streaming in from all sides into the house that stands open to all, 
and the one who was just now standing alone finds many noble relatives.21
21 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On Moods (1864)’, 5-6.
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The soul is inf luenced—pushed, attacked, conf irmed, elevated—by 
impressions that can stand in a relationship of confluence or contrast 
with its current state. To the musical image of a string in the soul that 
vibrates and resonates with a related external event, Nietzsche adds an 
additional material element: even where there is no resonance, since we 
are matter among matter, external events still put pressure on the soul. 
Against the Stimmung art that appeases the f ight of existence, Nietzsche 
celebrates Stimmung as subjective experience of the confrontation be-
tween self and world. Rather than understanding Stimmung as simply a 
continuous, contingent change, Nietzsche values Stimmungen because 
in the encounter between self and world, the moods change and grow, 
become simultaneously deeper and higher, since the amassing of expe-
riences in the self allows for more intense encounters with the world. 
As such, the change of Stimmungen rises above the changes in nature, 
since the latter is determined by eternal sameness.22 In his short text on 
moods, Nietzsche ends by demonstrating the power of the moody soul 
over nature by invoking a thunderstorm: ‘And I implore a thunderstorm; 
does the tolling of the bell not attract the lightning? Now, you approaching 
thunderstorm, clarify, purify, blow fragrances of rain into my dull nature; 
welcome, at last, welcome!’ In art, nature attunes to the soul, and the voice 
of the creative soul now addresses the self magnif ied, as instantiation from 
the world: ‘Be cleansed!’ ‘Hope!’ ‘Become new!’23
Turn-of-the-Century Stimmung and Cinema: Georg Simmel and 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal
During the f irst few decades of cinema, vitalist writers turned to the 
interface of self and world with a curiosity fueled by the readiness to let 
the borders of the self dissolve in the onslaught of manifold Stimmungen, 
stimuli, and impulses. Knowledge and experience, it seemed, were not 
achieved internally after a ref lection on external events, but rather at 
the seam of inside and outside, on the skin, in the evocations of a word, 
sound, rhythm, line. Without postulating a relationship of cause and 
22 ‘Dear moods, I salute you, marvellous variations of a tempestuous soul, as manifold as 
nature itself, but more magnif icent than nature, since you eternally transcend yourselves and 
strive eternally upwards, whereas the plant still exhales the same -fragrance it did on the day 
of creation. I no longer love as I loved some weeks ago; I am no longer this moment in the mood 
I was in as I began to write.’ Nietzsche, ‘On Moods (1864)’, 8.
23 Ibid., 9-10.
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effect, I see the development of technological media in the nineteenth 
century—in particular, photography, the gramophone, and cinema—as a 
direct companion of a notion of Stimmung that sought new configurations 
of self and world, dissolving not only the contours and coordinates of the 
self, but also its environment. These media allowed for new experiences 
of temporality characterized by achronology and simultaneity, and new 
experiences of the body based on a separation of immediate sensual and 
spatio-temporal connections (the disembodied voice that is suddenly 
found to carry a body with it and f ill a room, for example). These experi-
ences also informed Georg Simmel’s and Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s use of 
Stimmung, and it is through these authors that the term also influenced 
early texts on cinema.
Simmel, like Nietzsche, worked out how Stimmung mediates between 
nature and human being precisely because an original unity is lost. He 
did so by invoking landscape, writing: ‘By nature we mean the inf inite 
interconnectedness of objects, the uninterrupted creation and destruction 
of forms, the f lowing unity of an event that f inds expression in the conti-
nuity of temporal and spatial existence.’24 Nature is spatially whole, all-
encompassing; temporally, it is eternal and uninterrupted, and natural life 
is interwoven, characterized by permanent change. The idea of landscape 
is itself already the signature of an attempt at a unity of a second order, 
one that derives its coherence from human perception and comprehension 
(and, we could add, thus also one that bespeaks the loss of the original 
harmony that allowed human beings to understand themselves as part 
of the cosmos): ‘a self-contained perception intuited as a self-suff icient 
unity, which is nevertheless intermeshed with an inf inite expansiveness 
and a continual f lux’.25 In Simmel’s text, the dynamic interplay of soul 
and world that for Nietzsche characterized the ‘moody’ self becomes a 
dynamic that is played out in aestheticized and quasi-objectif ied nature 
itself, as a fluctuation between a human-given form and the borderlessness 
of transcendent nature (a non-nature-bound aesthetic object such as a 
painting would present such a fluctuation in a different way, namely as one 
between aesthetic form and the creator’s vitality that remains connected 
to it).
For Simmel, this dualism of form and life characterizes culture more 
generally. Simmel views any cultural product, including ‘civil laws and 
constitutions, works of art, religion, science, technology’, as artifacts that 
24 Simmel, ‘The Philosophy of Landscape’, 21.
25 Ibid., 22.
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are produced by the ‘creative dynamism of life’ and, since they have form 
and life is formless, ‘provide it with forms of expression and actualization’ 
by absorbing life’s f low.
But a peculiar quality of these products of the life process is that from the 
f irst moment of their existence they have f ixed forms of their own, set apart 
from the febrile rhythm of life itself, its waxing and waning, its constant 
renewal, its continual divisions and reunif ications. They are vessels both 
for the creative life, which however immediately departs from them, and 
for the life which subsequently enters them, but which after a while they 
can no longer encompass. They have their own logic and laws, their own 
signif icance and resilience arising from a certain degree of detachment 
and independence vis-à-vis the spiritual dynamism which gave them life. 
At the moment of their establishment they are, perhaps, well-matched to 
life, but as life continues its evolution, they tend to become inflexible and 
remote from life, indeed hostile to it.26
Landscapes, for Simmel, are a form given to nature by life as it manifests 
itself in us. A ‘form drive’ (Formtrieb) is inherent to life, and an artwork 
constitutes an object that is a now self-suff icient and independent product 
of this drive, the result of a kind of crystallization. The landscape is an 
in-between object: it is the result of our vital drive to form, but it has not 
ossif ied into a f ixed, stand-alone object.27 For Simmel, Stimmung is that 
which carries the new unity of the elements that make up the landscape. 
The intuitive unity of what we call landscape; its Stimmung; and the Stim-
mung into which it moves us—this is one indivisible act that transcends 
the subject-object dichotomy and unites perception and feeling.28 The new, 
man-made unity of a landscape and Stimmung as a feeling are both located 
in the interaction of our individuality and the specif icity of the surround-
ings we perceive. Stimmung is thus part of the very act of vital creation of 
a form (i.e., landscape), it is inscribed in that form; since the form is itself 
26 Simmel, ‘The Conflict of Modern Culture’, 75-76.
27 Simmel is simultaneously drawing on and distancing himself from Friedrich Schiller here, 
without naming him directly. In ‘On the Aesthetic Education of Man’, Schiller distinguishes 
between two basic drives: a ‘sensual drive’ and a ‘form drive’, whereby the latter strives toward 
a distance from the feeling body, harmony and permanence to secure man’s identity through 
the changes over time. Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man.
28 The basis for Heidegger’s understanding of Stimmung is not that dissimilar: because Stim-
mung puts us in touch with the world and highlights how we are part of the fabric of the world, 
we can gain an understanding of the conditions of Dasein. See Heidegger, The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics.
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made by a person based on that which she actually f inds before herself, 
both form and Stimmung are simultaneously subjective and objective.
For Simmel, Stimmung encompasses the aesthetic and emotional dimen-
sion of the encounter between individual and environment, an encounter 
in which neither exists autonomously for the duration of the perception 
of the landscape. Simmel’s approach to landscape thus also allows us to 
think about the viewing of an image, a moving image, since his def inition 
of landscape describes nothing other than the process of turning a view 
into a mental image; a view that is ‘made,’ that is delineated by a stable 
frame and determined by certain spatial relations between things and by 
certain qualities (light, color, etc.). Like the landscape, the moving image is 
an in-between object, a form on the edge of formlessness, a form threatening 
to dissolve back into the flow of life at any moment. With a landscape, its 
instability results from the fact that it is def ined by a purely perceptual 
frame; it does not exist outside of our perception, unless we recreate it 
in an image. Moving images have a set frame and perspective, but have 
reconstituted natural movement which defies a determinate form; instead, 
the image assimilates, or reintegrates, seamlessly back into the flow of life. 
While landscapes maintain a connection to the flow of life via perception 
as vital act, moving images maintain this connection via the properties of 
the new medium of cinematography itself.
Most early ref lections on cinematography, that is, texts about the 
potential, danger, and possibilities of the new medium, focus on either 
the new world that cinema opens up—a world that lacks sound, color, 
gravity, fate, and anthropocentrism, but also promises a new awareness of 
the body and nature, expanded senses, and overall nerve stimulation—
or on the experience of watching moving pictures in a movie theater. 
Stimmung is usually not a central term in these texts to describe the 
effect of f ilm images or the relationship between spectator and image, 
presumably because the colloquial use of Stimmung referred back to its 
mid-nineteenth century def inition of a captured, but removed and reflect-
ing observer who f inds himself vis-à-vis an image, rather than enmeshed 
in it. Authors and critics thus explicitly turned against the spatiotemporal 
coordinates of Stimmung in Carus’ or Riegl’s sense and focused on how 
the motion picture upset those aesthetic attitudes. They described the 
vertiginous temporality, the loss of cohesion, direction, and causality; the 
tearing at the nerves, the lust and sensationalism, the pure, sensual, and 
non-sensical spectacle. While for Riegl, Stimmungskunst was a reprieve 
or counterbalance to the pressure of modern life, early f ilm reviewers (at 
least those who were not f ighting cinema on moral and cultural grounds) 
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celebrated the ability of f ilm to reflect back to them the reality of modern 
life, in particular its speed, amorphousness, possibilities, and imbrication 
with technology.29
Yet Stimmung still provided an important aesthetic structure for these 
critics, and it did so in two ways upon which I shall expand below. De-
scriptions of the effect of cinema were often closely related to the modern 
subjective permutations of Stimmung (i.e., in its sense of an individual 
mood) by Nietzsche and fin-de-siècle Viennese writers such as Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal or Fritz Mauthner, for whom Stimmung was fleeting, contra-
dictory, and in its connection of self and world, current and past experiences 
a companion of a decentered, unstable self.30
Hofmannsthal, Mauthner and other fellow travelers found their me-
dium—language—to be lifeless and distant from actual experience; they 
thus attempted to def ine and carve out a space for poetic words to touch 
life despite language.31 Stimmung in its modern, Nietzschean understand-
ing describes that space, especially when it is turned against its more 
colloquial, holistic use. In the brief text ‘Poetry and Life’ (Poesie und Leben), 
Hofmannsthal rejected the common use of Stimmung (that is, Stimmung 
as something that can be objectively described and ascribed to texts and 
paintings) to def ine, in one long, winding sentence, the essence of poetry 
as Stimmung—the latter now understood as a subjective state of being.
I don’t know if, among all that tiresome chatter about individuality, 
style, attitude, Stimmung and so forth, there has not been a loss of 
awareness of the fact that the material of poetry is words, that a poem 
is a weightless weave of words which, by way of their order, their sound 
and their content; by connecting the memory of visible things and the 
memory of audible things with an element of movement; elicit a precisely 
29 These reviews generally read like an illustration of Walter Benjamin’s argument about 
the loss of aura with media such as photography and f ilm—an argument that reframes Riegl’s 
discussion of Stimmung. For Benjamin on aura, see Benjamin, ‘Little History of Photography’, 
518-19; Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art, 103-05, 112. On the distinction between aura and Stimmung, 
see Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 233; and Dirk Niefanger, Produktiver Historismus, 52. 
30 Another group of f ilm critics, among them Hermann Häfker and Herbert Tannenbaum, 
turn to external Stimmungen (i.e., in the sense of the mood or atmosphere of a landscape) to 
discuss a new aesthetic of nature and landscape connected to movement that f ilm has ushered 
in. See Helmut H. Diederichs, ‘Frühgeschichte deutscher Filmtheorie’; Häfker, Kino und Kunst; 
and Herbert Tannenbaum, Der Filmtheoretiker Herbert Tannenbaum.
31 See Gisbertz, Stimmung – Leib – Sprache; Carsten Strathausen, The Look of Things; Assenka 
Oksiloff, Picturing the Primitive; Stefanie Harris, Mediating Modernity; Heinz Hiebler, Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal und die Medienkultur der Moderne.
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circumscribed, dreamily clear, f leeting condition of the soul we call 
Stimmung.32
As is typical of Hofmannsthal, he used contradictions to outline the quali-
ties of this state—’dreamily clear’—that highlight how its quality eludes 
the grasp of words. Stimmung designates this quality of words beyond any 
objective ascription: it is a weave without weight, so what matters is the in-
terweaving, not what the weave could carry—what matters is the medium, 
not the message. This interweaving includes subjective associations, both 
sensual and intellectual, evoked by the words’ rhythm, sound, appearance, 
and content. Important for us is the role of movement: the material qualities 
of words in poetry resonate with our embodied feelings and memories. 
There is a ripple that poetry can send through the atmosphere and through 
our f ibers, and this ripple, like a weaver’s shuttle, connects the memories 
of visible and audible phenomena nudged by poetry into a fleeting texture.
This weave is diametrically opposed to those holistic understandings 
of the world that are associated with vitalism more generally, namely the 
idea that there is an overarching unity to an individual living being and 
its connection to the cosmos. Instead, this weave is a tenuous connection 
that claims no unif ication or completeness; in contrast to the holistic 
claim that the sum is greater than the parts, Stimmung for Hofmannsthal 
and fellow travelers replaces the illusion of holism, unity, and coherence 
with a decentered, temporary connection. This is one way of reading 
Hofmannsthal’s ‘Letter of Lord Chandos’ from 1902, even though in this 
watershed text of the so-called ‘language crisis’ among fin-de-siècle Viennese 
writers, Hofmannsthal never discusses Stimmung directly. In the form of a 
letter to Francis Bacon, Lord Chandos chronicles his development from poet 
to someone unable to grasp anything coherently, either in language or in 
thought. In the days of his belief in poetry and in his ability to understand 
and convey both himself and the world, Chandos writes that he, ‘in a state 
of continuous intoxication, conceived the whole of existence as one great 
unit: the spiritual and physical worlds seemed to form no contrast’. In 
everything he ‘felt the presence of Nature . . . and in all expressions of 
Nature I felt myself’. Both physical and spiritual experiences were the same: 
‘neither was superior to the other, whether in dreamlike celestial quality or 
in physical intensity—and thus it prevailed through the whole expanse of 
32 Hugo von Hofmannsthal, ‘Poesie und Leben’, 14-15 (translation mine). 
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life in all directions; everywhere I was in the centre of it, never suspecting 
mere appearance’.33
Yet in being unable to view things from a distance and put them into per-
spective, Chandos experiences the loss of determining relationships—both 
his self and objects disintegrate. Increasingly, he becomes unable to use 
words; f irst, concepts such as ‘soul’ or ‘body,’ and soon any abstract words 
and verbal judgments. The mediation of perception by a magnifying glass 
becomes indicative of this disintegration:
As once, through a magnifying glass, I had seen a piece of skin on my 
little f inger look like a f ield full of holes and furrows, so I now perceived 
human beings and their actions. I no longer succeeded in comprehending 
them with the simplifying eye of habit. For me everything disintegrated 
into parts, those parts again into parts; no longer would anything let 
itself be encompassed by one idea. Single words floated round me; they 
congealed into eyes which stared at me and into which I was forced to 
stare back—whirlpools which gave me vertigo and, reeling incessantly, 
led into the void.34
What Chandos describes as a disorienting loss—the f loating of words 
signals that all f irm coordinates have indeed been lost—reappears in early 
f ilm theory a few years later in often exhilarating terms, when vaudeville 
programs and distraction were seen as a marker of modernity and mass 
culture.35 For Chandos, the crisis is set off by mediated vision and results in 
the transformation of words into eyes with a commanding gaze—an image 
very similar to Alfred Döblin’s description, seven years later, of the movie 
screen as a ‘white eye’ that spellbinds the masses with its ‘f ixed stare’.36
This loss of a sense of self, however, becomes for Chandos the precondi-
tion for a new sensitivity to things, views, and thoughts. Stephanie Harris 
has argued that what I would call ‘found images’ in the Chandos letter cor-
respond very closely to the images Hofmannsthal conjured up in his essay 
on cinema, ‘The Substitute for Dreams’ (1921). In this essay, Hofmannsthal 
describes cinema’s moving images as an antidote to words, about which the 
masses have become wary and distrustful. In the Chandos letter, Chandos 
mentions ‘a pitcher’ half-f illed with water, ‘a harrow abandoned in a f ield, a 
33 Hofmannsthal, ‘The Letter of Lord Chandos’, 132.
34 Ibid., 134-35.
35 See Kracauer, ‘Cult of Distraction’.
36 Hofmannsthal, ‘The Substitute for Dreams’, 38. 
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dog in the sun, a neglected cemetery, a cripple, a peasant’s hut—all these can 
become the vessel of my revelation’.37 The f ilm essay turns to similar images 
to describe how the effect of the moving images resembles the daydreams of 
children: ‘a dark corner, a breath of wind, the face of an animal or the shuffle 
of a stranger’s steps . . . the dark space behind the cellar steps, an old keg 
in the yard half-f illed with rainwater’.38 But the case against language as a 
transparent, conceptual vehicle in the Chandos letter takes a social-critical 
turn in the essay on f ilm written almost twenty years later. In an argument 
pref iguring Siegfried Kracauer’s and Walter Benjamin’s critique of f ilm, 
Hofmannsthal connects the language crisis to comprehensive processes of 
rationalization undermining language, processes extending in particular 
to the living and working conditions of the urban masses. People’s heads 
are ‘empty;’ landscapes, houses, factory routines, administration, all reduce 
life to a ‘number.’ What is missing are ‘strong images that condense the 
essence of life’.39 For Hofmannsthal, the movie theater resembles dreams 
in its provision of images connected to ‘the only true power’ there is, and 
these dream-like images that come to the audience from without, but then 
take with them the entire person, down into its very depths, provide the 
only true antidote to any external power, whether capitalist, political, or 
social, as these latter are powers that rely on words and numbers.
While neither the Chandos letter nor ‘Substitute for Dreams’ mention 
Stimmung, they are nevertheless closely connected to Hofmannsthal’s 
understanding of the term. Stimmung grasps the potential of poetry, but 
even more so of art forms such as dance, theater, or f ilm, to stir the essence 
of life, and to do so with images, sounds, gestures, movements, and rhythms 
that awaken something deep inside us that nothing else can stir. Film ‘offers 
beautiful beings, transparent gestures, and expressions and looks from 
which the soul as such bursts forth’.40 The spectator/dreamer is stirred 
in her entirety—not as a whole person, but rather in everything that her 
sensing, thinking, dreaming self has collected over her lifetime, consciously 
and, even more importantly, unconsciously. Hofmannsthal’s indebtedness 
to Sigmund Freud’s Dreams, which was published just two years prior to 
his f ilm text, is most apparent here.41 From every dream, including those 
we cannot recall, ‘there remains within us a certain something, a quiet 
37 Hofmannsthal, ‘The Letter of Lord Chandos’, 135-36.
38 Hofmannsthal, ‘The Substitute for Dreams’, 387.
39 Ibid., 384 (translation modif ied).
40 Ibid., 386.
41 See Harris, Mediating Modernity, 72-75; and Hanno Loewy, Béla Balázs, 290-98.
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but decisive coloration of affect (Färbung der Affekte)’—a Stimmung.42 
Hofmannsthal’s thoughts on cinema pref igure not only Kracauer’s and 
Benjamin’s ideas (their awareness of f ilm’s social-critical relevance, as well 
as the former’s notion of photography as go-for-broke game of history and 
the latter’s notion of the optical-unconscious), but also resonate with Béla 
Balázs’ The Visible Man, one of the earliest comprehensive attempts at an 
aesthetic theory of the medium f ilm.43
Balázs, Kammerspielfilm, and Expressionism
The Romantic and early modernist history of Stimmung that I have outlined 
above puts us in a position to understand better the appearance of this 
term in debates on ‘German’ cinema in the 1920s. In this period, German 
cinema had begun to distinguish itself on the basis of a kind of Stimmung 
f ilm aesthetics, though most critics used the term ‘Stimmung’ in its more 
conventional form, as synonymous with atmosphere. The invocation of a 
distinct, sophisticated German cinema occurred originally in the context 
of the Autorenfilm around 1913/14, f ilms that employed famous writers 
(Gerhart Hauptmann, Arthur Schnitzler, Hugo von Hofmannsthal) and 
well-known theater actors, and told stories inspired by literary and folk 
motifs.44 As Thomas Elsaesser and Dietrich Scheunemann convincingly 
argue, Autorenfilm, Expressionist cinema, and Kammerspiel f ilm—those 
intimate psychological dramas that mostly play out in petit-bourgeois 
parlors and are related to Max Reinhardt’s theater experiments in intimate 
spectator-stage relations at his Kammerspiele theater in Berlin—are linked 
on the basis of not only their cultural and international market ambitions, 
but also similar motifs and visual strategies. All three groups of f ilms rely 
on Romantic stories that are often set in the past and feature supernatural 
and/or gothic elements. At the same time, style and plot are driven by 
42 Hofmannsthal, ‘The Substitute for Dreams’, 386.
43 Kracauer’s notion of a ‘last image’ that he develops in his essay on ‘Photography’ resonates 
particularly with Hofmannsthal’s symbol that f lashes up from the depths of inner life: ‘As the 
eyes read from the f lickering f ilm the thousand-sided picture of life, the whole of this subter-
ranean vegetation, down to the darkest regions of its roots, joins in the stirring movement . . 
. Before this dark view from the depths of being, the symbol appears like a f lash: the sensual 
image of spiritual truth beyond the reach of ratio.’ Hofmannsthal, ‘The Substitute for Dreams’, 
386. On Kracauer’s essay, see Chapter 4.
44 See Dietrich Scheunemann, ‘Activating the Differences’; Thomas Elsaesser, ‘Weimar Cinema, 
Mobile Selves, and Anxious Males’.
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technical innovations in f ilm, most often by innovative cameramen such 
as Guido Seeber or Karl Freund, as Katharina Loew has demonstrated in 
her work on early German cinema’s ‘technoromanticism.’45
By reconsidering films from the early 1920s that are generally described as 
Expressionist or Kammerspiel f ilms in terms of the way Stimmung operates 
in these f ilms, my work participates in the critical reassessment of these 
stylistic attributions by recent scholarship. The very idea and def inition 
of an Expressionist cinema, as well as the question what f ilms could be 
categorized as in this group, has come under scrutiny by German f ilm 
scholars such as Elsaesser, Scheunemann, and Thomas Koebner.46 How can 
one dissociate Weimar cinema from Expressionist cinema? What makes a 
f ilm Expressionist; is it the story and its narrative construction (as in, for 
example, From Morn to Midnight [Von morgens bis mitternachts, Karlheinz 
Martin, 1920], which is based on an Expressionist drama and maintains 
the source’s structure)? Is it the style, in particular the set design, lighting, 
and camerawork? Or might Expressionist ideas translated to f ilm result 
in a creature bearing very little resemblance to Expressionist literature or 
painting? Lotte Eisner’s The Haunted Screen (published in France in 1952, 
in Germany in 1955, and in the US in 1969) and Siegfried Kracauer’s From 
Caligari to Hitler from 1947, long constituted the canonical texts on Expres-
sionist cinema and determined our understanding of these films. As authors 
who were both part of the f ilm world they described, their account has a 
symptomatic quality, as Elsaesser asserts: ‘If, as their different arguments 
imply, the German nation is haunted by its cinema screen, and the f ilms 
are haunted by German history, then their books are themselves haunted 
by the history that came after the f ilms.’47 While Expressionist cinema is 
still a favorite example of a distinct, coherent style bound up with national 
history in f ilm studies textbooks and survey classes, this cinema’s stylistic 
coherence, its symptomatic quality, and relevance for German history, but 
also the stylistic elements themselves have spread out and diversif ied, at 
times to a degree that the object itself seems to dissolve.
My focus on Stimmung as a critical category is part of this revisionist view 
of early Weimar cinema. While the term was important in Eisner’s Haunted 
Screen, it was also central to texts contemporary with the f ilms themselves, 
most notably Balázs’ Visible Man and Rudolf Kurtz’s Expressionismus und 
45 See Loew, ‘The Spirit of Technology: Early German Thinking about Film’.
46 Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After; Thomas Koebner, ed., Diesseits der ‘Dämonischen 
Leinwand’; and Dietrich Scheunemann, ed., Expressionist Film – New Perspectives. 
47 Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After, 3-4.
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Film, which was published in 1926. Stimmung was an important category to 
describe the stylistic innovations that made f ilms such as The Cabinet of Dr. 
Caligari, Shattered or Nosferatu (F.W. Murnau, 1921) exciting for critics, f ilm-
makers, and other artists. Balázs distinguishes the Kammerspiel f ilm from 
Caligari by means of Stimmung, and in his writings, the social relevance 
of Stimmung aesthetics comes to the fore because it is intimately tied to 
social-scientif ic understandings of milieu. Kurtz—in a rhetorical gesture 
similar to Hofmannsthal’s in ‘Poetry and Life’—invokes a new meaning of 
Stimmung to simultaneously def ine Expressionist f ilm and set it off from 
earlier (impressionist, psychological) Stimmungskunst.48
Balázs attributes to f ilm the power to impart to everything—faces, 
objects, gestures, landscapes—a physiognomy; that is, a symbolic expres-
sivity that transcends anything we could perceive under normal conditions. 
Balázs takes inspiration for his claims from both von Goethe and Lavater’s 
Physiognomic Fragments.49 He quotes Goethe: ‘The things surrounding a 
person do not simply impinge on him; he also reacts to them, and, while 
letting himself be modif ied, he modif ies his surroundings.’ Arguing that 
we need to go beyond a simplistic distinction of nature and culture, inte-
riority and exteriority, Balázs contends that everything we see in f ilm is 
expressive: ‘everything external testifies to an internal reality’.50 The scenes 
Hofmannsthal lists in the Chandos letter and in ‘Substitute for Dreams’ 
are typical examples of images that f ilm can provide with a ‘face’, accord-
ing to Balázs. Furthermore, Balázs’ account of the limitations of normal 
perception—which is characterized by habit, prejudice, generalization, and 
conceptualization—is related to the impoverishment that for the ‘language 
crisis’ authors had also befallen language. Whereas Hofmannsthal believed 
that f ilm could activate all unconscious thoughts, feelings and sensations 
48 The critical and innovative edge Stimmung receives in these texts can also put Eisner’s 
reference in context: ‘In any German f ilm, the preoccupation with rendering Stimmung (“mood”) 
by suggesting the “vibrations of the soul” is linked to the use of light. In fact, this Stimmung 
hovers around objects as well as people: it is a “metaphysical” accord, a mystical and singular 
harmony amid the chaos of things, a kind of sorrowful nostalgia which, for the German, is 
mixed with well-being.’ Lotte H. Eisner, The Haunted Screen, 199. The def inition of a national 
Stimmung and the metaphysical aspects of Stimmung are part of Eisner’s explanatory pattern 
of a national stylistic tradition originating in Romanticism, even though in the 1920s, the term 
had achieved more modern connotations.
49 Balázs thus steps into a long tradition of physiognomic thought in Germany, a tradition that 
includes Lavater, Goethe, Carus, and many mostly conservative thinkers with racist or eugenic 
leanings, such as Oswald Spengler and Ludwig Klages. See Richard T. Gray, About Face. See also 
Erica Carter’s discussion of Balázs’ references to Goethe in Balázs, Early Film Theory, xxvii.
50 Balázs, Early Film Theory, 29.
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in spectators (and was hence akin to dreams, in that f ilm reached down 
to the ‘darkest region of the roots’ where myths originate), for Balázs, f ilm 
could unlock unseen, unknown views (and thus knowledge) that seem to 
transcend the boundaries of human being-in-the world.51 By theorizing f ilm 
perception as able to activate forgotten or unknown aspects of being-human 
(and thus effectively transgressing the human), Balázs’ f ilm theory returns 
us to Marc’s and Uexküll’s attempt to glimpse a world beyond that given to 
our regular human being-in-the-world.
Whereas Marc’s paintings seek to connect to animals and animal worlds 
intuitively and empathically, and whereas Marc understands Umwelt as a 
feeling and vision, Balázs believes in a more invasive penetration of percep-
tion by the camera:
Our normal situation is that we perceive the objects around us only 
vaguely, paying heed to them only through the fog of habitual generaliza-
tions and schematic conceptions. We look out mainly for the possible 
benefits they could bring or the damage they might inflict—to observe 
them in themselves happens rarely, if ever. Now when the cameraman 
cranks up his projector he penetrates the foggy cataract that obscures 
our vision, and we suddenly f ind ourselves confronted with an unac-
customed, mysterious, unnatural image of nature. We sometimes feel at 
this point that we have eavesdropped on a profound, sacred mystery, a 
hidden life that frequently possesses the secret charm of the forbidden.52
The ‘profound, sacred mystery’ and ‘hidden life’ of which Balázs speaks is 
a world of which we, as human beings, are not part. Film provides us with 
the possibility ‘to see what things are like when we are not present’.53 In 
order to describe the mediation of this mysterious image of nature, Balázs 
makes recourse to Stimmung: ‘Such images of nature always contain a very 
special mood [Stimmung]. And it is this mood the camera most wishes to 
capture.’54 Stimmung describes the relationship between spectator, image, 
and camera: an image of nature that is not directly witnessed, but only 
relayed to us by a camera, contains a profound mystery that manifests itself 
as Stimmung. Stimmung, as something we sense and to which we attune 
51 Hofmannsthal, ‘The Substitute for Dreams’, 386.
52 Balázs, Early Film Theory, 60-61.
53 Stanley Cavell later made this idea an important aspect of his f ilm philosophy in Stanley 
Cavell, The World Viewed.
54 Balázs, Early Film Theory, 61; emphasis Balázs’.
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ourselves, is the true medium between us and this mystery. The camera 
makes these images visible, but it can only seek to ‘capture’ the Stimmung 
of that of which it provides an image—that is, the Stimmung is not solely 
created by the camera.
This attempt to represent Stimmung extends beyond individual moving 
images to narrative cinema as a whole. A f ilm succeeds in capturing Stim-
mungen if it is able to make use of the natural expressivity all things and 
places possess—their physiognomic quality which lends them symbolic 
meaning. This meaning is a Stimmung that emanates from the expressive 
object and interacts with the Stimmungen of the other objects, charac-
ters, and the background. Balázs makes recourse to musical metaphors 
to express this: ‘The sounds of an object ring out whether he will or not, 
and he must turn them into meaningful music or else they will degener-
ate into a confusing babble of sound.’ Balázs thus completely refutes the 
idea that the documentary qualities of photography and f ilm consist of a 
‘factual-objective’ mode of representation; representation in a f ilm is always 
‘physiognomically signif icant’.55
By understanding Stimmung to be synonymous with the expression, 
essence, or physiognomy of something, Balázs’ def inition of the term 
is not unlike Hofmannsthal’s. This is probably not a coincidence, since 
Balázs had relocated to Vienna in 1920 and in all likelihood was familiar 
with Hofmannsthal’s work even prior to leaving Hungary.56 In a text on 
the capabilities of Max Reinhardt, the grand German theater director 
who also tried his hand in f ilm and who created the f irst chamber play 
theater in Berlin in 1907, Hofmannsthal uses Stimmung to describe the 
expressivity of skilled, and skillfully directed, acting: ‘Indeed, above 
every thing, every event there f loats a something that wants to present 
itself, so to speak, and which separates itself from this thing—floating 
above it—in order to crown and complete the thing’s existence’. This 
‘something’ is Stimmung, he says, itself a ‘f loating and ambiguous word’. 
The more sensitive the observing human being, ‘the more distinct and 
manifold the transparent shadow of this Stimmung for him will lie on 
moments and encounters, places and instants—a Stimmung in which 
the true essence of individual things seems to f loat above them’. For 
Hofmannsthal, ‘[t]he thousand nuances of Stimmung’—when the latter 
55 Ibid., 56 (translation modif ied).
56 On Balázs’ f irst years in Vienna and parallels with Hofmannsthal (in particular their notion 
of the dream), see also Loewy, Béla Balázs, 260 ff.
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‘is brought to life’—then become a means to create a ‘true atmosphere 
of life [Lebensatmosphäre]’.57
Both Balázs and Hofmannsthal understand Stimmung as something 
transcendent, even as it is also intimately tied to the ‘texture’ of cinematic 
elements or the ‘weave of words’ that bring it forth.58 Stimmung is not itself 
life; it is brought to life by artistic elements—in f ilm by mise en scène in 
particular, as well as by cinematography and montage—and in turn creates 
a dense atmosphere in art that gives the latter life. Both authors def ine 
‘atmosphere’ as dependent upon, and evoked by, the suggestive expressive-
ness of Stimmung. Atmosphere, Balázs writes, ‘is the air and the aroma that 
pervade every work of art, and that lend distinctiveness to a medium and 
a world.’ Stimmung creates atmosphere, for its resonances are the medium 
of f ilms’ ‘living atmosphere, the dense, aromatic fluidity they possess of a 
living life’.59 Atmosphere is ‘the soul’ of the whole, an immanent meaning 
that is nevertheless opaque and ungraspable. In order to capture this soul, 
a director has to create an image that captures that aspect of a landscape, 
milieu, event, or person that is most expressive—its ‘eyes’, in Balázs’ words.60 
Balázs explored the temporal and spatial conditions of Stimmung in f ilm 
to work out the stylistic differences between Expressionist, Impressionist, 
and Kammerspiel f ilms. How Stimmung works in these f ilms—which is 
also how these f ilms express meaning—not only throws into relief the 
particularities of the respective films’ aesthetics, but also the implicit notion 
of subject-environment interaction in mise en scène, shot lengths, montage 
patterns, and camerawork.
In Balázs’ Visible Man, Stimmung is an important reference in order to 
distinguish stylistic elements from Expressionism, naturalism, and New 
Objectivity in f ilm, and to describe how these elements combine with the 
technological and aesthetic possibilities of f ilm to forge a new register of 
images. The images in these f ilms probe definitions of background, milieu, 
and environment by means of their mise en scène, in particular the shot 
length and the ensuing compositions. Balázs correlates the aesthetics of 
Expressionist f ilms, the Kammerspiel f ilm, and Impressionist f ilms with 
different renderings of the environment: how the latter is constituted, 
57 Hofmannsthal, ‘Max Reinhardt’, 314 (translation mine).
58 ‘For a f ilm text consists of its texture, of that language of images in which every group, every 
gesture, every perspective, every lighting set-up has the task of conveying the poetic mood and 
beauty that are normally to be discovered in the words of an author.’ Balázs, Early Film Theory, 
18-19. On the ‘weave of words’, see quote above from Hofmannsthal, ‘Poesie und Leben’.
59 Balázs, Early Film Theory, 22.
60 Ibid., 44.
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how it shapes the creatures in it, and how it may be shaped by subjects 
in turn. Each conception of environment that emerges is tied to a specif ic 
shot length and mise en scène: Expressionist f ilms thrive on full shots, 
Kammerspiel f ilms come into their own in mid-range shots, and Impres-
sionist f ilms occasion Balázs’ interest in the work done in close-up shots. 
Of these shot lengths, Balázs’ thoughts on the close-up are certainly the 
best-known, not only because he himself describes close-ups as ‘f ilm’s true 
terrain’, but also because many other f ilm theorists shared this assess-
ment, from contemporaries of Balázs, including Jean Epstein and Walter 
Benjamin, to Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Aumont.61 While the close-up is 
also instrumental for Balázs’ thoughts on Stimmung, Balázs’ comments on 
Expressionist and Kammerspiel f ilms reveal the interaction of Stimmung 
aesthetics and concrete social, political, and scientific conceptions of milieu. 
It is thus important to consider his discussion of all three shot lengths, and 
their connections to Stimmung and milieu, for these discussions reveal an 
unexpected aesthetic-political problem at the heart of Expressionist f ilm 
and Kammerspiel f ilm. While we commonly associate Kammerspiel f ilm’s 
psychologized plots with a return to naturalism, and we associate Expres-
sionist cinema with a drive toward abstraction that counters naturalism, 
these f ilms’ Stimmung aesthetics undercuts these literary, theatrical, and 
painterly correlations by changing the relationship between spectator, 
characters, and milieu. Together with Balázs’ description of Impressionist 
f ilms, his discussion of these f ilm styles reveals how Stimmung in f ilm 
becomes a f ilm aesthetic category in its own right. This new f ilm aesthetic 
category retains links to earlier discussions of Stimmung in art history and 
literature, but the aesthetics of the moving image and the different address 
and situation of the spectator change how Stimmung is produced and how 
it mediates between spectator and image.
Following Balazs’ account of Stimmung requires us, though, to under-
stand how his description of shot lengths differs signif icantly from today’s 
terminology. When we speak of close-ups, medium shots or long shots, we 
use the human body as a stable frame of reference. Balázs used a different 
terminology; he talks about ‘Premierplan’ (foreground shots or close ups) 
and ‘Sekundärplan’, second plane, long and medium long shots that capture 
the midfield, that which is in between foreground and background, proxim-
ity and distance. These terms seem to have been quite common when he 
was writing, and they highlight a conception of the visual f ield in the frame 
61 Jacques Aumont, ‘The Face in Close-Up’. For more recent scholarship on the close-up, see 
Doane, ‘The Close-Up’, as well as Noa Steimatsky, The Face on Film.
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that differs from our terminology as well. The following classif ication of 
shots by Robert Kümmerlen, published 1930 in Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und 
allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft (‘Journal for Aesthetics and Art History’), 
throws some light on Balázs’ references to shot lengths:
We distinguish: 1. the group of full shots or long shots (Totale), in which the 
space, which records all those circumstances that are of relevance for the 
pantomime, is always the greatest. The individual elements of the space or 
the image are, independent from one another, subordinate to the general 
impression of the total space. Movement also adds eff iciently to the total 
characteristic of the space. 2. The second-plane shots (Sekundärplan) or 
so-called intermediary images are images of relation (Beziehungsbilder), 
which are relatively dependent and only receive their full spatial value 
from other spatial framings. These presentations have the purpose of 
heightening spatiality; the second-plane shot is the truly ‘space-creating’ 
presentation in f ilm. The 3rd group is generally conceived of as the 
most characteristic for f ilm, here the images are generally completely 
‘detached’ from space. It is the group of close-ups, which lift a certain 
detail-image out of the f ilm-whole and which direct our gaze to a solo 
performance that stands out qualitatively.62
This categorization highlights the fact that shot lengths were not necessarily 
determined relative to the human f igure, but rather relative to the space 
of action, as well as relative to the preceding and following shots. For this 
reason, full shots depend on the size of the space of action—which in indoor 
shots, is generally a room, such as a small living room, but may also be a 
grand hall, and can become much larger outdoors—while Sekundärplan 
shots are even more diff icult to discern. They are those shots that show 
only part of the plane of action, and they are ‘in between’: size-wise, in 
between close-up and total image, and also cut in between full shots of the 
place of action and detail shots. Balázs seems to understand the notion of 
Beziehungsbilder (‘images of relation’) in two ways. They relate other shots, 
especially close-ups and full shots, to one another (and themselves need to 
be integrated carefully into shot sequences for ‘visual linkage’), but even 
more importantly, they relate characters to their environment.63 These 
mid-level shots do not take the milieu as a whole into view, as full shots 
62 Robert Kümmerlen, ‘Über die Bildwirkung der pantomimischen Filmbühne’, 50 (translation 
mine).
63 Balázs, Early Film Theory, 39.
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do, but focus on the relation of a character to this milieu (or, in the case of 
shots of objects, the role of a thing in/for a milieu).
Balázs ascribes to Expressionist f ilm an aesthetic that mostly relies on 
full shots that show the entirety of the milieu: ‘Expressionism […] provides 
the total image of a milieu, but stylizes it into an expressive physiognomy 
rather than leaving it to the viewer to imbue the scene with his own mo-
mentary mood (Stimmung)’.64 This claim helps us to make sense of the fact 
that the most important register of images in Expressionist f ilms such 
as Caligari, Genuine (which Robert Wiene directed in 1920, shortly after 
Caligari) or From Morn to Midnight shows an entire room or street. The 
elements of the environment—that ‘total image of a milieu’—dominate 
our understanding of the expressive content in these images. The use of the 
terms milieu and Stimmung in this sentence denote a particular connection 
between Expressionist aesthetic and environment. ‘Milieu’ def ines the 
relationship of the environment to the character; ‘physiognomy’ describes 
the cinematic expression of what is visible on the screen, whether character, 
object, or environment; and Stimmung describes the complex interaction 
between spectator and image. Expressionist stylization, in other words, 
provides the milieu with a physiognomy, but does not leave any options to 
the viewer’s imagination. Rather, the spectator is drawn into, and submits 
to, the image’s rendering of the environment. Yet a problem concerning 
the relationship between Expressionist stylization of the image and the 
spectator also becomes apparent in Balazs’ comment: the Expressionist 
stylization runs the risk of excluding the spectator in its totalizing effect.
Some of the most famous shots from that most iconic Expressionist f ilm, 
The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, illustrate both this formative, totalizing effect 
on the spectator and the force the milieu exerts on the characters. In many 
shots, supported by a static camera that renders the setting absolute, the 
character will literally ‘click into place’ over the course of his movements 
through the setting. Take, for example, Cesare’s (Conrad Veidt’s) approach 
to the sleeping Jane in order to murder her, although he then decides 
to kidnap her instead. The view of the street is framed by black, round 
shapes that intrude into the image, focusing our gaze on the illuminated 
spot of street and house wall. The shapes simultaneously imitate a realist 
equivalent—tree branches thick with leaves—and have the suggestive 
appearance of phantoms leaning in to the image, observing the crime about 
to be committed. However, they also provide a mold for the movements 
and expressive gestures of the actor. Veidt’s black silhouette glides along 
64 Ibid., 51. 
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the wall with similar organic movements that are seemingly dictated by 
the diagonal composition of the wall. Once inside Jane’s bedroom, the two 
dark, dagger-like shapes protruding down from the top of the frame indicate 
the danger Jane is in, while they simultaneously, like arrows, draw our 
attention to Cesare. When Cesare lifts his dagger to murder Jane, the bright 
blade of his dagger appears as an exact copy of the black dagger-like shapes 
in the background. After he has decided instead to kidnap Jane, and then 
leaves her behind as he is pursued, Cesare enters a shot dominated by the 
silhouettes of abstract, dead trees against a white background. Once in 
the frame, he lifts his arms in a powerless and exhausted dramatic gesture 
before falling to his death.
In their discussion of the compositional qualities of ‘Expressionist f ilms’ 
(which they def ine rather broadly), David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson 
highlight that in Expressionist f ilms, the setting is an active, expressive, 
‘living’ component of the f ilm, which allows the actors to interact with 
the environment in new ways, not least by becoming graphic elements. 
Bordwell and Thompson cite Conrad Veidt in this context: ‘If the decor has 
been conceived as having the same spiritual state as that which governs the 
character’s mentality, the actor will f ind in that decora [sic] valuable aid in 
 
Fig. 3.2.a-d: Cesare’s approach of the sleeping Jane and his flight in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari 
(robert Wiene, 1921).
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composing and living his part. He will blend himself into the represented 
milieu, and both of them will move in the same rhythm.’65 Similarly, Kracauer 
praised both Conradt Veidt’s and Werner Krauss’ acting abilities: ‘Werner 
Krauss as Caligari had the appearance of a phantom magician himself 
weaving the lines and shades through which he paced, and when Conrad 
Veidt’s Cesare prowled along a wall, it was as if the wall had exuded him.’66 
The turn to Stimmung in f ilm criticism and theory in conjunction with 
Expressionist f ilms seems to be directly connected to the stylistic quality 
of the f ilms. Graphically as well as materially, the image is conceived as one 
expressive unity. While the setting attains an expressive face, the actors can 
appear flattened and abstract, blending into their environment. Stimmung 
encompasses the ability of the images to express with all of their elements. 
This is quite reminiscent of nineteenth-century landscape paintings and 
Carus’ description of these paintings as representing ‘a certain Stimmung of 
inner life (Gemüthlebens) (sense) by means of the imitation (Nachbildung) 
of a corresponding Stimmung of natural life (truth).’67 Expressionist f ilms 
are different, however, in that their images do not depend upon an absolute 
distinction between non-human and human, inner and outer life—distinc-
tions upon which the motif of the Rückenfigur still insisted, even as it put 
these terms into play. The f ilm image grants everything in it the same 
vitality and potential for expression; there are no qualitative differences 
between characters, objects, and environments. Veidt’s and Kracauer’s 
comments express the way in which Caligari made use of this qualitative 
sameness by having the actors assimilate to the décor.
There is, however, an aesthetic wager associated with Expressionist f ilms 
such as Caligari. For Balázs, Expressionism in f ilm is, to some extent, f ilm’s 
natural terrain—not only because of f ilm’s ability to control and stylize 
environments, but also because f ilm can give equal expressive value to 
characters, things, and landscapes. He claims that ‘no director today can 
still tolerate a lifeless background, a neutral milieu; instead, he attempts to 
animate the entire screen with the same mood [Stimmung] that animates 
the faces of his actors’.68 However, many Expressionist f ilms—which were, 
after all, also consciously marketed as German Expressionist stylizations 
for an international market—precisely do not provide the object world 
65 Conrad Veidt, ‘Faut-il supprimer les sous-titres?’, quoted after David Bordwell and Kristin 
Thompson, Film History, 92. This conception of milieu also connects quite well to some remarks 
in reviews of the f ilm, for example the criticism that the characters did not f it into the setting.
66 Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, 69-70.
67 Carus, Neun Briefe über Landschaftsmalerei, 41.
68 Balázs, Early Film Theory, 47.
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with ‘the living naturalness of the human sphere’, as Balázs claims to be 
true for Caligari. Instead, their stylization is formal, external, or ‘decora-
tive’, as Balázs says: the f ilms’ effect becomes ‘ornamental, a consistent, 
constant style that has lost the character of spontaneous expression’.69 
While he does not name specif ic f ilms, Expressionist f ilms such as Genuine 
or From Morn to Midnight both come to mind. Stylization can ossify the 
background, which thereby loses its expressive qualities. In the case of 
both living expression (physiognomy) and dead expression (decorative 
stylization), the aesthetic stylization of the milieu into an expressive ‘face’ 
prevents the spectator from imbuing the scene with his or her own mood. 
There is thus a tension, an imbalance in the relationship between spectator 
and image in these long shots in Expressionist cinema. Stimmung pervades 
the entire image and reaches out to the spectator as well, whose personal 
Stimmung will not f ind a place in the expressivity or faciality of the image 
as a whole. If an Expressionist f ilm image attains a living expression, the 
spectator must engage with, and attune herself to, the polyphonic Stimmung 
of the f ilm and becomes unable to engage in a dialogic exchange of moods 
with the f ilm. If the image has congealed into a decorative, dead formalist 
mode of Expressionist f ilm, it has become completely determinist, and the 
spectator is, as in the case of the characters in the f ilm itself, subjected to 
the formative force of the f ilm as a milieu.
Balazs sees shots like the ones from Caligari described above as avoid-
ing dead decoration, but—as shots in an Expressionist f ilm—they still 
balance on a narrow ridge between determinism and open expression. 
These shots also highlight the fact that in Expressionist f ilm aesthetics, 
def initions of Stimmung and milieu are mutually dependent. Although 
we generally associate Expressionism with an externalization of internal 
conflicts, and thus with a projection of the soul out into the surrounding 
space, in the reception or experience of these f ilms, due to the stylization 
of the setting over other formal elements (acting, camerawork, editing), the 
image’s dynamic is one of a determining milieu. This determinist effect of 
‘typical’ Expressionist f ilms in the wake of Caligari—Genuine, From Morn 
to Midnight, to name but a few—might not be stylistically faithful to the 
spirit of Expressionism, but they rather return, in their aesthetic effect, to 
a determinist milieu aesthetic we associate with naturalism. In order to 
explain this further, I briefly turn to the permutations of understanding of 
‘milieu’ and then explore how these map onto the f ilms Balázs discusses.
69 Ibid., 51.
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Particularly in the Marxist discourse of the early twentieth century, 
milieu referred to determining environmental conditions, including so-
cial, political, psychological, biological, or climatic influences. Originally, 
milieu—the French word for ‘middle’—denoted a place located in the 
middle. Beginning in the Renaissance, milieu was used in the sense of an 
intermediary, that is, something that mediated between two poles.70 Milieu 
is thus closely related to medium, especially when the focus is on a relation 
rather than a location. As the term milieu migrated from physics to biology 
(and f inally to sociology), it became conjoined with life: it is that on which 
organic life depends, including not only surrounding fluid or air, but also all 
external circumstances. For Jean Baptiste Lamarck, for example, writing in 
the early nineteenth century, the milieu is a dynamic, ever-changing entity, 
yet ‘[t]he life and the milieu that is unaware of it are two asynchronous 
series of events.’71 The movement of life is thus ignored, unregistered by the 
milieu, which remains indifferent to it. Auguste Comte, by contrast, stressed 
the harmony of milieu and life, since the former protected and benefitted 
the latter. Subsequent sociological, medical, and literary appropriations of 
the term by Hyppolite Taine, Claude Bernard, and Emile Zola took a sharp 
mechanist turn and denied agency to life. Taine, for example, focused on 
the power and mindlessness of the milieu that has produced man. For 
him, milieu is completely severed from the perceptions and actions of life, 
untouched by it. The living being is molded by the forces the milieu exerts 
on it, and these forces are mechanical and static in nature.
Caligari and subsequent Expressionist f ilms are certainly ‘milieu films’ in 
that they place an extraordinary emphasis on the setting, which supports, 
guides, or even determines the action and creates the atmosphere. Yet they 
are not dialogic in their presentation of the milieu qua setting: the environ-
ment of the characters might reflect their (or ‘an’) inner disposition, but the 
aesthetic effect is a determinist one—the characters cannot but act and 
move in the way their environment prescribes. To some extent, their actions 
are reduced to ‘behavior’, with the latter term understood as determined 
by instincts. This even seems to be true of the famous sequence in which 
Dr Caligari is haunted by his obsession with the historic f igure of Caligari, 
such that on a path in the woods, he is suddenly physically threatened by 
the sentence ‘Du musst Caligari werden (“You have to become Caligari”)’, 
which appears repeatedly, letter by letter, amid the abstract, barren tree 
70 For the French history of the term, see Spitzer, ‘Milieu and Ambiance’. The development of 
meanings in English in German is quite similar; see J. Feldhoff, ‘Milieu’, 1393-95.
71 Canguilhem, ‘The Living and Its Milieu’, 12.
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silhouettes and the black sky, in bright, superimposed lettering. While 
the scene is certainly an externalization of Caligari’s state of mind, the 
depiction visualizes his psychological state as a threatening, commanding 
milieu that confronts the tortured individual with an imperative he cannot 
escape—the precise understanding of milieu as mechanist and determinist 
that we f ind in late nineteenth-century scientif ic texts and in naturalist 
novels and plays.
The Kammerspiel Film: Naturalist Plots and Progressive 
Aesthetics
The Expressionist f ilm married commerce and mass appeal with an artistic 
sensibility that derived its impulses from styles in painting that had been 
avant-garde a decade previously. As a consequence of this diff icult alliance, 
the Stimmung effect and a corresponding understanding of milieu gained 
a totalizing, determining effect. In this context, we should read Balázs’ 
comments on ‘the recent tendency, visible in the latest f ilms, to make 
 
Fig. 3.3: Caligari threatened by letters superimposed on the setting in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari 
(robert Wiene, 1921).
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expressive use of the middle-ground shot’ (the ‘shots of relation’ according 
to Kümmerlein’s classif ication), as a description of a counter-strategy. Even 
though Balázs does not say so explicitly, we can assume that he is referring 
to Kammerspielfilme here; those f ilms by Lupu Pick, Leopold Jessner, and 
Murnau that are characterized by an intimate setting, naturalistic acting, 
and a stripped-down plot that focuses on its characters’ psychologies. These 
f ilms’ middle-ground or second-plane shots show the whole f igure only in 
their immediate environment, rather than the environment at large. By 
doing so, they avoid the totalization and determinism of the Expressionist 
f ilms and instead bring variable, specif ic relations between characters, 
and between characters, environments and things, into view. Balázs puts 
this as follows:
[The second-plane shot] shows only the characters’ immediate sur-
roundings, and by drawing the image frame in more tightly it enables a 
human being to illuminate the image, as it were, with the emanation of 
his soul. The milieu becomes the visible ‘aura’ of the human being, his 
physiognomy expands beyond the contours of his own body. The human 
play of gestures and expressions continues to prevail over that of objects 
and his facial expressions will interpret the expression of objects. For, 
in the f inal analysis, it is only human beings that matter. And the ‘facial 
expressions’ [Mienen] of objects become signif icant only in so far as they 
relate to the human being.72
By restricting the view of the environment to that which immediately 
surrounds a character, something happens to the expressivity of these 
surroundings. Instead of showing the wider milieu as an independent agent 
with its own expression, everything becomes tinged by the expression of 
the character at the center of the shot. As a consequence, nothing can be 
seen or interpreted on its own terms anymore, but everything must be 
interpreted in its relationship to the human being at the center.
This discussion of the middle-ground shot seems to run counter to 
the most frequently discussed trend in 1920s f ilm theory, namely, that of 
highlighting the non-anthropocentric qualities of cinema and its ability to 
alienate our vision and understanding of the human being, not least because 
characters no longer appear as privileged in the image. (This is a theme that 
emerges in the work of Jean Epstein, Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, 
and even Balázs himself.) The term ‘aura’ in the quote above highlights this 
72 Balázs, Early Film Theory, 51 (translation modif ied).
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difference. Aura for Balázs is a human quality; he does not use the term 
to describe the quality of objects or landscapes. Neither does aura for him 
seem to be a category subject to historical change or dependent upon its 
form of mediation. In all of these respects, Balázs’ notion of aura therefore 
differs signif icantly from Benjamin’s use of the term. Erica Carter thus 
describes Balázs’ aesthetic as anthropomorphic (and not anthropocentric, 
an important difference).73 Because of the anthropomorphic scale of the 
long shot, the milieu is transformed into a character’s aura.
Balázs’ description might seem conservative, a retreat into a humanism 
somewhat at odds with his poetics of the close-up. However, the focus of 
his description lies much more on the animating forces of the image than 
on the human center of these forces. In contrast to the decorative and 
static conception of milieu in Expressionist f ilms, in the Kammerspiel f ilms 
the whole image resonates expressively. The shot length in combination 
with the realist mise en scène grants an expressiveness, akin to a face, to 
objects. Their individual expression is not suppressed or dominated by the 
character in the image, but rather enters into a dynamic relationship with 
the character, such that this expression partakes in a human drama. As a 
consequence, the Kammerspiel aesthetic and its second-plane shots produce 
a delicate resonance between the Stimmung of the f ilm—the expressive 
interplay of things and characters in the image—and the Stimmung of the 
spectator. They thus correspond to, even evoke, a conception of milieu that 
runs counter to the determinist milieu of the nineteenth century and in-
stead seems to be based on a more open dynamic of calling and responding.
Shattered, a 1921 f ilm by Lupu Pick with a screenplay by Carl Mayer, is 
generally credited as one of the first Kammerspiel f ilms, and it provides some 
examples of the image dynamics suggested by Balázs. The f ilm describes 
f ive days in the lives of a railway worker (played by Werner Krauß), his 
wife, and his daughter. Their daily routine is interrupted by a visit from a 
railway inspector. The young inspector rapes the daughter, the mother dies 
while praying outside in the snow, and when the father f inally f inds out the 
truth, he kills the inspector. The f ilm—which, no doubt in part because of 
limited circulation and availability, has not received much critical atten-
tion—possesses a haunting quality. The plot takes place over the course of 
a short period in one single locale and is shot in concise, rhythmic images 
that emphasize the relentless unfurling of the tragedy. With the exception 
of titles that announce the beginning of a new day and the final confession ‘I 
am a murderer,’ the f ilm does away with intertitles. In many ways, Shattered 
73 See Ibid., xxvi.
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is reminiscent of Gerhart Hauptmann’s Lineman Thiel (Bahnwärter Thiel), 
a masterpiece of naturalist playwriting. In Lineman Thiel, a quiet railway 
worker tending to a lonely railway outpost in the woods kills his domineer-
ing wife and their baby, after his son from a previous marriage is killed by 
a train as a consequence of his wife’s inattention.
The f irst minutes of the f ilm focus on the dreary family routines, and the 
f ilm keeps returning to the same shot setups of the inside of the house, the 
front door, and the tracks, to introduce the individual characters’ everyday 
movements and tasks. In the f irst shot, with the camera mounted on the 
front of a train, we look down at the rapidly moving tracks underneath. 
Slowly, the camera pans up and reveals a lonely, hilly winter landscape and 
a small station house in the distance. The following shots are extremely 
concise vignettes that depict the small family’s life. We see the front door 
and part of a window, with a railing alongside the front doorsteps in the 
foreground. The door opens and the wife steps outside, an apron around her 
waist and a large laundry basket in her hand, warily checking the weather, 
with her gaze directed toward the sky and the horizon as the wind moves 
her hair, before she descends the stairs and exits the frame. The following 
shot looks out toward the yard: white sheets hang on clotheslines and sway 
in the wind in front of a rickety picket fence; in the background, we see 
a snowy f ield, the dark silhouettes of a forest and a line of mountains in 
the distance, all emphasizing the family’s spatial isolation and the hostile 
weather. On the right, the stark legs of an electrical line pylon stand out 
against the sky and indicate the proximity of the train tracks. The wife 
enters the shot and begins to pull the sheets off the clotheslines as the wind 
continues to tear at them (Fig. 3.4).
On the surface, this shot f its the bill of the (seemingly) naturalist story. 
It depicts the conf ining milieu of this family, and in particular the life 
of the railwayman’s wife, out in the middle of nowhere, in the shadow 
of the loud, smoky, faceless trains rushing past, battling everyday life in 
isolation. The laundry, one might say, determines her life. Yet even though 
the laundry, the fence, and the other elements of the image bear mark-
ers of a determining milieu, the aesthetic impression of the image is not 
determinist; rather—and in contrast to Expressionist f ilm images—the 
image is open and dependent upon the feelings of a spectator. Composition, 
movement, and montage rhythm all contribute to images that seek to con-
nect to our body and senses. The shot above makes visible how the laundry 
is beckoning; we see the image of the fluttering sheets as what they mean 
to her. Rather than visualizing the milieu as a formative force bearing on 
the character, we see the environment as her world, as how objects appears 
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to her, what they say to her. Two important factors help Lupu Pick achieve 
this effect: f irst, a mise en scène in which the character enters the frame 
only after the setting is established, such that we initially only experience 
our affective relationship to the moving image; and second, movement: the 
wind literally animates the sheets and gives them their calling-character. As 
a consequence, we see various forces and force f ields that we can relate to 
as well: the wind tearing at the sheets, the precarious homestead defending 
itself against both an overbearing, determining technology (the railway) 
and cold, uncivilized nature, the coldness affecting the shuddering wife’s 
body, and her struggle to grab hold of the sheets and tear them off the 
clotheslines. Even though this landscape, and everyday tasks such as doing 
laundry, determine the railwayman’s wife’s existence and are thus legible 
as milieu, the images themselves reach out to and demand comprehensive 
understanding from a sensing, thinking, and feeling spectator. Meaning in 
these images is only generated in the process of the spectator’s embodied 
participation in the images.
The relationship between milieu and character that we experience in 
images such as this corresponds to a much more contemporary conception 
 
Fig. 3.4: the wife tending to the laundry in Shattered (lupu Pick, 1921).
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of milieu. When Balázs indicates that the total expressive stylization and 
determinist Stimmung of the Expressionist f ilm might have had its day, 
we could thus conceivably connect this claim to the paradigm shift in 
conceptions of milieu as outlined above, too; namely, a movement away 
from static conceptions of milieu, and towards more dynamic ideas of 
subject-environment interaction. Beginning in the late 1910s, new dynamic 
models for milieu-life interaction emerged. A new generation of biologists 
such as Kurt Goldstein, Jakob von Uexküll, and Frederik J.J. Buytendijk 
developed theories of a dynamic and mutually constituting relationship be-
tween organisms and environments (as I discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter). According to these paradigms, as Georges Canguilhem put it, the 
milieu poses a problem and often ‘proposes’ but never imposes a solution; 
the solution can only be found by the living being, through the activity 
of living in the world.74 Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the term milieu thus lost its denotation of a concrete place and 
instead described the force f ield, the interrelations between an individual 
and her surroundings (the medium).75 What characterizes in particular 
Uexküll’s work on environment as individual Umwelt is the idea that the 
milieu is subjective, a world shaped by the living being (see the discussion 
of Uexküll in Chapter 2). The shots of a character in her environment are not 
simply anthropomorphic or anthropocentric in the sense that they return 
to an old-fashioned, anti-revolutionary humanism; rather, they partake in 
a new understanding of life in its environment, and the ability of f ilm not 
only to make visible a living attitude, a living impulse, but also how this 
impulse is reflected in and constitutes the meaning of the milieu.
Lotte Eisner also picked up the terms Umwelt and Stimmung in both 
The Haunted Screen and her book on Murnau, and linked them to Carl 
Mayer and his cinematic scriptwriting.76 She cited director Lupu Pick, 
who said about Mayer’s script for their following collaboration, the f ilm 
Sylvester (1924): ‘The composition of this moving picture seems to me novel 
because it encloses the action within a limited framework, giving a major 
role to the Umwelt without involving it in the action proper, which would 
74 Canguilhem, ‘The Living and Its Milieu’, 17.
75 It is also in this context that one should understand Balázs’ references to Goethe’s scientif ic 
thoughts. See Balázs, Early Film Theory, 29, where he quotes Goethe on physiognomics: “‘The 
things surrounding a person, do not simply impinge on him; he also reacts to them, and, while 
letting himself be modif ied, he modif ies his surroundings.’” However, the references to Goethe 
also make clear that for Goethe, the distinction of living being, and man in particular, and 
environment are clearly drawn, as they generally are in nineteenth-century landscape painting.
76 Lotte H. Eisner, Murnau.
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be banal. The Umwelt must constitute the base and symphonic background 
of a particular destiny, and thus become the emblem of a principal idea.’77 
Contemporary reviewers of Shattered, in particular the scriptwriter and 
f ilm critic Willy Haas, described this effect of the role of the environment 
as it was captured by Pick’s camera, namely a universal animation as a 
result of the interconnection of the characters and their milieu—that is, 
the world presented—that swept the spectator along as well.
This simplicity – all this would hardly be tenable as a drama . . . . But 
incredibly stronger than in drama are, in my opinion, the unity, the 
flowing feel, the rhythm, the stanza, the verse, the refrain, the trembling 
melody in the air, the dullness of the earth, daily life, the tragedy of 
the times, the bell toll of eternal sameness and the mystery of strange 
elements within this sameness. This f ilm can show a railroad track of 
eternal length. And the railroad worker who walks, walks, walks along 
it . . . endlessly: for the span of a human life—it is tangible. The camera 
walks with him—endlessly. This can never be expressed on the stage: a 
symbol of life barred to theater.78
The vitality with which Haas credits Scherben is the result of the spati-
otemporal dynamism of the image due to mise en scène, camerawork, and 
montage (see Fig. 3.5). Haas’ language reveals how the rhythmicization of 
the image expands the f ilm’s elements beyond the confines of the screen 
into the spatiotemporality of the spectator (‘melody in the air’, ‘daily life’, 
‘tragedy of the times’, ‘eternal sameness’, ‘eternal length’, ‘tangible [man fühlt 
es]’, ‘endlessly’). The spectator grasps not only the story told, but also the 
larger social, cultural and natural environment (including the forces of the 
milieu on the railwayman) on the basis of an attunement to the Stimmung 
that unfolds in the f ilm over time. The f ilm’s Stimmung aesthetics allows 
for the ‘feeling’ of the complex subject-environment dynamic implicit in the 
f ilm and implicating the spectator. It thus becomes a more effective vehicle 
for conveying both the forces of the milieu and the inner turmoil and projec-
tions of the characters. Affective, sensorial cues combine with the sensible 
77 Eisner, The Haunted Screen, 186. Eisner is citing from Lupu Pick’s foreword to Carl Mayer’s 
script for Sylvester, which was published separately. See Carl Mayer, Sylvester: Ein Lichtspiel, 
10-11. In an illuminating essay on Mayer’s script for Sylvester, Hermann Kappelhoff makes the 
case—supported by contemporary f ilm critics such as Herbert Jhering and Willy Haas—that 
the f ilm to some extent did not quite live up to the role Mayer had assigned to the environment. 
See Hermann Kappelhoff, ‘Literarische Recherchen am kinematograf ischen Bild’, 177.
78 Willy Haas, ‘Scherben’.
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aspects of story and content and allow the spectator to enter and engage 
with the cinematic image while still retaining freedom of judgment.79
A f ilm such as Shattered uses a new mode of Stimmung aesthetics to 
depict the interrelations among the working-class family, society (in the 
form of the inspector as well as the business and leisure travelers on the 
train, who witness the family drama as spectacle from the windows of their 
compartment), nature, and technology. This mode of Stimmung aesthetics 
is determined by disturbances, interventions, and dialogic contrasts; Stim-
mung never encompasses a whole, since it requires an image that is open 
to the spectator’s senses and thoughts (the ‘open image’ would become 
important in the post-war cine-vitalist discourse, as I show in Chapter 4). 
It is thus in stark contrast to understandings of Stimmung that presume 
79 Haas’ f ilm review also highlights the similarity between the effect of a f ilm such as Shattered 
and Richter’s abstract Rhythm f ilms, as discussed in Chapter 1, since the rhythm and musicality 
of mise en scène and montage are important carriers of affect in this f ilm. Einfühlung is central 
to the Stimmung aesthetics under discussion here.
 Fig. 3.5.: a tracking shot of the railway worker (Werner Krauß) inspecting the tracks in Shattered 
(lupu Pick).
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a holistic congruence of inner disposition and environment, such as that 
of Carus, but also some more recent def initions. Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht, 
for example, recently advocated for Stimmung as a reading practice that 
foregrounds the prosodic element of literary texts and focuses on presence 
rather than representation; atmosphere, tone, and rhythm rather than plot 
and interpretation, thus allowing for a merging of historical and aesthetic 
experience. For Gumbrecht, the capacity of literary texts to ‘surround’ 
and ‘envelop’ us with a Stimmung fulf ills a need in times characterized by 
technological mediation to experience the thickness of material presence.80 
Stimmung for him is a ‘warm’ concept; it envelops us like a coat.
Against this concept of Stimmung and mediation, I insist on the crucial 
role of the conditions of particular forms of mediation. In the case of f ilm, 
this means technological mediation and f ilm’s capacity to reflect on tech-
nological conditions. A f ilm’s mise en scène and cinematography interweave 
not only nature and dramatic narrative with somatic affection, a texture we 
could describe by means of the traditional use of Stimmung, but they also 
interweave cinema’s own technological conditions, so that the technological 
medium becomes the place where nature becomes empowered to speak of 
rationalization, technology, and the modern condition in a language that 
addresses the reasonable subject as much as the embodied subject.
A f ilm such as Shattered can teach us about the mood, attunement, and 
subject-environment dynamics exactly because it reflects the conditions 
of its technological making—an achievement that also makes this f ilm 
much more than simply a f ilm version of a naturalist play. When the father, 
mother, and daughter sit down for dinner at the table, the camera suddenly 
pans to the right, and with the help of an iris mask, focuses our attention 
on a Morse telegraph receiver that then comes into view. A sudden cutaway 
shows powerlines against the sky, and with the help of a special effect, we 
see one of the lines illuminated, transmitting short and long signals. The 
following shot shows a close-up of the telegraph at work, all parts moving 
and spitting out a received message. Whereas f ilms such as Karl Grune’s 
The Street (Die Straße, 1924) set up an opposition of bourgeois parlor and 
alluring metropolitan street life, with the window as gateway, in Shattered, 
technology and modernity have already pervaded this living room. Mother 
and daughter continue to eat their soup as the father eventually gets up to 
read the telegram (Fig. 3.6). The conditions of his line of work have already 
torn apart the coherent fabric with which Biedermeier culture was woven; 
80 Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Stimmungen lesen, 29.
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the father sleeps on the sofa and his rhythm is determined by train schedules 
that require him to get up night and day.
The mise en scène (in particular, the setting and lighting), camera posi-
tion, and, increasingly, the camera movement—in shots such as the one 
described above—change the role of Stimmung in the Kammerspiel f ilm. In 
Shattered, Stimmung signif ies the dynamic exchange between the relation-
ships within the image and the relationship the spectator establishes to 
the image. The mobility of the image and the rhythm of changing views 
ensure that Stimmung retains the ephemeral character that Hofmannsthal 
and Nietzsche had already described. The moments in which a Stimmung 
formulates itself are nevertheless accompanied by a flash of instant cogni-
tion [Erkenntnis]—constellations and relations of which we are part, and 
which are, in a f ilm such as Shattered, seared by moments of photographic 
realism, be it laundry sheets f luttering in the wind or branches hitting the 
illuminated windows at night. This dynamic returns us, in fact, to the one 
we witness in Franz Marc’s White Dog—a painting that seeks to expand 
cognition and feeling by interlocking the observer’s feeling-into the dog 
with the dog’s feeling-into its environment.
 
Fig. 3.6: the petit-bourgeois parlor and daily rhythm are punctuated by the intrusion of a telegraph 
receiver and the railway schedule in Shattered (lupu Pick).
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The development of Marc’s painting style, in fact, foreshadowed the 
development of Stimmung aesthetics from the early Kammerspiel f ilms 
onward. In subsequent paintings, Marc increasingly dissolved the bounda-
ries between animal and environment, and animal vision and modes of 
perception. His later paintings, such as ‘Picture with Cattle’ (Bild mit Rind, 
1913), ‘Lying Bull’ (Liegender Stier, 1913), or ‘Abstract Forms II’ (Abstrakte 
Formen II, 1914) abandoned distinct divisions between animal body and 
background; animal sensation seems to spread across the entire canvas and 
not be bound to particular senses, and brushstroke and paint have become 
more visible.81 A similar dissolution takes place with the progression of 
Kammerspiel f ilms and the increasing use of camera movement. Shattered 
already features some rudimentary camera movement that does not have a 
purely subservient function—that is, keeping the characters in view—but 
rather becomes a narrative agent in its own right. Sylvester is famous for 
its use of a camera moving along a busy street at night, connecting various 
spaces, and Murnau would ‘unshackle’ the camera even further in the 
late Kammerspiel f ilm The Last Laugh (1924) and the subsequent Faust 
(1926). The breakdown of immobile standpoints and stable frames in these 
f ilms, and the discursive activity of a camera engaging with spectator and 
image in its own right, turns the Rückenfigur of Friedrich’s paintings into 
a virtual, mobile agent (that is, the camera) who invites us to engage with 
the world presented to us in f ilm under conditions of absolute mediation. 
‘The human being will become visible again’, was Balázs’ prognosis in 1924. 
Yet it increasingly seemed as though the human being could only become 
visible in a medium, and by means of an aesthetic, that increasingly blurred 
the boundaries between the human, technology, and other forms of being.
81 I thank Kimberly Smith for making me aware of the relationship between animal vision 
and abstraction in Franz Marc’s paintings of 1913 and 1914. See Kimberly A. Smith, ‘Becoming 
Human / Becoming Animal’.

4. Open Bodies, Open Stories
Evolution, Narration, and Spectatorship in Post-war Film 
Theory
In the post-war period, European film theory was dominated by approaches 
to f ilm that incorporated post-catastrophic narrative forms and visual 
styles, especially those of Italian neorealism. Yet this period also saw a 
return of vitalist motifs in f ilm theory. Even more so than in pre-war f ilm 
theory, the vitality of the moving image was related to the question of the 
human being and its relationship to other forms of life, as well as ques-
tions of humanism. This novel combination of interest in life, realism, 
and modes of narration is especially evident in the work of André Bazin, 
but also seems to set Siegfried Kracauer’s belated Theory of Film (1960) 
apart from his pre-WWII writings. The resurgence of vitalist motifs in 
post-war f ilm theory should surprise us, for classical accounts of vitalism 
see this as a movement that achieved its apotheosis when it merged with 
Nazi ideology in the Third Reich, where holism and the idea of the state 
as an organism served to justify an aggressive foreign policy and racial 
ideologies; it is not diff icult to detect, for example, the chilling resonance 
between this political interest in holism and Uexküll’s idea of the Umwelt 
of the state.1 In the interwar period and during WWII, in other words, a 
politicized notion of life encouraged value distinctions between good and 
bad forms of life, and fueled the idea of ‘cleansing’ the state organism, a goal 
that was then used to justify radical measures against ‘harmful elements’ 
such as Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, and handicapped people. From this 
perspective, the dangers of vitalism were thoroughly exposed by Nazism, 
and the Allies’ triumph over Nazism was also understood to be a triumph 
over vitalist thought.
At the same time, though, a different strand of vitalist thought persisted 
through the 1930s and 1940s, resurfacing after the war both in the work of 
a few singular individuals in disciplines such as philosophy (e.g., Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty) and the history of biology (Georges Canguilhem), but also, 
signif icantly, in f ilm theory.2 Rather than concentrating on holistic no-
tions of the body and, by extension, communities, authors such as André 
Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer insisted on the idea of a (vulnerable) open 
1 Uexküll, Staatsbiologie. For such an account of vitalism, see Harrington, Reenchanted 
Science.
2 See Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological and Merleau-Ponty, Nature.
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body; instead of the eternal duration of the Third Reich and the ecstatic 
era of its well-orchestrated mass festivals, they sought to def ine an open 
temporality of the everyday (exemplif ied for them by Italian neorealism). 
Their work, in quite different ways, provides us with an example of post-war 
f ilm theory that continues the lineage of cinematic vitalism that this book 
has traced.
This chapter discusses the conceptions of nature, life, and evolution in 
Bazin’s essays on cinema and Kracauer’s early essays and in Theory of Film, 
and investigates the way in which these conceptions are linked to post-
catastrophic narrative forms and visual styles in cinema. In contrast to 
earlier vitalist ideas in early texts on f ilm and in the interwar avant-garde, 
this post-catastrophic cinematic vitalism is marked by a kind of quiet, 
passive urgency. For both Bazin and Kracauer, despite their theoretical 
and biographical differences, cinema is necessary in order to formulate a 
metaphysic of life that is able to work against the political catastrophe that 
took place in the name of life and by means of technology. The f irst part of 
the chapter turns to the way in which Bazin’s essays embed cinema within 
both a larger context of natural phenomena and the scientif ic investigation 
of such phenomena, by means of references and allusions that Bazin draws 
from f ields such as biology and geology. Many of these references are to 
phenomena that capture, phenomenologically, change and force, and 
they point to a conception of vitality that runs through both the organic 
and the inorganic worlds. These ideas of nature, as I will show, present 
not only a discussion and modif ication of vitalist theories, but also paral-
lel Merleau-Ponty’s nature lectures from the same period, in which the 
latter turned to Bergsonian vitalism, behaviorism, and Uexküll’s Umwelt 
theories. Bazin’s nature references also resonate in surprising ways with 
Eisenstein’s later texts on nature and history, in particular Nonindifferent 
Nature and Notes for a General History of Cinema (see Chapter 1).3 Such a 
contextualization of Bazin’s canonical texts allows us to understand how 
a vitalist notion of organic becoming shaped not only Bazin’s ontology 
of cinema, but also his notion of realism, especially as he articulated his 
understanding of realism with respect to Vittorio De Sica’s and Roberto 
Rossellini’s f ilms.
The second part of the chapter looks at Kracauer’s Theory of Film and in 
particular the central notion of ‘the flow of life’ that Kracauer develops in 
3 Antonio Somaini has pointed out some of the aff inities between Bazin and Eisenstein, 
especially with respect to their shared references to cinema as mummif ication. See Somaini, 
‘Cinema as “Dynamic Mummif ication,”‘ 80-84.
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this text. In order to understand the implications of the role that life—both 
the life of the f ilm and the life of the spectator—play in this text, I turn to 
Kracauer’s critical writings from the 1920s, especially his essays on vitalist 
biologist and philosopher Hans Driesch and the state of contemporary 
German philosophy, and his essay on ‘Photography’ and its augurial discus-
sion of the role of photographic media for the future of the human being. 
Both Kracauer and Bazin, as well as Merleau-Ponty, are interested in the 
conditions for emergence of the new as a condition of life and in the interac-
tion between organism and environment; they sought the emergence of 
new possibilities that break habitual molds and allow for new connections 
between humans, between humans and nature, and between humans and 
technology. This search entails an insistence on humanism, on meaning 
and value, while nevertheless abandoning anthropocentrism, organicity, 
and the human. And as in the case of the path described by the previous 
two chapters, this path, and hence this chapter, also progresses from animal 
to human.
The Axolotl and Cinema: Bazin, Bergson, and Evolution
It was their quietness that made me lean toward them fascinated the f irst 
time I saw the axolotls. Obscurely I seemed to understand their secret 
will, to abolish space and time with an indifferent immobility. I knew 
better later; the gill contraction, the tentative reckoning of the delicate 
feet on the stones, the abrupt swimming (some of them swim with a 
simple undulation of the body) proved to me that they were capable of 
escaping that mineral lethargy in which they spent whole hours.
During one of his regular visits to the Jardin des Plantes in Paris, the young 
man in Julio Cortázar’s short story from 1956, ‘The Axolotl’, becomes ob-
sessed with the animal’s peculiar features and charisma. He wonders why 
it would be that this strange amphibian, of all animals, appeared to hold 
a secret for him, to communicate to him across the abyss that separated it 
from man. Its body seemed to speak of a different time and space: capable 
of suspending time, stretching it inf initely by seemingly abandoning 
movement and giving no signs of life; then suddenly moving with a pace 
and eff iciency that presented a complete rupture with the previous state. 
The bond that is forming between the visitor to the aquarium and the 
axolotl catapults the man beyond the boundaries of human perception and 
worldview and into a new, foreign being and vision.
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Above all else, their eyes obsessed me. In the standing tanks on either 
side of them, different f ishes showed me the simple stupidity of their 
handsome eyes so similar to our own. The eyes of the axolotls spoke to 
me of the presence of a different life, of another way of seeing. Glueing 
my face to the glass (the guard would cough fussily once in a while), I 
tried to see better those diminutive golden points, that entrance to the 
inf initely slow and remote world of these rosy creatures. It was useless to 
tap with one f inger on the glass directly in front of their faces; they never 
gave the least reaction. The golden eyes continued burning with their 
soft, terrible light; they continued looking at me from an unfathomable 
depth which made me dizzy.4
The encounter between man and axolotl in Cortázar’s story certainly has 
cinematic qualities: the animal itself takes on the qualities not of a recording 
apparatus, but a projecting apparatus. The axolotl’s movement and lack 
thereof, alternating between the stillness of death and rapid, isolated mo-
tion, is reminiscent of the projector’s pull of photograms on a f ilmstrip past 
the aperture. Separated by the thick glass of the aquarium, the observer is 
drawn in by the ‘soft, terrible light’ of the axolotl’s lidless eyes, which seem 
to devour him. Like a f ilm image on a screen, the eyes do not seem to see 
him; yet the animal seems to address itself to him.
Cortázar’s story ends, however, with a more existential exchange: the 
narrator f inds himself in the aquarium in the axolotl’s body, now possessing 
‘insider’ knowledge of its human consciousness. This identity shift of the 
f irst-person narrator, however, also upsets our position as reader, and poses 
the question of what kind of interface this short story actually is; a short 
story the thinking axolotl hopes the man will some day write. The unsettling 
identity and the unsettled spatiotemporality of the axolotl now pervade 
our reading experience and turn our attention to the medium itself. What 
is it to be an axolotl, and what is it to read of someone’s experience? What 
does it mean to look as a non-human being, and what is the image of a f ilm 
to us? These questions of an encounter with animality and how it bears on 
mediality have been posed by John Berger and Jacques Derrida in texts that 
are central to the rapidly expanding f ield of animal studies.5 However, 
pursuing the trace of the axolotl—itself an identity-shifting animal—across 
4 Julio Cortazar, ‘The Axolotl’, 5-6. 
5 John Berger, ‘Why Look at Animals?’; and Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am. 
See also Akira Mizuta Lippit, Electric Animal.
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media allows us to ask even more specif ic questions about life, mediation, 
aesthetics, and form.
Cortázar himself compared the metonymic quality of the short story 
to the photograph. The spatiotemporal cutout of photography is like ‘an 
explosion which fully opens a much more ample reality, like a dynamic 
vision which spiritually transcends the space reached by the camera’.6 
The dynamic Cortázar attributes to photography and short story, namely 
an expansion outward, ref lects the thoughts on f ilm and photography 
expressed around the same time by f ilm theorist André Bazin—who, not 
coincidentally, was also fascinated by animals, ranging from cats to birds 
to reptiles, and who, according to Dudley Andrew, spent hours with the 
family iguana, fascinated by a ‘different life, another way of seeing’ and the 
possibilities and limits of communication with a species so different—a 
sense that, as I have noted in the second chapter, both sustained Uexküll’s 
research on animal Umwelten and constitutes the basis for the aff inity 
between animals and cinema.7 And in his essay on ‘Theater and Cinema’, 
which contains a reference to the axolotl, Bazin also conceives of the 
aesthetic of f ilm as expanding from the center outward. He writes that, in 
contrast to the theater stage’s centripetal force, which relates everything 
to the human f igure at the center of the drama, ‘the space of the [f ilm] 
screen is centrifugal’.8 For Bazin, this means not only an expansion 
beyond onscreen space and an opening to transcendence, as for Cortázar; 
it also implies that the essence of cinema lies not in the human being (as 
is the case for theater), but rather in the way cinema mediates the world 
to us.9 This world is not ‘ours’—it is alien to us, and work is required to 
establish it as our environment and tie it to our physical and moral exist-
ence. It is in this sense that I postulate a connection between the axolotl 
and cinema, between development, evolution, behavior, and aesthetics, 
6 Cortazar himself says about literary formats: ‘The novel and the short story can be compared 
analogically to the f ilm and the photograph.’ Julio Cortazar, ‘Some Aspects of the Short Story’, 
246. He further suggests that this genre functions as a metonymy, a ‘photography’ that is a 
fragment of reality which opens an ampler one: ‘an explosion which fully opens a much more 
ample reality, like a dynamic vision which spiritually transcends the space reached by the 
camera.’ See also Nataly Tcherepashenets, ‘Place and Displacement’. 
7 Dudley Andrew, André Bazin, 8. 
8 André Bazin, ‘Theater and Cinema’, 105. 
9 This has a both metaphysical and historical dimension. The f ilm image can put us in touch 
with the ‘universe’, and thus present, and eventually restore, a world to us, a restoration that 
includes the potential of restoring the human being. For Bazin, cinema is able to formulate a 
metaphysic of life that works against the political catastrophe that took place in the name of 
life and by means of technology.
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between organism-environment interaction and technological mediation. 
The axolotl will provide me with a literal lifeline for understanding certain 
aspects of French f ilm aesthetics in the 1950s that are closely connected to 
questions of evolution, development, and behavior.
Bazin’s understanding of the arts in the context of dynamic vital pro-
cesses and life-forms is part of a long tradition of French critical thought. 
Throughout the twentieth century, philosophy and cultural criticism in 
France have been deeply intertwined with the philosophy and history of 
life sciences, though this connection has not always been acknowledged 
or recognized, as Michel Foucault notes. Foucault argued that a central 
dividing line cuts through the various schools of the French intelligentsia 
of the post-war years:
[i]t is the line that separates a philosophy of experience, of sense and of 
subject and a philosophy of knowledge, of rationality and of concept. On 
the one hand, one network is that of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty; and then 
another is that of Cavaillès, Bachelard and Canguilhem. In other words, 
we are dealing with two modalities according to which phenomenology 
was taken up in France.10
Bazin certainly belongs to the former camp in this model, and yet we f ind 
in his work a strong aff inity to natural phenomena that points beyond 
a philosophy of the subject. In order to better grasp the peculiarities of 
Bazin’s thought, I am proposing a slightly different line alongside which 
to think about Bazin’s humanism, animalism, and materialism; namely, 
that of the divide caused by a Hegelianism (Alexandre Kojève, Jean Paul 
Sartre, etc.) that vehemently strove to distinguish itself from Bergsonism 
and neo-Kantianism. In Modern French Philosophy, Vincent Descombes 
presents Bergsonism as no more than an atavistic precursor to the neo-
Hegelianism that was to dominate French philosophy from the 1930s 
onward; that is, Bergsonism was the ‘unmodern’ belief of an older generation 
that belonged more to the nineteenth century than to the twentieth century 
(until Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari raised the stakes once again in 
the 1970s).11 Yet a closer look at Bazin’s writing reveals that he cannot be 
clearly allocated to one side or the other of this split between Bergsonism 
and neo-Hegelianism—that is, the split between ‘old’ and ‘modern’ French 
10 Michel Foucault, ‘Introduction’, 8.
11 See Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, 9-54. This otherwise very insightful history of 
philosophy is thus itself part of the tradition it describes.
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philosophy—but rather sits, with an existential discomfort appropriate to 
the post-war situation, on the dividing line, with an undercurrent of life-
philosophical thought sustaining and informing his thinking throughout 
his writing career and increasingly during his later years. Merleau-Ponty 
might be said to occupy a similar position, for not only was his inaugural 
lecture at the Collège de France in 1952 on Bergson, but he also turned to 
Bergson and nature-philosophy as he increasingly shifted his focus from 
phenomenology to ontology.12
Bazin’s indebtedness to Bergson expresses itself in two realms, which 
more or less correspond to two of Bergson’s major works. On the one hand, 
and most importantly, one can trace the influence on Bazin of Bergson’s evo-
lutionary theory, which the latter developed in Creative Evolution, and which 
emphasized notions of intellect, intuition, development, and sympathy. 
This work, corresponding to Bazin’s own interest in biology and the animal 
world, was highly influential for Bazin’s theory of the relationship between 
cinema and the other arts and his notion of an evolution of the cinematic 
image. On the other hand, Bazin was influenced by Bergson’s thesis that 
time must be understood as duration, a claim Bergson f irst articulated in 
Matter and Memory, and then took up again in Creative Evolution, argu-
ing there that duration must be understood as intrinsic to the organism 
as such. Bazin applied these theories to cinema, which he understood as 
an expression of continuous duration. However, in addition to the direct 
reception of Bergson by Bazin, there are many Bergsonian and other vitalist 
elements in Bazin’s writings that might have been f iltered through mediat-
ing f igures such as Teilhard de Chardin, Proust, and Merleau-Ponty, as well 
as other French f ilm theorists, such as Émile Vuillermoz.13 I suggest that 
we understand Bazin’s Bergsonism in the light of critical engagement with 
Bergson that grappled with the relationship of Bergson’s work to history 
and historical temporality, most notably Max Horkheimer’s critique of 
Bergson and Benjamin’s engagement with Bergson.14 This angle helps us 
12 On Merleau-Ponty’s inaugural lecture, see Taylor Carman and Mark Hansen, ‘Introduction’, 
3. The importance of Bergson and f igures such as J. W. Schelling and Jakob von Uexküll—both 
part of the German tradition of Lebensphilosophie—stands out in Merleau-Ponty’s lectures on 
nature from 1956-58; see Merleau-Ponty, Nature. See also Renaud Barbaras, ‘A Phenomenology 
of Life’, 206-30.
13 Teilhard de Chardin was a Catholic priest, heavily influenced by Bergson, who not only 
formulated what came to be the Catholic Church’s off icial stance on evolution, but was also an 
active paleontologist and geologist. Proust functions, for his part, as a reference point in Bazin’s 
discussion of memory in a text such as Bazin, ‘De Sica: Metteur en Scène’. 
14 See Max Horkheimer, ‘On Bergson’s Metaphysics of Time’; Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire’; Benjamin, The Arcades Project. On Benjamin and Bergson, see also Ilya Kliger, The 
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to understand the transformations of vitalist ideas in the wake of, and 
subsequent to, the experience of WWII and the holocaust.
The role of vitality for Bazin is most evident in his understanding of art 
forms as dynamic, quasi-living entities that are governed by laws that also 
apply to natural phenomena. Bazin believes in the fundamental vitality 
of cinema, painting, theater, and literature. He attributes to art forms an 
organic capacity for evolution, development, and interaction with other art 
forms—a medium’s historical genesis is, in Bazin’s writings, comparable 
to the phylogenetic development of a species. Throughout his essays on 
cinema, for example, Bazin imbues the medium with the capacity to evolve, 
adapt, react to other entities in certain habitats; remain in a ‘larval’ or 
‘embryonic’ state; and so forth. The number, consistency, and biological 
accuracy of Bazin’s attributions of life-like qualities to cinema make these 
more than mere metaphors; thinking of cinema as a living being guided 
Bazin’s approach to the question of realism, for example, cinema’s depend-
ency on historical conditions, and its interaction with theater, painting, 
and literature. Additionally, Bazin’s understanding of f ilms themselves, as 
experiential, time-based artworks, has vital connotations—he compares 
their effect to natural, growing phenomena (in his ‘Ontology’ essay) and 
ascribes to them an organic, dynamic temporality, rather than a mechanical 
one.15
Readers of Bazin’s essays are often struck by the wealth of allusions and 
references to realms that seem to have little or no connection to an aesthetic 
inquiry into the nature of cinema and the stylistic particularities of specif ic 
f ilms. For the most part, these references come from studies and observa-
tions in the natural sciences or from observations of nature itself. Bazin 
does not employ these natural facts as metaphors for cinema or a particular 
f ilm; rather, they are presented alongside or parallel to the characteristics 
of cinema or a particular f ilm, such that in his prose, descriptions of f ilms 
are juxtaposed to those of natural phenomena, mutually reinforming one 
Narrative Shape of Truth. See also Andrew and Joubert-Laurencin, eds., Opening Bazin, 65n.
15 In his famous essay on the ‘Ontology of the Photographic Image’, Bazin writes of photography 
that, since it does not entirely spring from man, it ‘affects us like a phenomenon in nature, like 
a f lower or a snowflake whose vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of their 
beauty.’ Not only are the f lower and the snowflake natural phenomena, but their appeal also 
comes from the fact that they are temporal; that is, subject to constant change. Moreover, 
their development is visible in their very form, both in the inorganic crystalline growth of 
the snowflake and the organic development of the f lower from its bud. This understanding of 
evolutionary time, one that includes both organic and inorganic phenomena, underwrites not 
only Bazin’s understanding of the temporality of f ilm(s), but also that of cinema as an art form. 
See Bazin, ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’, 13.
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another not on the basis of a causal or metaphorical connection, but solely 
on the basis of their ‘proximity’ in the text. Films and natural phenomena 
exist on the same plane in Bazin’s texts, such that the essays on cinema 
embed their subject in a larger context of natural phenomena and the 
scientif ic investigation of natural phenomena. Most frequently, Bazin’s 
references and allusions belong to biology, especially evolutionary biology, 
geology, or behavioral psychology. Thus, Dudley Andrew, who describes 
Bazin as ‘organicist’, is only partially right, since Bazin’s references include 
not only organic phenomena such as bees, dogs, and salamanders, but also 
non-organic phenomena such as bacteria, rivers, stones, and viruses.16 What 
unites all of these references is not organicism, but rather a phenomenologi-
cal interest in change, expression or expressivity, and force—in short, a 
very broadly understood conception of vitality that encompasses both the 
organic and the inorganic.
Two texts express these two vitalist elements in Bazin most forcefully. 
The two-part essay on ‘Theater and Cinema’, published in 1951 in Esprit, 
provides an introduction to the relationship between Bergson’s theories 
on evolutionary biology and Bazin’s theory of the interrelationship of the 
arts. It also introduces the f igure of the axolotl. Bazin’s essay on cinema 
and painting—’The Picasso Mystery: A Bergsonian Film’—picks up ideas 
about adaptation that he earlier developed and focuses on the question of 
temporality by fusing Bergsonism with existential phenomenology. These 
two articles provide several key ideas that allow for a deeper analysis of the 
precise nature of Bazin’s realism.
In Bazin’s two-part essay on ‘Theater and Cinema’, included in the f irst 
volume of What Is Cinema?, the axolotl is used to illustrate the relation 
between the two art forms. The axolotl functions like a prism in the texts, 
focusing and concentrating ideas of development, evolution, and temporal-
ity by inscribing them onto an animal body and reflecting them back onto 
various f ilms. In these essays, Bazin pursues two arguments. First, the 
comparison between cinema and theater allows him to distinguish the 
specif icity of the cinematic image. In contrast to the theater, in which 
everything revolves around the dramatic presence of man and his fate, such 
that centripetally, everything serves to illustrate the human drama, f ilm’s 
aesthetic is centrifugal and spirals outward. This description of f ilm seeks 
to capture certain qualities of the cinematic image, such as its openness, 
limitlessness, and the fact that it puts humans, animals, and environment 
on the same plane—everything in the image moves and is animated by 
16 See Andrew, André Bazin.
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the same technological spirit. This argument seems in agreement with a 
classical position in f ilm theory, namely that of the autonomy of cinema as 
an art form in its own right, one that needs to be ‘cleansed’ of the influences 
of theater as an established, bourgeois art form.
Yet in a second step, this distinction between theater and cinema for 
Bazin becomes the prerequisite for a mutual exchange between cinema and 
theater. By looking more closely at comedy, slapstick, and ‘f ilmed theater’, 
that is, theater plays adapted for cinema, Bazin introduces the idea of a 
co-evolution of theater and cinema in order to undo the idea that cinema has 
been developing autonomously and along a linear line of progress toward 
self-realization. Informing this point is the conviction that cinema, like any 
other art form (and any other living being, for that matter) does not come 
into its own and make use of its potentials through a process of isolation 
and purif ication, but rather by engaging in an ongoing exchange with its 
environment and other dynamic, ‘vital’ entities, including other forms of 
art such as theater. In the case of comedies like those of Chaplin, cinema 
‘offers more than the theater but only by going beyond it, by relieving it of 
its imperfections’.17 While both the acting style and dramatic structure 
of early slapstick f ilms come from a theatrical tradition, cinema is not 
restricted by time and space in the same way that theater is.18
In order to explain the relationship between theater and cinema in f ilms 
like slapstick or f ilmed theater, Bazin describes the state of dramatic situ-
ations in the theater as a ‘larval stage’ of dramatic possibilities in cinema: 
‘What makes it possible to believe that the cinema exists to discover or 
create a new set of dramatic facts is its capacity to transform theatrical 
situations that otherwise would never have reached their maturity.’ In 
order to explain this developmental allusion, Bazin turns to the axolotl 
(though not by name):
In Mexico there is a kind of salamander capable of reproduction at the 
larval stage and which develops no further. By injecting it with hormones, 
scientists have brought it to maturity. In like fashion we know that the 
17 Bazin, ‘Theater and Cinema’, 79.
18 Two aspects of Bazin’s theater essay are thus critically important: f irst, his break with 
‘myths’ and convenient (often simplif ied historical) reasoning in order to def ine an ontology 
of cinema against theater and other arts; and second, a def inition of ‘realism’ in cinema that 
subsumes technology and materiality under an aesthetic ontology. It is especially the second 
point—which, in some ways, is the consequence of the former—that sheds light on Bazin’s 
notion of the difference between cinematic and theatrical realities. These realities have to be 
understood as the expression of the living beings he understands art forms to be.
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continuity of animal evolution presented us with incomprehensible gaps 
until biologists discovered the laws of paidomorphosis from which they 
learnt not only to place embryonic forms in the line of evolution of the 
species but also to recognize that certain individuals, seemingly adult, 
have been halted in their evolutionary development.19
I am not sure to what extent Bazin knew of the popular scientif ic experi-
ments with the axolotls; whether he had heard Merleau-Ponty talk about 
the astonishing amphibian in his lectures, or had read Aldous Huxley’s 
1939 novel After Many a Summer (which was published in France in 1941), 
in which he recounts his brother Julian Huxley’s experiments and applies 
them to a human maturing into an ape. In any case, though, Bazin was 
tapping into a scientif ic reference with numerous reverberations among 
other cultural critics, poets, and philosophers.20
The axolotl was f irst introduced to Europe when 34 specimens were 
brought from Mexico to Paris in 1863, and six of these ended up at the Jardin 
des Plantes. Under the hands of zoologist Auguste Duméril, they quickly 
spawned into the hundreds. The animal was initially believed to be a very 
large newt whose main characteristics were anthropomorphic hands with 
free digits and ‘three large appendages on each side of the back of the head, 
fringed with f ilaments which, in their fullest development, remind one of 
black ostrich feathers’ (Fig. 4.1).21 Yet some axolotl of the third generation 
at the Jardin des Plantes developed into salamanders, thus revealing the 
axolotl to be in fact a larval stage of the salamander, albeit a larval stage in 
which it was nevertheless able to reproduce. The ability to mature sexually 
in the larval stage is an example of biological heterochrony; that is, a kind 
of ‘untimeliness’ in the temporal relationship of different developmental 
processes to one another. This larval maturity is called paedomorphosis, and 
is thought to occur in order to provide living beings with the evolutionary 
option of regression in order to adapt to certain circumstances. In the case 
of the axolotl, for example, the ample lakes around Mexico City allowed the 
axolotl to remain more comfortably in water over the course of its entire 
lifespan, rather than spending its adult life on land. As a consequence, it 
retained its larval body in adulthood; or, to put it the other way around, it 
19 Bazin, ‘Theater and Cinema’, 79.
20 André Breton included the axolotl in surrealism’s ‘coat of arms.’ Other allusions to the 
axolotl include, for example, a reference at the end of René Daumal, A Night of Serious Drinking; 
and Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Idea of Infancy’.
21 Anon., ‘Axolotl’, 69.
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acquired the capacity to reproduce prematurely. As Richard Dawkins points 
out, this heterochrony can be understood either as an acceleration of sexual 
maturity, or a slowing down of everything else relative to sexual maturity.22 
In 1913, Vilém Laufenberger in Germany injected an axolotl with a thyroid 
growth hormone and thus artif icially induced the animal to develop into 
its ‘adult’ stage as a salamander. A few years later, Julian Huxley, Aldous 
Huxley’s brother, repeated the experiment in England.
Bazin’s reference to the axolotl emphasizes that theater and cinema 
developed along a path that was neither straightforward nor monochrono-
logical, nor was it a path that was ‘natural’ and predetermined. First, the 
example of the axolotl highlights cinema’s potentiality: just as the axolotl 
possesses in nuce developmental potentials to evolve into different forms, 
so too are dramatic situations in cinema and in theater tied to one another 
as potentials. Second, it highlights the anti-determinist character of Bazin’s 
notion of development: just as the axolotl’s ‘evolutionary leap’ in the Jardin 
des Plantes was brought about by experimental intervention and interac-
tion, so too is cinema’s development of expressive possibilities brought 
about by means of its incorporation of theater. (However, Bazin foregoes 
22 Richard Dawkins, ‘The Axolotl’s Tale’, 316.
 
Fig. 4.1: the axolotl (ambystoma mexicanum) as depicted in auguste duméril, Annales Des 
Sciences Naturelles-Zoologie et Biologie Animale 7 (1867).
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the opportunity to comment on the colonialist implications of the forceful 
‘progression’ of a Mexican animal that was imported into France as a con-
sequence of French military occupation and repression in Mexico).23 And 
third, the animal reference highlights the necessity of seeing phenomena 
in context, as interconnected with other phenomena and reacting to a 
particular, changing environment. The organism in question is radically 
open: open to intervention, open in its potential, and open to environmental 
changes. Theater and cinema are, in this light, two expressions of the same 
animal Bazin calls ‘dramatic situations.’24
The axolotl thus provides a model organism that enables us to understand 
better how the slapstick f ilms Bazin initially cites, such as Onésime Horloger 
(Jean Durand and Louis Feuillade, France 1912), rely on the interaction of 
theater and cinema. This f ilm begins with a theatrical mise en scène in which 
the main character (played by Ernest Bourbon) and his dilemma—an inher-
itance to which he will only gain access in twenty years—are introduced. 
Onésime addresses the audience f irst in hand-wringing despair and then, 
after reading a clock-making treatise, in resolute excitement: he will change 
the pneumatic regulating clock to make time faster. The central regulating 
clock office itself is a chaotic place full of apparatuses and criss-cross wiring. 
With a few crude mechanical manipulations using a big hammer, Onésime 
accomplishes his task and somersaults over the suspended wires in a last 
farewell of the theatrical body to technological power. As soon as he has 
exited the frame, time-lapse speeds up the f ingers of the clock and the 
regime of ‘fast time’ begins—and thus, the cinematic regime of manipulated 
time that transfers the comic and uncanny from bodily performance to 
bodies subjected to technologically accelerated motion.
In this self-ref lexive narrative, Onésime’s pounding hammer visual-
izes the injection that brings about the hormonal leap to a new state and 
therefore not only makes use of cinema’s exponentiation of the theater, 
but also makes it an integral part of the narrative, thus continuing in the 
tradition of George Méliès’ f ilms. The majority of the f ilm is concerned 
with the attraction of time-lapse photography and repeats, in fact, the 
23 Christian Reiß has outlined the ways in which the history of the axolotl as a scientif ic 
subject is intertwined with histories of colonialization, and has tied this latter history to shifts 
of scientif ic paradigms (from natural history to taxonomy to biology and genetics). See Christian 
Reiß, ‘The Acclimatization of a Model Organism’.
24 Tom Conley also recently used the image of the axolotl to elucidate Bazin’s understanding of 
evolution. However, he misunderstands the biological image of neoteny and interprets cinema 
to be the hormone that is injected into theater. See Tom Conley, ‘Evolution and Event in Qu’est-ce 
que le cinéma?’. 
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very scenes that formed the subject of the most popular early f ilms by 
the Lumière brothers, Edison and others: street scenes, the execution of 
justice, family life, and construction. The comic effect of sped-up motion 
either simply makes movement look funny, as in the street scenes, or is 
amplif ied by additional tricks, as in the case of the rapid transformation of 
a baby joyously shaken by his mother into a man in baby clothes bouncing 
up and down, still held by his mother’s arms. Onésime Horloger conjoins 
the cinematic spectacle of time manipulation and surprising tricks with a 
meta-narrative that proclaims that real time is passing fast and movement 
is really faster—movement is determining time, but movement itself is 
determined by the cinematographic apparatus. The delight on the part of 
the spectator is doubled: it is not only pleasure in the spectacle, but also 
in the mind-bending reconciliation and disjuncture of fast movement and 
regular time. Onésime Horloger is not simply a f ilm that thrives on the 
superior possibilities of f ilm over theater and thus proves itself dominant; 
cinematic possibilities communicate with theatrical potential and expand 
the dramatic expression in the interaction.
Similarly, the representative ‘f ilmed theater’ f ilms Bazin discusses in the 
main part of the essay—Laurence Olivier’s Henry V (1944) and Jean Cocteau’s 
Les Parents terribles (1948)—are not a ‘cinematization’ of theater, that is, 
they are not an adaptation, but instead constitute examples of f ilms that 
enhance the theatrical intention with new cinematic means. Cinema does 
not occupy theatrical territory, but rather puts its potential with respect to 
time (durée), dramatic effect (words vs. camera), and décor (artif iciality vs. 
realism) in the service of the dramatic situation expounded by the theatrical 
play.25 The dramatic situation is the organism, the axolotl, which might 
change its phenotype from newt to salamander, theater to cinema; a change 
that might result in new potential, environments, movement, and behavior, 
but it will remain the same living entity.26
25 In science, model organisms (such as E. coli, mice, or fruit f lies) are species that have 
become experimental defaults on the basis of their specif ic qualities, such as easy maintenance, 
quick generational turnover, hardiness, genetic makeup, or responsiveness to experimental 
treatments, and which often allow conclusions to be drawn about human biology. The axolotl 
has been a model organism since the early twentieth century and is especially interesting for 
researchers due to its regenerative capacities.
26 In that sense, Bazin’s reference to the axolotl presents one step further (phenotypical, rather 
than genotypical differences) from his discussion of mixing of the arts as ‘cross-breeding’ in his 
essay ‘In Defense of Mixed Cinema’: ‘There are fruitful cross-breedings which add to the qualities 
derived from the parents; there are attractive but barren hybrids and there are likewise hideous 
combinations that bring forth nothing but chimeras’. Bazin, ‘In Defense of Mixed Cinema’, 61.
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This understanding of the relationship between theater and cinema 
casts aside both essentialist def initions of cinema and ontological prede-
terminations. Films like Henry V, Les Parents terribles, Alfred Hitchcock’s 
Rope (1948), William Wyler’s The Little Foxes (1941), Orson Welles Macbeth 
(1948), and Olivier’s other productions such as Hamlet (1948) all highlight 
their theatrical origins and make use of cinematic means to push theater 
further, rather than push against theater. Henry V manages this balance 
by showing a theater performance of Henry V in Shakespeare’s day. (Cin-
ematic) realism and (theatrical) illusion enhance rather than oppose one 
another, since f ilmic indexicality and mediated performance function as 
an exponentiation of theatrical presence and performance. Jean Cocteau’s 
Les Parents terribles, by comparison, uses camera and montage to increase 
the realism of the original stage melodrama by depicting cramped rooms 
and the fast rhythm of attention. Moreover, Cocteau translates the situation 
of the theatrical spectator into a cinematic equivalent by shooting from 
the perspective of an invisible observer—that is, employing a framing 
and focus dictated by spectatorial interest—and thus emphasizes the 
‘quasi-obscenity’ of viewing. Cinema increases the theatricality by using 
its means in the service of theater. For Bazin, Cocteau’s f ilm represents a 
trend of moving away from adaptation and toward ‘staging a play by means 
of cinema’.27 ‘“Canned theater” […] has certainly taken on a new lease of 
life’ – like the axolotl who, thanks to a hormonal boost, leaves the water 
and crawls on land, moving just as elegantly in the air as it had in the water.
Cinema’s Milieu
Scientif ic inquiries into the axolotl’s capacities for transformation invari-
ably reflected on the animal’s adaptability to the conditions in its environ-
ment, namely the water level in the lakes of Xochimilco in Mexico City, the 
axolotl’s natural habitat. While Xochimilco once provided so much water 
that the axolotl could comfortably remain in the water throughout its life 
cycle, the area had since been incorporated into the growing metropolis, its 
lakes had been drained to enable intensive agriculture, and artif icial canals 
contained the last remains of the former water reservoir.28 Bazin’s example 
of artif icial hormone injections to raise the thyroid hormones that regulate 
the axolotl’s metamorphosis are indicative of the artificiality that surrounds 
27 Bazin, ‘Theater and Cinema’, 92-93.
28 Reiß, Uwe Hoßfeld and Lennart Olsson, ‘150 Jahre Axolotl’.
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its modern life conditions: critically endangered, wild axolotls have not been 
found for years—yet as lab animal and aquarium pet, they are ubiquitous 
and can be bought for a few dollars. Even the import of the axolotl to Europe 
had been in the name of the Société Zoologique d’Acclimatation in Paris, 
one of many international acclimatization societies dedicated to studying 
the successful transfer of plants, animals, and humans from one area to 
another, in particular from non-European (colonial) regions to Europe.29
Just as the axolotl’s hybridity can serve to illustrate the dynamic concep-
tion of the interrelationship between the arts in Bazin’s work, the question 
raised by the axolotl’s organic development and behavioral patterns il-
luminates Bazin’s understanding of the internal development of a particular 
art form. Similar to scientif ic studies that analyzed the dependence of the 
axolotl’s development on its milieu, Bazin’s ‘The Evolution of the Language 
of Cinema’ engaged in a parallel inquiry into the dependence of f ilm style on 
the political and cultural milieu. As I have noted in earlier chapters, milieu 
theory had been an important aspect of both biology and cultural theory in 
France, especially in the work of Auguste Comte, Hyppolite Taine, Claude 
29 Ibid., 189; see also Iris Borowy, ‘Akklimatisierung’.
 
Fig. 4.2: an axolotl in an aquarium.
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Bernard, and Émile Zola. During the 1940s and 1950s, Georges Canguilhem 
in particular—following Canguilhem, Merleau-Ponty, and others—turned 
to the concept of milieu and redefined it.30 In keeping with his conception 
of the coevolution of theater and cinema, Bazin views the evolution of the 
language of cinema itself not as a unilinear path toward perfection, but as 
the formal and technical coevolution of different impulses or forces, which 
seek ever-new (and in this sense always temporary) ‘well-balanced stage[s] 
of maturity’.31 The form and expression of both art and animal depend on 
the conditions of the environment: social, biological, and historical. If water 
becomes scarce, or living conditions too overcrowded, the axolotl adapts 
by changing its form.
For Bazin, the evolution of f ilm style is dependent upon the interaction 
and interdependence of f ilm’s milieu and f ilm’s internal development. This 
development happens within a f ield defined by two poles, one of which may 
take precedence over the other in certain conditions: on the one hand, the 
impulse to privilege the image and, on the other, the impulse to privilege 
reality. The terms seem confusing—is cinema not made up of images? Yet 
Bazin restricts his notion of image to ‘everything that the representation on 
the screen adds to the object there represented’, namely ‘plasticity’—that 
is, arrangement, framing, performance, cinematography—and montage.32 
Cinema, for him, is thus image plus reality; or, rather, cinema is a kind of 
image that is real, as in Bergson’s def inition of objects as image in Matter 
and Memory.33 Interestingly, Bazin argues that the advent of sound did 
not constitute a major event that upset the equilibrium of forces. Rather, 
it was the introduction of a new ‘subject matter’ that brought about a 
change in style between 1940 and 1950. Bazin describes this subject matter 
as ‘self-effacement before reality’, which we might call, more precisely, a 
new attitude toward matter—one that allows form to free itself from its 
subservience to the f ilm’s content or subject.34 The image Bazin uses to 
describe this dynamic development is the equilibrium-prof ile of a river. 
30 Canguilhem’s seminal essay ‘The Living and Its Milieu’, for example, was based on his 
lectures from 1946-7 and was published in French in 1952. See Canguilhem, ‘The Living and Its 
Milieu’.
31 Bazin, ‘The Evolution of the Language of Cinema’, 29.
32 Ibid., 24.
33 See Bergson, Matter and Memory, 10-11: ‘[B]y “image” we mean a certain existence which 
is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, and less than that which the realist 
calls a thing. . . . the object exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself, pictorial, 
as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image.’
34 Bazin, ‘The Evolution of the Language of Cinema’, 29. On form and content, see Bazin, ‘In 
Defense of Mixed Cinema’, 74.
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The forces of the water and the resistance of the geological strata struggle 
against one another, thereby literally in-forming one another, until the river 
flows in a settled bed. Any changes in waterflow or geology will cause a 
change in the riverbed, until a new equilibrium is reached.
While Bazin equates cinema’s new subject matter with a ‘vast stirring of 
the geological bed of cinema’, he never hints at what caused the stirring.35 It 
seems beyond question that this stir was created by the war and its political, 
social, physical, and psychological toll. It is, however, important to note that 
Bazin avoids direct ascriptions of cause and effect. In an essay on danger, 
suffering, and death entitled ‘Cinema and Exploration’, Bazin says of a 
f ilm that ‘the camera is there like the veil of Veronica pressed to the face 
of human suffering’.36 According to the medieval legend of St Veronica, she 
wiped the blood and sweat off Jesus’ face on the Via Dolorosa and her veil 
retained the image of Jesus’ face—an acheiropoieton (an image not made 
by human hands), like the photographic image. Similarly, the evolution 
of f ilm style functions like a veil, or screen, pressed to the face of reality. 
This is the double function of the veil and the screen: simultaneously to 
reveal and to conceal. Stanley Cavell has described the screen’s function 
thus: it ‘screens me from the world it holds—that is, makes me invisible. 
And it screens that world from me—that is, screens its existence from me. 
That the projected world does not exist (now) is its only difference from 
reality’.37 For Cavell, the screen introduces a separation between subject and 
world. Bazin, by contrast, emphasizes mediated contact. The form of a f ilm 
mediates reality—reality can only become visible through mediation, and 
this is how film can bring us into contact with the world. Developing, living 
creatures are not isolated from the world, as in a skeptical worldview, but 
have the world inscribed into their bodies in the form of their development.
When Bazin returns to the image of the riverbed in ‘In Defense of Mixed 
Cinema’, he focuses on the complex (and contradictory) ways in which 
cinema interacts with its environment, namely other arts:
Like those rivers which have finally hollowed out their beds and have only 
the strength left to carry their waters to the sea, without adding one single 
grain of sand to their banks, the cinema approaches its equilibrium-
prof ile. The days are gone when it was enough to ‘make cinema’ in 
order to deserve well of the seventh art. While we wait until color or 
35 Bazin, ‘The Evolution of the Language of Cinema’, 37.
36 Bazin, ‘Cinema and Exploration’, 163.
37 Cavell, The World Viewed, 24.
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stereoscopy provisionally return its primacy to form and create a new 
cycle of aesthetic erosion, on the surface cinema has no longer anything 
to conquer. There remains for it only to irrigate its banks, to insinuate 
itself between the arts among which it has so swiftly carved out its val-
leys, subtly to invest them, to inf iltrate the subsoil, in order to excavate 
invisible galleries. The time of resurgence of a cinema newly independent 
of novel and theater will return. But it may then be because novels will 
be written directly onto f ilm. As it awaits the dialectic of the history of 
art which will restore to it this desirable and hypothetical autonomy, the 
cinema draws into itself the formidable resources of elaborated subjects 
amassed around it by neighboring arts during the course of the centuries. 
It will make them its own because it has need of them and we experience 
the desire to rediscover them by way of the cinema.38
Film theorists and historians often focus on ‘new cycle[s] of erosion’, that 
is, times in which the form of f ilm draws attention to itself due to new 
advances in technology. But while nothing seems to happen on the surface 
during times of formal-technological stability, underground inf iltration, 
and excavation continue the play of forces, changing the river’s structure 
almost imperceptibly. The river incorporates and makes use of the matter 
of other arts. The force of its water uncovers hidden structures in the 
geographical layers, and like a negative imprint, the water f ills hollows it 
has carved out. Like the f low of the river, the axolotl’s development will 
respond to changes in its environment. The axolotl highlights what is 
slightly more diffuse in the image of the riverbed: that bodily expression, 
or form, or style, is a result of the interaction between the conditions of 
the environment and the potential, or potential futures, inherent in the 
present organism. The body in its manifest expression, as a phenotype, 
ref lects, like the negative imprint on St Veronica’s veil, the environment. 
‘Imprinting’, however, is not a determinist process that privileges nurture 
over nature; rather, the environment interacts with the organism, such 
that the latter takes certain paths and not others, privileging certain 
elements, strands, and futures. Similarly, in Bazin’s essay, there are a 
number of f ilms such as Citizen Kane (Orson Welles, 1941) or Rossellini’s 
Paisà (1946) that seize upon one of cinema’s innate potentials, namely its 
quality of ‘revealing’ reality. This potential had been there in nuce—and 
had appeared in the earlier work of F.W. Murnau, Erich Stroheim and 
Jean Renoir—but only now, in the new dynamic set in play between the 
38 Bazin, ‘In Defense of Mixed Cinema’, 74-75
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geopolitical stirrings of the war and cinematic style, does this realist ten-
dency come to full expression. This development f inds perfect expression 
in the axolotl, which reaches maturation as larval stage in suff iciently wet 
conditions, in a movement that is simultaneously regression and evolution, 
and thus the coming into being of something new by means of a ‘folding’.39
Sergei Eisenstein, who was highly interested in regression, also picked 
up on the axolotl’s heterochrony. Eisenstein detects a ‘dialectic polarity’ 
between ‘regression’ and ‘progress’ in every work of art, linking artworks 
to both ‘the deepest layer of emotional thinking’ and ‘the highest peaks 
of consciousness.’ In the essays written for Metod, this ‘deepest layer’ 
encompasses for Eisenstein not only thinking-feeling, but extends to 
those organic, psychological and social states more generally that are 
characterized by a ‘synthethic, unif ied, undifferentiated state,’ including 
androgyny, prelogical thinking, protoplasmaticity, and archaic commu-
nism.40 Throughout the history of the arts, traces of these ‘deepest layers’ 
can be detected. It is in this context that he references the axolotl in his 
Notes for a General History of Cinema. In a section guided by the heading 
‘“The Dynamic Panoptikum [German for ‘wax museum’ or ‘cabinet of 
curiosities’, I.P.]]”—connection with Dionysia and Mystery plays,’ Eisen-
stein discusses the Oberammergau Passion Play, which strikes him as an 
original form of ‘the tradition of the guild plays of antiquity,’ in this case 
‘still surviving in a (relatively) untouched form (like axolotl ambystoma – a 
phenomenon that lived into our own time, having preserved in one crea-
ture’s biography the transformation from the stage of branchia to the stage 
of lungs, i.e. to [the era] of its emergence from water).’41 Similar to Bazin’s 
reference to the axolotl, Eisenstein views the animal as an embodiment 
of certain characteristics of artworks—in this case, not only the achro-
nistic retainment of an ancient form into the current time, but also the 
39 In his essay on Bazin’s understanding of evolution, Conley convincingly links this under-
standing to Gilles Deleuze’s conception of the event in Deleuze, The Fold. Deleuze explains the 
event with the image of Napoleon’s soldiers being confronted with a pyramid in the Egyptian 
desert. As soon as they see the pyramid, with a shudder they realize that it has been there for a 
long time, and a different temporality cuts across their being, uprooting and questioning their 
endeavor. Likewise, for Bazin, through f ilm, and facilitated by f ilm’s long takes and deep focus, 
‘one can move into the world and let the world enter the geography of one’s body: a feeling of 
space and being is grasped, and so also an intimation of an open-ended totality of things’. Both 
geological and aesthetic evolution ‘belong to a greater “life of forms” that includes those of the 
earth’s crust, the living organism, and also the seven arts’. See Conley, ‘Evolution and Event in 
Qu’est-ce que le cinéma?’, 39.
40 See Somaini, ‘Cinema as “Dynamic Mummif ication,”‘ 44.
41 Eisenstein, ‘Dynamic Mummif ication,’ 175.
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preservation in an individual body of a transformation that recapitulates 
species development. Eisenstein’s reference to the axolotl thus highlights 
his interest in the idea of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny; a popular idea 
in the late nineteenth century, thanks to Engels’ Dialectics of Nature and 
Ernst Haeckel’s The Riddle of the Universe, and which, as Antonio Somaini 
explains, had already been transferred to art history by Alois Riegl and 
Heinrich Wölff lin.42
While Eisenstein’s reference to the axolotl focuses less on environmental 
conditions and more on the embodiment of phylogenetic qualities, he nev-
ertheless shares with Bazin an emphasis, qua axolotl, on cinema’s unfixed 
form and its interrelation with other arts, across time and space. Somaini’s 
summary of Eisenstein’s understanding of cinema as ‘synthesis of the arts’ 
resounds Bazin in many ways:
Eisenstein never considered cinema a medium that had reached a 
f inal and def initive form. Rather, cinema was for him a constantly 
evolving set of elements and techniques, each one of which opened up 
new ‘possibilities’ that needed to be explored in order to produce art 
forms increasingly capable of exerting a powerful inf luence on their 
spectators.43
In order to highlight the interesting confluence of the axolotl as organic 
emblem for a constantly evolving cinema for both Bazin and Eisenstein, 
the specif icity of Bazin’s approach can further be usefully distinguished 
from Giorgio Agamben’s more recent use of the f igure of the axolotl. 
Whereas for Bazin, the emergence of new expressions of an animal’s body 
or of an art form is historically and culturally specif ic, Giorgio Agamben 
has looked to the axolotl for universal ontological conditions of relating 
to the world. Bazin insists that one needs to tie the emergence of new 
organic expressions—that is, the emergence of meaning—to the organic 
and environmental circumstances in the animal’s case, and, in the case of 
cinema, to social, historical, and technological conditions, and to cinema’s 
interaction with other art forms. Agamben, by contrast, uses the axolotl 
in a short essay in Ideas of Prose to think about what distinguishes the 
human being from other living beings. Like Bazin, Agamben makes use 
of the axolotl’s paedomorphosis to think about time and development. Yet 
42 Somaini, ‘Cinema as “Dynamic Mummif ication,” 37-38.
43 Ibid., 50.
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Agamben takes the axolotl’s eternal state of infancy as a starting point to 
imagine an infant that
does not merely keep to its larval environment and retain its own im-
mature form, but is, as it were, so completely abandoned to its own state 
of infancy, and so little specialized and so totipotent that it rejects any 
specif ic destiny and any determined environment in order to hold on to 
its immaturity and helplessness.44
While other animals are attuned to a specif ic environment and are bound 
to the ‘Law’—that is, to what has been written in their genetic code—this 
axolotlian infant is able to remain open; rather than being cast into a 
specif ic environment, he is cast into a world.45 Agamben links the open 
potential of the axolotl to language, to the capacity for naming things, 
which precedes values and concepts. This potential and active engage-
ment with the world seems to bear a close relationship to Bazin’s—and, 
as we will see, to Merleau-Ponty’s—reference to the axolotl’s active 
developmental response to environmental conditions. However, as will 
become clear from my reading of Bazin through Merleau-Ponty below, the 
openness of the axolotl’s body is exactly what makes it deviate not only 
from an anthropological machine—a mechanism that introduces the split 
between human and animal—that characterizes Agamben’s essay, but 
also simplistic distinctions between natural and unnatural, organic and 
inorganic. In fact, what the axolotl opens for Bazin and Merleau-Ponty is 
a separation between the organism and the unitary whole, a separation 
we can think of in two ways: either by saying that the axolotlian organism 
encompasses inorganic environmental inf luences and thus transcends 
traditional understandings of organicity, or by seeing the axolotlian 
organism as part of an assemblage that includes environmental factors. 
It is this latter sense that connects the thought f igure (Denkfigur) of 
the axolotl not only to Uexküll’s Umwelt theory, but also to a Stimmung 
aesthetic that aspires to an open image—open to the off-screen, open to 
the spectator, and open to letting reality shimmer through the texture 
of the screen.
44 Agamben, ‘The Idea of Infancy’, 96.
45 This essay is, in many ways, a precursor to Agamben’s The Open: Man and Animal, which 
was published seven years later. ‘The Idea of Infancy’ already draws upon the ideas that are 
foundational for Agamben’s discussion of the anthropological machine he develops in the later 
text, especially Heidegger’s distinction of Welt and Umwelt, which he in turn got from Uexküll. 
See Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal.
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Life and the Temporalities of Film and Painting
So far, I have used the axolotl as an instantiation of Bazin’s notion of cinema 
and art forms more generally. The axolotl’s body and its bodily potential 
have served as a screen that makes visible how Bazin correlates the develop-
ment of art with organic development. In what follows, I would like to 
pursue this constellation one step further. The axolotl’s development and 
behavior also illuminate the properties of f ilm in Bazin’s work, and aspects 
of cinematic temporality in particular. How to map the animal onto art, 
and onto f ilm in particular, becomes clearer in Merleau-Ponty’s ‘Nature’ 
lectures from 1956-58, which were to comprise the f inal part of The Visible 
and the Invisible. In order to grasp the temporal implications of Bergson’s 
philosophy of nature and Uexküll’s understanding of environment as part of 
life, Merleau-Ponty turns to studies of the successive evolution of the axolotl 
and the impact of this evolution on the step-by-step process of the animal’s 
learning how to swim. Bazin had referenced the axolotl to support his claim 
that ‘cinema exists to discover or create a new set of dramatic facts’; for 
Merleau-Ponty, the axolotl’s behavioral development proves exactly this, 
the discovery of the new ‘out of itself’, as a quality inherent to the animal.
Merleau-Ponty is interested in the axolotl because the embryonic devel-
opment of its organism seems to anticipate how it needs to behave in order 
to function in a changing environment. The development of nervous and 
sensuous tissue—that is, its innervation, to use a term central to Walter 
Benjamin’s theory of cinema—as well as the development of muscular 
tissue appear to happen in accord with the organism’s need for certain types 
of movement in the water and on land.46 In the beginning, for example, 
the axolotl’s legs can only move in accord with the trunk, which results 
in an S-shaped movement necessary for swimming; only then do the legs 
begin to move independently, enabling eff icient movement on land – as 
though the organism as a whole foresaw the change in its milieu: ‘the 
maturation of the organism and the emergence of behavior are one and 
the same thing. For the axolotl, to exist from head to tail and to swim are 
the same thing’.47 There is thus a dynamic relationship between organic 
development, behavior, and environment that can be explained neither by 
the preformationist idea that all potential of the organism is already present 
in the embryo in nuce, nor by positivist, teleological interpretations that 
46 On Walter Benjamin and innervation, see Hansen, ‘Benjamin and Cinema’.
47 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 144.
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see everything that happens in, with, and to the body as a consequence of 
goal-oriented behavior.
It is this open f ield constituted by the interaction between body and 
environment, at every step of the axolotl’s development, that for Merleau-
Ponty has the quality of a kind of interrogative being. Merleau-Ponty speaks 
of the ‘problems’ that the axolotl solves: it ‘“transfers” the solution from 
the problem posited by its displacement in water to the problem posited 
by its displacement on land’.48 This dynamic understanding of organism 
and behavior allows Merleau-Ponty to apply a Bergsonian notion of time 
to the axolotl. According to Bergson, the organism—that is, the medium 
of life—is capable of bringing something new into being, since it does not 
just passively react to changing conditions, but rather carries within itself 
a ‘reference to the future’; in other words, it exists to produce the new. 
Likewise, Merleau-Ponty says about the axolotl that ‘there is the future in 
every present, because its present is in a state of imbalance’.49 There is an 
openness, or a negativity, that is part of organic life: in the present, there 
is an absence of meaning that is only yet to come. This meaning to come 
is the result of the organism’s temporality and evolution in the interaction 
with its environment. Any living being capable of complex reactions that 
go beyond a mere stimulus-response schema creates meaning by reacting 
to its Umwelt. Life, for Merleau-Ponty, is expression, that is why to live and 
to swim is the same thing for the axolotl.
With an instructive reference to the telephone, Merleau-Ponty transfers 
the axolotl’s behavior and developments to technology: ‘The organism is not 
just a telephone switchboard. In order to understand it, we must include in 
it the inventor or operator of the telephone: we could say that the axolotl 
is a telephone which invents and maneuvers itself.’50 An animal might be 
subject to mechanical, physico-chemical laws, but these are not suff icient 
to account for the dynamic whole. The axolotl thus provides us with a model 
for technological media according to which media have such mobility and 
self-direction that their content will always be subject to the medium’s 
own transformation—a transformation embedded in its historical and 
cultural environment.
From his discussion of the axolotl’s development, Merleau-Ponty draws 
conclusions for life in general and proposes an understanding of life as 
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[t]he directing principle is neither before nor behind; it’s a phantom, it is 
the axolotl, all the organs of which would be the trace; it’s the hollowed-
out design of a certain style of action, which would be that of maturation; 
the arising of a need would be there before that which will f ill it. It is not 
a positive being, but an interrogative being which def ines life. . . From 
the moment when the animal swims, there will be life, a theater, on the 
condition that nothing interrupts this adhesion of the multiple. It is a 
dimension that will give meaning to its surroundings.51
Life creates needs, like hollows, which are then (ful-)filled by developmental 
exchange with the environment. Every need, every hollow, creates an open-
ing that in turn adds a new possibility or reality to whatever is given in a 
behavior—or in an image.52 An organism (or a f ilm) does not predetermine 
the function of the parts, as a teleological principle, but rather has to be 
understood as a project that outlines possible futures.
 An understanding of the activity of life as outlining possible futures 
returns us not only to Bergson’s notion of duration, but also to Bazin’s 
discussion of f ilm and Bergson. In Bazin’s 1956 essay on Henri-Georges 
Clouzot’s The Mystery of Picasso (a f ilm that, incidentally, Merleau-Ponty 
also references in his lectures on the axolotl, Bergson, and time), Bazin links 
the evolution of cinema and painting to an ontology that encompasses both 
media, focusing on their inherent temporalities.53 The Mystery of Picasso 
is a f ilm, Bazin writes, that does not ‘explain’ Picasso, but rather ‘shows’ 
him, in a description or exhibition that benefits from the translation of one 
medium, painting, onto another, f ilm. Clouzot f ilmed Picasso in the process 
of painting; however, rather than depicting Picasso painting, the film screen 
is, with the exception of a few black-and-white interludes of conversation 
with Picasso, coincident with the canvas. This canvas, however, is transpar-
ent and f ilmed from behind, so that what we see are the lines and dots 
produced by Picasso’s pen or brush touching the canvas, without seeing 
the utensil or Picasso’s hand themselves. As a consequence of this visual 
strategy, what emerges from the f ilm is not only the ‘creative evolution’ of 
a painting, but creative evolution as the temporal condition not only of 
painting and cinema, but life in general. For Bazin, this f ilm thus brings 
51 Ibid., 155-56.
52 Ibid., 151.
53 See ibid., 154: ‘Let’s take as an example the f ilm on Picasso, or the one on Matisse. In the 
f irst case, we do not see the hand of the artist, so the effect of the miracle is quite superfluous 
because even without it, there is a miraculous character: there is a double impression, the 
impression of the unforeseeability of touch and an impression of logic.’
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out one of cinema’s basic properties: to express duration as an ontological 
condition of life.
The temporal character of painting had already served Bergson as a 
model for the temporality of life:
The f inished portrait is explained by the features of the model, by the 
nature of the artist, by the colors spread out on the palette; but, even 
with the knowledge of what explains it, no one, not even the artist, could 
have foreseen exactly what the portrait would be, for to predict it would 
have been to produce it before it was produced—an absurd hypothesis 
which is its own refutation. Even so with regard to the moments of our 
life, of which we are the artisans. Each of them is a kind of creation. And 
just as the talent of the painter is formed or deformed—in any case, is 
modif ied—under the very influence of the work he produces, so each 
of our states, at the moment of its issue, modif ies our personality, being 
indeed the new form that we are just assuming.54
The f inished artwork can be explained by its constitutive elements a 
posteriori; however, we have grasped nothing of its creation if we do not 
include the process of the painting’s becoming. Likewise, Bazin takes the 
‘unpredictability’ of the next stroke due to Clouzot’s mise en scène (and to 
Picasso’s mode of painting)—that is, the ‘suspense’ of the f ilm—as an index 
for two things. First, this unpredictability unites painting, f ilm, and specta-
tor in a temporality in which nothing is pre-determined, since every new 
brushstroke grows out of a whole which is in a constant state of becoming; 
‘[e]ach of Picasso’s strokes is a creation that leads to further creation, not as a 
cause leads to an effect, but as one living thing engenders another […] What 
Clouzot at last reveals is the painting itself, i.e., a work that exists in time, 
that has its own duration, its own life.’55 As in Merleau-Ponty’s description 
of the axolotl—and Bazin’s own image of the riverbed—each brushstroke 
appearing on the screen is a question with several possible answers, the 
formation of a problem to which there are a number of solutions, the defini-
tion of a hollow that can be f illed in various ways.
Out of this open path of the painting’s creation, there follows a second 
point. Bazin also explains that this unpredictability ‘implies the inexpli-
cability of the compound—in this case the composition—by the simple 
54 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 6-7.
55 Bazin, ‘A Bergsonian Film’, 212.
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isolation of its elements’.56 He emphasizes the organic nature of the work, for 
which mechanical explanations of cause and effect are not sufficient and in 
which the whole is always of a different nature than the sum of its parts. By 
adding a stroke, the whole is changed and a new set of possible futures opens 
up. In ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’, Merleau-Ponty takes 
up this point around the same time in a reference to François Campaux’s 
f ilm Henri Matisse from 1946:
There are two sides to the act of painting: the spot or line of color put 
on a point of the canvas, and its effect on the whole, which is incom-
mensurable with it, since it is almost nothing yet suff ices to change a 
portrait or a landscape [...] [Matisse] did not have in his mind’s eye all the 
gestures possible, and in making his choice he did not have to eliminate 
all but one. It is slow motion which enumerates the possibilities. Matisse, 
set within a man’s time and vision, looked at the still open whole of his 
work in progress and brought his brush toward the line which called 
for it in order that the painting might f inally be that which it was in the 
process of becoming.57
The f ilm’s slow motion made visible the possibilities, the freedom of 
choice, that preceded the actual stroke—the brush is seen in ‘a solemn 
and expanding time—the imminence of a world’s time’—as it tries ‘ten 
possible movements, dance[s] in front of the canvas, brush[es] it lightly 
several times, and crash[es] down f inally like a lightning stroke upon the 
one line necessary’.
While Merleau-Ponty also uses a f ilm about painting-as-process to think 
about the relationship between part and whole in duration (in order to 
improve our understanding of it with respect to expressive speech), he of 
course pays less attention to the consequences of his observations for the 
medium of cinema. Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty is interested in what it is 
the f ilm reveals about the interaction between Matisse, ‘set within a man’s 
time and vision’ and equipped with human ‘perception and gesture’, and 
the painting. He does not conceive of f ilm as having an intrinsic aff inity 
to duration. Yet implicit in his argument is the idea—which he might have 
derived from an earlier essay by Bazin himself—that in cinematic slow-
motion new possibilities appear, new choices become visible, broadening 
the spectrum of choices humans can see before them. This new wealth of 
56 Ibid., 211.
57 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’, 46-47.
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choices, however, does not exceed the choices that are actually available to 
the human being (Matisse is not able to produce other strokes or paintings 
in slow-motion), but it brings these choices, which were previously invisible 
and imperceptible (even though executed by the body), into visibility and 
consciousness.58
For Bazin, by contrast, f ilm is necessary to link the durational nature 
of painting to the duration of the spectator, and ‘only f ilm could make us 
see duration itself ’—duration as the creative temporality of becoming, 
which in Matisse became visible in the hand’s half-begun movements and 
hesitation, and in The Picasso Mystery in the suspense of the appearance of 
lines.59 By means of a co-evolutionary movement similar to that of theater 
and cinema in the theater essay, f ilm becomes ‘pure’; that is, it comes into its 
own by means of submitting itself to another art form. The Picasso Mystery 
is (almost entirely) reduced to the temporality of creation, and receives its 
‘dramatic’ impulses only from the uncertainty of what the next stroke will 
bring. The suspense of the next brushstroke, in other words, replaces any 
dramatic suspense and reduces it to the ‘pure waiting and uncertainty’ that 
is creation.60 Yet what this combination of painting with f ilm reveals is that 
artistic creation is, in turn, essentially cinematic in its temporal nature; the 
spectacle of creation consists in ‘the appearance of free forms in a nascent 
state’ and thus places this f ilm in a line with the animations of Émile Cohl 
and Norman McLaren.61
This contingency of free forms in a nascent state, where one form brings 
the next form into being along an undetermined path—that is, neither a 
teleological, nor a mechanist, but an organic-evolutionary conception that 
def ies holism by emphasizing an openness to external impulses—also 
lies at the base of Bazin’s love of Italian neorealism. Indeed, love is a term 
he frequently uses to describe the treatment of people, things, and events 
in neorealist f ilms, especially those of De Sica. ‘Love’ for Bazin is not a 
disavowal of analytic treatment, but itself a kind of critical category that 
describes an attitude that pervades most of Bazin’s concepts discussed in 
58 In a recent essay, Dudley Andrew also connects Bazin’s texts on cinema and painting to 
Merleau-Ponty, as well as to André Malraux, and discusses the intellectual and biographical 
connection between their writings. Bazin wrote about Matisse in a 1948 essay in Esprit entitled 
‘An Aesthetic of Reality: Cinematic Realism and the Italian School of the Liberation’ (translated 
in Bazin, ‘An Aesthetic of Reality: Cinematic Realism and the Italian School of the Liberation’). 
See Andrew, ‘Malraux, Bazin, and the Gesture of Picasso’, especially 159-65.
59 Bazin, ‘A Bergsonian Film’, 213.
60 Ibid., 214.
61 Ibid., 214.
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this chapter. In ‘Umberto D: A Great Work’, Bazin writes: ‘De Sica is one of 
those directors […] whose entire talent derives from the love they have for 
their subject, from their ultimate understanding of it. The mise-en-scène 
seems to take shape after the fashion of a natural form in living matter.’62 
De Sica’s love for his subject, according to Bazin, allows him to create ac-
cording to organic laws rather than logical laws that operate external to 
matter. Love, then, is the comprehensive sense of potential of a creature. As 
a general attitude, it constitutes the ethical impetus that follows from the 
aesthetic and scientif ic understandings of organic development outlined 
in this chapter.
The organic-environmental principles which for Bazin parallel the 
development of the narrative in a f ilm such as Umberto D. connect his 
f ilm theory to philosophers and theorists of biology of the time, yet in a 
way that emphasizes their indebtedness to Bergson. In Creative Evolution, 
Bergson presented an image that illustrates the narrative development 
of Umberto D. as much as the axolotl’s ‘interrogative being’. For Bergson, 
organization ‘works from the centre to the periphery’, whereas in manu-
facturing, ‘[t]he parts are arranged, so to speak, around the action as an 
ideal centre’, working from the periphery to the center.63 We can infer the 
working of organization only negatively, a fact Bergson seeks to illustrate 
with the image of an invisible hand passing through iron f ilings:
[T]here has been merely one indivisible act, that of the hand passing 
through the f ilings: the inexhaustible detail of movement of the grains, 
as well as the order of their f inal arrangement, expresses negatively, in 
a way, this undivided movement, being the unitary form of a resistance, 
and not a synthesis of positive elementary actions.64
Similarly, the ‘order of the f inal arrangement’ of the gestures, incidents, and 
single objects in Umberto D. produces a unity without losing the contingent 
character of the individual parts, an idea for which Bazin also mobilizes 
the analogy of iron f ilings: ‘If [these elements] are set in order with an 
undeniable clarity on the spectrum of social tragedy, it is after the manner 
of the particles of iron f ilings on the spectrum of a magnet—that is to say, 
individually; but the result of this art in which nothing is necessary, where 
nothing has lost the fortuitous character of chance, is in effect to be doubly 
62 Bazin, ‘De Sica: Metteur en Scène’, 63.
63 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 92.
64 Ibid., 94.
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convincing and conclusive.’65 Just as we cannot see the hand that produces 
a certain arrangement of f ilings in Bergson’s image, social tragedy is not 
depicted directly in Umberto D. by a chain of dramatic actions whose direct 
cause is social misery.
‘Organic’ does not mean that Bazin understands the f ilm as a closed-off, 
holistic organism composed of different organs. Umberto D. is by no means 
composed like a traditional organism—it is not a closed dramatic narrative, 
entitled ‘social tragedy’, that consists of a chain of dramatic actions which 
can be explained by, for example, the inequities of post-war society. Rather, 
the film consists of little units, contingent events such as Umberto’s cold, the 
ants in the kitchen, and the maid’s pregnancy. Every element is independ-
ent, or accidental, and at the same time partakes of a whole that cannot 
subsume the parts. The ‘natural form in living matter’, the phrase Bazin 
uses to describe Umberto D., is thus like Merleau-Ponty’s axolotl, which 
develops the neck, leg and tail movements that constitute its behavior, yet 
this behavior is not determined by the organism’s development. Rather, the 
successive acquisition of swimming movements is concomitant with the 
rhythm of its maturation.
A better understanding of the Bergsonian discourse on organic evolution 
that informed Bazin’s view of cinema thus also helps us understand what, for 
him, it is that makes Umberto D. a realist f ilm, an example of ‘a truly realist 
cinema of time […] a cinema of “duration”‘.66 In both essays on Umberto D., 
Bazin emphasizes the contrast between the natural genesis of the events 
depicted in the f ilm and the subordination of f ilmed material to abstract, 
logical principles that one f inds in conventional dramatic f ilms. Following 
Bergson’s division between an (intellectual) intuition that is able to grasp 
duration, and a purely intellectual approach that proceeds logically and 
can only cut out states in matter, Bazin ascribes to De Sica a method of 
f ilming that lets duration and organic, contingent evolution emerge from 
what is seen. ‘De Sica and Zavattini attempt to divide the event up into still 
smaller events and these into events smaller still, to the extreme limits of 
our capacity to perceive them in time’, rather than reconstructing ‘the event 
according to an artif icial and abstract duration: dramatic duration’.67 Where 
others deal with events as basic dramatic units and isolated happenstances, 
De Sica breaks up the action into a stream of small activities that are played 
out in ‘real time’, which transforms them from events to lived experiences. 
65 Bazin, ‘De Sica: Metteur en Scène’, 68.
66 Ibid., 76.
67 Ibid., 81, 65.
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Of course, these experiential units are carefully arranged—that is why 
Bazin changes Bergson’s image of randomly displaced iron f ilings into a 
graphic arrangement that indicates the force f ield of the magnet. But it is 
the iron f ilings we see, from which the tragedy can be inferred negatively. 
In this consists the ‘marvelous aesthetic paradox of this f ilm’: ‘that it has the 
relentless quality of tragedy while nothing happens in it except by chance.’68
Post-Apocalyptic Life: Kracauer’s Theory of Film
Like Bazin’s work, Kracauer’s Theory of Film provides an example of a theory 
that correlates f ilm and life to explicate f ilm’s aesthetic potential (and it 
even hints at possible redefinitions of life). Yet while Bazin was f irmly situ-
ated within the leftist Parisian cultural intelligentsia, which, for the most 
part, shared with him the broader concept of a f ilm culture that could do 
its part to facilitate a post-war reconstruction of human, social and cultural 
values, Kracauer’s background is much more disparate, vagrant and eclectic. 
His most famous writings fall into a period—the late 1920s—in which he 
was a central f igure in Weimar culture, as a journalist for the important 
Frankfurter Zeitung. By contrast, the belated Theory of Film, which was 
published in 1960 but which Kracauer began to outline during the 1940s in 
Marseille, has the personal and historical experience of war atrocities, mass 
annihilation, and life-threatening exile in France and eventual emigration 
to the US written into it.
A highly-differentiated conception of life is central to both Bazin’s and 
Kracauer’s theories of f ilm; both base cinema’s aff inity for vitalist notions 
of life in its medium-specif ic combination of autonomous movement and 
an indexical image. This is true for Theory of Film to an even greater degree 
than for Bazin’s essays, not least because the former presents a more or 
less comprehensive and coherent theory that adopts ‘the f low of life’ as 
one of the medium’s basic elements. Yet for Kracauer, this emphasis on 
life came after decades of writing about f ilm in a mode in which such 
notions of life, if they came up at all, were viewed extremely critically. In 
this section, I begin by discussing briefly the conception of life as it occurs 
in Theory of Film. I then turn to Kracauer’s early work, especially his essay 
on photography, to be able to get a better understanding of Kracauer’s 
intellectual and theoretical development: whence did this notion of life 
come; did it take the place of another critical constellation; and what do 
68 Ibid., 68.
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the differences between his early work and Theory of Film tell us about the 
latter’s ‘disposition’ and situatedness in a particular historical moment? As 
I will note in that part of the chapter, Kracauer’s earliest writings were not 
about f ilm, but about (among other topics) vitalism and life-philosophy, and 
he turned to the analysis of f ilm as part of a project begun there. Though 
some commentators have sought to separate off these early writings from 
Kracauer’s corpus, his late text Theory of Film establishes the continuity of 
key concepts, including life, throughout his work.
The writings of early commentators on the f ilm experience that I cited 
in the introduction had already illustrated the use of the concept of life 
to account for the affective impact of a moving image. Kracauer’s Theory 
of Film provides a much more comprehensive elaboration of the relation-
ship between f ilm and life as an aesthetic concept. He ascribes to both 
photography and f ilm an aff inity for unstaged reality, for the fortuitous, for 
endlessness, and for the indeterminate. Additionally, f ilm, as a consequence 
of its capacity for movement and temporality, has an aff inity for ‘the flow 
of life’—the latter, in fact, is constitutive of the medium. Life, for Kracauer, 
‘suggests itself as alternate expression’ for physical reality or nature.69 He 
describes the medium-specif ic aff inity for life as f low:
[C]inematic f ilms evoke a reality more inclusive than the one they 
actually picture. They point beyond the physical world to the extent 
that the shots or combinations of shots from which they are built carry 
multiple meanings. Due to the continuous influx of the psychophysical 
correspondences thus aroused, they suggest a reality which may f ittingly 
be called ‘life.’ This term as used here denotes a kind of life which is 
still intimately connected, as if by an umbilical cord, with the material 
phenomena from which its emotional and intellectual contents emerge.70
According to Kracauer, ‘life’ in f ilm is the result of the open character of the 
cinematic image (as a result of movement, off-screen space, and montage). 
This open character creates a peculiar relationship between the physical, 
emotional, and intellectual contents of a f ilm and the material by means 
of which they were achieved—whether this material base is a human, an 
animal, a landscape, or an inanimate object. Film images are capable of 
stirring up matter that has settled both temporally and spatially around that 
which they depict. On the basis of this capacity, cinema can make expressive 
69 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 18, 28-29.
70 Ibid., 71.
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use of the ‘psychophysical correspondences’ of material objects (as well as 
of psychological events, as he explains later in the same section), that is, 
of the ‘fringe of meanings’ that surrounds them.71 These correspondences 
run through the body of the spectator, so that not only cinematic image 
and material phenomena are connected ‘as if by an umbilical cord’, but the 
spectator is also part of this connection.
In Kracauer’s adaptation of vitalist ideas to the modern, technical me-
dium of cinema, the notion of life comes to stand in for at once an embodied 
connection with and an estrangement from the world on the screen, an 
uncanny combination of familiarity and unfamiliarity. What becomes 
visible and capable of being experienced in cinema is (a) life that is not 
our own, that is not even human, and that is also not necessarily organic 
or holistic. Yet we feel ourselves responding ‘with skin and hair’; that is, 
existentially. Kracauer’s text thus provides an example of a f ilm theory that 
def ines f ilm’s aesthetic potential by means of a vitalist notion of life, yet 
binds this notion to the properties of the revealing technological apparatus 
rather than locating it in nature.
In her introduction to Theory of Film—which introduces the historical 
genesis of the book, the historical and cultural context, and Kracauer’s 
theoretical concerns across the span of his work—Miriam Hansen success-
fully defends Theory of Film against the charge of being simply a belated 
case of a somewhat naïve realism. Instead, she chisels out its qualities 
as ‘a theory of a particular type of f ilm experience, and of cinema as the 
aesthetic matrix of a particular historical experience’. She traces the 
historical dimensions of Theory of Film by linking its structure and main 
claims to both Kracauer’s f irst drafts, sketched in exile in Marseille in 
1940/41, and his Weimar writings, and she correlates the main shift from 
Kracauer’s earlier to his later writings with the historical context of each. 
As a consequence, she explains, the view of history in Theory of Film ‘no 
longer ticks to the countdown of a self-destructing modernity but keeps time 
with an “open-ended limitless world,” the proverbial “flow of life.”‘72 However, 
Hansen’s qualif ier ‘proverbial’ also seems to signal a certain discomfort 
with Kracauer’s suspiciously vitalist and holistic vocabulary. While my 
reading of Kracauer is deeply indebted to Hansen’s work, I take Kracauer’s 
references head-on as more or less covert indications of his aff iliation with 
life-philosophical thought. Kracauer’s early work echoes his training with 
the philosopher of life and sociologist Georg Simmel, and his familiarity 
71 Ibid., 68.
72 Hansen, ‘Introduction’, x, xiii.
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with Nietzsche, Bergson, and Dilthey. Theory of Film, I argue, revisits this 
philosophy of life, which has become much less of an enemy now that the 
political stakes of the debate have changed, and ref ines the def inition of 
life, duration, and organic development.
For a number of key concepts and discussions in Theory of Film, vital-
ist ideas of life, of organicity and time (memory and history) are quite 
important, and they also take center stage in many of Kracauer’s essays 
from the early 1920s on life-philosophy, as well as in his philosophically 
and sociologically inflected essays from that time that seek to contribute 
to a political, social, and existential image of the present. These essays, 
which predate, but also establish the conditions for, Kracauer’s interest 
in the analysis of f ilm, spell out Kracauer’s concern about the relation-
ship between ‘Realität’ and ‘Wirklichkeit’: that is, between what we may 
translate as ‘existential reality’—that which appears to us, surrounds us 
and determines our social, political existence—and ‘essential reality’, that 
which lies behind appearances, which itself is unattainable, yet should be 
striven for.73 These essays address his account of the f irst decades of the 
twentieth century and the role of the f irst world war: ‘vital’ tendencies to 
break up the ossif ied structures of nineteenth-century monarchical and 
patriarchal bourgeois culture, a welcome uprising, turned, following the 
war, into constructive attempts to create new forms of social existence to 
counter the reality of rationalism and capitalism. Yet they also reveal how, 
as Kracauer discusses vitalism with his characteristic dialectical stylistics of 
literal turns of phrase, a deep concern with what constitutes life—a concern 
he pursues mostly via Simmel’s work (and Bergson’s via Simmel’s)—informs 
his arguments.
Kracauer seems to have been deeply impressed by Simmel’s analysis 
of the basic conflict of life, which Kracauer paraphrases as follows: ‘Life 
is after all always more than life, it wrenches itself free of itself and en-
counters itself as a sharply def ined form. It is simultaneously the stream 
and the f irm shore; it yields to the creations that have come from its own 
womb, and in turn liberates itself from their power.’74 These expressive 
forms that are created by life and as forms, oppose it, are the material we 
73 While Realität and Wirklichkeit are often used synonymously, some philosophers have 
employed the terms to capture different aspects of reality. Edmund Husserl, in Ideas, refers to 
empirical reality as ‘Realität’, while ‘Wirklichkeit’ seems to be more general and inclusive (the 
reality of everything in the universe, whether empirically verif iable/perceptible or not), such 
that he also speaks of ‘realen und idealen Wirklichkeiten’ (§ 135). See Index, ‘Reality’, n.p., in 
Husserl, Ideas.
74 Kracauer, ‘Georg Simmel’, 239-40.
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can read and interpret to attain a sense of the ground, the essential reality. 
Kracauer, however, criticizes Simmel and Bergson for confusing the f low 
of life with the absolute, with what for Kracauer himself is an unattainable 
Wirklichkeit. He does so in numerous essays, from ‘Those Who Wait’ to 
‘Georg Simmel’ to ‘Philosophy of the Work’. In his essay ‘Those Who Wait’ 
from 1921, for example, Kracauer had criticized vitalist philosophy for its 
indifference:
‘[L]ife’ as the last absolute—life, which releases from its womb ideas 
and forms that subjugate life for a length of time but that are only to 
be in turn themselves devoured by life. But this doctrine recognized 
life-transcending norms and values only for the time being, so to speak, 
and destroyed the absolute in the very act of making the ebb and flow 
that is indifferent to value—in other words, the process of life—into an 
absolute.75
Kracauer, then, diagnoses an open, unresolved contradiction that differs 
from that which Simmel def ines in his life-philosophy. For Simmel, life as 
flow and the forms (Gestalten) life creates (artistic, social, cultural, political) 
are in irresolvable conflict, since the latter are simultaneously based in life 
and oppose life, but to be true—wirklich—need to resolve back into life. 
For Kracauer, by contrast, an alienation from life has already taken place, 
such that the forms themselves do not refer back to an essentially real life, 
but rather to an unreal—unwirklich—reality. ‘As unreal (unwirklich) as 
today’s realities (Realitäten) may be, they exist nevertheless and continue 
to grow rampant.’ After the ‘beautiful’ early twentieth-century phase of 
a ‘naïve-vital resistance’ against ossif ied forms that understood the flow 
of life as ‘Wirklichkeit’, the post-war phase of a ‘will toward formation’ 
(Wille zur Gestaltung), by aiming at the deeper sense, order and coherence 
Wirklichkeit promises, foregoes the ‘chaotic phenomena’ of current realities 
and neglects to grapple with them.76
Kracauer thus continues to subscribe to Simmel’s and Bergson’s phi-
losophy of the essential movement and formative force of life, but cautions 
against absolutizing the flow of life and turning it into a f inal cause. Kra-
cauer’s vitalism is intimately tied up with meaning and history, much like 
the work of Wilhelm Dilthey. In ‘Philosophy of the Work’, he issues another 
timely warning about Bergsonian vitalism: ‘Bergson’s panvitalism has quite 
75 Kracauer, ‘Those Who Wait’, 131.
76 Kracauer, ‘Gestalt und Zerfall’, 284-87 (translation mine).
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a bit in common with the indifference to values and the glorif ication of an 
aimlessly flowing energy on the part of the spirit of high capitalism.’77 The 
Kracauerian subject needs to sustain the tension between life-as-flow and 
a commitment to form, historical time, and value, without lapsing into 
either meaningless flow or premature form.
It is against the background of this modified vitalist position that we can 
better understand the surprising praise Kracauer has for vitalist biologist 
and philosopher Hans Driesch.78 In several reviews from 1925, Kracauer 
explains Driesch’s comprehensive philosophical works that were published 
a few years previously, namely Philosophy of the Organic (Philosophie des Or-
ganischen, 1921), Theory of Order (Ordnungslehre, 1923), and Theory of Reality 
(Wirklichkeitslehre, 1922). These reviews followed earlier positive references 
to Driesch that Kracauer included in other essays from the 1920s. Hans 
Driesch was a reputable biologist in the early 1900s, the student of Ernst 
Haeckel and August Weismann, and became famous for his experiments 
on sea urchin and polyp embryos at the Zoological Station in Naples. The 
organisms developed into complete animals even if part of the embryo was 
removed, a result that led Driesch to deduct the existence of a causality dif-
ferent from mechanic causality, namely, a unifying causality specif ic to life, 
which Driesch termed, following Aristotle, entelechy. Entelechy suspends 
the endless possible ways in which a given organism could develop, and 
then, by relaxing its suspension in a certain way, transforms these possibili-
ties of homogenous matter into specif ic realities in heterogeneous matter.79 
His talks and publications made Driesch the most prominent proponent of 
a ‘neo-vitalism’ and won him a chair in natural theology at the University of 
Aberdeen in 1906. Yet the relatively meager experimental foundation upon 
which Driesch founded his theory also illustrated—and Driesch admitted 
as much—that vitalists can only show that there is something that exceeds 
mechanical causality, but they cannot directly prove what, precisely, it is 
that distinguishes life from non-living matter. Following these experiments 
and his turn to vitalism, Driesch changed academic faculties and became 
professor of philosophy, f irst in Cologne and subsequently in Leipzig. His 
lifelong outspoken commitment to pacif ism, democracy, and universal 
human rights explains his premature retirement enforced by the National 
Socialist party in 1933.
77 Kracauer, ‘Philosophie des Werks’, 92 (translation mine).
78 See also the discussion of Driesch in the Introduction.
79 See Driesch, The History and Theory of Vitalism, 203.
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When Kracauer published his texts on Driesch in the early 1920s, Driesch 
had already been largely discredited as a biologist, and his main scientif ic 
ideas, such as the concept of entelechy, seemed ridiculous in the light of 
more recent discoveries in embryology and morphology. Driesch’s philo-
sophical framework was met with skepticism from many contemporaries, 
and Driesch’s dabbling in parapsychology did not help the matter, either. 
Hence it is surprising and daring that Kracauer published a long review of 
Driesch’s work, especially one written in the context of the philosophical 
congress about which Kracauer had little positive to say. Kracauer empha-
sizes Driesch’s difference from other philosophers, arguing that Driesch is 
basically an extraterritorial philosopher located outside of any school; he is 
a biologist turning to philosophy, a position that affords Driesch ‘unbiased-
ness and intellectual integrity’. This positionality allowed Driesch to think 
beyond the spiritual situation of the present and incorporate signif icant 
aspects of the essential reality of human existence. Driesch’s philosophy 
did so, Kracauer says, by developing a system which ‘stretches from zoology 
to theology, from the sea urchin to god’. He contends that
[i]n his endeavors to explain the concept of life, which he raised into 
independence, with flawless logic, Driesch easily could have followed in 
the footsteps of Bergson or Simmel and sunk life itself into the founda-
tion of being. He is prevented from this revealing mistake—a mistake, 
however, which also opens up for the latter two thinkers some issues 
disregarded by Driesch—not so much because of his logical scrupulous-
ness but rather because of the concreteness (Gegenständlichkeit) of his 
gaze and his belief in an overarching order and wholeness which enfolds 
both the living and the non-living.80
In Driesch, Kracauer f inds the biological equivalent of his own vitalism, 
which likewise seeks to connect a vitalist understanding of life to something 
larger that, even though it maybe unreachable, nevertheless turns life into 
a part of a whole, rather than the foundation of being and the source of 
meaning.
Kracauer argues that, in contrast to the irrational position of life-
philosophy (Simmel and Bergson), Driesch did not understand reason to be 
a product of a self-suff icient life. Instead, according to Kracauer, he insisted 
on the postulation of a wholeness in which life has its place, though human 
reason is not able to decipher the archetypal configuration of a ‘spiritual 
80 Kracauer, ‘Hans Driesch: Zu seiner Philosophie’, 255 (translation mine).
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reality which enters into matter and then frees itself from it again’.81 For 
Kracauer, inherent in Driesch’s philosophy is an existential openness to the 
independent character and inherent essence of objects that is an antidote 
to philosophical idealism and moves Driesch closer to phenomenologists 
such as Husserl and Max Scheler. Yet, in contrast to the latter, Driesch insists 
on the inaccessibility for humans of the f inal truth; instead of truth claims, 
he posits f inal questions.
There is no doubt that Kracauer was in a sense ventriloquizing Driesch 
to formulate his own philosophy. The same arguments returned when, 
shortly after this essay, in a review of the German Congress of Philosophy in 
1925, Kracauer specif ied his critique of phenomenology, which he neverthe-
less saw as the only worthwhile philosophical endeavor, especially when 
counterposed to the then-prominent Idealist and neo-Kantian movements. 
Kracauer’s primary critique of Husserl’s phenomenology is that it failed truly 
to allow concrete phenomena to speak for themselves; that is, to constitute 
a reality [Wirklichkeit] or an essence [Wesen] on their own accord, in their 
own right, beyond human capacities for comprehension or understanding. 
While Kracauer shares with Husserlian phenomenology the belief that 
one needs to proceed from the bottom upward, that is, from concrete phe-
nomena to higher truths, he is also convinced of the existence of a higher 
truth outside ourselves, beyond human grasp, one we may participate in, 
without complete understanding or willful influence upon it. This belief 
of Kracauer’s lies at the base of his earlier writings, such as his treatise on 
the detective novel. This is the cultural-social, even moral dimension one 
often f inds in Kracauer’s writings: there is a virtue to abandoning oneself 
to the concrete phenomena, in particular those on the outskirts and in the 
midst of popular culture. Doing so is not only a commitment to everyday 
life and to reality, but it is also a spiritual, a philosophical exercise, namely 
the only chance to glimpse a few pieces here and there of a larger truth, 
and to feel meaning—to feel human, even—in the tension toward these 
strewn-about pieces (Versprengsel).
In the early- to mid-1920s, Kracauer discovered cinema as a privileged 
place in which to engage with the concrete phenomena of reality, in the 
hopes of glancing the Wirklichkeit behind it. Kracauer hailed f ilm, as 
Hansen put it, ‘as the perfect medium for a fallen world, an at once sensory 
and ref lexive discourse uniquely suited to capturing the experience of 
a disintegrating world, a “life deprived of substance.”‘82 There is a direct 
81 Ibid., 259.
82 Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 5.
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relation between the psycho-physical correspondences of which Kracauer 
speaks in Theory of Film, and the tension of ‘Those Who Wait’, or the ten-
sion (different from suspense) of the attentive reader of detective novels in 
The Detective Novel. In his ‘Photography’ essay from 1927, Kracauer applied 
his critical perspective on modernity most thoroughly to visual media, 
from illustrated magazines to photographs to f ilm. For Hansen, the essay 
entwines a ‘lapsarian critique of modernity; phenomenological description 
of quotidian and ephemeral phenomena impelled by a gnostic-modernist 
materialism; avant-garde iconoclasm; and critique of ideology that resonates 
with the more immanent political approach his writings take from the 
mid-1920s on’.83 Her analysis attempts to chisel out the unique nexus of these 
strands in this text and with respect to Kracauer’s theoretical stance and 
methodology more generally. In doing so, she also has a vested interest in 
marking the difference between Kracauer and life-philosophy/vitalism. My 
understanding of the essay has a slightly different emphasis, since I read the 
essay as a hinge between the philosophical positions I outlined above and 
Kracauer’s theory of f ilm, and I seek to restore a complexity and valuation 
to Kracauer’s life-philosophical roots that expands upon the ‘lapsarian 
layer of his earlier writings’ that Hansen describes, and that will also help 
us understand some of his positions in Theory of Film.84
Though Kracauer’s essay ‘Photography’, in which he def ines the rela-
tionship between photography, memory and history (and thus also the 
relationship between organic temporality and photographic spatiality), is 
not ostensibly about ‘life’, it nevertheless introduces the main aspects of his 
theory of the spatiotemporality of the photographic—and, by extension, 
cinematic—image and its relationship to organic, lived time, space, and 
meaning-making. The development of Kracauer’s thought from ‘Photogra-
phy’ to Theory of Film especially elucidates the extent to which the latter 
text is indebted to both an earlier life-philosophical tradition and a more 
contemporary post-war discourse on life. Kracauer’s essay on photography 
partakes in the ideology-critical work of his more programmatic essays, 
such as ‘Cult of Distraction’, ‘The Little Shopgirls Go to the Movies’, or ‘The 
Mass Ornament’, but it simultaneously hints at the redemptive potential 
inherent in mass media that might enable a reformulation of the relation-
ship between humans and technology.
The essay on ‘Photography’ proposes that there are three ways of archiv-
ing, retaining, and collecting the past, each with its own tendencies for 
83 Ibid., 27.
84 Ibid., 4.
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investing their archives with meaning. These are photography, historicism, 
and memory—a technological invention, an intellectual endeavor, and a 
biological-physiological means. In contrast to historicism and photography, 
personal memory (and, along with it, an ‘organic’ history dependent upon 
memory-images) retains what is given only insofar as it has a larger meaning 
for the individual. Memory thus provides a counter-procedure to the other 
two means, photography and historicism, which are oriented toward an 
exhaustive temporal and spatial completeness; while photography and 
historicism ‘[grasp] what is given as a spatial (or temporal) continuum’, 
memory images ‘retain what is given only insofar as it has signif icance’.85 In 
contrast to the meaningful coherence of memory-images, which condense 
into a history of a life, the photograph presents the trash of history, the 
incoherent residues of meaning, in an arbitrary spatial configuration that 
threatens the integrity of the human individual. However, historicist and 
photographic archives also bear—precisely because of the arbitrariness, 
fragmentation, and disconnectedness of their elements—an unprecedented 
possibility for a confrontation with reality: ‘the images of the stock of nature 
disintegrated into its elements are offered up to consciousness to deal with 
as it pleases’. Photography and f ilm therefore enable an active, playful 
engagement with historical conf igurations that have lost their natural 
givenness, so that in experimental, dream-like, and necessarily provisional 
new rearrangements, we might catch a glimpse of ‘the right order of the 
inventory of nature’.86
Kracauer’s argument is organized by what he describes as a conflicted 
relationship between photography and memory, a conf lict illustrated 
by two very different photographs. The f irst photograph shows a young 
f ilm diva and is printed on the cover of an illustrated magazine. All of 
the details, including her fashionable hallmark hairstyle and even her 
individual eyelashes, ‘are in their proper place—a flawless appearance’.87 
The second photograph shows another 24-year-old girl, but in this case, 
it is a sixty-year-old photograph; the woman in the photograph has since 
died, and those who now behold the photograph are her grandchildren. 
Kracauer claims that two elements come into play when one beholds a 
portrait photograph, namely, recognition on the basis of memory and the 
85 Kracauer, ‘Photography’, 50.
86 Ibid., 62.
87 A more precise translation would be: all details ‘have their right place in space, an appear-
ance without gaps’. See Kracauer, ‘Die Photographie’, 21. Kracauer’s terms Raum (‘space’) and 
Lückenlosigkeit (‘gaplessness’) emphasize that photography establishes a spatial continuum 
that makes everything equal.
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actual visual impression. In the case of the diva’s cover picture, these two 
elements reinform one another seamlessly. However, Kracauer suggests that 
when the grandchildren of the second woman behold her portrait as a young 
woman, these two elements fall apart into seeming contradiction. While 
the grandchildren are told that the photograph shows the grandmother, 
they cannot identify her and reconcile the image with their own sparse 
memories of her. The photograph thus has an arbitrary aspect to it, and 
it cannot establish a continuum with either the real grandmother or the 
presence of the grandchildren. As a consequence of the disjunction between 
memory-image and photographic image, the grandchildren can only react 
to the portrait with uncomfortable laughter, since what they are witnessing 
at the breaking-point of memory, in the photograph whose meaning they 
cannot encompass, is a temporality located outside of them as well; in other 
words, a relentless, objective temporality that is not embodied, and that 
does not result in the accumulation of meaning.
The photograph of the grandmother thus presents an instance of a non-
human technology that exceeds human capacities to retain, recollect, and 
invest with meaning; as such, it makes visible (or rather: palpable, with a 
‘shudder’) an order of non-organic temporality that invests our perception 
with the fact of death. (For Kracauer, such an investment of our perception 
with death is only possible from the standpoint of a time external to hu-
man temporality, a point to which I will return with respect to Theory of 
Film).88 The photograph does not incorporate time into its representation, 
but rather only space. However, it is itself a (non-human) ‘representation of 
time’ that subjects to its spatial continuum whatever it captures, without 
distinguishing between humans, landscapes, or things:
A shudder runs through the viewer of old photographs. For they make 
visible not the knowledge of the original but the spatial configuration of 
a moment; what appears in the photograph is not the person but the sum 
of what can be subtracted from him or her. The photograph annihilates 
the person by portraying him or her, and were the person and portrayal 
to converge, the person would cease to exist.89
88 The reading of the photograph of the diva, by contrast—a picture recently taken—is still 
reinformed by, and reinforming, our memory of her (on the f ilm screen), and it is in this dialecti-
cal relationship between these two orders of (re)cognition that the photography reveals the 
diva’s life.
89 Kracauer, ‘Photography’, 56-57.
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So long as a living memory can cling to the photographed person, this mem-
ory can provide a historical context that reestablishes a human order and 
lifts the person who has been photographed from the picture’s contingent 
spatial arrangement.90 Yet as soon as no living memory remains to invest the 
photograph in this way, the arbitrary elements of the photograph take over 
and begin their surrealist ‘danse macabre’.91 Photography becomes quite 
literally a medium in which residue, trash, is able to take on life in fantastic 
configurations: the crinoline of the grandmother becomes, in Kracauer’s 
description, a dancing zombie. A f ilm that serves most wonderfully as an 
illustration of Kracauer’s claim that f ilm is aff iliated with magic, trash, and 
death is Ladislas Starevich’s The Mascot (1933), a puppet animation created 
on the precipice of fascism, in which animated stuffed animals, dolls, and 
toy soldiers die in the gutters of the (real-life) streets of Paris, while at night, 
a devil’s ball reanimates the dead to engage in a murderous danse macabre, 
including f igures composed of trash paper and f ish skeletons that emerge 
from trash cans and magically recompose themselves.
In Kracauer’s essay, memory thus takes on the role of the natural, 
anthropocentric temporal organization of meaning. The images created 
by memory are organized centripetally around the individual, and the 
arrangement of remembered scenes is determined by the meaning they 
have for the person remembering. They are retained ‘[i]m Hinblick auf 
das für ihn Gemeinte’: that is, with respect to that which is meant for the 
person, or with regard to the person.92 Even though we are at the center 
of meaning, the ordering principle of memory-images is inaccessible to 
us: the moment the principles of memory-selection became transparent 
to us, we would completely grasp ourselves. Just as photography f inds its 
temporal equivalent in historicism—that is, the attempt at a complete 
account of history—memory f inds its temporal equivalent in a human 
being’s personal history. Kracauer contends that the more a society is 
90 Where Kracauer employs an ideological reading of photography’s contingent spatial con-
tinuum, Benjamin jumps directly to the complicated temporal implications of photography’s 
‘representation of time’. Kracauer emphasized the uncanny aspect of the photographed person 
being devoured—’annihilated’—by the environment of a moment past; an ‘unredeemed’, ‘ghost-
like reality’. For Benjamin, by contrast, inanimate objects never take on such a threatening 
visage (and he never recedes as deeply into the shade of things as Kracauer). Rather, throughout 
his discussion of photographs, Benjamin undertakes detective work in order to unearth the 
relationship between the person and his or her environment. Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art’, 117.
91 In his Marseille notebooks, Danse Macabre was one possible title Kracauer gave to his 
planned last chapter on Eisenstein’s Death Day and some ‘ultimate conclusions’ of the book as 
a whole. See Hansen, ‘Introduction’, xxiv.
92 Kracauer, ‘Die Photographie’, 25. 
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governed by reason and liberated from the constraints of nature, the more 
memory-images reveal a higher truth. Complete transparency, however, 
is only possible in a gnostic ‘last image’. This last image is composed of 
memories with a truth content, which an individual was able to achieve as 
insights (Erkenntnisse) that liberated this individual from natural compul-
sions and the life of the drives. This last image constitutes a person’s actual 
history, which Kracauer compares to a monogram that contains only 
fragments of a person’s physical and psychological existence, namely those 
fragments that truly matter. However, as Kracauer had already established 
in his earlier writings, such as his treatise on the detective novel or his 
essay ‘Those Who Wait’, in which he claimed that contemporary man 
lives in a superf icial, atomized, and in this sense, photographic space, 
he believed that modern human beings were currently quite far from 
a society in which the state of nature and reason would allow memory-
images and artworks to stitch an organic ornament that would ref lect 
human values. The idea of organic and holistic unity, community, and 
meaningfulness in the Weimar Republic was utopian, and the desire for 
it was dangerous, since it would only cover over the rational, atomized 
conditions of modernity.
Yet the photographic and historiographic principle of contingent inven-
torying also allowed for a different, albeit risky, possibility for cognition, 
or what Kracauer termed the ‘go-for-broke game of history’. He traces the 
history of images, from symbols to allegories, as one of an increasing sepa-
ration of consciousness and nature: ‘[t]he more decisively consciousness 
frees itself from imprisonment in nature [Naturbefangenheit] in the course 
of the historical process, the more purely does its natural foundation 
present itself to consciousness.’93 With the advent of photography, ‘mere 
nature’, completely disconnected from human consciousness, f inally 
becomes visible—the same nature that ‘f lourishes in the reality of the 
society produced by this capitalist mode of production’.94 The severed 
tie between nature and consciousness provides both a danger and an 
opportunity, and this is the ‘go-for-broke game’ of history as it plays out in 
photography and f ilm: either nature will overcome consciousness or con-
sciousness will overcome nature, depending on whether society decides to 
93 Ibid., 36 (translation mine). Naturbefangenheit (‘capture by nature’) is an important concept 
that Kracauer derives from Hegel’s aesthetics; it is also central to Adorno and Horkheimer. See, 
for example, Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I, 75: ‘[B]y dissolving this unity [with nature] 
for man, art lifts him with gentle hands out of and above imprisonment in nature.’ 
94 Kracauer, ‘Photography’, 60-61.
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confront the contingency, alienation, and deathliness in photographic im-
ages head-on, playing with them as real possibilities, or whether it decides 
to hide itself in its own ‘photographability’, becoming a photograph itself 
in order to try to evade temporality, consciousness, memory, and death.
The new constellation of human being, technology, nature, and social 
reality that f ilm provided led Kracauer (as well as Benjamin) to a particu-
lar redef inition of reality. Kracauer had already argued that, in order to 
grasp our material base, our natural foundation, we need to evacuate the 
anthropocentric order from our images, so that the ‘warehousing of nature’ 
enabled by a technology such as photography and cinema could promote 
the confrontation of consciousness with nature (nature, as Hansen points 
out, ‘has a ferociously pejorative valence’ in this essay and is the ‘allegorical 
name for any reality that posits itself as given and immutable’).95 Thus, 
writes Kracauer, ‘[j]ust as consciousness f inds itself confronting the una-
bashedly displayed mechanics of industrial society, it also faces, thanks to 
photographic technology, the reflection of reality that has slipped away 
from it’.96 Paralleling Kracauer’s argument that reality can become visible 
again only through the ability of photographic technology to reveal the 
profound separation of consciousness from nature, Benjamin, too, sees 
f ilm’s total—what he calls ‘surgical’—penetration with technology as the 
prerequisite for making visible the ‘equipment-free aspect of reality’:
In the f ilm studio the apparatus has penetrated so deeply into reality 
that a pure view of that reality, free of the foreign body of equipment, is 
the result of a special procedure—namely, the shooting by the specially 
adjusted photographic device and the assembly of that shot with others 
of the same kind.97
For both Benjamin and Kracauer, reality is not immediately visible, but 
made visible, as sociopolitical reality with truth-content, in the inscription 
and disf iguration of the world by means of photographic imagery.
Theory of Film picks up several of the thoughts initially outlined in Kra-
cauer’s ‘Photography’ essay, such as the revelatory function of photography 
(a function that is also important in Bazin’s understanding of photography’s 
and cinema’s relationship to reality), the importance of the inanimate 
world, and the aff inity of f ilm to the ephemeral and contingent. However, 
95 Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 35.
96 Kracauer, ‘Photography’, 62.
97 Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art’, 115.
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in contrast to Kracauer’s early texts—and in even greater contrast to his 
critical-interventionist writings of the late 1920s—politicized notions of 
reality are subdued in Theory of Film. As a consequence, the book seems 
in many ways to be a tragic text. Yet rather than reading Theory of Film as 
a scholarly de-politicization of his earlier claims, I suggest we read it as a 
post-apocalyptic text, written after the go-for-broke game has been lost. 
Theory of Film is, in other words, the consequence of a complete severance: 
the nature that consciousness has failed to penetrate has sat down at the 
very table that consciousness abandoned.
The cinematic cosmos into which Kracauer is retreating in Theory of 
Film is a kind of mirror of the Lebenswelt that has been irretrievably lost 
for those who have survived the war; the extraterritorial status of these 
survivors, including Kracauer’s own, is absolute. Melancholy has become 
an ideal photographic disposition: ‘it favors self-estrangement, which on its 
part entails identif ication with all kinds of objects’.98 In contrast to classical 
phenomenology, for which intentionality provides the only means of access 
to the external world, Kracauer seeks to confront ‘intention with being’ in 
order to undercut an anthropocentric, let alone humanist, viewpoint that 
would impose upon phenomena human measures of action and projection.99 
Kracauer aims at more or less the contrary: it is the material, non-human 
world in f ilm which is supposed, in turn, to reinform the spectator and 
disintegrate her, her bodily senses, from the bottom up, engaging her ‘physi-
ologically before [s]he is in a position to respond intellectually’.100 Film’s f inal 
redemptive potential, and the only chance we have of regaining access to the 
Lebenswelt, consists in this initial physiological overruling of consciousness 
by f ilm’s address to the body. Continuing the line of thought begun in the 
photography essay, even involuntary memories—the individual-historical 
aspect of perception—are excluded from Kracauer’s rendering of the specta-
tor; she is reduced to a physical being in a dream-like or hypnotic state that 
opens her up to new experiences. For this reason, the ‘formalist tendency’ 
of f ilmmakers needs to be kept in check by the ‘realistic tendency’: crea-
tive efforts must ‘benefit, in some way or other, the medium’s substantive 
concern with our visible world’.101
If there is a thesis that remains unchanged from the early essay on pho-
tography to Theory of Film, it is that of photography’s revelatory function, 
98 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 17.
99 Hansen quoting from Marseille Notebooks, in Hansen, ‘Introduction’, xvii.
100 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 158.
101 Ibid., 39.
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or what Benjamin termed the ‘optical unconscious’: an ‘other’ nature that 
reveals itself in photography.102 The optical unconscious persists with or 
without aura, prior to and following the catastrophe. The link the optical 
maintains with the human being, however, is reduced to a de-politicized, 
vitalist notion of ‘life’ in Theory of Film. The ‘absolute’, which was so central 
to Kracauer’s early thought, seems to have lost valence and meaning after 
the experience of technological warfare and mass annihilation. Theory of 
Film renounces any interest in ‘life-transcending values’ in favor of a notion 
of life that encompasses the reality of the material world in its ‘multiple 
meanings’. This reality, which is understood as equivalent to ‘life’, is ‘still 
intimately connected, as if by an umbilical cord, with the material phe-
nomena from which its emotional and intellectual contents emerge’.103 Yet 
it is, like Bergson’s notion of duration, characterized by endlessness—a 
temporality we might understand not only as trans-individual, but also as 
post-apocalyptical.
In contrast to the essay on photography, what emerges from Theory of 
Film’s conception of life and the cinematic image is f irst, a shift of weight 
from consciousness, as a critical, rational, subjective, and human force, to 
a spectator’s ‘natural foundation’; second, the emergence of the idea that 
cinematic images provide the glasses through which the post-apocalyptic 
spectator—whose consciousness has proven itself, via the war, to be a 
102 Benjamin, ‘Little History of Photography’, 511. In Benjamin’s essay on photography, the 
optical unconscious designates, as optical unconscious, an image-content that is not human, 
and as optical unconscious, an image-content that can only be brought to consciousness by 
‘a tiny spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared 
the subject’ (510). The procedure by means of which we as spectators can grasp the optical 
unconscious is thus similar to the way in which we access what Proust, in reformulating Bergson, 
calls ‘involuntary memory’—i.e., a memory that is unconscious until it is conjured up by chance 
through a material object. Benjamin describes the change in the structure of experience as a 
consequence of urban modernity and a ‘perception conditioned by shock’ (Benjamin, ‘On Some 
Motifs in Baudelaire’, 328). Even though this latter essay features a rather pessimist outlook (it 
was written in 1939) and does not itself mention the optical unconscious, it can furnish us with 
a clue about the general role of the concept. If involuntary or pure memory consists of instances 
that are stored in memory (Gedächtnis rather than Erinnerung) and constitute lived experience 
(Erfahrung rather than Erlebnis), the optical unconscious could be said to provide a similar 
archive of experience—yet this would be a non-human experience. In ‘Paris, Capital of the 
Nineteenth Century’, Benjamin develops the notion of the collective conscious and unconscious; 
f ilm, as collectively perceived medium, can link the two and provide a collective memory device. 
This is what Benjamin hints at when, in the Artwork essay, he says that ‘thanks to the camera, 
therefore, the individual perception of the psychotic or the dreamer can be appropriated by 
collective perception’. Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art’, 118.
103 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 71.
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(self-)destructive lens—can access the world; and third, a translation of 
cinematic time into ‘the f low of life’, which is characterized by endless-
ness and openness. These changes can be attributed to the crisis of life 
that separates the two texts. Ultimately, it is not so much Kracauer’s 
conception of the image that has changed, but rather his conception of the 
historical-political conditions surrounding the reception of these images. 
The changes thus run through the spectator, and it is not coincidental 
that his chapter on ‘The Spectator’ contains those claims in Theory of Film 
that contrast most with Kracauer’s earlier texts. Kracauer cites Michel 
Dard’s 1928 description of young moviegoers, a description that is itself 
cinematic in its evocative language: ‘“passive, personal, as little humanistic 
or humanitarian as possible; diffuse, unorganized, and self-unconscious 
like an amoeba; deprived of an object or rather, attached to all [of them] 
like a fog, [and] penetrant like rain.”‘104 This description of passionate f ilm 
‘addicts’—which is hardly a description of an ‘other’, but a description that 
Kracauer tacitly accepts for himself as well—highlights that spectatorship, 
for Kracauer, is a passive affair, but that it is an ‘active passivity’, as he puts 
it in History: Last Images Before the Last: an activity of surrendering to the 
power of f ilm images.105 Film addicts crave ‘for once to be released from the 
grip of consciousness, lose their identity in the dark, and let sink in, with 
their senses ready to absorb them, the images as they happen to follow 
each other’.106 This spectator relinquishes control of the self and opens all 
of his bodily senses to the moving images on the screen. In this surrender, 
‘subconscious and unconscious experiences, apprehensions and hopes tend 
to come out and take over’.107 The impact and lure of cinematic experience 
is thus a combination of a surrender on the part of the spectator, and a 
particular sensual, quasi-’biological’ power inherent in the cinematic image, 
which ‘engag[es] [the spectator] physiologically before he is in a position to 
respond intellectually’.108 This power is grounded in f ilm’s capacity to record 
physical reality and confront the spectator with raw material nature—its 
104 Ibid., 165.
105 In History: Last Images Before the Last, Kracauer describes the attitude of the spectator thus: 
‘Anybody looking at a picture, Schopenhauer claims, should behave as if he were in the presence 
of a prince and respectfully wait for what the picture may or may not wish to tell him; for were 
he to talk f irst he would only be listening to himself. Waiting in this sense amounts to a sort of 
active passivity on the historian’s part.’ Kracauer, History, 84.
106 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 159-60.
107 Ibid., 165.
108 This capacity of f ilm to overcome perceptual barriers established by consciousness provides 
an interesting transformation of the concept of the ‘choc’, which was so important to Benjamin’s 
and Kracauer’s earlier media theory.
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motion—that produces kinesthetic responses, as well as the flow of the 
images, which induce us to flow along with the f ilm in order not to miss 
anything.
In this combination of the specif ic properties of the cinematic image and 
a particular attitude and capacity to respond on her part, the spectator gains 
an access to the material world that is not limited to that human (or even 
humanist) approach to the world that is characterized by a combination of 
rational, use- and market-value-oriented interests and habit. Rather than 
the human being grasping hold of the world, the world ‘reveals’ itself and 
stretches out its many tentacles in the direction of the spectator. She is able 
to experience aspects of the world—a side of things—she wasn’t able to see, 
hear, think and feel before, including things that are too small, big, fast, or 
slow for human perception, objects or body parts that in the isolation and 
magnif ication of the screen reveal new aspects and vistas that the screen 
releases from the blindness produced by familiarity. However, this list also 
includes ‘phenomena overwhelming consciousness’: in the combination of 
the spectator’s physical-unconscious opening to the screen and cinematic 
presentation of reality, we are able to behold things, such as war atrocities, 
that we had not been able to see and understand because of censors, or 
guards, that consciousness had put up to protect us from them.
In many ways, the ideas that Kracauer puts forward in Theory of Film 
resemble the f ilm theories of the 1920s, in particular those writings of Jean 
Epstein, Louis Delluc, and Germaine Dulac that concerned f ilm as a new 
form of vision. There is, however, something different at stake for Kracauer. 
For him, what is important is not a new vision of the world that is expressive 
of the new possibilities facing the human being in the light of modernity 
and technology, but rather the chance that f ilm provides to forego human 
consciousness, values, and dispositions altogether in order to f ind reality, 
history, and meaning as they have settled in matter. As a photographic 
medium, Kracauer wrote, f ilm has an aff inity with unstaged reality, with 
the fortuitous and the random, with endlessness or inf inity, and with the 
indeterminate, diffuse, unorganized, or unshaped.109 Its capacity for move-
ment and temporality, however, enables f ilm to reveal the world (not ‘our’ 
world, but rather the transitory world in which we live), which for him be-
comes equivalent to revealing life itself. For the post-apocalyptic spectator 
of Theory of Film, f ilm becomes a means to construct, and reconstruct, 
past, present, and future. Film grants access to the past, since it reveals the 
history stored in the material world, especially in its neglected aspects and 
109 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 18-20.
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its refuse. A teapot with a sealed crack can powerfully evoke the dramatic 
event that caused it to break; images of concentration camps, Kracauer 
believed, allowed spectators to behold a reality that their bodies and minds 
had previously refused.110 Film also grants access to the present, since the 
moviegoer, as Kracauer describes him, has an acute sense of isolation and 
alienation from the world and from life, and this alienation from life drives 
him to the movie theater; the movie spectator is a ‘being out of touch with 
the breathing world about him, that stream of things and events which, 
were it f lowing through him, would render his existence more exciting and 
signif icant. He misses “life.”‘111 And f ilm grants access to the future, since it 
is able to point out new directions, or, to use a term that Kracauer employs 
repeatedly, f ilm ‘[expands] the external world . . . in all directions’.112
110 On correspondences between mental life and physical life in the traces in objects, see 
Ibid., 68: ‘Natural objects, then, are surrounded with a fringe of meanings liable to touch off 
various moods, emotions, runs of inarticulate thoughts; in other words, they have a theoretically 
unlimited number of psychological and mental correspondences. Some such correspondences 
may have a real foundation in the traces which the life of the mind often leaves in material 
phenomena; human faces are molded by inner experiences, and the patina of old houses is a 
residue of what happened in them.’ Kracauer’s most beautiful texts from the 1920s—a time 
when he was still roaming real streets and not just movie theaters—were similar tracings of the 
mental condition of society in neglected material objects. See, for example, Kracauer, ‘Farewell 
to the Linden Arcade’; ‘Two Planes’; ‘Spuk im Vergnügungslokal’.
111 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 169. Interestingly, this is a point for which Kracauer derives much 
evidence from a 1940 German audience survey. While he never discusses the fact that these 
data represent moviegoers at a time of war (and in fact seems to de-historicize this material by 
applying it to contemporary international audiences), the fact that he does mention the study’s 
origin in Germany in 1940 seems to imply that he def ines the isolated post-war attitude as a 
continuation of the condition of shell-shocked war audiences.




By way of a conclusion, I would like to trace briefly the journey traveled 
in this book and indicate how the vital nexus between spectator, f ilm 
form, and the philosophical and biological discourses on life outlined here 
connects to contemporary discussions in f ilm theory and theory at large. 
These discussions concern the relationship between nature and culture 
and, by extension, the sciences and the humanities; the question of the 
body as an organism and its relationship to the (technologically mediated) 
environment; the nature of matter, organic and inorganic, and of affection 
as that which connects, disconnects, moves, and changes matter; and the 
materiality of media in particular and their relationship to the environment 
at large.
Though, as I noted in the last chapter, Bazin used terms such as ‘organic’ 
and ‘the whole’ in his description of cinema, in the 1950s these terms no 
longer had the same connotations that they possessed for turn-of-the-
century vitalist discourse. Hence, the axolotl’s development could illustrate 
for Bazin, as well as for Merleau-Ponty, the fact that both aesthetic and 
biological existence have a quality of openness: an open interaction be-
tween organism and environment; a temporality that every moment opens 
new possible futures; and a ‘centrifugal’, inf inite spatiality that can turn 
everyday objects as well as a human being into the center of the universe 
into which they radiate. This correlation of aesthetics and biology was, 
as I have suggested, by no means a naturalization of aesthetics. Rather, it 
suggested a notion of life that does not separate ‘crude existence’ and ‘art’, 
but understands life to be aesthetic.1 If life is located in aesthetic and 
material existence, thinking about the laws of living matter, that is, biology, 
also yields knowledge about the nature of aesthetics, while thinking about 
aesthetic experience f inds a correlation in the capacities of living matter.
This understanding of life as aesthetic and material, and thus of art as 
vital in a profound sense, posits itself against a classical understanding of 
aesthetics that seeks to separate these realms. This kind of separation was 
exemplif ied by, for example, G.W.F. Hegel’s approach to aesthetics:
1 The aesthetic vitalism I am tracing here could thus be conf igured to go back to Nietzsche’s 
claims about the inseparability of life and aesthetics in Birth of Tragedy. 
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The mitigation of the power of passions therefore has its universal ground 
in the fact that man is released from his immediate imprisonment in 
a feeling and becomes conscious of it as something external to him, 
to which he must now relate himself in an ideal way. Art by means of 
its representations, while remaining within the sensuous sphere, liber-
ates man at the same time from the power of sensuousness. Of course 
we may often hear favourite phraseology about man’s duty to remain 
in immediate unity with nature; but such unity, in its abstraction, is 
purely and simply rudeness and ferocity, and by dissolving this unity 
for man, art lifts him with gentle hands out of and above imprisonment 
in nature. For man’s preoccupation with artistic objects remains purely 
contemplative, and thereby it educates, even if at f irst only an attention 
to artistic portrayals in general, later on an attention to their meaning 
and to a comparison with other subjects, and it opens the mind to a 
general consideration of them and the points of view therein involved.2
For Hegel, art is sensuous, but this sensuous relationship is subdued and 
contemplative, in contrast to the power of passions and the sense of natural 
existence. Art lifts the spirit out of its imprisonment in feeling and nature.
All of the authors and f ilmmakers I have considered in this book 
contest this basic approach to life and art. As I noted in Chapter 1, the 
contrast between Hans Richter’s understanding of f ilm reception as 
a sensual bond with f ilm’s rhythmic temporality and Wilhelm Wor-
ringer’s def inition of abstraction and empathy with respect to painting 
illustrated that as a temporal and ‘physical’ art form, f ilm broke with a 
contemplative attitude and aligned itself with the spectator’s temporal 
being, her life. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate how Uexküll’s Umwelt theory 
became inspirational for artists and theorists because it provided a way 
to conceive of life as creative engagement with the environment, an 
engagement they then sought to give shape to in art. The turn-of-the-
century discussion of Stimmung as transient, embodied resonance with 
external impressions likewise sought to grasp art’s imbrication in the 
fabric of sensuous experience (Chapter 3). Bazin and Kracauer, each in his 
own way, go even further and ascribe to f ilm a vital aesthetic that does 
not lift the human being out of her imprisonment in nature, but seeks 
to allow her to grapple with nature on a new plane, by acknowledging 
her material existence (Chapter 4). As Kracauer put it, f ilm ‘undermines 
idealist and anthropocentric positions on the level of reception, in the 
2 Hegel, Aesthetics, 49.
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ways it engages the materiality of the spectator—the human being “with 
skin and hair”‘.3
When we relate Kracauer’s and Bazin’s f ilm aesthetics to the philosophy 
of nature and science in Merleau-Ponty’s writings, we effectively f latten 
both the categorical difference between natural expression (phenotype) 
and aesthetic expression. Already in Bergson’s work, we f ind the implicit 
idea of a profound interconnection of nature and culture—that is, the 
historical determination and variability of cognitive processes, nervous 
tissues, bodily formation and comportment in conjunction with cultural 
techniques. Bergson’s ideas reappear in the texts of Walter Benjamin in the 
1920s and 1930s on the innervation of mass media and modern machines. 
The imbrication of nature and culture is also central to French anthropology 
in the 1950s and 1960s, in particular André Leroi-Gourhan’s Gesture and 
Speech from 1964.4 In his account of primordial evolution, Leroi-Gourhan 
asserts that certain mechanical conditions (the freeing of the hands and 
the visibility of the face in particular) guaranteed a certain liberation from 
the environment and the development of what we now call human. Also in 
the 1950s and 1960s, Canguilhem, Raymond Ruyer, and Gilbert Simondon, 
like Merleau-Ponty, reintroduced vitalism into the debates in the history 
and philosophy of science. We should understand their notion of vitalism 
as a kind of post-vitalism, that is, a vitalism independent from the scientif ic 
divide between vitalism and mechanism. Rather than a dogmatic stance, 
vitalism for these thinkers afforded a certain freedom and independence 
from narrow, determinist scientif ic frameworks, a position that empha-
sizes interrelation, connection, creativity, affection, and temporality in 
its approach to problems, questions, and tasks, whether these latter are 
intellectual, emotional, or physical in nature. Just as ‘life’ in this post-war 
lineage is increasingly understood as something relational, rather than as 
an individuating property, vitalism, in this sense also becomes a kind of 
medium, namely one in which, or by means of which, a critical, problem-
oriented and unrestricted approach to the life sciences becomes possible.
As an example of the natural aesthetics, or aesthetics of nature, out-
lined above, let me briefly turn to Kracauer’s discussion of the organizing 
principle of certain f ilms he champions. Like Bazin, Kracauer f inds in 
certain narrative f ilms an arrangement or mode of expression that cor-
responds to f ilm’s aff inity for life, namely, f ilms featuring ‘found stories’ 
3 Hansen, ‘Introduction’, xvii.
4 Though certainly, Claude Lévi-Strauss was an important influence and corollary, too. See 
Lévi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked.
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or ‘episodes’, such as the neorealist f ilms of de Sica, Fellini, or Rossellini. 
What characterizes these narrative forms is a material (biological) structure 
that, like the axolotl or any other living being, comes into being as a result 
of the interaction between internal development and external forces. For 
Kracauer, both found story and episode well up out of the flow of life as 
suggested by the f ilm, and disappear back into it. The found story consists of 
environmental material that temporarily congeals into a narrative—Robert 
Flaherty’s Nanook of the North (1922) is one of Kracauer’s examples—while 
the episode can contain events and situations that are not merely derived 
from the environment and may be contrived; examples of the latter are Mr. 
Hulot’s Holiday (Jacques Tati, 1953), Umberto D., or L’Atalante (Jean Vigo, 
1934). Neither found story nor episode ever ‘develop into a self-contained 
whole’. The found story always remains ‘part and parcel of the raw material 
in which it lies dormant’; it is a momentary crystallization of environmental 
forces and forms, as such, a ‘pattern’ in the water ‘produced by some eddy 
or a breeze’, which constantly seems to ‘dissolve into the environment 
from which it is being distilled’.5 The episode is like ‘a monad or cell’ that 
might combine to form a greater story ‘like the cells of an organism’. Yet 
this story remains open-ended and thus maintains its relationship with the 
flow of life, rather than closing itself off. Each episode, as well as the f ilm 
as a whole, remains ‘porous’, ‘permeable to the flow of life’ out of which it 
rises; as a consequence, the f ilm ‘is full of gaps into which environmental 
life may stream’.6 Kracauer champions these types of f ilm because they 
capture and grasp life not only on the basis of the qualities of the medium 
of f ilm, but also on the basis of their organization. The quality of an organic 
f ilm, in other words, depends not on a closed-off whole that is greater than 
the sum of its parts, but rather on an open ‘aggregate’ that differs from the 
sum of its parts.
The notion of organicity to which both Kracauer and Bazin make 
recourse differs vastly from a traditional understanding of organicism. 
Their conception of organicity has more in common with Deleuze’s (and 
Guattari’s) definition of non-organic life, of the ‘Body without Organs’, than 
classical notions of organicity. One can see a ‘line of f light’ from Kracauer 
and Bazin to Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that ‘[t]he organism is not at 
all the body, the BwO [body without organs]; rather, it is a stratum on the 
BwO, in other words, a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and 
sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labor from the BwO, imposes 
5 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 245-46, 49.
6 Ibid., 252-56.
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upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations, 
organized transcendences’.7 The question remains, though, to what extent 
Deleuze and Guattari’s neologism of the ‘body without organs’ reveals and 
to what extent it conceals. Their new term helps us to highlight a difference 
in thinking about the vital organism, but it also conceals the longer, nuanced 
history of which their radical ‘break’ is a part. It seems hardly coincidental 
that Kracauer, in talking about the found story, takes up the same image that 
Bazin used in ‘De Sica’—and which Bazin drew from Bergson—to describe 
the interaction between organism (story) and environment, where the story 
‘involved the environment instead of being part of it; like a magnet, the 
film’s f ictional core attracts its repertorial elements which group themselves 
accordingly’.8 This open concept of organization operates by means of forces 
that organize matter both inside and outside bodies. What counts is the 
pattern or assemblage this force of affection produces, rather than any 
pre-constituted body.
This emphasis on a pattern of affection governing both f ilm image 
and narrative organization that I distill from Bazin’s and Kracauer’s f ilm 
aesthetics resonates with recent theories of materiality in the humani-
ties that expand upon the ‘bodily turn’s’ focus on the f inite body. These 
theories, in some ways, continue the cine-vitalist strands of thought 
and practice traced in this book. After years of neglect of the body and 
materiality in deconstructivist and poststructuralist theory, in the 1990s 
scholars turned their attention to the role of the body in engaging with 
both media and the immediate environment. In f ilm studies, feminist 
scholarship has played an important part for this turn, shifting its 
attention from psychoanalysis—which had enabled it ‘to reclaim the 
body from the realms of immanence and biology in order to see it as a 
psycho-social product’—to matters of embodiment.9 Linda Williams 
has emphasized that we should understand key f ilm genres—melodrama, 
porn, horror—as ‘body genres’ that make sense of, and with, visceral 
reactions.10 In Vivian Sobchack’s work, Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phe-
nomenology became an important touchstone to understand how the 
spectator’s body and the f ilm body engage one another.11 Laura Marks and 
Jennifer Barker have stressed the corporeal engagement of the spectator 
7 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 159.
8 Kracauer, Theory of Film, 250.
9 Elizabeth Grosz, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Body’, 270. See also Grosz, Volatile Bodies.
10 Linda Williams, ‘Film Bodies’.
11 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye and Carnal Thoughts.
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with the f ilm, in particular the role of the sense of touch.12 How can 
one acknowledge the specif icity of bodies and incorporate it into theory 
without falling back into naturalization and essentialization of the female 
body in particular? Additionally, scholars such as Donna Haraway, Stacey 
Alaimo, Anne Balsamo, and others addressed the fact that the natural 
and cultural determination and potential of specif ic bodies signif icantly 
includes technology as well as bioengineering.13 Work on the posthuman 
condition has also traced the dissolution of the (human) subject and the 
f inite body by interrogating questions of subjectivity, of the relationship 
between humans and animals, the organic and the non-organic, and 
technology and nature.14
In recent years, building on this work, attention has focused on 
describing and carving out new def initions of both matter and affect. 
As the position of the subject and the body have become unstable, so 
has the account of our perception and interaction, including feelings or 
affects. This shift from a ‘bodily turn’ to an ‘affective turn’ thus entails a 
shift of focus from ‘being’ to ‘doing’, a f lattening of differences between 
individuals, species and f inite machines, and an interest in the specif ics 
of materialities, their interactive properties and their dynamics. Vitality 
and technology have become complementary terms, and rather than 
insist on a specif icity of life, theorists including Patricia Clough, Brian 
Massumi, Mark Hansen, and Luciana Parisi have argued for vital qualities 
governing material dynamics—or affections—more generally, a tendency 
Marie-Luise Angerer has described as ‘an enlargement of the purview of 
what is called life: growth, change, development, adaptation, sentience, 
and suffering, these have become (virtually) universal traits . . . What 
would have been dismissed out of hand as pure anthropomorphism 
not too long ago is now in vogue as a critical objection to conceptual 
anthropocentrism.’15
One way of reading this book, then, is as a historical account of what 
has recently gone by the name of ‘vital materialism.’ By joining theory 
and historical context, however, I have sought to stress the co-evolution 
12 Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film; Jennifer Barker, The Tactile Eye.
13 Donna Haraway, Modest_Witness and When Species Meet; Stacy Alaimo, Bodily Natures; 
Anne Balsamo, Technologies of the Gendered Body.
14 For a forceful account of the posthuman that engages with animality, see Cary Wolfe, What 
Is Posthumanism?
15 Marie-Luise Angerer, Ecology of Affect, 21. See Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual; 
Patricia Clough, ‘The Affective Turn’; Mark Hansen,’Feelings without Feelers’; and Luciana 
Parisi, Abstract Sex.
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of media, science, and theories of life (and, by extension, the human)—an 
evolution that places new media in a long line of media.16 Film is not just 
an object that authors such as Epstein, Kracauer, Balázs, or Benjamin think 
about; they recognize its agency in the world, its actions that change and 
reorder our bodies and environments. Technological media—and here I 
concur with new materialism—constitute reality and are not merely tool or 
prosthesis. Karen Barad has captured the idea that ‘distinct agencies do not 
precede, but rather emerge from’, their entanglement and co-constitute one 
another with the neologism ‘intra-action’.17 As much as digital technologies 
and new media have ushered in this thought, I believe that a focus on what 
technologies do, rather than what they are—that is, a shift from ontology 
to agency and relationality—enables a historical account of media to be 
specif ic while nevertheless avoiding essentializing differences between 
old and new media. A conceptual shift away from agents, f inite bodies, 
and technological media as entities also allows us to be more open to the 
idea that (human) life and our environment have been profoundly altered 
in the technological age—historical changes the terms ‘posthuman’ and 
‘Anthropocene’ seek to capture, respectively.18
My invocation of a cinematic vitalism is, in many ways, an attempt to 
carve out how cinema and human beings—spectators, makers, think-
ers—have intra-acted, and how ‘life’ describes that in which both partake, 
the force f ield that continues to reorder the properties, abilities and interac-
tions of both. The aesthetics of the moving image, its f low, its evolving, 
contrapuntal forms, their ‘growth, change, development, adaptation’, the 
‘sentience and suffering’ the images produce—these qualities, to return 
to Angerer’s description of the ‘purview of life’ in recent theory, highlight 
the fact that f ilm aesthetics, as I have historicized it here, describes and 
structures material processes that new materialists and affect theorists have 
more recently sought to grasp as well. With their focus on material affection 
in mind, we can understand better how the vitality of the moving image 
perceived, described, and put to work by f ilm theorists, philosophers, and 
f ilmmakers is less a matter of ontology and more of an activity: this vitality 
outlines a change in perception and possibilities for new (intra-)actions. The 
use of the term ‘life’ by early f ilm theorists signaled the deep disturbance 
16 The term ‘vital materialism’ was coined by Jane Bennett. See Bennett, Vibrant Matter. 
17 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 33.
18 On posthuman, see Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? For a compelling account of what was 
at stake when proclaiming the Anthropocene, see Joanna Zylinska, Minimal Ethics for the 
Anthropocene. 
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created by the encounter with cinema: even more forcefully than other 
technical media before it, it upset the division between individual, living 
autonomy and technical phenomenon.19 By granting the experience of ‘life 
outside itself ’, the cinema created both a new environment for human 
bodies and ushered in a new phenomenal body. Rather than tracing this 
affection or intra-action on a purely conceptual and theoretical level, I 
have sought to focus on several protagonists who framed it in sophisticated 
and innovative ways: Richter, by attempting to orchestrate the affection 
of temporal regimes; Painlevé, by combining f ilm technology, animals, 
scientif ic explanation, and a queer anthropomorphism; Balázs, by thinking 
about the role of f ilm form for the atmospheric entanglement of f ilm and 
spectator; Bazin, by identifying cinematic realism as the mediation between 
our existence and the film world; Kracauer, by further exploring the physical 
connection between spectator and moving image; and so on.
This book thus stresses the extent to which technological media are life 
media, that is, specific milieux that enable (and disable) visceral, emotional, 
and intellectual engagements with the world. In the wake of the dominance 
of digital technologies and virtual realities, scholars have returned to the 
question of the materiality of media, and the terms ‘media ecologies’ as well 
as ‘environmental media’ have become important touchstones to capture 
how the understanding of an agential, affective materiality applies to our 
understanding of media technologies. The notion of media ecologies focuses 
on, in Matthew Fuller’s words, a ‘dynamic system in which any one part is al-
ways multiply connected, acting by virtue of those connections, and always 
variable, such that it can be regarded as a pattern rather than simply as an 
object’.20 These emergent patterns are by no means simply computational, 
however, but rather should be understood in the sense of the vital patterns 
that Bergson, Bazin, and Deleuze describe in their image of a magnetic 
movement organizing iron f ilings. This vitalist understanding of media 
ecologies reaches into Fuller’s language as well, when he seeks to analyze 
‘how elements of complex medial systems ‘cooperate’ to produce something 
more than the sum of their parts’ or how ‘the capacities and behaviors 
of media objects, systems, and dynamics are changed, potentiated, and 
mobilized when brought into abnormal or inappropriately preformatted 
relations to one another’.21 The idea of media as environmental, by contrast, 
19 Friedrich Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter is a forceful account of this history of 
interfaces.
20 Matthew Fuller, Media Ecologies, 4.
21 Ibd., 6, 9.
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considers the way in which the materiality of media is bound up with the 
environment at large. Bazin’s and Kracauer’s emphasis on the material 
connections between spectator and f ilm—for Bazin, via the light reflected 
off objects, impacting the silver nitrate on the plate, and projected onto 
the screen; and for Kracauer, the notion of a spectator who has ‘“sensu-
ous and immediate” contact with “life”‘ in the cinema, experiencing by 
incorporating f ilm images in the manner of ‘blood transfusions’ rather 
than a superf icial encounter—are picked up in the notion of a material 
medium as a ‘living medium’ or ‘mode of being’ and ‘mediation’ as ‘the 
primal connectivity shared by human and nonhuman worlds’, by scholars 
such as Sean Cubitt and John Durham Peters.22 Cubitt, Peters, and others, 
by privileging mediation over communication, are infinitely expanding our 
canon of what constitutes media, including animals, light, clouds, nitrate, 
coal, and water.23 This focus on mediation also highlights how we partake 
in, and depend upon, a multitude of mediations at any given moment, all 
of which come with their own, vastly different temporal and spatial scales, 
from the nanoseconds of computer processes to the melting of glaciers.
If meaning arises from material interactions of all kinds, rather than 
residing as a property in objects, then the domains of the natural sciences 
and the humanities, mathematics and aesthetics, themselves intra-act. 
Important work in the history of science has recently demonstrated the 
malleability of scientif ic questioning and reasoning, the creativity and 
imagination involved in scientif ic theories and worldviews, and thus sci-
ence’s direct partaking in domains usually reserved for the humanities 
(though often it requires the reading of theoretical scientif ic texts by 
humanities scholars to detect this).24 Scientists such as Jean-Henri Fabre, 
Hans Driesch, Claude Bernard, and Jakob von Uexküll, who reflect on the 
philosophical implications of their scientif ic work and who are aware of the 
way scientif ic experimentation intra-acts with worldviews, are therefore 
a crucial component of the probing of life by the images and people in this 
book. Many more cross-connections between science, f ilm and philosophy 
than the ones outlined here exist, creating a dense, co-evolving network. 
The musical principle of counterpoint that became so central as formal 
expression of vitality for Richter and Eggeling, for example, is also picked up 
22 See Bazin, ‘Ontology of the Photographic Image’; Kracauer, Theory of Film, 170, 297; Sean 
Cubitt, Finite Media, 2, 4; John Durham Peters, The Marvelous Clouds, 17.
23 So-called German media theory, following in the footsteps of Friedrich Kittler, has been 
an important theoretical foundation for this expansion of the notion of media. 
24 Great recent examples include Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, and Jimena Canales, 
The Physicist and the Philosopher.
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by Uexküll, who detected in counterpoint the central ‘motif/motive of form 
development’ and the central formula of how structures in nature relate to 
one another: ‘Were the flower not beelike/ And were the bee not flowerlike/ 
The consonance could never work.’25 Meaning arises from the counterpoint 
between an object and a subject, rather than distinct properties. Another 
example of the vital network between disciplines sketched in this book is 
Ludwik Fleck’s theory of the genesis and development of scientif ic facts 
published in 1935. Fleck highlighted how moods (Stimmungen), in particular 
the dominant Stimmung within a given thought collective (i.e., a group of 
researchers agreeing in their goals and methods and thus, ultimately, their 
‘truths’), determine scientific questions, experimental setups, explanations, 
and theses: ‘Cognition [Das Erkennen] modif ies the knower [den Erken-
nenden] so as to adapt him harmoniously to his acquired knowledge [das 
Erkannte]. This situation ensures the harmony within the dominant view 
about the origin of knowledge.’26 Fleck recognized that scientif ic facts are 
the results of dominant, variable moods, and thus not independent, timeless 
entities, but rather social, historical phenomena.
As a f inal example of the arc spanning from this book to contemporary 
theory, and from aesthetics to science, I want to return to Bazin’s and 
Kracauer’s notion of organization. Their opening of the organism to the 
environment currently finds affirmation in the sciences. A branch of biology 
known as ecological developmental biology, for which the axolotl is an 
important model organism, investigates the interactions between genetics 
and environment on an animal’s phenotype and has found many examples 
of variability that seem to confirm Merleau-Ponty’s hunches.27 For Merleau-
Ponty, the axolotl’s organic openness served as an example of the post-war 
dissolution of the contrast between ‘materialism’ and vitalism. Along with 
this dissolution, Merleau-Ponty found a ‘mutation of biological concepts’ 
such as ‘that of behavior, then that of information and communication. 
Introduced at the beginning in order to renew the conception of the animal-
machine (Watson’s psychology without a soul, the nervous system as an 
electronic machine), these notions are [now] charged with a meaning which 
25 Uexküll, A Theory of Meaning, 190.
26 Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, 86-87; Über die Entstehung 
einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache, 114. The German original, by using permutations of the word 
‘erkennen’, expresses the dynamic of ‘cognizing’, ‘cognizer’ and ‘cognized’ much more beautifully 
and poignantly.
27 See, for example, Ehab Abouheif and Gregory A. Wray, ‘Evolution of Development’; and 
Scott F. Gilbert, ‘Ecological Developmental Biology’.
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is no longer mechanical.’28 While I have foregrounded the ambivalence of 
the notion of behavior (which eventually brings Merleau-Ponty to Uexküll in 
his lectures), Merleau-Ponty’s mention of ‘information and communication’ 
also hints at a trajectory that leads, via cybernetics, to a certain neo-vitalism 
in new media and computational discourses, especially around the issue 
of artif icial life and affective computing.29
Cinema and other screen arts have, in recent years, been privileged 
ref lective media (or, to use Benjamin’s term, ‘second technologies’) to 
capture the material intra-action of organisms, technologies, and objects. 
At f irst glance, it might seem as though contemporary global art cinema, 
and the so-called ‘Slow Cinema’ in particular, have simply developed an 
aesthetic of slowness to celebrate cinema as a formal antidote to the fast 
switches of TV programs, computer windows, and cell phone interfaces. 
This would be a story of cinema f inding its uniqueness as medium within 
a fast-paced, distracted, media-saturated society.30 Against this somewhat 
nostalgic image I argue that much of recent art cinema is in fact investigat-
ing the manifoldness of media flows and their adherent temporal and spatial 
orders, not least by disrupting our habitual engagement with the world. 
Films such as Lisandro Alonso’s Liverpool (2008), Nuri Bilge Ceylan’s Once 
Upon a Time in Anatolia (2011), or Cristi Puiu’s The Death of Mr. Lazarescu 
(2006) eschew driven plot lines, dramatic acting and affecting close-ups in 
favor of long shots and long takes, which allow us to observe the behavior 
of characters in very specif ic milieux as though we are watching an axolotl 
learning to swim. The way in which these f ilms affect us, then, is not based 
on identif ication with a specif ic protagonist; rather, it comes from much 
further away, and relates to the affections that attach to the interactions 
in the f ilms: emptied of direct utility and purpose, gestures and actions 
refer us back to the dormant possibilities inherent in all interactions and 
open up ‘our receptivity toward the intensities, atmospheric values, and 
resonances of the moment’, as Lutz Koepnick has put it.31 This unfolding of 
28 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 139-40. 
29 See, for example, Stefan Helmreich, Silicon Second Nature; Richard Doyle also discusses 
Alife in Doyle, Wetwares. On affective computing, see Rosalind Picard, Affective Computing, 
and Luciana Parisi and Erich Hörl, ‘Was heißt Medienästhetik?’.
30 An example of an analysis of slow cinema based on an opposition to contemplation and 
distraction can be found in Ira Jaffe, Slow Movies. Throughout this book, and with the help 
of 1920s thinkers such as Kracauer, Richter, and Benjamin, I have sought to argue against the 
opposition of contemplation and distraction. Many would argue that slow movies in fact foster 
a distracted reception.
31 Lutz Koepnick, On Slowness, 4.
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possibilities allows cinematic mediation to return to us a quality Kracauer 
sought to grasp with the term ‘experience’:
We literally redeem this world from its dormant state, its state of virtual 
nonexistence, by endeavoring to experience it through the camera. And 
we are free to experience it because we are fragmentized. The cinema can 
be defined as a medium particularly equipped to promote the redemption 
of physical reality. Its imagery permits us, for the f irst time, to take away 
with us the objects and occurrences that comprise the flow of material 
life.32
Experience, if we read Kracauer against the background of contemporary 
media theory, need not depend upon a coherent subject and an authentic, 
unmediated encounter; rather, we might grasp the nexus of experience 
and mediation better, especially in our present time, if we understand it 
as instances of understanding, sensing, the vital media flows of which we 
are a part.
32 Kracauer, Theory of Life, 300.
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